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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores the role of community media in democratic civil society governance  
through  an  examination  of  participatory  communications  under  socialist  administrations  in  Latin  
America,  with a  primary focus on the Bolivarian government of Venezuela.  In  so doing, it  seeks to  
establish a theoretical framework that will facilitate publicly supported democratic media systems capable  
of displacing hegemonic commercial and state models. One major axis of investigation is the utility of  
public sphere theory for the structuration of participatory media institutions that function within a system  
of civil society governance.
The work opens by identifying three overlapping discursive modes within which community  
media has been theorized since its emergence in the late 1960s. It then recognizes a shift within the  
literature toward a more explicit engagement with notions of civil society and the public sphere. I argue  
that the benefits of this developing perspective will be augmented by a more nuanced understanding of  
social  governance in  terms of  a multiplicity  of interpenetrated meaning- and decision-making public  
spheres.
I then trace the theory and practice of participatory media in relation to socialist administrations  
in Cuba (1959 – 1989), Chile (1970 - 1973), Nicaragua (1979 - 1990), and Venezuela (1998 – present).  
This historical progression illustrates a weakness in Marxist conceptions of civil society that led to an  
over-reliance  on  the  state-party  apparatus  and  concomitant  limitations  on  the  incorporation  of  
participatory media practice. It also demonstrates that this debility has been increasingly addressed by a  
shift toward a Gramscian perspective of civil society governance as the goal of socialist organization.
The bulk of the dissertation tracks the above patterns as they have played out in Venezuela both  
before and after the establishment of a Bolivarian Republic in 1998. I demonstrate that a burgeoning  
community and alternative media movement emerged in a dialectical relationship with the Bolivarian  
movement. I then argue that the Bolivarian administration's institution of community media according to  
a liberal regulatory framework facilitated explosive growth within the sector that has been followed by a  
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period of relative stagnation due largely to the lack of a consistent and transparent funding model. This  
section concludes with a review of attempts to restructure the legal framework governing the sector, with  
a specific focus on the efforts of community media practitioners to more firmly incorporate civil society  
into  the  decision-making  processes  of  resource  provision  and  content  production  within  a  broader  
institutional framework for civil governance known as the commune system. Particular attention is paid to  
the relationship between the movement and the state during a prolonged attempt to formulate and pass a  
Law of Popular Communication.
This work concludes by contextualizing the Bolivarian community media experience within the  
broader theoretical considerations outlined in the initial chapters. In so doing, I employ the Bolivarian  
vision for civil governance over a publicly funded media system in order to better illustrate a dual-type,  
interpenetrated public sphere model that might facilitate the structuration of democratic media systems  
outside of the context of socialist state governments.
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Introduction: Toward a Participatory Democratic Media System
When people think of a socialist answer they think of bureaucracy and censorship,  
and so far, on the evidence, they are right. Yet I am convinced that the only way in which  
the communications service can be made adequate to the kind of democracy I want to live  
in, what I would define as an educative and a participating democracy, is through the idea  
of a public system. I have no doubts about this, I have gone over it again and again, until I  
can see no other way through. It  is  a plain matter of money, and the amounts of capital  
involved are so large that you have a straight choice. The existing alternatives are these,  
and as I see them, there are no others. You can have control by a minority of very rich men  
whose interest is a communications service which is profitable, which will sell—control of 
the kind we now know. Or, on the other hand some form of public ownership. Now I have  
watched, and whenever I say this people go away. But I do not think we have got to rest  
with the socialist solution—the definition of a public system—that first occurred. I think  
the principle that is important is a quite simple one, but a principle so difficult to conceive  
in this society, in a way, that one almost hesitates to put it forward. It is this: that where the 
means of communication are too expensive to be owned by those who are using them, that  
is  to  say,  all  the  big  communication  services,  television,  broadcasting,  and  all  the big  
papers, they should as means be held in trust by the society for use by the people directly  
concerned in their production. This is a system which I have tried to describe in detail, as  
yet inadequate detail, elsewhere. At the moment, I can only describe what seems to me to  
be the principle. We have to work out a system in which there is a reliance on public  
money, but where this reliance does not bring with it any centralized control of the real  
contributors and producers. I think that it is possible to conceive such a system although all  
the blocks in our mind are against it. The means must be held in trust, and leased to the  
people  using  them,  who  would  constitute  independent  professional  companies  and  
themselves provide the services. The amount of detailed planning that has to be done on  
this  idea  is  enormous.  All  I  can urge  is  the principle.  I  want  objections to  it,  I  want  
criticism of it, but you can be quite sure that in discussion here or anywhere else I shall be  
firm  and  even  rude  about  one  thing:  that  this  is  the  choice,  these  are  the  existing  
alternatives, and there is no point in trying to evade these facts. It is either the system we  
have now, or it is a system of this new public kind.... It is the business of a political party  
to bring all this together, to give it focus and to go over every aspect of it in quite practical  
terms, so that there might be some real prospect of a program of change. I believe that this  
issue is now at the center of change of any kind, and that a radical or socialist party which  
neglects it is simply not living in our actual world.
- Raymond Williams, The Existing Alternatives in Communications, 1962
All too little has changed since the above passage was written over a half century ago. One can  
only imagine that were he still alive, Williams would be yet firmer and ruder in his insistence that there is  
no point in trying to evade these facts: that our media system continues to be controlled by a minority of  
very rich men (they are, indeed, mostly men) whose interest is in profit and capital accumulation; that the  
mention of a socialist system of media continues to trigger fears of bureaucracy and censorship which are  
backed by historical  evidence; that  the political  economy of the media is  increasingly central  to  the  
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prospect of progressive social change; that the basic principle for a democratic alternative is that the  
means of communication must be held publicly yet free from centralized control. 
This is not to say that no advances have been made. Critical accounts of the existing capitalist  
system have proliferated,  with contributions from across  a vast,  interdisciplinary,  and still  expanding  
field of communications research. Among the fruits of these critical accounts is a more thorough analysis  
of existing political economic structures, as well as a deeper awareness of the relationship between those  
structures and the intersecting axes of social identity that determines the possibilities (or lack thereof) for  
what Williams refers to as “an educative and a participating democracy”. Meanwhile, media reform has  
become not only a concern of many civil society organizations but the motivating issue of a movement  
unto itself. If we ask, however, how much has been achieved in the way of a concrete “program of  
change” that would lead to a viable alternative for the structuration of a democratic media system, we  
must  acknowledge  that  the  amount  of  detailed  planning  yet  to  be  accomplished  remains  nearly  as  
enormous as when Williams called plainly for it to be undertaken.
Where in the vast field of communications research can we find a solid basis for this detailed  
planning? Critical accounts point to what must be changed, but they all too rarely suggest specific policies  
and  actions  for  effecting  that  change.  The  subfield  of  community  media  studies,  however,  offers  a  
literature that is directly engaged with actual “on-the-ground” attempts to practice a radically democratic  
form  of  media  production  and  distribution.  Since  its  emergence  as  a  recognized  mode  of  media  
production in the late 1960s, community media has been marked by its emphasis on access, participation,  
and (to a lesser extent) self-management. In recent decades, however, community media theorists have  
rarely sought to extend these principles as the basis for the type of publicly funded but privately held  
national media system that Williams had in  mind. Rather,  community media is  often assumed to be  
inherently localized, if not marginal. This has not, however, always been the case.
In the 1970s and into the 80s, community media (also known as alternative and participatory  
media)  was  frequently  envisioned  as  the  necessary  compliment  to  macro-level  policies  that  would  
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establish democratic public media systems at the national level. This was especially the case in Latin  
America, where the desire to replace capitalist media systems dominated by content from the United  
States, in conjunction with the obvious flaws of the centralized socialist model instituted in Cuba, led  
theorists to pursue alternative approaches. Much of this work was conducted in relation to the movement  
for a New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO) that developed within the Non-
Aligned  Movement.  Socialist  administrations  in  Chile  and  Nicaragua  provided  opportunities  to  
experiment with and study these alternatives. 
With the decline of the NWICO movement in the mid-1980s and the seeming inevitability of  
neoliberal  policies  in  the  90s,  the  incorporation  of  participatory  media  into  macro-level  policy  
frameworks diminished considerably. Instead, community media was most commonly framed in terms of  
development, where the emphasis was generally on empowering individuals and groups at the local level,  
as  opposed to  changing the structure of national and international media systems, or even achieving  
consistent modes of alternative content production.  There was,  during this  period,  a  decided  lack of  
political  economic  analysis,  with  one  result  being  a  tacit  acceptance  that  funding  for  participatory  
development communications would be provided as grants for specific projects, generally from non- or  
inter-governmental organizations. The question of long-term sustainability went largely unaddressed.
Following  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  community  media  studies  shifted  its  frame  from  
development toward civil society media, partly in response to the emphasis on “independent” media that  
accompanied the upsurge in “anti-globalization” protests in the global North. Concomitantly, community  
media has increasingly been considered within the context of public sphere theory, especially in terms of  
counterpublics. This recontextualization has opened up new possibilities for engaging community media  
as the basis for expansive democratic media systems, but theorists have yet to fully engage them.
This dissertation attempts to do so by examining the role of community media in the Bolivarian  
Republic  of  Venezuela,  which  was  established  upon  the  institution  of  a  new  national  constitution  
following the  election of  Hugo Chávez  to  the  presidency of  that  country  in  1998.  In  2005,  Chávez  
3
publicly  affirmed  that  his  Bolivarian  revolution  was  socialist  in  nature.  He  explicitly  referred  to  a  
socialism for the twenty-first century in which decentralized democratic participation is prioritized above  
the  authority  of  a  centralized  state-party  apparatus.  In  this  context,  the  Bolivarian  state  has  offered  
considerable support to Venezuela's alternative and community media movement, with the explicit goal of  
creating a national system of community media. One goal of this text is  to narrate  a history of this  
movement and its relationship to the Bolivarian state. In so doing, it will highlight issues of particular  
importance, including funding, institutional structure, and autonomy.
Another goal of the present text is to contextualize the Venezuelan experience within the broader  
history of participatory media and socialism in Latin America. This will allow us to identify long term  
trends in Latin American socialist media theory and identify aspects of the Bolivarian experience that are  
distinct  from previous  examples.  I  hope  to  make  clear  that  over  the  last  fifty  or  so  years  socialist  
communications  theory  in  Latin  America  has  steadily  shifted  away  from  centralized,  vanguardist  
approaches and toward a participatory ethos that is not only in line with but results from a dialectical  
relationship with the work of community media theorists and practitioners over the same time frame.  
Illustrating this point clearly will require recognizing the shift toward a Gramscian perspective on the role  
of civil society within socialist movements and systems of governance. We will explore, in other words,  
the  similarities  between  this  Gramscian  socialist  perspective  and  the  shift  within  community  media  
studies toward theorizing participatory media as a component of a truly democratic civil society.
A final goal of this work is to draw out lessons from the Bolivarian experience with community  
media that might be applied elsewhere, including countries where state support is much less than in the  
Venezuelan case or absent altogether. In other words, I seek to extract from the socialist framework an  
understanding of the structural basis for a participatory and democratic civil society that will lead to  
organizational models for community media which can be applied, even if only in a partial manner, within  
the context of liberal media policies and capitalist economic systems. These organizational models must  
be  practicable  within  the  contemporary  liberal  framework  of  civil  society  while  simultaneously  
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suggesting  and  leading  toward  the  development  of  a  more  integrated,  participatory,  and  sustainable  
system. In that sense, they must be inherently scalable.
The development of scalable organizational models that will position community media as the  
basis for a democratic media system requires a more nuanced conception of the public sphere than the  
public / counterpublic model that currently informs community media studies. One component of the  
present  work  is  therefore  the  description  of  dual-type,  modular,  and  interpenetrated  framework  for  
conceptualizing the role of public sphere communication within a democratic society.  Central  to this  
framework is the distinction between meaning- and decision-making public spheres, the interaction of  
which  is  determinative  of  the  democratic  nature  of  social  communications.  The  articulation  of  this  
framework, which is only partially realized in the present text, draws on Bolivarian attempts to structure a  
democratic  system for channeling public funds for participatory media through an apparatus of  civil  
society  governance.  Our  analysis  of  these  efforts  will  reveal  that  they  already  contemplate  an  
interpenetrated framework of meaning- and decision-making public spheres, although these are of course  
not theorized in such terms.
Scope and Methodology
Methodologically,  much  of  this  work  proceeds  from  historical  analysis.  My  discussion  of  
participatory  media  under  twentieth  century  socialist  administrations  in  Latin  America,  as  well  the  
development of community media studies generally, will draw on secondary literature. So too will my  
account of the development of alternative and community media in Venezuela prior to and during the  
Bolivarian revolution led by Hugo Chávez. Much of this secondary literature is unavailable in english  
translation.
While the body of academic work focused on community media in the Bolivarian Republic of  
Venezuela continues to grow, it is as of yet insufficient to allow for a thorough and nuanced understanding  
of the relationship between the alternative and community media movement and the state, between policy  
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and practice, and between Bolivarian community media and the participatory media initiatives of previous  
Latin American socialist movements. This work does not wholly fill that void, but it attempts to address  
the above points by supplementing secondary literature with knowledge acquired during eight months of  
field research in Venezuela during 2009 and 2011.
I chose to focus my field research on community television for three reasons. First, because the  
significant growth of the Venezuelan community media sector since the Bolivarian revolution made a  
comprehensive approach daunting, if not impossible. By concentrating on a single medium, I was able to  
more closely follow individual narrative threads within the context of a broader historical tapestry. I was  
also  able  to  more  directly  link  policy  decisions  to  practical  outcomes  and  vice  versa.  Second,  my  
professional background in video production enabled a more ready grasp of the aesthetic, technical, and  
organizational considerations facing community television producers. Additionally, linking my academic  
research to my personal passions facilitated a level of engagement that insured the work against  the  
sometimes tedious and often frustrating process of conducting field research.
My third reason for focusing on community television is perhaps the most important. In terms of  
the resources required, whether measured by technology or human labor, television is by far a more  
demanding  medium  than  print  or  radio,  which  are  also  among  the  most  prominent  media  in  the  
Venezuelan  community  media  sector.  As  such,  television  production  and distribution  impels  a  more  
explicit engagement with the daunting issue of resource allocation and sustainability. In the Venezuelan  
context, in which most community media practitioners come from working and/or impoverished sectors,  
these exigencies have led to a heightened awareness of the need for state support and the effects of state  
policy on civil governance and daily practice. My hope, which I believe to have been borne out by the  
research process, was that a focus on community television would lay bare the importance of structural  
and organizational considerations for the sustainability of participatory democratic media production.
While my focus has been on television, I have endeavored to present my findings within the  
context of Bolivarian community media more generally.  Even had I  not specifically  intended it,  this  
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would have been difficult to escape. As the following chapters will make clear, the history of community  
television in Venezuela is intimately bound up in a broader history of participatory media, such that the  
former cannot be told independently of the latter. In this context, while certain technical requirements are  
particular to the medium of television or pair it closely with radio broadcasting, Bolivarian community  
television  producers  view  themselves  as  members  of  a  social  movement  that  unites  all  formats  of  
community media. It therefore makes little sense to discuss their lobbying efforts or state policies on  
community television in isolation. Thus, while my focus on community television has brought certain  
issues into greater relief and allowed for a more concise historical narration, the present work nonetheless  
offers a relatively comprehensive and general overview of the history of community media in Venezuela  
and its development in relation to the Bolivarian administration.
At the outset of this field research, my hope was to make use of my professional background in  
video  production  in  order  to  develop  volunteer  working  relationships  with  multiple  Venezuelan  
community television stations and thus base my findings on ample participant observation. This course  
proved difficult and only partially successful. Though I was able to develop friendly relationships with  
community television practitioners, the type of working relationship that I had in mind developed in few  
cases and even then only weakly. My conclusion is that there were two principal causes for this difficulty.
First, the ideological commitments and historical perspective of many members of the Bolivarian  
community media sector are such that they viewed my presence with considerable circumspection and  
occasionally outright hostility. Many believed that, as an inquisitive United States citizen with a stated  
intention of investigating their organizational structures and production methods, I might be operating in a  
clandestine manner on behalf of the US Central Intelligence Agency. Given the duplicitous history of US  
initiatives across Latin America and Venezuela's highly polarized political climate, these suspicions were  
hardly baseless. They were expressed even where I was received amicably and given largely unobstructed  
access to the operations of community television stations. At other sites they contributed to significant  
restrictions on my access and limited cooperation on the part of certain practitioners. In one case, which I  
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had initially believed to be my best prospect for a warm and collaborative relationship, such suspicions  
led to my dismissal under pretenses that I learned only later to be false.
Beyond this obstacle, I felt that my participation in the work of Venezuelan community television  
stations  was  limited  by  their  organizational  structure.  As  will  be  discussed  at  some  length  below,  
Venezuelan community media outlets continue to be shaped by limited access to resources. One result is  
that, especially in the case of television where production requires greater amounts of time and costly  
equipment than in the case of radio and print outlets, community media outlets are largely maintained by  
a core group of committed practitioners who have developed systems of operation, often informal, that  
are not easily adaptable to the ready inclusion of a trained and experienced outsider. They are, rather, set  
up to offer basic training to inexperienced community members who might work their way into the core  
group over  a  period of  years,  or  to  facilitate  the production of  content  by  small  community groups  
operating  semi-autonomously.  Thus,  even  in  those  cases  where  I  was  welcomed  and  provided  with  
relatively unobstructed access, opportunities for contributing my labor to content production were limited.
This is  not to  say that participant observation is not a methodological basis  for the research  
presented here. On several occasions I was invited to operate a camera, contribute photographs, assist in  
editing, or appear as a guest on television programs. Additionally, I was presented with two unexpected  
opportunities to participate in the Bolivarian process of community media policy formation. In July of  
2009 I was allowed to participate in the first National Congress of Bolivarian Community Media, held in  
San Francisco,  in  the state  of  Zulia.  To the best  of  my knowledge,  I  was  the only non-Venezuelan  
participant in that event. As will be discussed below, this conference was an early step in a long process  
by which the Bolivarian alternative and community media movement sought to institute a new legal  
framework for the community media sector. I participated in one of two working groups focused on  
policy proposals related to the question of sustainability.
Upon my return to Venezuela in 2011, this process had advanced considerably,  such that the  
National Assembly had begun to facilitate the final consolidation of the movement's various proposals  
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into a single draft bill. In keeping with the government's commitment to increasing popular participation  
in the legislative process, the Assembly sponsored a series of regional conferences designed to refine  
existing proposals and generate new ideas. I was able to attend four of these conferences and participate  
in working groups focused on sustainability and participatory democracy. While my own opinions, to the  
limited extent that I offered them, were respectfully taken into consideration, these conferences were of  
course most fruitful for me in that they provided an invaluable opportunity to understand the priorities of  
community media practitioners and to gauge popular reactions to a variety of policy proposals.
While my research plan had always contemplated informal and unstructured interviews, restricted  
opportunities for participant observation at the level of media production led me to rely more heavily on  
this methodology. During the course of my visits to various community television stations, I sought to  
conduct informal interviews with both core practitioners and participating community members, but the  
great majority of the interviews I conducted belong to the former category. These interviews ranged from  
a single brief and unrecorded session to multiple sessions totaling as many as seven hours of recorded  
audio. Through them, I gained invaluable historical information and anecdotes that illustrated the context  
and outcomes of the theoretical and policy considerations which motivated my investigation. Many of  
these  interviews  are  cited  below,  but  all  of  them  contributed  to  the  comprehensive  background  
understanding that has informed my findings and conclusions. 
Chapter Structure
The initial chapter of this work offers a historical overview of the subfield of community media  
studies that sets up the theoretical considerations to be addressed in the conclusion. In tracing the roots of  
the practice and theorization of community media, we will identify three discursive modes by which  
participatory media has been understood and communicated since the 1960s. Though there is considerable  
overlap  between  these  three  discursive  modes,  their  development  and  application  were  shaped  by  
historical, geographic, and political specificities that led to significant differences of perspective. While  
9
one of these modes,  which I  refer to as “counterhegemonic”,  is  perhaps best  suited for  the political  
economic perspective that has guided this work, we will see that none of them has been wholly suitable  
for the type of systemic analysis and planning in which I am interested. As signaled above, this approach  
requires a more explicit engagement with the notion of civil society governance and the structure of a  
democratic public sphere. In chapter one we will see that over the last decade or so community media  
theorists have begun to address these issues with greater clarity, but that significant work remains. The  
chapter thus concludes with an attempt to sketch the outlines of that work.
Chapter  two  begins  with  a  general  discussion  of  Marxist  perspectives  on  revolution,  
communication, and the role of civil society in a socialist society. In this we will be guided by Gouldner's  
(1980) distinction between Scientific and Critical Marxisms, as well as his identification of civil society  
as a particular blind spot even for the latter category. This will lead us to recognize the importance of  
Gramsci's call for socialist revolution driven by an organized civil society movement and the aspiration  
for  a  system  of  democratic  civil  governance.  This  Gramscian  notion  of  a  “civil  state”  will  thus  
contextualize  our  subsequent  analysis  of  the  role  of  participatory  media  in  relation  to  three  Latin  
American socialist administrations during the latter half of the twentieth century: Cuba (1959 - present),  
Chile (1970 - 73), and Nicaragua (1978 – 1990). We will see that the historical record demonstrates that  
participatory media has been one expression of a general turn within Latin American socialist thought  
toward social movements representing a multiplicity of popular identities (as opposed to a more narrow  
emphasis on workers) and a minimization of the role  played by the state  in  a socialist  participatory  
democracy. We will also see, however, that the particular contexts of the socialist administrations under  
consideration prevented a robust implementation of participatory media at a systemic level.
The  final  three  chapters  of  this  work  address  the  particularities  of  participatory  media  in  
Venezuela  within  the  theoretical  and  historical  context  described  above.  Chapter  three  explores  the  
development of the alternative and community media movement in Venezuela prior to the election of  
Chávez in 1998. On the one hand it parallels the general development of participatory media in Latin  
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America, while on the other it has been significantly shaped by the particularities of Venezuela's political  
and economic history. Most importantly, we will see that a failure to incorporate popular civil society  
governance into Venezuela's corporatist version of liberal representative democracy, especially in the face  
of long term economic crisis, opened space for more radically progressive political movements, generally,  
and for the radicalization of the alternative and community media movement, specifically. While many  
accounts of community media in Venezuela take the election of Chávez as their point of departure, our  
analysis will demonstrate that the emergence of state support for the sector was the result of a social  
movement rooted in decades of increasingly concerted action that produced a dialectical interaction with  
the Bolivarian political movement as it emerged in the 90s.
Chapter four examines the period following the election of Chávez. We will trace the continually  
dialectical  interchange  between civil  society  actors  and  the  state  by  focusing  on  decisive  moments,  
including  the  explicit  inclusion  of  community  media  in  the  2000  Law  of  Telecommunications,  the  
adoption of a concomitant set of regulations in 2001, and the role of community media during and after  
the attempted coup of 2002. We will also describe an important tension between two factions of the  
alternative and community media movement, one of which  adopted a more liberal approach and the other  
of which demonstrated a more radical propensity. This chapter concludes with a discussion of how the  
legal  legitimation  of  community  media  according  to  the  liberal  approach,  in  conjunction  with  state  
resource provision, facilitated the explosive growth of the sector.
Chapter  five  opens  with  an  examination  of  the  shortcomings  of  the  institutionalized  liberal  
approach that  led to  stagnation within  the  community media sector,  both  in  terms of  the  growth  of  
officially recognized outlets and in the productive capacity of those that had already been recognized. The  
principal focus of this discussion concerns the lack of a consistent and transparent mechanism for the  
funding of community media outlets. One effect of this situation has been that the amount and quality of  
community  media  content,  as  well  as  the  level  of  community  participation  in  its  production  and  
distribution, have been severely curtailed. Even during the best of times, the unpredictability of state  
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funding has made it very difficult for community outlets to maintain consistent operational patterns, much  
less to execute plans for growth. In worse moments, even some of the most active and dedicated outlets  
have seen their operations grind to a halt. Another effect of the discrepancy between the liberal regulatory  
model adopted in  2001 and the actual  practice of state  resource provision has been the exposure of  
Bolivarian community media outlets to charges of dependency and bias.
Chapter five demonstrates how the above deficiencies have led the Bolivarian alternative and  
community media movement to push for a restructuration of the legal framework governing the sector.  
Throughout this process, community media practitioners have sought to more firmly incorporate civil  
society governance into the decision-making processes of resource provision and content production. We  
will examine how resulting proposals have been tailored to a more general Bolivarian impulse toward  
civil society governance that is very much in line with the previously discussed reorientation of socialist  
thought  and  organization  in  Latin  America.  The  most  significant  of  these  proposals,  the  ultimately  
unsuccessful 2011 draft bill for a Law of Popular Communication, will be discussed in considerable detail  
in order to describe how it was meant to fit into a broader institutional framework for civil governance,  
known  as  the  commune  system,  that  has  been  most  conspicuously  manifested  in  the  creation  of  
“communal councils” charged with allocating public funds according to the collective desires of local  
community members. 
Our detailed analysis of the 2011 draft bill and its relation to the commune system will provide  
the  basis  for  our  concluding  discussion,  in  which  we  will  attempt  to  contextualize  the  Bolivarian  
community media experience within the theoretical considerations that we will have set up in chapters  
one and two. We will, in other words, employ the Bolivarian vision for civil governance over a publicly  
funded media system in order to better illustrate a dual-type, interpenetrated public sphere model. In  
actuality, our conclusion is but a starting point for the development of this theoretical structure and its  
application for the structuration of the type of democratic media system called for by Raymond Williams  
over half a century ago. My hope is that the principles expressed herein can begin to guide civil society  
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organization and activity in support of this goal far beyond the context of socialist state governments,  
including in such contexts where state support is restricted to traditional liberal models of alternative  
media or is even more minimal.
Like Williams, I readily admit that my attempt to describe the workings of such a system in detail  
is “as yet inadequate”. Nonetheless, I believe it to represent an advance that is in line with the best of  
existing scholarship in the subfield of community media studies. I also believe it capable, at least in a  
future iteration, of shifting the locus of that subfield from its unjustly peripheral status within the larger  
field of critical communications research. Most importantly, I consider it a contribution to the detailed  
planning that Williams rightly identified as necessary to defining and constructing a viable system of truly  
democratic  media  that  is  subject  neither  to  the  consolidated  control  of  market  players  nor  to  the  
centralized control of the state, but to the decision-making capacity of an empowered and active civil  
society.
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Chapter 1: Community Media Studies, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere
Alternative,  participatory,  and community-oriented media production has expanded consistently  
since the late 1940s, although a related body of scholarly work only began to emerge in the 1970s. By the  
end of that decade the basic principles of community media - access, participation, and self-management -  
had been well articulated, yet scholars have since been unable to construct a shared theoretical framework  
within which to apply them. As a result, practical and (especially) policy recommendations have remained  
tentative.
Howley (2010) has aptly noted two factors that have principally contributed to the “theoretical  
underdevelopment common to community media studies”. One is varying contexts - “the particular and  
distinctive  use  of  various  technologies  in  disparate  geographic  and  cultural  settings”  (15).  Beyond  
technology, geography, and culture, however, differing political economic contexts have produced one of  
the most significant cleavages within the subfield. One trajectory of community media studies emerged  
from within development communications theory, where the primary focus has been on post-colonial  
society in the global South. Here community media was caught up in considerations of economic growth  
models, transnational information flows, (neo)imperialism, and socialist revolution. Scholarship focused  
on alternative and community media in the global North, on the other hand, was more commonly situated  
within considerations of liberal representative democracy and identity politics. This is not to say that  
research and practice within these two contexts were not mutually influential; they most certainly were.  
Nonetheless, as I hope to indicate below, contextual differences made it more difficult for scholars to pin  
down the shared theoretical concerns that united them.
Howley’s second factor is “a lack of definitional precision” ( ibid.). Probably no other subfield of 
communications research has had as much difficulty in defining its object of inquiry as community media 
studies. Discussion has primarily revolved around three potential descriptors for the category of media in  
question: participatory, alternative, and community. None of these has been deemed wholly  sufficient. 
White (1994) describes the concept of participation as “kaleidoscopic[,] … fragile and elusive” (16), and  
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Gumucio  (2001)  notes  that  participatory  communication  “lacks  an  accurate  definition  that  could  
contribute to a better understanding of the notion” (8). Howley (2002) and Carpentier et al. (2003) refer  
respectively to community media as a “notoriously vague” (12) and “highly elusive” (51) term. Atton  
(2002) confesses that the phrase “alternative media” can have “no meaningful definition” (9) and notes  
that Abel (1997, cited in Atton) has found it “so elastic as to be devoid of virtually any significance” (14).  
Downing (2001) finds the very notion of community to be “fuzzy” (39) and that of alternative media to be  
“almost oxymoronic ... [since e]verything, at some point, is alternative to something else”. He therefore  
tags on the “extra designation  radical” yet notes that “even here we need to make some preliminary  
qualifications” (ix, original emphasis). A long list of similar citations could be built. Some scholars have  
floated  alternative  terms,  such  as  “community  communication”  (Schulman  1992),  “citizens’ media”  
(Rodriguez 2001), and “rhizomatic media” (Carpentier et al. 2003), and several have posited that since no  
definitional terminology can be adequate, the simultaneous employment of a multiplicity of perspectives  
is in order (cf. Dervin & Huesca 1999, Servaes 1999, Carpentier et al. 2007). 
Rather than jumping into this morass, we should note that the debate over what exactly community  
(or alternative, participatory, etc.) media is has partially obscured a more fruitful discussion about what  
community media  does - or, at least,  should do. Toward this end, we will attempt to accomplish three  
goals in this chapter. First, we will trace the history of community media studies through three distinct but  
overlapping modes of theorizing media production outside of dominant systems. Second, we will show 
that over the previous decade or so scholars have begun to reconcile these three discursive modes by  
increasingly situating community media studies within the framework of civil  society and the public  
sphere. This is a welcome and promising shift in emphasis, but much remains to be worked out. Our third  
goal, therefore, is to sketch a path forward by suggesting the  fundamental elements for a heterarchic 
public sphere theory of participatory media.
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Three Early Community Radio Stations and Three Modes of Community Media Discourse
Academic  histories  of  community  media  generally  trace  its  emergence  to  radio  stations  that  
appeared in the late 1940s and early 1950s: Radio Sutatenza in Colombia, miners’ radio in Bolivia, and  
Pacifica Radio in California.1 Beyond serving as chronological entry points, these experiences provide a  
helpful heuristic schema for three overlapping but distinct modes of thinking about community media that  
would later become visible  in the scholarly literature.  When José Salcedo, a Roman Catholic priest,  
founded Radio Sutatenza in 1947, his primary goal was to broadcast instructional material to the peasants  
of his rural parish. Sutatenza subsequently grew into a national network that produced and broadcast not  
only educational material, but also news and cultural programming. Although community participation  
decreased as the network expanded in scope, Radio Sutatenza sought to maintain the concept of adult  
education that had inspired it and which emphasized “the need to help people to understand their own  
responsibility for improvement, to recognize their own potential for progress, and to know the value of  
their  own  resources”  (Gumucio  2001,  31). 2 For  our  heuristic  purposes,  Radio  Sutatenza  therefore  
represents community media as a means of fostering participatory development. In this mode of thinking, 
the impulse for community media often comes from outside the community (in this case, the church) and  
the goals (at least in the short- to mid-term) generally relate to improving quality of life considerations  
within a pre-existent institutional framework.
The loose network of radio stations that began in Catavi in 1949 and eventually grew to 26 stations  
across the Bolivian highlands resulted from a quite distinct set of concerns. Here the primary goal was to  
unify and strengthen the social  power of the miners’ unions.  The radio stations were funded by the  
1 The  overlapping  nature  of  alternative  and  community  media  makes  historical  treatment  problematic.  18th 
century pamphleteering,  19th century labor  union  presses,  and  early 20th  century  amateur  radio operators, 
among many other examples, certainly merit consideration within a historical approach to alternative media (cf. 
Armstrong 1981, 33-40; Downing 2001, 143-157),  and there is validity to investigating the history of local 
newspapers from a community  perspective (cf. Janowitz 1967 [1952]). As our interest here is in tracking the 
theoretical development of what would become community media studies, beginning with the post-WWII period 
is sufficient.
2 For more on Radio Sutatenza, see Torres (1961), Musto (1969), Ahmed & Coombs (1975), Pareja (1982), Fraser 
& Restrepo-Estrada (1998), and Gumucio (2001, 41-46).
16
mineworkers themselves, who donated a percentage of their salary, and they were “permanently open to  
participation” by workers and residents of “nearby peasant communities … whenever people needed to  
express themselves on any issue affecting their lives” (Gumucio 2001, 34). The miners’ stations were  
endogenous organizations, entirely owned and managed by the communities that they served. 3 Among 
their primary functions were training local journalists and reporting political and other news from the  
perspective of  the workers  and peasants.  This  placed them at  odds with  the country’s  elite  political  
establishment and, especially during periods of military domination of the state,  confrontations often  
became violent. During these crises the stations would link together in networked broadcasts, with the  
physical premises “defended to the death by the workers…. Some of the stations were destroyed six or  
seven times by the army in their lifetime” (33, 35). Within our heuristic schema, Bolivian miners’ radio  
represents community media as a means of fostering  counter-hegemonic liberation.4 In this  mode of 
thinking, community media is properly an endogenous activity whose organizational structure enables  
sustainable, democratic self-management wherein all power rests with the community. While this may  
ultimately  serve  the  same  set  of  quality  of  life  considerations  emphasized  within  the  participatory  
development model, the means of achieving them are much more radical in nature and involve not only a  
redistribution of power within society, but a total restructuring of communicative (and other) institutions. 5
Though distinct, the two previous examples both represent interventions within a rural population  
of impoverished and largely illiterate peasants and laborers. It should come as no surprise therefore that  
the founders  of Pacifica radio,  which arose during California’s  post-WWII population and economic  
3 Radio Pío XII in Llallagua, was established by “a group of Catholic priests” in the 1950s and eventually “moved 
so close to the miners’ community, that it joined the network of union radio stations” (Gumucio 2001, 15).
4 For more on Bolivian miners’ radio, see Schmucler & Encinas (1982), Gumucio (1982, 1983, 1989), CIMCA 
(1989), Kuncar Camacho (1989), O’Connor (1990, 2004),  Huesca (1995, 1996), Camacho (2000) and Herrera 
Miller (2006).
5 The difference between the development and the counter-hegemonic modes is illustrated by the 1960 evaluation 
of Radio Sutatenza conducted by Camilo Torres, a priest and sociologist. He found Sutatenza to be “demagogic 
and harmful for the peasants[,] … arguing that the campaigns of Radio Sutatenza against communism incited 
hate and violence” (Gumucio 2001, 31; see Torres 1961). Torres’ support for liberation theology and Marxism 
eventually  led him to join the National  Liberation Army [Ejercito  de Liberación Nacional /  ELN],  one of 
Colombia’s guerrilla militias.
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booms,  operated  according  to  a  quite  different  set  of  considerations.  In  1949,  when  KPFA began  
broadcasting, the United States was in the throes of the Cold War and the beginning of the second Red  
Scare. Pacifica’s founders, some of them conscientious objectors during the war and “committed to a  
Quaker  variety  of  pacifism” (Downing 2001,  325),  were  inspired  to  act  by  an  increasingly  militant  
climate of indirect and overt media censorship that would reach its apotheosis (or nadir) in the form of  
McCarthyism. The station’s “committed First Amendment liberalism” (330) was a reaction to political  
constraints manifested not only by State officials, but also by “the intrusive, repetitious and in other ways  
offensive  commercialism  common  in  American  radio”.  Lewis  Hill,  who  was  principal  among  the  
founders,  “believed radio and press  should not be run by entrepreneurs  motivated by profits,  but by  
journalists  and  artists  whose  motives  would  be  the  most  objective  and  enlightening  programming  
possible” (Stebbins 1969, cited in Downing 2001, 326). Thus, although the station was funded by its  
listeners and adopted an “experimental policy of paying all members [i.e. workers] equally and of having  
majority votes on programming” (330), the project’s goals were less about representing the experiences  
and knowledge of  a specific community via  their  direct  participation than airing a  set  of views not  
otherwise available to the general population. These views centered on “peace, social justice, promotion  
of the labor movement and support of the arts” (Stebbins, cited in Downing 2001, 326), but the station’s  
commitment to liberal plurality meant that prominent conservative figures of the era were also given  
airtime. While community access was always prioritized, in its early days, at least, Pacifica’s vision was  
arguably as close to the European public service broadcasting model as it  was to that of community  
media.  Later  on  –  partly  as  a  result  of  a  commitment  to  providing  access  to  all  –  the  station's  
programming took a more radical turn (330-343). 6
In any case, for the purposes of our tripartite heuristic, KPFA represents community media as a  
means  of  fostering  alternative  discourse  within  a  liberal  representative  democracy .  In  this  mode of 
6 For more on Pacifica, see Armstrong (1981, 74-76), Land (1999), Lasar (2000), Dunaway (2005),  and Rennie 
(2006, 63-65).
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thinking, community media is primarily concerned with ensuring that a particular range of repressed  
and/or  minority  viewpoints  are  available  within  a  society’s  political  and  cultural  discourse.  Media  
production in this mode may or may not be organized in order to maximize the participation of a specific  
community. Moreover, to the extent that a specific community is represented or addressed, it is more  
likely to be understood as a community of interest than of geography. 7
To be  clear,  each  of  these  three  modes  of  conceptualizing  community  media  -  participatory  
development,  counter-hegemonic  liberation,  and  alternative  discourse  within  a  liberal  representative  
democracy - encompasses a range of possibilities that are only thinly represented by the above examples.  
Moreover, there is a good deal of overlap between them. This is why they have remained constituents of  
community media studies even as their co-presence has been a cause of continual theoretical confusion.  
As we shall see, the emphasis of one or another of these modes by practitioners and researchers has had  
less to do with the particular medium under discussion, the internal organizational model employed, or  
the specific content produced than with the political economic context, on the one hand, and the desired  
political outcome, on the other.
The “Golden Era” of Community Media Experimentation
Community media (and related) initiatives remained relatively scarce during the two decades that  
followed the establishment of the community radio initiatives discussed above. A slow acceleration of  
activity, however, led to a relative boom period in the 1970s. During the 1950s and 60s, at least in the  
wealthier  countries  of  the North,  growth  was most  visible  in  the  underground and alternative press. 
Alternative periodicals that appeared in the 1950s in the United States  hewed to the more traditional 
journalistic model – in terms of both content, organization, and financing - of the pre-war era alternative  
press. In the more overtly politicized climate of North America and Europe during the 1960s and 70s,  
7 To  the  extent  that  production  within  this  mode  is  organized  according  to  hierarchical  and/or  professional 
divisions of labor, it falls further outside of the definition of  community media altogether and becomes more 
properly an instance of merely alternative media. This is one of the primary tensions leading to the definitional 
paralysis of the subfield discussed above. Again, the heuristic offered here is designed to move us away from 
such strict definitional boundaries and toward a theoretical framework predicated on functional possibilities.
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however,  titles  and organizational/financing models multiplied rapidly. 8 In the UK, the Federation of 
Writer Workers' and Community Publishers formed in 1976 “to co-ordinate and encourage the growing  
numbers of organizations publishing work written by working class people” (Lewis 1984, 104). Around  
the same time, as photocopying technology became more widespread, the punk fanzine spread throughout  
the US and UK (Atton 2002, 57).
Small-scale alternative press activity in the post-colonial states of the South is much less evident.  
This may be due in part to lower literacy levels and access to resources, though it is probable that many  
publications were not well preserved or documented; production certainly occurred in relation to minority  
political  movements  and  parties.  Mattelart  (1983)  has  cautioned  that  “[a]lthough  there  is  a  relative  
absence of historical work on the workers' press in … peripheral countries, it should not be too rapidly  
deduced that this history does not exist” (35). 9  In Chile during the early 1970s, journalism students from  
at  least  two  public  universities  began  collaborative  community  journalism  projects  with  workers,  
peasants, and impoverished urban residents (Mattelart 1971, 8; Henfrey & Sorj 1977, 157).
As for radio, commercially motivated pirate broadcasters in Scandinavia and the UK broke some  
ground in the 1950s and 60s, and politically motivated pirates forced regulatory changes in Italy and  
France during the 70s (Rennie 2006, 79-81). While community radio in the UK was largely sidelined in  
favor of local public-service and commercial models, community-oriented radio workshops and recording  
studios made use of the local stations to distribute their productions. 10 Italian Supreme Court decisions in  
1974 and 1976 led to a largely deregulated environment, which gave Italy the (by far) highest  radio  
station density in the world as of 1979, though only one-quarter of the stations were run as non-profits  
and those exhibited various degrees of community involvement. Sweden's public service broadcasting  
8 For histories of the alternative press in the North, see Glessing (1970), Lewis (1972), Woodsworth (1972), Spiers 
(1974), Watson (1979), Armstrong (1981), Kessler (1984), Lewis (1984, 103-106), Kruchkow & Johnson (1986), 
Fountain (1988), Kunoff (1988), Dickinson (1997), and McMillian (2011). Guides and directories include 
Woodsworth (1972), Peattie (1975), Case (1984), and Kunoff (1988).
9 For example, on the workers press in Mexico up to 1970, see Bringas & Mascareño (1979).
10 Proposals for community radio in the UK appeared as early as 1965, but the eventual implementation of 
independent local radio in the 1970s (carried out partly in response to the pirates) followed a commercial model 
(Stoller 2010, 155-56; Beaud 1980, 5). See also Partridge (1982) and Hind & Mosco (1985).
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authority created a Neighborhood Radio Committee that began renting transmission time to local groups  
on 16 different stations in 1979. Unlicensed “free radio” stations began to appear in Belgium in 1978,  
many  of  them  “set  up  by  informal  militant  groups  contesting  local  issues  connected  with  the  
environment”. In 1979, after “the authorities seemed prepared to tolerate the illegality”, stations geared  
toward music and “socio-cultural animation” began to appear (Lewis 95-108). 11
The history of community radio in Australia follows a timeframe similar to the European pattern,  
with alternative stations emerging in the 1960s and organized community radio advocacy in the 1970s  
leading the broadcasting regulator to create new “special purpose” licensing categories in 1978, including  
“[f]or community groups intending to provide programmes serving a defined community area” (Fist &  
Fist 1984, 62; see also Rennie 100-101). In North America, Pacifica grew to comprise a network of five  
stations spread across the country and non-affiliated stations following the Pacifica model began to appear  
as early as 1962.12 In the 1970s civic organizations such as churches began making use of extremely low-
power transmitters for very local broadcasting and in 1975 a group of fifteen larger stations formed the  
National Federation of Community Broadcasters (NFCB) (65-66). 13 Government supported expansion in 
Canada helped set the stage for the founding of the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters  
(Asociación Mondial de Radios Comunitarias / AMARC) at a 1982 conference in Montreal.
In Latin America,  the Radio Sutatenza model was implemented in Mexico in 1965, with the  
Radio Huayacocotla network. Radio Quillabamba began broadcasting in Peru in 1969, though it didn't  
adopt  a  popular  education model until  almost a  decade later  (Gumucio 2001, 36-43).  Both of  those  
projects evolved under the auspices of the Catholic Church. In the Philippines, Radio DYLA - established  
11 On local radio experimentation in Europe, see also Beaud (1980, 87-148; 1981, 4-6). On radio in Italy, see 
Richeri (1983).
12 Pacifica was partially funded by the Ford Foundation's Fund for Adult Education (Rennie 65). The Fund for 
Adult Education also sponsored the San Bernadino Valley Project (1952-56), which incorporated radio 
programming as part of an attempt to make “community development an experience in liberal adult education for 
those who participated” (Groombridge 1972, 193; see also Johnson 1958). The role of adult education as a 
catalyst for community media in the North deserves greater attention from community media studies scholars 
(see note 15 for several examples in relation to television).
13 On the history of community radio in the US, see Walker (2001).
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in 1967 by the Visayas-Mindanao Confederation of Trade Unions – organized  a group of “Concerned  
Citizens for Good Government” in 1978 in order to partner with the local community to solve “urban  
problems” (Braid & Clavel 1984, 222-232).14
The emergence of community television in the North is commonly traced to George Stoney’s  
work on Canada’s Fogo Island in the late 1960s and his subsequent founding of the Alternative Media  
Center (AMC) in New York.15 During the 1970s, Stoney’s work influenced the spread of community-
oriented and public access television throughout North America, and spurred experimentation with local  
and  access  television across  Western  Europe (Lewis 2006;  17-18,  21).  In  the United States,  a  1974  
Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC) decision  “mandated  that  larger  cable  operators  provide  
public,  educational,  and  governmental  (PEG)  access  channels,  equipment,  and  facilities  to  the  
communities  they  served”.  These  rules  were  struck  down  by  the  US  Supreme  Court  in  1979,  but  
municipalities continued to negotiate public access provisions in their contracts with cable franchisees  
(Stein 2001, 301-302). Community television  in Canada was catalyzed by the National Film Board's  
Challenge for Change program (in which Stoney participated), as well as its French language counterpart  
in Quebec, Societé Nouvelle (Lewis 1978, 7-8). Federal and regional government funding was available  
throughout the 1970s and a national public access mandate was maintained until 1997 (Frederiksen 1972,  
14 To be sure, during these decades clandestine radio broadcasting was employed across the globe by a variety of 
underground, revolutionary, and counter-revolutionary groups whose perspectives ranged across the political 
spectrum. These, however, were principally propaganda enterprises and evinced little of the dialogic and 
participatory ethos that is fundamental to the counter-hegemonic liberation mode described above. They rarely 
advocated regulatory changes that would foster participatory models, as was the case in Italy and France. For a 
thorough history of clandestine broadcasting, see Soley & Nichols (1987). As will be discussed in the following 
chapter, Sandinista radio practices in Nicaragua shifted from a guerilla strategy in the late 1970s, during the 
uprising, towards more participatory models in the 1980s, under the newly consolidated government.
15 For discussions of the Fogo Island experience, see Gwyn (1972) and Boyle (1999). While Stoney's work has 
been  identified  as  the  catalyst  for  community  television  (see  Teicher  1984,  Lewis  2006,  Rennie  2006), 
Groombridge  (189-212)  points  to  several  earlier  examples.  They include  Iowa  State  College's  early  1950s 
program “The Whole Town's Talking” (see Siepmann 1952, 62-69; Groombridge 1957); a collaborative French 
agricultural extension initiative called Télé Promotion Rurale that began in 1966 (see Council of Europe 1968); 
an  Irish  agricultural  development  project  called  Telefis  Feirme (Television Farm);  the  Metroplex  Assembly 
project launched in 1958 by the Civic Education Center of Washington University in St. Louis (see Johnson 
1965); the use of public television by Town Meeting Inc. (see Magnuson 1970);  and Canción de la Raza, an 
entertainment-education telenovela produced and broadcast by KCET in Los Angeles during 1968 and 69 (see 
Mendelsohn 1969).
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54-55; Sénécal 1981; Rennie 70).16
The European trials of the 1970s did not lead to strong regulatory protection for community  
television, partly out of a fear that they would open a “back door” for the commercialization of the public  
service broadcasting sector.17 In the UK, where experiments began in 1972, most of the initiatives had  
been shuttered by 1979 (Rennie 86).18 Of the six cable TV experiments planned in France, “only one …  
actually  emerged  and  this  ended  when  central  government  funding  was  not  renewed  in  1976”. 19 
Experiments in the Netherlands and Switzerland also largely failed, though local television survived in  
Belgium into the early 1980s, and even longer in Denmark (Lewis 1984, 94; Rennie 85). Experiments  
were also conducted in Sweden (1979) and Germany (1984) (83). In Australia, the Film and Television  
Board  of  the  Australia  Council  established  a  total  of  12  community-oriented  video  access  centers  
beginning in 1974, though all failed to achieve sustained video content production (Fist & Fist 73-78;  
Rennie 108-111). 
During the 1960s and 70s, some Latin American countries, such as Bolivia and Chile, entrusted  
television broadcasting to their major universities, but funding issues and competition from commercial  
broadcasters prevented the development of significantly participatory structures (Gumucio 2001, 16). In  
Mexico, an initiative beginning in 1971 employed broadcast television as part of a popular education  
campaign directed toward rural farmers (Berrigan 1981, 23). In 1974, UNESCO and the University of the  
West Indies Extra-Mural Department collaborated to form the Trinidad and Tobago Television Workshop,  
which  trained  young  people  and  produced  educational,  community-oriented  programming  that  was  
16 On the history of public access in North America, see Price & Morris (1971), Anderson (1975, 77-92), Berrigan 
(1977b), Lewis (1978, 4-11), Engelman (1990), Goldberg (1990), Kellner (1990, 207-14; 1992), Stein (2001), 
Halleck  (2002),  and  Rennie  (2006,  47-76).  Community-oriented  use  of  video  was  not  limited  to  cable 
distribution, of course. In addition to those listed in the previous note, a wide array of examples are discussed in 
Shamberg (1971), Frederiksen (1972) and Anderson (1975).
17 On Western European initiatives, see Berrigan (1977b), Beaud (1980, 11-83 & 150-172; 1981, 7-10), Jankowski 
et al. (1992), and Rennie (2006, 82-95). On television in Italy, see Richeri (1983).
18 On the “local television” experiments in the UK, specifically, see Lewis (1978), Bibby et al. (1979),  Beaud 
(1980, 23-40), Nigg & Wade (1980), and Rushton (1994, 1997).
19 Following the model used by radio broadcasters, at least one unlicensed French “free television station” 
attempted to broadcast in 1981, with the result that the first telecast was “a live police raid” (Soley & Nichols 
111).
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broadcast on the commercially operated, state-owned network over the course of at least a decade (Laird  
1984). In 1975, India's Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) initiated the Kheda project, an  
important  early  attempt  to  incorporate  participatory  television  production  into  rural  development  
(Berrigan  1981,  35-38;  Voigt  &  Jain  1984,  131;  Agrawal  1994).  Generally,  however,  as  television  
broadcasting systems in post-colonial regions were highly centralized and/or much less robust than in  
wealthier Northern countries, and as cable systems were not yet deployed, opportunities for community  
access were nonexistent. Participatory development projects therefore sometimes focused on the use of  
portable video technologies for non-broadcast playback, with early examples taking place in Tanzania  
(1971), Peru (1975), Brazil (1978) and Mexico (1978). 20
The purpose of the preceding summary is to sketch a rough timeline of the accelerating global  
emergence of community media during the 1960s and 70s, not to provide a thorough accounting of the  
many initiatives which took place in every region. Significant community media, such as theater, have  
been left out altogether.  Even for those listed, crucial contextual differences and practical nuances have  
been glossed over. We will explore some of these in more detail below. For the moment, the point is that  
while  some  seeds  were  planted  in  the  1940s  and  50s,  the  “golden  era”  of  community  media  
experimentation occurred in  the 1960s and, especially,  70s,  as  citizens,  churches,  aid agencies,  non-
governmental  organizations,  and/or  governments  began  working  together  to  explore  the  potential  of  
participatory models for local media production.
Two Primarily Southern Modes of Community Media Discourse: Participatory Development and  
Counter-Hegemonic Liberation
Not  surprisingly,  the  emergence  of  community  media  studies  scholarship  was  effectively  
coterminous  with  the  golden  era  of  accelerating  community  media  experimentation.  The  political  
20 The Tanzanian project is described in Berrigan (1981, 23-24) and Kinyanjui (1984, 21-22). The Peruvian and 
Mexican examples are discussed in Gumucio (2001, 44-51) and the Brazilian in Encalada (1984, 167-170). 
Berrigan also mentions the incorporation of video within development initiatives in Gambia, Guatemala, India, 
the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, all during the 1970s (24).
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economic context in which those early initiatives took place tended to reinforce one or another of the  
three modes of thinking about community media outlined earlier, with the most significant determinant in  
this respect being the division between the post-colonial global South and the wealthier North (referred to  
in  that  era  as  the  “third”  and “first”  worlds) 21.  The  general  tendency of  the  time was  for  theorists,  
researchers, and practitioners focused on the global South to think within the modes of participatory  
development and counter-hegemonic liberation . Within the global North, community media was often  
understood as alternative discourse within a liberal representative democracy. Again, this is not to say that  
these three modes are mutually exclusive; we will address the overlaps below. Still, tracking this tripartite  
heuristic will be helpful in making sense of the concerns that would later preoccupy researchers and  
partially obstruct a more productive theoretical framework.
In the South, sustained scholarly concern for the organization and practice of community media  
arose in the wake of a broad shift in economic development theory. Following WWII, the dominant model  
of  economic  development  assumed  a  process  of  “modernization”  in  which  impoverished  Southern  
nations, with the right mix of foreign loans and investment, were meant to “catch up” to the industrial and  
technological levels of Northern states. In the face of the modernization paradigm's mounting failures, a  
structural counter-model gained prominence, especially among Latin American economists inspired by  
Raul Prebisch's (1950) work as Director of the United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America  
and the Caribbean (ECLAC).22 This model held that global trade flows, rather than raising Southern  
economies to parity, served to keep them in a perpetually underdeveloped and dependent relationship to  
the  North.23 Dependency  theory,  as  it  came  to  be  known,  motivated  calls  for  a  New  International  
Economic Order (NIEO) in which, among other objectives, global commodity flows would be rebalanced  
21 The terminology used to refer to this divide remains problematic; I will employ the contemporary terms with the 
usual caveats.
22 Hans Singer's (1949) work on trade flows was instrumental in the development of Prebisch's work (see Toye and 
Toye 2003).
23 See Furtado (1956, 1964), Prebisch (1959), Bhagwati (1966), Sunkel (1969), dos Santos (1970, 1971, 1978 
[1968]),  Frank (1971 [1967], 1979), Hettne (1978, 1982), and Cardoso & Faletto (1979 [1969]).
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vis-a-vis manufactured goods in order to improve the standing of “underdeveloped” countries. 24
As this debate played out in the field of macro-economic development, a parallel progression was  
occurring within the field of development communications, where theory and practice in the post-WWII  
period were also dominated by a modernization paradigm. Initiatives within this framework have been  
classified as “top-down” and focused on capital intensive technology in order to maximize economic  
efficiency according  to  the  liberal  model.  The  modernization  paradigm also  assumed a  transmission  
model of communication and carried eurocentric assumptions regarding culture and the dominance of  
positivistic  science.25 Here,  too,  scholars  developed  a  critique  of  modernization,  and  here,  too,  the  
principal activity occurred within Latin America,  as  theorists drew heavily on economic dependency  
theory in order to advance the thesis of cultural imperialism which held that the aesthetic and ethical  
values  (or  lack  thereof)  of  Northern  society  were  increasingly  foisted  on  Southern  society  via  an  
imbalanced global flow of commoditized information and entertainment products. 26 Following the pattern 
established with the NIEO, these ideas spurred calls for a New World Information and Communications  
Order (NWICO) under which information flows would be rebalanced to the benefit of “underdeveloped”  
countries, largely via greater access to telecommunications and media technologies (see Masmoudi 1979).  
The principal forum for debate regarding NWICO was the United Nations Education, Scientific, and  
Cultural  Organization (UNESCO),  whose publication  of  the  so-called MacBride report  (International  
Commission  for  the  Study of  Communication  Problems  1980)  offered  validation  for  many  NWICO  
arguments (see Hamelink 1980) and arguably represented the movement's high point.
Ultimately, neither the NIEO nor the NWICO proposals bore much fruit within the higher circles  
24 This set of proposals first came together at a 1973 conference of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) held in 
Algiers and was principally debated within the United Nations (see Bhagwati 1977, Murphy 1984).
25 The classic texts of the modernization paradigm of development communications include those by Lerner 
(1958), Rostow (1990 [1960]), Rogers (2003 [1962]) and Schramm (1964).
26 See Pasquali (1964), Schiller (1992 [1969], 1976), Beltrán (1970, 1976), Dorfman & Mattelart (1975 [1971]), 
Montes (1971; Wacquez 1971), Avaria (1972), Schiller & Smythe (1972),  Mattelart (1973a, 1973b, 1980 
[1974]), Dorfman & Jofré (1974), Garretón Merino (1974),  Reyes Matta (1974), Hamelink (1977, 1981, 1983), 
Reyes Matta & Somavía (1977), Burton (1978), Mattelart & Polan (1978), Li (1979), Beltran S. & Fox de 
Cardona (1980), Dorfman (1980, 1983), and Pavlič & Hamelink (1985).
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of international policy-making, having been quashed by Northern opposition, principally from the United  
States.27 They did, however, leave a lasting mark on development theory and practice, having cemented  
the concept of participation as a crucial component of any intervention. 28 This occurred as development 
communications scholars complemented dependency theory's macro approach to media structures with a  
newfound  valorization  of  dialogic interpersonal  communication  culled  especially  from  the  radical  
pedagogical theory of the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (1967, 1970, 2000 [1970], 1983 [1971]). Freire  
drew  on  Marxian  and  Christian  theory,  as  well  as  continental  philosophy  (e.g.  Buber),  in  order  to  
formulate a model of education as a dialogue within which both student and teacher benefit from the  
sharing and mutual construction of  knowledge. In an explicit  rejection of the transmission model of  
communication that served as a foundational assumption of the modernization paradigm, Freire sought  
conscientização (conscientization)  as  an  interplay  of  action  and  critical  reflection  that  leads  to  an  
individual’s greater understanding of his or her historical, political, and cultural context (see Richards et  
al.  2001).  Although  Freire's  formative  experiences  took  place  in  the  context  of  rural  literacy  and  
agricultural campaigns, and although he “never really linked his analysis to the use of a particular media,  
it is implicit in his writings that communication, in order to be effective, has to be participatory, dialogic,  
and reciprocal” (Thomas 1994, 51).
In  this  climate,  even  the  celebrated  founders  of  the  modernization  paradigm were  forced  to  
acknowledge the shortcomings of their framework and make space for scholars pursuing research within  
27 “US President Ronald Reagan unilaterally declared the death of the NIEO at the Cancun Summit on International 
Development Issues in 1981” (Sneyd, n.d.). A few years after the release of the MacBride Report, both the 
United States and the United Kingdom withdrew from UNESCO, taking their substantial dues with them 
(Preston et al. 1989). Prodded by its corporate constituents, the US government successfully shifted the site of 
international communications policy making from UNESCO to the ITU and then to commercial fora like the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Hills 1998). By 
the mid-1990s, the neoliberal “Washington Consensus” held full sway, with NIEO and NWICO widely seen as 
footnotes of Cold War politics.
28 By 1973, even Robert McNamara, then serving as president of the World Bank, was showcasing participation as 
the cornerstone of the Bank’s ‘new directions’ policy (Ascroft 1994, 248; Ascroft & Masilela 1994, 267; White 
1994, 21). McNamara - having earned a MBA from Harvard, analyzed US bomber efficiency during the 
firebombing of Japan, risen to president of the Ford Motor Corporation, and served as US Secretary of Defense 
until 1968 – was a somewhat unlikely proponent of participatory development.
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the  new perspective  (see  Lerner  & Schramm 1976,  Rogers  1976,  1980).  These  and  other  scholars,  
however,  resisted  comprehensive  changes.  At  worst,  participation  was  incorporated  rhetorically,  but  
neither  integrally  nor  practically. 29 Even  where  participatory  concepts  were  more  fundamentally  
integrated, scholarship often remained ensconced within an academic worldview that continued to view  
development as a controlled progression toward an order established by the liberal democracies of the  
North. Such work staked out the theoretical ground that belongs to the participatory development mode of 
discourse and allowed for a broad range of practical instantiation, as will be discussed further below.
Meanwhile, scholars that were more invested in the Marxian underpinning of dependency theory  
began to investigate, theorize, and instigate radical changes to the structure of media systems in order to  
guarantee the incorporation of dialogic citizen participation. Some participated in and/or were inspired by  
the 1970 democratic victory of a socialist administration in Chile and/or the 1979 military victory of a  
socialist  revolution  in  Nicaragua.30 The  ultimate  goal  of  this  counter-hegemonic  liberation mode of 
theorization was a complete replacement of top-down commercial and/or authoritarian (or paternalistic)  
state media structures with participatory forms. This goal, it was argued, could not be achieved through  
tactical interventions at the local level if these were not executed within a coherent framework of macro-
level structural change. Aguirre (1981) provides a succinct example of this logic:
Although finished designs can't be effected, it is possible and even necessary, to define the  
guidelines of new macro- and micro-social models to inspire practices, even small scale,  
that embody popular power and its alternative expression. It would be a fiction to expect  
that the day after the revolution a mechanical liberation of popular expression will take  
place. (23-4, my translation)31
29 As Ascroft & Masilela (1994) forthrightly noted, “[t]he problem is that the dominant paradigm did not pass 
away: it merely went underground where it is alive and kicking.... How else are we to explain the fact that in the 
1983 edition of the Diffusion of Innovations, Rogers' definition of a change agent has remained as defiantly top-
down as ever – 'an individual who influences clients' innovation decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a 
change agency' (29)?” (275).
30 See Lavin Cerda (1971), Mattelart (1980 [1974], 1986), Mattelart & Siegelaub (1979, 1983), Rothschuh (1980, 
1983), Simspon Grinberg (1981), Gumucio (1983), Läpple-Wagenhals (1984), Mattelart & Rothschuh 
Villanueva (1985).
31 “Aunque no puedan efectuarse diseños acabados, si es posible y aun necesario, definir los lineamientos de 
nuevos modelos macro y microsociales para inspirar las prácticas, auque sea en pequeña escala, que 
corporicen el poder popular y su expresión alternativa. Sería una ficción esperar que al día siguiente de la 
revolución se efectúe una liberación mecánica de la expresión popular.”
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Scholars working within the counter-hegemonic mode did provide some broad guidelines, notably calls  
for legal frameworks that “would guarantee the right to communicate for political, social, and cultural  
organizations at  the corresponding level,  whether  national  or  local”  in  conjunction with “norms that  
would  assure  financing  of  communication  activity  based  on  the  representativeness  of  different  
organizations,  either  through  access  to  state-owned  media  or  subsidies  to  privately-owned  media”  
(Portales  1981,  73;  my translation). 32 For  reasons  that  will  be  discussed  further  below,  the  counter-
hegemonic mode fell out of favor before any more detailed programs could be articulated, much less  
agreed upon.
In a spectrum anchored on one end by the modernization paradigm (where dialogic participation  
was  almost  entirely  absent)  and  on  the  other  by  counter-hegemonic  liberation  (where  dialogic  
participation  was  theoretically  omnipresent),  the  participatory  development  mode  occupied  a  central  
position.  However,  within  the  narrower  confines  of  the  newly  emergent  participatory  paradigm  of  
development communications (from which modernization was discarded), these two modes represented  
opposite ends of a spectrum. The tension between them therefore played out within the NWICO debates,  
in which all sides professed at least some commitment to a more participatory framework.  UNESCO, as  
the  primary  forum for  these  discussions,  had  become a  key  sponsor  and  publisher  of  participatory  
communications research (see  Berrigan 1977a,  1977b,  1981;  Díaz Bordenave 1977,  O'Sullivan-Ryan  
1980).  Amidst  the fraught  Cold War politics  of  the period, overt  support  for  the counter-hegemonic  
interpretation  of  participation  would  open  UNESCO  to  accusations  of  encouraging  totalitarian  
communism, thus imperiling its attempts to remain impartial by advocating for a free and balanced flow 
of  communication  at  the  international  level. 33 As  a  result,  UNESCO's  publications  evince  a  certain  
32 “que garantice la vigencia del derecho a la comunicación para las organizaciones políticas, sociales y 
culturales a nivel nacional o local, según corresponda”; “normas que aseguren el financiamiento de la actividad 
comunicativa en función de la representatividad de las distintas organizaciones, sea mediante el acceso a los 
medios de propiedad estatal, sea mediante el subsidio a medios de propiedad privada”
33 During the NWICO debates, the United States and its allies insisted upon a “free flow” of information, which the 
NAM countries interpreted as code for a commodified, free trade approach. The NAM countries, meanwhile, 
argued for a “balanced flow”, which the US and its allies interpreted as code for authoritarian state regulation in 
the communist vein. Thus, UNESCO's endorsement of a “free and balanced flow” was an attempt to split the 
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ambivalence that resolves itself  with an inclination toward the less radical path.  For instance,  in the  
second chapter of Berrigan's (1981) discussion of “The Role of Community Media in Development”, she  
reviews  the  definitions  “accepted”  at  a  1977  UNESCO-sponsored  conference  held  in  Belgrade  and  
entitled “Self-Management, Access and Participation”. 34 Here, “self-management is the most advanced 
form  of  participation[,]  …  [where]  the  public  exercises  the  power  of  decision-making  within  
communication  enterprises,  and  is  fully  involved  in  the  formulation  of  communication  policies  and  
plans.” She then acknowledges that this definition “gives a clear picture of a demand for radical reforms  
in the management of communications systems,” but is compelled to  immediately point out that “the 
range  is  so  extensive  and  far-reaching  that  it  would  be  over-optimistic  to  expect  that  such  a  total  
reorganization could come about in the short term” (19). Her first chapter, meanwhile, has a subsection  
entitled “Access and Participation” but leaves out self-management altogether, noting that “even though  
day-to-day participation in decision-making may be the ideal, the practicalities of setting up such a system  
are overwhelming.... Rather, the feasibility of introducing some method of horizontal participation has  
occupied most attention” (10).
This tension between the development and counter-hegemonic modes is unresolved within the  
early literature of community media studies produced in relation to the global South. Dervin and Huesca  
(1999) have argued that it can be traced to profound and perhaps irreconcilable conceptual differences:
Taken  together,  horizontality,  intersubjectivity,  knowing  by  being-in-the-world,  and  
dialogue as praxis-manifested constitute the pieces of one perspective on communication  
drawn  from  the  Latin  American  tradition.  At  the  same  time,  another  contradictory  
perspective  existed,  one  focusing  on  the  necessity  of  structural  changes  to  eliminate  
dependencies and make participation possible. In one sense, these two avenues - structural  
versus  process  -  in  the  development  of  ideas  about  alternative  communication  seem  
entirely complimentary - structural change, it is assumed, makes participatory processes  
possible. At a deeper level, however, we suggest they become contradictory because they  
imply  different  but  undiscussed  ontological  and  epistemological  assumptions  and  
emphases. The structural avenue, even when it starts off with epistemological assumptions  
(e.g.,  diversity  in  perspectives),  ends  up  privileging  ontology  and  often  setting  
epistemology aside.  In  contrast,  the  process  avenue  usually  takes  ontology out  of  the  
middle.
34 Though published in 1981, the text gives a completion date of May 1979.
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question and focuses on epistemology. (175)
Indeed, as we shall see further below, later scholars placed an even greater emphasis on “process” at the  
expense of “structure”. We will see, however, that the breach is not irreparable, and that a reincorporation  
of structural logic will ultimately expand possibilities for implementing the participatory process. Before  
arriving  at  that  argument,  however,  an  examination  of  the  early  literature  as  it  related  to  Northern  
initiatives is in order. 
A Northern  Mode  of  Community  Media  Discourse:  Alternative  Discourse  Within  a  Liberal  
Representative Democracy
Academic appreciation of  Northern community  media initiatives  was partially  shaped by the  
participatory development mode of community media discourse. UNESCO encouraged this perspective  
by commissioning a 1977 report on “Some Western Models of Community Media” (Berrigan 1977) and a  
1984 “study of community media in the urban context” (Lewis 1984) that included sections on Australia,  
Europe, Japan, and North America, in addition to various Southern regions. Meanwhile, prominent US-
based advocates for more participatory models were inspired by the MacBride report to author the 1981  
“Willow Declaration” in which they pledged “to struggle for democratization of communications within  
our communities, our places of work, and our political institutions” (Halleck 2002, 92-96). 35 Also, from 
1968  until  the  late  1970s,  UNESCO  worked  with  the  International  Association  for  Media  and  
Communications Research (IAMCR) to bring Northern and Southern scholars into contact. 36 Nonetheless, 
Lewis recalls that a 1978 seminar held in Quito, Ecuador “showed that Latin American scholars were far  
ahead of their European colleagues at this time”, and it was not until 1982 that the IAMCR officially  
35 The “Willow Declaration” was signed by “a group of artists, educators, researchers, film and video producers, 
electronic technicians, social scientists, and writers” in August 1981.
36 Following UNESCO's 1968 adoption of “a new strategy for promoting communication research and policy,” it 
commissioned IAMCR Vice President James Halloran to author a working paper and organize a meeting on 
Mass Media and Society. UNESCO then funded panels to coincide with IAMCR conferences in 1972 
(“Communication and Development”)  and 1974  (“Mass Communication and Social Consciousness in a 
Changing World”), as well as a workshop on “Communication and Community” at the 1976 conference. These 
and other IAMCR conferences led to UNESCO funded publications throughout the 1970s (Nordenstreng 2008; 
Lewis 2010, 831).
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formed a Community Communications Section (Lewis 2010, 831). Some Northern scholars and activists  
working in other contexts, however, had already been drawing on the development mode of thinking  
about community media. Groombridge (1957, 1972), situated his advocacy for television as a medium of  
adult  education  within  a  broader  vision  of  participatory  democracy,  and  he  saw  “participatory  
programming” as one component of community development. 37 Canada's Challenge for Change program 
positioned community media as a tool for development, as did Stoney's work in New York, and this  
perspective was reflected in calls for action and how-to manuals produced by activists and practitioners  
across North America (see Frederiksen 1972, 54-55; Zelmer 1973, 108-110; Anderson 1975, 11-13, 31-
34, 40-44, 48-50).  
The counter-hegemonic mode, on the other hand, received scant serious attention from Northern  
scholars. Downing's (1984) impressive work, which focused on “prefigurative” organizational structures, 
was to some extent an exception, but it stood rather alone. During the 1970s, some community media  
activists  did  occasionally  invoke  the  counter-hegemonic  mode  in  their  calls  for  a  macro-level  
restructuring of societal communication systems. Generally, however, this was limited to a brief vision  
statement and – unlike in the oppositional and revolutionary Latin American contexts – the understanding  
that such a vision would not be achieved anytime soon was at least implicit. For example, Frederiksen's  
“video dedication” states that “[i]t is becoming increasingly evident that  man's survival rests upon the 
establishment of a non-commercial communications system that provides equal access to all information  
sources” (original emphasis), but immediately goes on to state that “[t]oward this end, we must each  
begin the process of freeing the information channels in our community” (my emphasis). Further below  
he identifies his work as part of “[t]he alternate counter-culture video movement” (n.p.), which was less  
concerned with establishing a new hegemonic system than creating space for itself within the existing  
order. In this sense, therefore, Frederiksen's work – like much of the early Northern literature regarding  
37 In fact, Groombridge's work (see 1972, 187 - 212) suggests that the field of adult education in the United States 
had advanced considerably toward a dialogic model of communication, including the use of radio and television, 
before Freire made his contributions.
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community media - fits more properly into a mode of thinking about community media as alternative  
discourse within a liberal representative democracy. This mode is largely peculiar to the North for at least  
two interrelated factors.
First,  the North's greater wealth and rates of literacy had, by the “golden era” of community  
media experimentation, led to a more robust alternative press tradition than in the South. As noted above,  
the rapid expansion of the alternative and underground press in the increasingly contentious political  
climate  of  the  1950s  and 60s  catalyzed  and shaped that  experimentation.  Most  academic  observers,  
however,  viewed this  expansion  as  merely  another  stage  in  a  long history  of  alternative  media  that  
differed from dominant forms in their scope, reach, and impact, but not in their structure or fundamental  
relation to their audience (see Glessing 1970, Lewis 1972, Armstrong 1981, and Kessler 1984). To be  
sure,  many  underground  periodicals  did  fit  that  bill,  but  this  perspective  lumped  more  community-
oriented media into the same mix, overlooking their much more explicit focus on fostering new forms of  
social interaction and community participation (as were emphasized in the participatory development  
mode). At the same time, it assumed that alternative media would forever remain just that – alternative –  
and that their only role was to condition dominant forms of media and patterns of behavior. While this  
might effect a steady and continual shift in terms of societal patterns of thought and behavior, it would not  
affect  the structure of the media system itself  (as  was emphasized in  the counter-hegemonic mode).  
Armstrong's formulation exemplifies this perspective:
The relationship of alternative media to the dominant society is, of course, two-way. Not  
only do ideas introduced by alternative media modify society, they are also themselves  
modified in the course of being absorbed by mainstream culture. In effect, the mass media,  
through which the public is introduced directly to those ideas, use the alternative media  
for research and development.... Something happens to all ideas, trends, and styles that  
emerge from the alternative media. Taken from their original context and sweetened by the  
merchandisers of mass culture, alternative values and concepts are changed even as they  
change society. Thus, once far-out expressions of cultural radicalism … which received  
early and exhaustive attention in the underground media have been thoroughly absorbed  
into  mainstream  culture,  stripped  of  their  challenging  context,  and  marketed  as  
accoutrements of the good life (25-6; my emphasis).
Here alternative media are cast in the role of a perpetual handmaiden within an extant hegemonic media  
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system.
Activists in the late 1960s and early 1970s began using radio and video in an analogous manner  
and often saw themselves as peers of the underground press, even as they incorporated more community-
oriented elements. In this regard, video became the basis for “guerrilla television” (Shamberg 1971) and  
Pacifica radio opened a “Third World Department” in 1975 (Downing 2001, 337). Also indicative of this  
conflation of alternative and community media is Anderson's guide to “grass roots television”, which lists  
the  use  of  video  in  support  of  radical  political  groups  like  the  American  Indian  Movement  (AIM)  
alongside examples of “neighborhood-based television” like the Washington, D.C. Community Video  
Center  and  South  Bronx  Cable  (31-38).  This  conflation  is  especially  evident  where  proponents  of  
community  media  identified  with  the  counter-culture  youth  movement  of  the  era.  For  instance,  
Frederiksen's guide to community access video includes examples such as the recording of a peace march  
and  a  university  library  “nude-in”  (36-38),  a  detailed  suggestion  for  financing  community  access  
television with “video porn for fun and profit” (32), casual references to “long-hairs, freaks, and dopers”  
(36), psychedelic illustrations, and cartoons in the style of Robert Crumb. The confluence of public access  
activism and counter-cultural  attitudes enabled critics  to  paint  public  access  with a  broad brush.  As  
Kellner (1990) recounts:
When progressive  public  access  television  became widespread  and popular  in  Austin,  
[TX,] it was subjected to political counterattacks. The establishment daily newspaper, the  
Austin American-Statesman, published frequent denunciations of public access television,  
claiming that it was controlled by the “lunatic” fringe of “socialists, atheists, and radicals”  
and that it was not representative of the community as a whole (an interesting claim given  
that many conservative church groups, business groups, and political groups also make use  
of access). In 1983 these criticisms were repeated in editorials and articles … in the more  
liberal monthly magazines... (210-11).38
Halleck  concurs,  noting  that  public  access  television  in  the  US  was  generally  mentioned  in  the  
38 Some twenty years earlier Pacifica Radio had faced similar criticism, with the station manager ultimately 
appearing before the US Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. When “asked why three [Communist Party] 
members had been allowed to broadcast, the station manager pointed out that in the same month, KPFA had also 
given the microphone to a Los Angeles broker, an academic from the Center for the Study of Democratic 
Institutions, a Unitarian minister, the former chair of a Democratic Party club, a public relations specialist, the 
president of the Los Angeles Chapter of the American Federation of Scientists, and, not least, Casper 
Weinberger, then chair of the Central California Republican Party committee” (Downing 2001, 330).
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mainstream media only in relation to “'kinky'  sex programs and the use of the medium by skinhead  
racists” (97), thus reinforcing the mainstream public conception of community media as a marginalized  
space for the expression of fringe lifestyles and unworthy ideas. 
The second factor to influence the emergence of alterity as a mode of thinking about community  
media in the North was government policy. In a general sense, the policy frameworks employed in Europe  
and the US – though distinct – had much to do with the historical tradition of alternative presses and the  
sharp rise in “underground” and counter-cultural media in the post-WWII era. While the adoption of the  
liberal free press model meant that overt censorship of alternative ideas was much less common than in  
many Southern nations, the privileging of commercial and public service models meant that minority  
views often had to seek alternative outlets. Policy decisions (or non-decisions) taken during the 1970s in  
relation to the use of radio and television technology as specifically community media tended to reinforce  
that precedent, as politicians and regulators weakly endorsed community media even as they marginalized  
it in relation to commercial and/or public service broadcasting. This, in turn, largely shaped the public and  
academic understanding of community media's role in society. The pattern is exemplified by the British  
and US cases.
Local radio broadcasting in the UK, which had adopted a modified version of the continental  
public service model, was ostensibly the prerogative of the BBC, though it had largely neglected its  
responsibilities in this regard throughout the post-war period (Lewis 1984, 101-2). During the 1960s,  
partly in reaction to “the growing commercial lobby”, the BBC made a concerted and indeed successful  
attempt to improve it's local programming, but the stations “remained part of the BBC machine, lacking  
the genuine independence of a community station”. Meanwhile, the “first documented use of the phrase  
'community radio' in the UK” appeared in 1965 as part of a proposal for “250 not-for-profit local stations,  
financed partly by local government and partly from BBC licence fees”. A community radio lobby formed  
over the following years to support this proposal. Nonetheless, the election of a conservative government  
in 1970 led to Independent Local Radio (ILR), which was approved in 1972 and implemented according  
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to a commercial model. The community radio lobby adopted a “tone … [that] was overwhelmingly one of  
doctrinal hostility to ILR” with the result that “in political circles at least a 'community radio activist'  
came to mean effectively someone from the loose coalition of interest which was the 'radical left' in the  
seventies” (Stoller 155). Thus marginalized, community radio could be mentioned favorably but vaguely  
in subsequent government studies, such as the crucial “Annan Report” (Report of the Committee on the  
Future of Broadcasting 1977) which, instead of calling for a new “specific third tier of radio”, merely  
suggested a new type of authority that would “break out of the present mould of financing broadcasting,  
and  encourag[e]  the growth of  co-operative and other  joint  forms of  financing  to  stimulate  a  direct  
involvement by the community in its own broadcasting services” (cited in Stoller 156; see also Freedman  
2001). That suggestion was not enacted and non-profit community radio would not appear in the UK for  
another quarter century (Stoller 313-335).
The US experience was a mirror image of the UK process: whereas community radio in the UK  
had  been  marginalized  by  the  introduction  of  commercial  radio  into  a  public  service  framework,  
community  radio  in  the  US  was  marginalized  by  the  introduction  of  public  service  radio  into  a  
commercial framework. As mentioned above, the NFCB had formed in 1975, signaling the consolidation  
of  a  grass  roots  movement.  Following the  passage  of  the  Public  Broadcasting  Act  in  1967 and the  
establishment  of  National  Public  Radio in  1970,  however,  “[a]  financing  structure was  implemented  
whereby stations could apply for money from the public purse if they could prove that they met certain  
criteria”, which generally involved greater funding, more staff, increased broadcasting hours, and gearing  
content  toward  obtaining  higher  ratings  (Rennie  66).  At  the  same  time,  the  new  public  stations  
complained that small ten-watt stations – cheaper to set up and thus favored by unfunded community  
groups – were taking up valuable spectrum of which they could make more efficient use. Somewhat  
counterintuitively:
the NFCB joined the campaign against small community stations in the name of spectrum  
efficiency … [and t]he FCC ruled that they would no longer award licenses to stations of  
ten watts or less.... The requirements enforced upon the community stations brought about  
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a type of professionalism that pushed out many of the more radical radio announcers (67,  
original emphasis).
As in the UK, regulators gave enough ground to partially satiate the desire for locally responsive radio  
without embracing the participatory ethos of self-management that distinguishes community from local  
public  service  and commercial  radio.  In  so  doing,  they  cast  community  radio  as  volunteer  run  and  
necessarily amateurish, in contrast to the “professionalism” of commercial and public service radio. The  
result in both cases was to push community radio proponents to the fringes of an officially sanctioned  
discourse.
A parallel tendency is evident in the discourse surrounding community television in the US and  
UK. In the US, the trustees of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation commissioned an independent citizens'  
group, the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications, to assess “the possibilities, both positive and  
negative,  of  cable  television”  in  order  to  facilitate  policy  recommendations  for  the  FCC  (Sloan  
Commission on Cable Communications 1971, vii). The Sloan Commission's final report, published in  
1971, called for at least one public access channel on each cable system to be devoted “exclusively to  
public discussions at the grass roots level”, especially “within well-defined neighborhoods with ethnic  
problems [where] these channels would hopefully enable the groups therein to speak gratis to each other,  
to the inner city, and to the general public” (Levin 1973, 356). Meanwhile, in an attached commentary  
reviewing experiences in New York City (“the one metropolitan area where formal public access channels  
have been in operation”), the following was included among the “tentative hypotheses”:
Public access channels will not be used, generally, to reach the viewing public at large. If a  
large, distributed audience is desired, public access channels are ineffective....  Because  
public access channels  will  not reach broad audiences in the near future,  they are not  
adequate substitutes for conventional television; they are not yet adequate as a forum for  
the presentation of competing views on controversial  issues ....  Public channels will  be 
used, often, as a kind of closed-circuit medium for internal communication within already 
established organizations, neighborhoods, and interest groups (Price & Morris 1971, 237;  
my emphasis).
While this dour assessment was evidently meant to motivate calls for nourishing public channels with  
“promotional  forces  within  the  community  and  for  technical  assistance  and  talent  to  assist  in  the  
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preparation  of  programs”  in  order  to  overcome “production  barriers  and  difficulties  in  developing  a  
viewer constituency [that] are often as great as difficulties in obtaining access”, one must assume that it  
also  blunted  the  impact  of  those  suggestions  and  ultimately  contributed  to  the  realization  of  the  
commentary's final prediction – that “without general use, the shape of the public access channel may be  
skewed and the impetus for their maintenance diminished” (ibid.). Thus, prominent academics advocating  
public access at the highest levels of US policy-making were nonetheless simultaneously casting it as a  
marginal  tool,  necessary  only  in  problematic  communities  and  unsuitable  for  effective  democratic  
deliberation.39 In any case, public access was sufficiently marginalized as to be entirely excluded from  
Shapiro's  (1976)  volume  on  “Media  Access:  Your  Rights  to  Express  Your  Views  on  Radio  and  
Television” and in 1992 Halleck could still lament that its potential for democratic transformation was  
“neither recognized by the public nor acknowledged by most communication theorists” (Halleck 97). 40 
Devine, meanwhile, concluded in 1995 that “communication academics have marginalized access TV as  
nothing but an amateurish, illusory, and ineffective attempt to democratize the media” (cited in Rodriguez  
2001, 12).
As  in  the  US,  early  discussion  of  community  television  in  the  UK  was  closely  related  to  
commercial cable television expansion. Most observers, including private interests hoping to enter the  
market,  expected  that  critical  decisions  would  be  taken  in  1976,  when  the  BBC  Charter  and  the  
Independent Television Act (governing commercial broadcasting) were due to expire and could thus be  
modified.  Commercial  cable  operators  and  other  private  interests  were  hoping  for  greater  profit  
39 The authors of the commentary were Monroe Price and Charles Morris. Price served as Deputy Director of the 
Sloan Commission while a law professor at UCLA and would go on to become Director of the University of 
Pennsylvania’s Center for Global Communication Studies and the Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy 
Research in London. Morris had served as Research Director of the Center for Analysis of Public Issues in 
Princeton, NJ.
40 Shapiro declares in the first sentence of his preface that “[t]his book focuses upon one key aspect of broadcasting 
law: namely, those rules which require a broadcaster to provide air time to concerned citizens for self-
expression” (vii). The absence of any discussion of cable access, therefore, can be defended on the grounds of 
academic specificity. The more general point, however, is that mainstream academic discussion of access in the 
mid-1970s was still hyper-focused on the application of the “fairness doctrine” and related regulations within a 
media apparatus organized according to the liberal model.
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opportunities in the television sector and they had good reason to be optimistic after a Conservative  
victory in  the 1970 election. The new government dissolved the Annan Committee,  which had been  
appointed by the previous Labour government to develop policy proposals for both radio and television,  
and began “giving indications that it would allocate the remaining fourth TV channel without benefit of a  
government  enquiry”  (Lewis  1978,  13).  In  this  context,  Greenwich  Cablevision,  a  relatively  small  
company, “successfully lobbied the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications to allow programs of local  
origination on its cable system, which until then had been limited to relaying existing broadcast service”  
(Rennie 83). The government announced that it would be willing to license additional cable operators to  
do the same on an “experimental” basis.
The licenses were to be granted with certain conditions, including that no public money would be  
provided; that the applicant companies be wholly British-owned; that fees be paid to cover the Ministry's  
oversight costs; that programming be local, appealing to the local community, and of high quality; and  
that no advertising, sponsorship, or film screenings would be permitted. While the major cable companies  
were caught by surprise and unhappy with the licensing terms, especially the lack of opportunity for  
revenue generation, “they presumably calculated that they could not afford to stay out”. Thus, among the  
five  eventual  licensees  were  Rediffusion  and  British  Relay,  (which  controlled  50  and  16  percent,  
respectively, of the 9,000 cable systems in the UK as of 1972/73), as well as EMI, the music label and  
electronics manufacturer, which financed its station “as a research and development project” (Lewis 12-
14; Beaud 1980, 25). As a Rediffusion representative made clear at the time, the participation of the cable  
companies  -  which had organized as the Cable Television Association (CTA) and released a set  of  
proposals in 1973 - was primarily a first step in what they hoped would be an advance toward expanding  
their  business  model  into  retransmission,  “special  interest  channels”,  and  “box office”  (i.e.  premium  
channels or pay per view):
The  experimenters  applied  [for  the  local  licenses]  because  community  television  is  
certainly one of the services that cable, by its essentially localised structure and availability  
of channels, is better able to supply than the ether. The other reason was to set a precedent  
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–  the  first  time  that  someone  other  than  the  broadcasters  was  entrusted  with  
communicating with people in their homes.... We don't want any closed experiments. We  
don't want permission simply to do this sort of service in this town, and to be told that  
permission to continue the service or to expand is a matter of Government decision as a  
later date. If cable operators and programme providers are to invest money to find answers,  
they will only be encouraged to do so on an open-ended basis knowing that they have the  
freedom  to  develop  thereafter.  (Standing  Conference  on  Broadcasting:  'Cable:  An  
Examination of the Social and Political Implications of Cable TV', 1973, cited in Lewis  
17)
The CTA's vision did not, however, come to pass.
After  a  new  Labour  administration  was  elected  in  1974  it  swiftly  reconstituted  the  Annan  
Committee  and  extended  the  BBC  license  for  three  years,  damping  the  enthusiasm  of  the  cable  
companies,  which would  now have  to  wait  until  1979 for  any  further  openings.  Though the Annan  
Committee,  which was “impressed by what  it  had  seen so far  of  the cable  stations,”  persuaded the  
Ministry to allow caption advertising, it was not sufficient to keep any but the EMI owned station on air  
as of early 1976 (18). Later that year the EMI station was transferred to local ownership and began  
employing a mixed funding model including private and public foundations, local donations, and rental  
and advertising revenues (52-53). In that same year a sixth station began operating in a newly developed  
suburb of  London. The local  development  corporation,  “feeling that  the new town's  lack of  its  own  
communications  was  the  main  obstacle  to  the  birth  of  a  local  life”,  had  successfully  petitioned the  
government for a three year license (which prohibited advertising) and agreed to finance the station in  
conjunction with the Post Office. By 1980, however, this station had ceased transmitting video, and by  
1984 the  erstwhile  EMI station  had  also  ceased  operating,  leaving  Britain  once  again  without  local  
programming (Lewis 1978, 64-70; 1984, 94; Beaud 1980, 34-40).
One result of the cable access experiments' failure was to taint community television with the  
opportunism of commercial interest. As Rennie points out, the British school of critical cultural studies,  
with its Marxist underpinnings, was especially fearful of the potential for community media to serve as a  
trojan horse for the privatization of the public service structure. Murdock, for example, argued that:
[f]rom the point of view of the companies involved, then, the present cable experiments  
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fulfil [sic] two principal functions. Firstly, they act as public relations exercises aimed at  
establishing  the  present  operators  as  capable  of  running  a  domestic  television  station  
responsibly,  and  persuading  the  government  to  allow  cable  to  precede  [sic]  on  a  
commercial  basis.  Secondly,  they  provide  convenient  opportunities  for  electronics  
manufacturers to develop and test 'hardware' facilities. They are, in fact, one component in  
these companies' overall 'Research and Development' programs.” (in Bibby et al. 1979,  
cited in Rennie 85)
Garnham (1990) agreed and also saw “community participation [as] a myth promoted by industry to sell  
Portapaks to  'video  freaks'”  (cited  in  Rennie  84).  In  making his  case  for  a  “re-evaluation  of  public  
service”, he argued that observers on “the Left” remained:
trapped  within  a  free  press  model  inherited  from  the  nineteenth  century....[,]  have  
concentrated their critique on the question of the coercive or hegemonic nature of state  
power....[,  and  have]  tended  to  fall  back  either  on  idealist  formulations  of  free  
communications  given  no  organizational  substance  or  material  support,  or  on  a  
technological  utopianism  which  sees  the  expansion  of  channels  of  communication  as  
inherently desirable because pluralistic. Both positions are linked to some version, both  
political  and  artistic,  of  free  expression,  for  example,  the  long  debate  and  campaigns  
around [an additional BBC channel],  the touching faith in cable access, Left support for  
'free' or 'community' radio, and so on. (1986, 40; my emphasis)
Once  again,  the  swing  in  government  policy  between  commercial  and  public  service  models  led  
observers to cast community media not as a robust model in its own right, but rather as a subservient and  
ineffectual alternative to dominant forms.
Community Media Theory in the 1990s: Dismissing Counter-hegemony and Debating Participation
sBy  the  end  of  the  1980s  the  golden  era  of  experimentation  was  definitively  over,  zealous  
excitement had diminished, and the three modes of community media discourse had congealed into stable  
(though still overlapping) forms. Then, over a decade beginning in 1993, there was a veritable explosion  
in academic publications related to community media, including multiple edited volumes. Significantly,  
the vast majority of this work fit squarely within the participatory development mode, focused primarily  
on experiences in the global South, and comprised a sustained and collective reflection on what had been  
accomplished by the participatory paradigm of development communication over the previous decades. 41 
41 See Lewis (1993), White & Nair (1993), Huesca & Dervin (1994), Moemeka (1994, 2000), White et al. (1994), 
Huesca (1996, 2003), Servaes et al. (1996), Dervin & Huesca (1997), Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammad 
(1997), Fraser & Restrepo-Estrada (1998), Jacobson & Servaes (1999), Servaes (1999), Tehranian (1999), White 
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What  came  to  the  fore  was  a  realization  that,  despite  several  decades  of  work,  researchers  and  
practitioners had yet to truly come to terms with some very fundamental questions: What exactly was  
meant by “participation” and how should the theoretical construct be translated into frameworks of policy  
and practice?
 As Thomas (1994) noted, participatory communication “calls for a fuller involvement of people  
in their own development, but not (and this is seldom pointed out) the total involvement of all people in  
every  aspect  of  human  development”  (49).  Thus,  while  all  could  agree  that  more  participation  in  
development communications was desirable, there was little agreement regarding the specificities of who  
was meant to participate in which processes, to what degree, and toward which ends. In the most general  
sense, researchers sought to use dialogic communication in order to identify and achieve development  
goals that may have little to do with media systems, much less popular production of media texts (cf.  
Ascroft and Masilela 1994, Cohen 1996, Schoen 1996). For instance, dialogic interventions might be used  
in  order to  evaluate  and prioritize  needs in  relation to  health  care,  education, agriculture,  or  natural  
resource  management  (cf.  Wijayaratna  &  Valdez  1996,  Barton  1997,  Macleod  2003,  Minkler  &  
Wallerstein  2003).42 Other  researchers,  however,  sought  to  tie  participation  more  directly  to  media  
production. Here, too, a range of possibilities exists. On the one hand, participation might be employed in  
the service of traditional propaganda campaigns. In this scenario, a representative group from the intended  
audience would  be  consulted,  much like a  marketing  focus group,  and their  feedback would  enable  
professionals to better tailor the messaging of the campaign (cf. Mody 1991, Nair & White 1994, Storey  
1999, Mandel 2002). On the other hand, participatory communication can be interpreted to mean that  
(1999), Boafo (2000), Braman et al. (2000), Wilkins (2000), Gumucio (2001), Melkote & Steeves (2001), 
Richards et al. (2001), Rodriguez (2001), Shepherd & Rothenbuhler (2001), Waisbord (2001), Carpentier et al. 
(2003), Couldry & Curran (2003), and Mody (2003).
42 In this vein, dialogic participation has long and increasingly been emphasized as the basis for urban planning and 
generalized community development in the United States (cf. Arnstein 1969, Johnson 1987, Forester 1988, 
Kretzman & McKnight 1993, Green et al. 2000, Okubo 2000). Significantly, these academic fields seem to have 
focused hardly at all on the specific role of participatory media. Likewise, the subfield of international 
development communications seems to have drawn hardly at all on the Northern urban planning and community 
development literature. 
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media texts should be produced not by professionals, but by members of the same groups whose identities  
would be represented and determined by those texts (cf. Deza 1994, Kasoma 1994, Huesca 1996, Stuart  
and Bery 1996). This, of course, is the interpretation of participatory development communications that  
bears most directly on the field of community media studies.
Even  at  this  level  of  specificity,  where  grassroots  media  production  is  the  desired  goal  of  
participatory  development  communications,  a  range  of  theoretical  interpretation  and  practical  
implementation remains. We can sketch the poles of this spectrum in the following manner. At one end,  
the primary goal of participatory production is the empowerment of participants. Through the process of  
creating content based on their own experiences and knowledge, participants gain self-esteem and begin  
to form a different conception of the power relations inherent in their lifeworld, along the lines of Freire's  
conscientização.  To the extent that they have gained a greater appreciation for the media production  
process, they are better equipped to interpret the media messages that they encounter on a daily basis.  
Development interventions based on this goal need not be long term; once the participants’ eyes have  
been opened, so to speak, they return to and bring this new perspective to bear on their previous role in  
the community. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the primary goal of participatory production is to  
construct  a  media  production  apparatus  that  will  continue  to  represent  the  community.  Here,  too,  
individual participants will be empowered, but the goal is not simply to carry the new perspective into  
their previous lives. Rather, participatory production should have a long-term and sustainable impact on 
the flow of information and production of meaning within the community. Towards this end, it should  
include  distribution  networks  that  ensure  the  media  content  is  accessible  by  all  members  of  the  
community and, perhaps, beyond.
This spectrum returns us to the discursive distinction between participatory development  and  
counter-hegemony.  The  point  here  is  that  during  this  decade  of  intensified  publication  the  counter-
hegemonic mode is conspicuously absent. Most of the work produced in this period emphasized the use  
of participatory media production for empowerment and the achievement of development goals unrelated  
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to the functioning of the media system. The disappearance of the counter-hegemonic mode is partially  
explained by changes in the global political economic context. Many observers interpreted the end of the  
Cold War as the death knell of socialist ideology itself. Whatever the ultimate truth of that conjecture, the  
subsequent and seemingly untempered reign of the “Washington Consensus” on economic development,  
which spurred a global wave of telecommunications privatization and channeled development funding  
toward  market-oriented  approaches,  certainly  placed   constraints  on  practitioners  and  shaped  the  
academic discourse.
That said, however, the subfield of community media studies (which during this period was more  
recognizable as that of “participatory development communications”) was also responding to important  
shifts within the larger field of communications research. As we have seen, the participatory paradigm  
arose from within dependency theory,  which viewed modernization as a Northern attempt to cement its  
dominance over global communication flows. Dependency theorists argued that this resulted in a form of  
cultural  imperialism in  which  Northern  (capitalist)  ideology  was  foisted  upon  Southern  populations  
through news and entertainment content. During the 1980s, however, cultural analysis within the field of  
communications research – influenced by the prevailing academic winds – veered away from political  
economic concerns and macro-level structural analysis. In this context, scholars argued that the cultural  
imperialism thesis actually relied on the same assumption of a transmission model of communication that  
had been criticized when deployed by modernization theory. Indeed, research from the increasingly robust  
subfield of audience studies compounded these doubts by demonstrating that the same text might be  
received quite differently in distinct social contexts. 43 With its theoretical headsail thus torn, and facing  
the  post-Cold  War  headwinds  of  neoliberal  political  economics,  the  counter-hegemonic  mode  lost  
momentum and was left behind.
This shift had significant implications for the progression of community media theory. Dervin &  
Huesca  make  this  clear  through  a  series  of  articles  that  tracks  the  progression  of  “meta-theoretic  
43 See Liebes & Katz (1986, 1990), Straubhaar (1991), Golding & Harris (1997), and Aillón Valverde (2002).
44
assumptions” in participatory development communications and outlines a diachronic movement from  
positivism – which posits a fixed, continuous, and fully knowable reality – toward postmodernism –  
which posits “chaotic reality, chaotic knowing, and no possible universal standard of judgment” (1999,  
193).44  While  acknowledging  that  “those  who  attempt  to  use  postmodern  ideas  in  development  
communication contexts either fail to realize them fully or assume that the ideas cannot be used [because  
they] are in fact contradictory to the very ideas of participation and development” (196), they nonetheless  
emphasize the importance of postmodernism in provoking a reconceptualization of human subjectivity  
and the role of power (197). They thus call for postmodernism to be incorporated into a “communitarian  
position that formally incorporates both order and chaos as ontological and epistemological assumptions”  
(199). They hope this move will encompass “all prior perspectives” in order to respond to the:
explicit  recognition that  we need to  be attending  to  the in-between,  to  mediations,  to  
spaces between order and chaos, structure and individual, product and process ... [and] to  
see the in-between as the time-space where humans collectively and individually use a  
variety  of  communicating  strategies  for  making  and  unmaking  order  (e.g.,  structure,  
community,  facts,  agreement,  self)  and  chaos  (e.g.,  diversity,  conflict,  cacophony,  
spontaneity, uniqueness) (201).
As Dervin & Huesca recognize, this impulse to resolve the theoretical debate by acknowledging  
the usefulness of the whole spectrum of perspectives and allowing them to simultaneously coexist, so to  
speak, was shared by Servaes, who had been arguing for a “multiplicity in one world” model for some  
time (see 1989, 1996, 1999). The problem with his approach, however, is that it does not actually resolve  
the tension in a way that provides a normative basis for structuring policy or designing community media  
initiatives. Dervin and Huesca's conclusion that “[w]hat [Servaes] ended up with is essentially a cultural  
relativity approach” (195) seems apt in the light of his claim that “[t]here is  no universal  model for  
development. Each society must develop its own development strategy” (Servaes 1996, 84). Dervin and  
Huesca, however, get us no further with their “privileging of process”. They claim that “ by focusing on  
the process by which humans individually and collectively make and unmake both order and chaos,  a 
basis for systematic study can begin to emerge out of what has been a dysfunctional ricochet ... between  
44 See also Huesca & Dervin (1994) and Dervin & Huesca (1997).
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order and chaos" (200, my emphasis). As noted earlier, however, their treatment of the tension between  
“process” and “structure” runs parallel to my heuristic dichotomy between the participatory development  
and  counter-hegemonic  modes.  They  emphasize  process,  therefore,  at  the  expense  of  structure,  thus  
reinforcing the shift away from not only the counter-hegemonic mode, but also the political economic  
analysis that can help elucidate the types of structures that best facilitate democratic and participatory  
processes. Without sufficiently addressing structure, they are left with a weak call to respect the “principle  
of diversity and maximal multiplicity” (202) that merely echoes what they classified as cultural relativity  
in Servaes' approach.
Rodriguez's  (2001) widely  influential  conception  of  “citizen's  media” largely  reproduced this  
error, even as it advanced community media studies one crucial step forward. She begins with a similar  
analysis of the theoretical landscape, noting that “the potential of … Dervin and Huesca's theoretical  
proposals is unquestionable” before offering her “own different attempt to break the boundaries of binary  
thinking” (16). That attempt also leans heavily on what can be categorized as postmodernism. She draws  
on Mouffe and McClure's feminist “theory of radical democracy”, which explicitly rejects the liberal  
understanding of an essential citizen that is passively subordinate to power. Instead, they posit a citizen  
whose multiple subjectivities are constituted by her “historical location” and are enacted “on a day-to-day  
basis, through [her] participation in everyday political practices” (18-19). Following Foucault, they view  
power as not merely something wielded from above, but something that can also be created and shared  
through the process of empowerment.  Thus, for Rodriguez:
referring to “citizens' media” implies first that a collectivity is enacting its citizenship by 
actively  intervening  and  transforming  the  established  mediascape;  second,  that  these  
media  are  contesting  social  codes,  legitimized  identities,  and  institutionalized  social  
relations; and third, that those communication practices are empowering the community  
involved, to the point where these transformations and changes are possible. (20, original  
emphasis)
This is a crucial step because it begins to re-situate the  process of community media within societal  
structures,  even  if  those  structures  are  only  articulated  as  “social  codes,  legitimized  identities,  and  
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institutionalized social relations”, without explicit reference to the political economic apparatuses that  
sustain them.45 As with Servaes and Dervin & Huesca, lacking from Rodriguez's notion of citizens' media  
is  a  normative  framework  that  will  facilitate  the  sustained growth  of  the  radical  democracy  and 
empowered  citizenship  for  which  she  calls.  Instead,  she  claims  that  “what  makes  citizens'  media  
fascinating is how they stir power in kaleidoscopic movements  which fade soon after they emerge, like 
movements in a dance toward empowerment” (21, my emphasis).
As she makes quite clear, Rodriguez's emphasis on the ephemerality of citizen's media is a direct  
response to the often harsh judgments of scholars who “study alternative media in terms of their success  
or their failure in balancing the power equation between [trans-national communications corporations]  
and powerless communities [with the result that] alternative media are frequently declared a failure” (11).  
She points out that defining “alternative media by what they were not, instead of by what they were …  
entrapped these analyses in oppositional thinking and binary categories” (13). Moreover, their:
understanding of how democracy is built emerges from thinking about political actions  
and social movements as linear, continuous, and conscious processes toward a common  
goal. As a result, citizens' media – with their often fragmented and improvised nature – are  
dismissed  for  not  having  enough  political  potential  to  contribute  significantly  to  the  
construction of democracy. (22)
The majority of the scholars she cites in this regard emerged during the NWICO debates and her rejection  
of their “binary” analyses is one of the clearest rejections of the counter-hegemonic mode to appear in the  
literature. Rather than faulting citizens' media for having “such short life cycles that they appear and  
disappear leaving – what at first glance seems to be – no signature, no accomplishments, no successes”,  
she celebrates “a multitude of small forces that surface and burst like bubbles in a swamp,” signaling that 
the swamp is alive in the same way that democratic communication is “a live creature that contracts and  
expands with its own very vital rhythms” ( ibid.). This is well and good – if community media has not yet  
45 Rodriguez does state – in a footnote – that “academic and activist efforts for more democratic communication 
should maintain multiple fronts, such as political-economy explorations of the cultural industries” (23), but the 
implication that political-economic structural analysis is only appropriate for dominant media systems 
unwittingly reinforces the binary between “mainstream media and … alternative media” that she means to 
overcome with her substitution of the term “citizens' media” (20).
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succeeded in significantly displacing, much less replacing, the hegemony of top-down and increasingly  
commercial systems, it certainly lives on and continues to empower individuals, communities, and social  
movements. But must it simply be left to its own vital rhythms? To fend for itself in the face of attacks  
from authoritarian politicians and profit hungry capitalists?  Can scholars not seek a normative framework  
that would nourish and nurture this “live creature”? That would help it to build a stable theoretical home,  
buttressed by stable policies, where it might grow and multiply?
For all  its  value,  Rodriguez's  theoretical  framework pushes her  into the same relativism that  
marks Servaes and Dervin & Huesca's frameworks:
Addressing our obsession for clinging to our theorizing the construction of democracy as a  
unified and straight-line project, McClure challenges us to let go of these prefabricated  
notions and to learn to capture the political action as a historical claim. A claim has a  
location in time and space. A claim is relevant only within a historical context and for a  
situated subject, and it cannot be transferred to a different positioning.... As opposed to the  
“platform” or the “social project,” claims are not static; they are in constant flux, following  
the movements of a changing social subject. ( ibid.)
The problem here is that any attempt to theorize democracy is preemptively reduced to a dogmatic and  
top-down “platform”, leaving no possibility for the construction of a normative framework for democratic  
decision-making. Rodriguez (continuing to cite McClure) insists that this “marks the opening of a new  
politics”,  but  this  is  only  described  as  a  shift  from  addressing  rights  claims  made  to  the  state  to  
“addressing such claims to each other, and to each 'other', whoever and wherever they may be” (22-23).  
No mention whatsoever is made of a process that would allow for the adjudication of those claims, and it  
is hard to see how that could be accomplished without some normative democratic framework.
What Rodriguez fails to concede is that such a framework does not necessarily posit a singular  
and static end state that can only be reached via a unilinear course.  While this may aptly describe a certain 
vision of “scientific” socialism that served (or was assumed to serve) as a more or less implicit backdrop  
to discussions of community media within the counter-hegemonic mode, that particular error should not  
preclude  all  other  attempts  to  articulate  a  vision  for  a  robust  and  radically  democratic  system  of  
participatory media production and circulation that would be capable of displacing and even replacing the  
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currently  hegemonic  model.  At  this  point  in  the  history  of  community  media  studies,  however,  the  
rejection  of  the  counter-hegemonic  mode  had  severely  constrained  the  space  available  for  such  a  
discussion. Significantly, however, while Rodriguez's advocacy of citizens' media had, in many ways,  
continued this trend, it also signaled promising new avenues for advancing community media studies.
Integrating the Three Modes of Community Media Discourse: Civil Society and the Public Sphere
The accelerated “globalization” of the 1990s and 2000s impelled communications researchers –  
across the field - to grapple with the ever more significant and ubiquitous ramifications of transnational  
data  networks  and  media  flows.  It  also  reinforced  the  importance  of  integrating  perspectives  from  
seemingly disparate geopolitical and cultural contexts. To a great extent, participatory communications  
researchers had been ahead of the curve in this regard. The NWICO movement of the 1970s and early 80s  
had engaged many of these issues and UNESCO had fostered a global perspective in its publications. For  
the better part of the next two decades, however, no such broadly comparative studies appeared. 46 Rather, 
the works that appeared during the boom period discussed in the previous section collectively exhibit a  
somewhat myopic focus on participatory development communications in the South,  especially Latin  
America, South Asia, and Africa. The geographic breadth of Rodriguez's case examples – which she drew  
from Nicaragua, Colombia, Catalonia, and the United States – serves as a precursor to the resurgence of  
what  might  be  termed  “comparative  internationalism”  within  community  media  studies  during  the  
following decade.
Rennie's (2006) “global introduction” to community media focused primarily on Europe, North  
America,  and  Australia  before  addressing  “the  deployment  of  community  media  as  a  development  
strategy in both First and Third World Countries” (11). Howley (2005) employed “community media as a  
lens to examine the dialectical (if uneven) process between global forces and conditions and the everyday  
lived experience of local communities” and dealt entirely with case examples from the United States,  
46 For example, in 1993 UNESCO published another volume edited by Lewis in which the only case examples not 
drawn from the South deal with Aboriginal broadcasting in Australia and the alternative press in Belarus. Four of 
the remaining six are from Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Canada,  and  Australia.  His  subsequent  edited  volume  (2010),  meanwhile,  presents  work  from New  
Zealand,  Slovenia,  Hungary,  and Macedonia,  as  well  as  North  America,  Latin  America,  Africa,  and  
Western  Europe.  In  a  similar  manner,  Fuller's  (2007)  collection  of  “International  Perspectives”  on  
community media highlights Israeli, Basque, Turkish, Kazakh, Thai, and Singaporian initiatives alongside  
those from South Asia, North America, and Western Europe, not to mention Brazil and Ghana.
 This period also witnessed an intensified effort on the part of community media scholars to track  
and  theorize  the  relationship  between  participatory  media  and  digital  networking,  paying  particular  
attention to the exponential increase in “virtual communities”. 47 Of particular interest at the international  
level were new methods for networking global activism that made use of the Internet and came to the fore  
in the late 1990s with the Zapatista movement in Mexico and the protests against the 1999 World Trade  
Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Seattle. 48 These movements grew symbiotically with new 
efforts to reshape global information flows – such as that formed around the People's Communication  
Charter (PCC) (cf. Hamelink 2007) – which picked up the baton that NWICO had carried some decades  
before.
The expanded scope of community media studies, both in terms of geography and media, sparked  
a renewed engagement with the alternative and counter-hegemonic modes of theorization. For instance,  
Howley's fresh look at the role and potential of community radio, public access television, and online  
virtual communities in the North could not rely on an outmoded notion of alternative media as merely  
counter-cultural and/or subservient. He acknowledges this by noting that: 
...the phrase “alternative media,” which all too often serves as a “catch-all” that embraces  
47 This trajectory, of course, intersects with the long history of research regarding Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) in development, “e-government”, and civic participation, as well as a vast amount of 
sociological research regarding “virtual communities”. For recent work situated within community media 
studies, see Ford & Gil (2001), Pigg (2001), Atton (2002, 133-152), Hollander (2002), Gumucio (2003), Howley 
(2005, 72-82, 226-257), Laudeman (2005), Erble & Günnel (2006), Rennie (2006, 163-84), Stewart & Pileggi 
(2007), Fuchs (2010), Goodwin (2010), Guglietti (2010), Sienkiewicz (2010), and Meinrath & Pickard (2010). 
48 On the Zapatista employment of the Internet, see Ronfeldt et al. (1998), Ford & Gil (2001), Ronfeldt & Arquilla 
(2001), Halleck (2002, 333-342), Darling (2007, 2008), Jeffries (2010) and Van Laer & Van Aelst (2010). On the 
role of Indymedia in Seattle and beyond, see Halleck (2002, 415-432), Downing (2003), Pickard (2003, 2006a, 
2006b, 2008), Wall (2003), Lopez & Roig (2006), and Fontes (2010). 
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a variety of media forms and practices – some participatory in nature, others not, that may  
or may not have very much relevance to geographically situated communities – confounds  
the study of participatory communication models like those associated with community  
media. (2005, 4)
In a like manner, Rennie's (2003) analysis of community television policy in Australia argued for “a shift  
from seeing community media as oppositional and marginal to new notions of community-based media  
that  are  empowering  and  generative  in  nature”  (49).  If  the  long  debate  over  the  “proper”  role  of  
participation in development communications had not produced a conclusive answer,  it  had, at  least,  
served to cement participation as the factor that distinguishes community from merely alternative (i.e. not  
mainstream)  media  in  whichever  context,  including  the  North.  The  alternative  mode,  which  had  
previously induced media theorists to largely overlook community media, therefore needed an overhaul.  
Meanwhile,  the  renewed  attention  to  global  information  flows,  alongside  the  rise  of  transnationally  
networked social movements, returned a sense of urgency to the types of policy considerations that were  
prominent in the counter-hegemonic mode but downplayed or even discounted in the 1990s and early 00s.  
This is especially evident in the concern for “public philosophies” that motivated Rennie's (2006) analysis  
of  the  historical  role  of  government  policy  in  determining  the  different  emphases  and  outcomes  of  
community media initiatives in Australia, Europe, and North America.
The point here is not that the alternative and counter-hegemonic modes have returned to some  
rightful place alongside the development mode and returned community media studies to an integral  
wholeness. As I have tried to make clear, these modes always overlapped and existed in tension with each  
other. Neither singly nor in tandem do they form a sufficient framework for the theoretical analysis of  
community media's potential for democratic communication. The point, rather, is that community media  
studies is only now coming into its own precisely because it is working its way beyond the constraints of  
the three modes while keeping their central concerns intact.
In 2003 Jankowski noted that “the main deficiency in community media research is the paucity of  
theoretical grounding and model building” (11).  Howley (2005) agreed, arguing that the “engaging and  
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richly detailed case studies [of the previous decades] often fail to situate community media in the context  
of contemporary cultural theory, or within the wider contours of our rapidly changing communication  
environment” (5).  The urge to  better situate community media has been fundamental  to  the promise  
shown by community media studies scholarship over the previous decade. In this regard, Rodriguez's  
theorization, despite the shortcomings noted above, was instrumental. If her construct of “citizens' media”  
prioritized personal and local empowerment at the expense of structural and policy considerations, her  
emphasis on citizenship nonetheless situated community media firmly within the framework of public  
participation within a democratic society. This, of course, had never been absent from the alternative,  
counter-hegemonic, and participatory modes, but it had not been the primary axis of theorization for quite  
some time. 
Howley picked up this thread when he noted that, “by treating community members as citizens,  
not as consumers, community media foster a greater awareness of the interdependent nature of social  
relations  and  shared  environments  both  locally  and  globally”  (268).  He  attempted  to  theorize  this  
interdependence by utilizing Stuart Hall's notion of “articulation”, which “refers at once to 'speaking' or  
'uttering'  as  well  as  to  a  'connection'  or  'linkage'  between  disparate  elements[,]  ...  offers  a  way  to  
conceptualize  community  as  a  unity  of  differences[,]  … [and  serves  as]  an  organizing  strategy  for  
progressive social  change” (6).  While  Howley's  case  studies  valuably  trace  a  range  of  strategic  and  
tactical uses of community media to articulate varying levels of community, the concept remains thin and  
he ultimately fails to present articulation as a robust and actionable theoretical framework, much less a  
replicable model for organizing and growing community media.
Rennie successfully integrates the notions of citizenship and articulation by situating community  
media  within  the  theoretical  framework of  civil  society.  This  maneuver  advances  community  media  
studies  in  two important ways.  First,  it  provides a  framework within which to  integrate  the varying  
concerns of the three modes of community media discourse. Participation is inherent in the concept of  
civil society, which Rennie sees as “something that is associational and nonprofit, generated for itself and  
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by itself rather than for or by the state or the market.... Community media should therefore be seen as a  
means to the maintenance and extension of civil society by civil society itself” (35-36, my emphasis). In 
this context, community media can accommodate alterity but need not be defined by it. As Rennie points  
out:
community  media  as  a  whole  has  attracted  much  less  attention  than  has  one  of  its  
components – alternative, or radical, media … [but this does] not account for the large  
amount of community media that is  not radical or social-change focused … Using the 
notion of civil society expands the field to encompass all community media. (36)
Additionally, because civil society “requires a relationship with the state in order to exist”, the framework  
impels a consideration of “the positive role that the state can play towards the development of community  
media” (37) in terms of regulation and policy, thus engaging one of the primary concerns of the counter-
hegemonic  mode.  The  theoretical  frame  of  civil  society,  therefore,  is  robust  enough  to  successfully  
integrate the three overlapping but disparate modes of discourse. It does this not by specifically defining  
just what community media  is – in fact, it actually opens up a great deal of space for a multiplicity of 
community media forms – but instead begins to clearly stake out what community media does. 
Rennie's introduction of civil society also points to the importance of public sphere theory for  
community media studies. “The public sphere,” she points out, “is implicit within the notion of civil  
society,  as  only  an  understanding  of  communication  within  public  space  can  link  civil  society  to  
democratic  theory”.  While  her  subsequent  discussion  is  frustratingly  brief,  she  does  note  that  
“[c]ommunity media, being a media that is produced by civil society groups, has a unique relationship to  
the types of citizen participation that occur through civil society engagement” (34). The conclusion to be  
drawn here is that only a system of community media can facilitate the public communication necessary  
for  the  democratic  functioning  of  civil  society.  We  might  hang  Howley's  terminology  on  Rennie's  
framework and say that the proper role of community media is to serve as an articulating mechanism of 
civil  society itself. Whereas Howley's conceit only allows us to name this role, public sphere theory  
provides an adequate framework for modeling its mechanics.
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The Public Sphere in Community Media Studies: 1) Counterpublics
Noting the long wait for a complete English version of  The Structural Transformation of the  
Public Sphere (which appeared in 1989), Lewis (2006) has lamented that “anglophone ignorance for so  
many  years  of  Habermas's  seminal  work  on  the  public  sphere  was  a  serious  loss  to  the  study  of  
community media” (21). Indeed, only in recent years have community media scholars begun anything  
resembling a systematic engagement with public sphere theory, and much work remains to be done. We  
must note, however, that Habermas's ideas were not entirely inaccessible in English prior to 1989, as a  
translation of his encyclopedia entry on the public sphere was available as early as 1974 and reprinted  
five years later in an anthology that would have been familiar to many scholars interested in community  
media (Habermas 1979). Surprisingly, however, instead of buttressing calls for community  media, this 
article seems only to have informed Garnham's (1986) argument in favor of public service broadcasting  
over and against community media. We discussed Garnham above, in the context of the alternative mode,  
noting his quick dismissal of community media. Here we will explore his insistence on “the public service  
model of broadcasting as an embodiment of the principles of the Public Sphere” (45).
In relation to the “fundamental contradiction between the economic and the political at the level  
of their value systems and of the social relations which those value systems require and support” (46),  
Garnham argues that:
[t]he great strength of the public service model … is the way it (a) presupposes and then  
tries to develop in practice a set of social relations which are distinctly political rather than  
economic, and (b) at the same time attempts to insulate itself from control by the state as  
opposed to, and this is often forgotten, political control. (45)
The problem here is not the postulation of a divide between the political and the economic, but the failure  
to see that within the category of the political there is a further distinction to be made, between the state  
and civil society. Garnham alludes to this when he rightly recognizes that political control is not – as his  
conservative interlocutors would have it – necessarily state control, but he never articulates the role of a  
civil society that exists apart from both the market and the state. His supposed dichotomy is, in fact, a  
54
trichotomy, and his failure to recognize this crucial point muddies his discussion of “mediation within the  
Public Sphere and … knowledge-broking within the [public service] system” (49). For, while he is right  
to point out that to the degree which political communication “is forced to channel itself via commercial  
media … [it] becomes the politics of consumerism” (48), he is unable to articulate the structural model of  
a public service system that would prevent the same political communication from becoming – as free-
market proponents fear – the politics of statism. His solution revolves – as it should – around the notion  
of public accountability and he suggests a familiar set of controls: “a structure of Freedom of Information,  
and so on[;] ... better trained journalists[; and] a public service structure of provision” (49). Aside from  
noting the circularity  of  arguing that  an accountable  public  service system requires  a  public  service  
structure of provision, we might ask who should train the journalists and according to what criteria? Or  
who will  structure and ensure the freedom of information? If the State is to be entrusted with these  
functions, Garnham has merely pushed the question of public accountability to a different level without  
clarifying the mechanism for its assurance.
Garnham seems to recognize this,  as  he immediately notes  that  “the function of information  
search and exposition … needs a public accountability structure of its own” ( ibid.). His proposed solution 
is quite telling:
...much greater direct access needs to be given to independent fields of social expertise....  
Perhaps bodies such as the Medical Research Council, the Economic and Social Research  
Council, Greenpeace, Social Audit, and one could list many others, should have regular 
access  to  broadcasting and print  channels and  employ their  own journalists to  clarify 
current issues for the general public as a background to more informed political debate....  
(ibid., my emphasis)
The call here is for (the established sector of) civil society to have greater access and participation. A  
similar tendency is manifest in his call for “the debate function” of public service journalism “to be more  
highly politicized” (50). His proposal in this regard is for:
political parties and other major organized social movements having access to the screen  
on their own terms … Here one might envisage a situation where any group that could  
obtain membership of over a certain size would be eligible for regular access to air time 
and national newspaper space. (ibid., my emphasis)
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Here also he suggests increasing access and participation for (the established sector of) civil society.  
Garnham's ethos, therefore, clearly has something in common with that of community media advocates,  
but equally clear is the barrier between them. Garnham (echoing Lippmann) would limit the participation  
of civil society according to standards of expertise, professionalism, and legitimacy, whereas community  
media  advocates  (echoing  Dewey)  would  afford  participation  to  individuals  whose  “legitimacy”  is  
determined primarily by their membership in a particular community, not an established civil society  
organization. Moreover, community media often seek to grant legitimacy to marginalized individuals and  
communities that might not otherwise qualify for access and participation; Garnham's modifications to  
public service broadcasting would not necessarily accomplish that goal.
At issue here, in a general sense, is how best to structure a media system so as to maximize the  
participation of civil society within a democratic public sphere. Garnham's emphasis on the public service  
model is tied to his insistence on a single, overarching and universal public sphere. Clearly, he felt that  
community media could never be robust enough to facilitate decision-making at that level. Surprisingly,  
this view has, up till now, been largely shared by community media theorists who have engaged public  
sphere theory. Here we can discern the influence of the alternative mode of community media discourse  
over and above the counter-hegemonic mode. As we have seen, within the counter-hegemonic mode  
scholars posited community media as the basis for a national democratic media system that would replace  
commercial  and  state  models.  While  they  did  not  employ  public  sphere  terminology,  the  implicit  
argument was that community media could indeed structure a universal public sphere. By the time public  
sphere theory was being incorporated into community media studies, however, the counter-hegemonic  
mode had been backgrounded. Thus, where public sphere theory has been engaged, scholars have drawn  
on the alternative mode and cast  community media as the basis for only a supplemental or resistant  
“counterpublic”.
The  notion  of  counterpublics  emerged  from  a  critique  of  Habermas's  presentation  of  the  
transformation of the public sphere, which many scholars read as a “lament for the disappearance of a  
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bourgeois  public”  (Downing 2001,  29).  They felt  that  Habermas  had  presented  the  seventeenth  and  
eighteenth century public sphere in an idealized manner, overlooking,  inter alia, the degree to which 
participation in the formation of public opinion was severely restricted to white, propertied men. Critics  
such as Fraser (1992) argued that Habermas had facilely indulged “the bourgeois public's claim to be the 
public” and neglected to acknowledge that “virtually contemporaneous with the bourgeois public there  
arose a host of competing counterpublics, including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics,  elite 
women's publics, and working-class publics” (116, original emphasis). Contrary to Habermas's schema, in  
which  rational  debate  within  a  unified  public  sphere  led  to  formation  of  a  single  public  opinion,  
“counterpublics contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public, elaborating alternative styles of  
political behavior and alternative norms of public speech” ( ibid.,  see also Ryan 1992, Negt & Kluge 
1993).  
Community media scholars have found this conception abundantly useful. Downing, for example,  
noted that Fraser's conception of counterpublics had been implicit in his previous work on the use of  
media in political activism, which involved “not only the notion of two types of public sphere, alternative  
and official, but also the variety of such spheres in and around social movements” (29). Atton (2002)  
picked up the same thread and argued that:
[a]n  alternative  public  sphere  would  seem  an  appropriate  theoretical  foundation  [for  
alternative media] in its formulation of a nexus of institutions that work together without  
parliamentary influence, to enable the public to address and debate political and social  
issues independently of the state. (35)
Halleck (2002) referenced Negt & Kluge's presentation of the proletarian public sphere and claimed  that  
public access television activists in the US "are struggling to create a public sphere for those otherwise  
excluded from discourse" (90). Howley (2007) stated that “community media serve as a resource for  
subaltern counterpublics to articulate their interests and concerns” (345).
The historical accuracy of this framing is unassailable. In our contemporary society, community  
media have, indeed, offered an avenue for the formation and representation of counterpublics. There is,  
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however, a danger in presenting community media in this way. As indicated above, it echoes and invites  
repeating  the  errors  of  the  alternative  mode.  If  community  media  are  cast  as  merely the  media  of 
counterpublics, then they will forever remain in an oppositional role, as easy to dismiss now and in the  
future as they were in the 1970s and 80s. Even more importantly, to the degree that we believe that  
community  media  maximize  the  democratic  ideals  of  access,  participation,  and  self-management,  
accepting them as eternally oppositional requires that we permanently cede the dominant space of public  
discourse  to  media  systems that  foreclose  democratic  opportunities.  We can  avoid  this  dead-end  by  
honoring the counter-hegemonic mode's insistence on community media as the basis for not merely one  
or more counterpublics, but a robust and maximally democratic public sphere that is inclusive of all  
communities.
The Public Sphere in Community Media Studies: 2) Multi-publics
Though public sphere theory and the counterpublic frame have appeared with greater frequency  
in community media studies, they have been detached from any coherent model of mediation within the  
public sphere. This comes as no surprise, since the structure of the public sphere remains under intense  
debate within the field at large. As we have seen, Habermas's original formulation was criticized for  
positing a single and unitary public sphere. Theorists readily took up the notion of counterpublics to  
counteract this flaw. This move suggested a model in which one dominant (i.e. bourgeois) public sphere  
was the central node around which orbited a fixed number of counterpublics. It also opened up a series of  
questions: What constitutes a counterpublic? Is it  bounded? Autonomous? Via which mechanisms do  
counterpublics interact with and influence each other and/or the dominant public sphere? One need not  
ponder  these  questions  too  deeply  to  realize  that  a  static  model  of  autonomous  counterpublics  is  
inadequate to a true description of social reality.
Noting this shortcoming, Garnham (1993) offered an alternative:
...a series of autonomous public spheres is not sufficient. There must be a single public  
sphere, even if we might want to conceive of this single public sphere as made up of a  
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series  of  subsidiary  public  spheres,  each  organized  around its  own political  structure,  
media system, and set of norms and interests. (371)
Here we have shifted from an atomic model, with multiple satellite spheres orbiting a much more massive  
nuclear sphere, to what might be called a molecular model, in which multiple public spheres, though still  
discrete, are no longer autonomous but linked in a “series” to form a larger whole. Within this molecular  
formation (to indulge the analogy) some spheres will have greater atomic masses than others and one  
particularly  massive  sphere  might  (over)determine  the  entire  molecular  structure.  As  we  have  seen,  
Garnham's preference was for the determinant sphere to be organized around a public service media  
system. He viewed community media as, at best, components of especially subsidiary public spheres, or,  
at worst, vehicles which might help establish a commercial media system as the organizing framework for  
the determinant sphere.
Rennie  (2006),  however,  argues  that  “the  thinking  behind  public  service  broadcasting  (and  
content requirements) in broadcasting policy” is dependent on an outmoded conception of “[t]he public  
interest … [as] something highly valued, a collective good that is seen as more important than other  
legitimate demands and interests” (172). In its place, she advocates a “new public interest” that:
involves embracing a range of possible publics that may conflict with or contradict each  
other. There is no claim to what the “good” is, only a striving for it; more players and  
more  ideas  means  a  greater  chance  that  some  kind  of  progress  will  emerge  …  The  
difference between this idea of media democracy and the more cautious, regulated idea of  
the (old) public interest in broadcasting policy is clear: policy approaches that seek to  
uphold the new public interest are important for community broadcasting as they admit the  
existence of multiple publics – something that has always been a feature of the community  
media rationale. (172-73)
With  this  conceptualization,  Rennie  makes  two  important  moves.  First,  she  drops  the  idea  of  one  
particularly massive and determinative public sphere. These are not “counterpublics”, because there is not  
necessarily a dominant public for them to counter. Rather, we have a fluid structure of multiple publics  
that “may conflict” but, presumedly, might also reinforce one another, or simply not interact at all. They  
might  do  any  or  all  of  these  things  at  different  times,  with  different  other  publics,  in  constant  
reorganization. We should note, however, that for the moment the logic of that (re)organization, including  
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the nature of their “boundedness”, remains undefined.
Rennie's second move is to shift the locus of the claim on the “good”. She argues that “[t]here is  
no claim to what the 'good' is”, but this is misleading. She makes clear that the “good”, according to the  
new public interest, is to be found in “the commons”. It is “about protecting the spaces where openness  
exists and creating new spaces for that to occur” (172). Her argument, therefore, is not that there is no  
normative framework for policy making, but rather that the normative framework has shifted from a  
public service model which limits access (to professionals/experts) in order to produce a certain type of  
content (circumscribed by a  pre-defined, dominant notion of  the “good”),  to  a  commons model that  
expands access  (to  the wider  citizenry)  in  order  to  produce a  multiplicity  of  content  (expressing  an  
uncircumscribed variety of “goods”). Both of these, of course, are counterposed to the commercial model,  
which also claims to expand access, but does so only to the degree that the content produced can be  
successfully commodified.
The choice among these three models depends on a basic normative evaluation: the degree to  
which  they  maximize the  effective  participation  of  civil  society  in  a  democratic  public  sphere.  The  
limitations of the public service and commercial models have been widely discussed and are well known.  
The assumed limitation of the community media model has been its marginality. On the one hand, it has  
been seen as necessarily amateurish and unable to produce a quality of content that might have significant  
impact. On the other hand, it has been seen as necessarily local and unable to scale up to a reach that  
might facilitate debate and decision-making at supra-local levels. Neither of these limitations are real,  
though they have often been accepted by community media scholars working within the development and  
alternative modes. Theorization within the counter-hegemonic mode did not accept these limits, but was  
unable to  offer a viable model for surpassing them.  In the absence of such a model, and because the  
counter-hegemonic mode was often associated with nationalist, socialist, and other political projects that  
clung to the same outmoded notion of the “public good” that informed the public service model, it was  
easy for critics (if not also the theorists themselves) to assume that state intervention would go beyond the  
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construction of regulatory frameworks and disinterested resource provision and into politicized influence  
over content. The result was that only with great difficulty could counter-hegemonic theorization detach  
itself from an over-emphasis on the role of the state. 
The challenge, therefore, is to construct a model for a system of community media production and 
circulation  that  fulfills  the  following  conditions:  it  must  maximize  access,  participation,  and  self-
management for civil society actors; it must be shielded from the politicized influence of government  
officials; it must be shielded from the commodification of information and entertainment; it must achieve  
the scale and quality suitable to the facilitation of democratic decision-making at all levels of society.  
Public sphere theory provides a potential framework for the construction of such a model, but not in its  
current  state.  The  following  section  proposes  a  modified  public  sphere  framework  that  will  better  
facilitate the task at hand.
Toward a Heterarchic Public Sphere Theory
We have reviewed Garnham's gesture toward a “molecular” model of multiple public spheres and  
differentiated it from Rennie's suggestion of a more fluid structure, noting the different conceptions of the  
“public good” implicit in each. Keane (1998) has also noted that the dominance of “a single, spatially  
integrated public sphere within a nation-state framework … and its corresponding vision of a territorially  
bounded  republic  of  citizens  striving  to  live  up  to  their  definition  of  the  public  good”  has  become 
“obsolete”. In its place, he argues, “a complex mosaic of differently sized, overlapping and interconnected  
public spheres” has developed (169). Keane refers to this as “modularization”. Braman (1996) has applied  
a similar logic to her conception of “interpenetrated” public spheres, in which “the relationship between  
the parts and the whole may be understood as mutually constitutive” (22). This logic of interpenetrated  
modularity is the beginning of a model that can not only accurately map the current configuration of  
multiple public spheres, but can also guide us toward a model for a robust and scalable community media  
system.
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As Keane points out, the logic of interpenetrated modularity “does not mean that the boundaries  
among variously sized public spheres are obliterated completely” (187). In this regard, he offers three  
“idealtypish” categories – macro, meso, and micro – that correspond to global/regional, national, and sub-
state  public  spheres.  What  is  unclear,  however,  is  how  these  conceptual  categories  can  help  us  to  
understand the interactive logic of public spheres. Yes, it is true that some spheres are smaller in scope  
than the state, but so what? Does that category of public sphere have a distinct set of characteristics that  
can help us understand their functioning? Keane offers little in the way of an answer. To illustrate the  
point, we can take one of his examples, in which he notes that:
… micro-public  spheres  are  today a  vital  feature of  all  social  movements  … [which]  
normally comprise low-profile networks of small groups, organizations, initiatives, local  
contacts and friendships submerged in the everyday life patterns of civil society.... Such  
public spheres as the discussion circle, the publishing house, the church, the clinic and a  
political chat over a drink with friends or acquaintances are the sites in which citizens  
question the pseudo-imperatives of reality and counter them with alternative experiences  
of time, space, and interpersonal relations. (172)
Social movements are not, however, merely local. One would be hard pressed to argue that the labor or  
suffragist movements of the nineteenth and early twentieth century were not transnational, and it would  
be ludicrous to argue that contemporary social movements are not so. The question then, is whether a  
local church group discussing a protest is different than an online forum involving activists from multiple  
nations  discussing  the  same  protest.  According  to  Keane's  tripartite,  one  is  micro  and  the  other  
presumably macro, but this tells us very little about their role in the wider social movement. To be sure,  
Keane  speaks  of  “[m]acro-publics  of  hundreds  of  millions  of  citizens  [that]  are  the  (unintended)  
consequence of the international concentration of mass media firms previously owned and operated at the  
territorial nation-state level” (176), so he might argue that the online forum is not a macro-sphere at all,  
but that merely begs the question of what type of sphere it actually is. If it is a micro-sphere due to the  
number of participants (but not their physical location), then we can no longer define micro-spheres as  
sub-state or local.
The employment of size or scope as the defining feature of various categories of public spheres is  
62
commonplace. Many pages have been devoted to teasing out the relative characteristics of the national  
and trans-national public spheres (cf. Sparks 1998, Crack 2008). In community media studies, local public  
spheres were discussed as early as 1992 (Hollander & Stappers). In recent years the concept has been  
employed with greater frequency, but it  remains imprecise and tied to the notion of counterpublics. 49 
Lewis, however, has applied the term in a provocative manner:
Eleven different organizations form the association which owns the [radio] station. The  
station here is providing civil society with a local public sphere that on closer inspection,  
as we follow the account of the three organizations involved in Tandem training, can more  
accurately be described as the intersection of several local public spheres. (2006, 32)
Reinterpreting this claim in the vocabulary I have developed above, we can view the station as a)  the 
articulating mechanism between (at least) eleven different civil society organizations and b) a primary  
structural component of the modular interpenetration of several local spheres. The task for community  
media studies is to build on this type of analysis through a continued dialectic of empirical and theoretical  
research.
In order to do so, we will have to shift our conception of the basic units of analysis. Categorizing  
public spheres based on their scope or reach is perhaps important but certainly not sufficient. We must  
also specify the structural logic that underpins the modular interpenetration of public spheres categorized  
according to these units. We will elaborate this argument in the concluding section of this work, but here  
we will  introduce several  key components.  First,  we need to  be more precise  about  the relationship  
between the notions of “community” and “public sphere”. As mentioned above, debate regarding the  
definition of community, including the relative importance of communities of place and interest,  has  
generated  a  wide  body  of  literature.  We  should  view  communities  of  place  as  a  specific  type  of  
community of interest  in  which mutual  interests are  determined by aspects  of  shared proximity.  We  
should also recognize that any particular community may participate in multiple public spheres and that  
the scope of those spheres  may (but need not) correspond to the scope of the community. We should  
49 See Fraley (2007), Howley (2007), Schiller (2007), Barker-Plummer & Kidd (2010), Ndlela (2010), Parlette 
(2010), and Vatikiotis (2010).
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further recognize that there are moments when a community may want to explicitly delimit the scope of a  
public sphere to include only members of the community. Finally, and most importantly, although Keane  
is correct that size-based boundaries remain useful as a heuristic device, we must conceptualize public  
spheres as inherently fluid and scalable in terms of their scope. Only a scalable unit of analysis will allow  
us to articulate the structural logic of modular interpenetration. Moreover, the scope of a public sphere  
must be defined in terms of the outcomes associated with the debate it facilitates. In other words, scope is  
a measure of those who will be affected by a particular set of outcomes, rather than formal or even  
informal  inclusion  as  a  member  of  a  defined  or  imagined  community. 50 Thus,  distinct  issues  will 
correspond to distinctly bounded public spheres, and it may even be the case that the boundary fluctuates  
as a result of the ongoing discussion of those issues.
Second, we must further refine our unit of analysis by recognizing two fundamental categories of  
public spheres. Fraser (1992) first articulated this distinction in terms of “weak” and “strong” spheres.  
Whereas both of these types facilitate opinion formation, only the latter also facilitates the adoption of  
binding decisions. I employ her distinction but change the names, partly to avoid the importation of value  
judgments that “weak” and “strong” might imply, but also to focus on the primary communicative role  
carried out by each. Thus, I exchange the term “weak” for meaning-making, and “strong” for decision-
making. Fraser's primary example of a decision-making sphere is the national level sovereign parliament,  
and she reminds us that empowering such parliamentary bodies to translate public opinion (as expressed  
and contested in meaning-making spheres) into authoritative decisions was a “democratic advance over  
earlier political arrangements” (134). Indeed, the degree of accountability between meaning-making and  
decision-making public  spheres is  a  significant  measure of  democracy,  yet  public  sphere research in  
communications research has largely ignored the important distinction between these two types. 51 This 
50 Fraser has previously endorsed this conception, which she refers to as the “all-affected principle”, but now 
prefers the alternative “all-subjected principle” which “holds that what turns a collection of people into fellow 
members of a public is … their joint subjection to a structure of governance that set the ground rules for their 
interaction” (2009, 95-6). I explore this distinction in chapter five.
51 Writing from the field of International Relations, Brunkhorst (2002) has discussed the role of weak and strong 
publics at the transnational level.
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oversight is  especially surprising in relation to community media studies since, as Fraser points out,  
“[o]ne  set  of  [related]  questions  concerns  the  possible  proliferation  of  strong  [i.e.  decision-making]  
publics in the form of self-managing institutions” (135). For community media researchers, the primary  
questions might be: How do self-managed media outlets respond to and inform the meaning-making  
public spheres within which they operate? How do varying degrees or structures of self-management (i.e.  
alternative forms of decision-making spheres) change this dialectic? It's not that these questions haven't  
been asked in different forms, but the time has come to engage them within a public sphere framework  
that places a premium on the crucial difference between meaning-making and decision-making spheres  
and allows the relationship between them to be described in terms of interpenetrated modularity.  
Third, we must articulate the structural logic of interpenetrated modularity in terms of heterarchy, 
which is as “a fundamental organizational principle of complex systems” (Crumley 2005). Crumley has  
provided the best general purpose definition by contrasting hierarchies, “the elements of which are ranked  
relative to one another”, to heterarchies, “the elements of which are unranked, or possess the potential for  
being ranked in a number of different ways, depending on systemic requirements”. Heterarchy, in fact, “is  
the more general category”; hierarchy is just a particular type of heterarchy (2008, 469-70). While the  
term has been employed in fields as diverse as evolutionary biology, neuroscience, computer science,  
archaeology, sociology, and management,  it  has  found surprisingly little currency in communications  
research outside of network analysis. Yet the value of an organizational logic that permits elements to be  
ranked in various and fluid orders is clearly of particular use in describing the interpenetrated modularity  
of public spheres. Rather than seeing public spheres as unitary elements arrayed according to the fixed  
ranks of hierarchies (e.g. micro, meso, and macro), we can understand them to be fuzzy modules existing  
in a constant state of fluidity in which emerging and receding networks of meaning- and decision-making  
public  spheres  function  within  a  continually  changing  nexus.  In  this  framework,  the  participatory  
structure of community media is not restricted to local and small scale organization, nor are participatory  
media outlets relegated to articulating only local civil society organizations.
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We will further develop a heterarchic public sphere theory as the basis for a participatory media  
system in the conclusion.  In  order to  do so,  it  will  be helpful to  draw on historical  cases  in  which  
community  media  have  been  deployed  as  part  of  an  attempt  to  construct  such  a  system.  Here  the  
alternative and development modes of discourse are of less help than the counter-hegemonic. Especially  
helpful will be an examination of the counter-hegemonic mode in precisely those cases where it was  
construed as the potential basis for state media policy. A particularly useful set of such cases can be  
created from socialist administrations that rose to power in Latin America during the second half of the  
twentieth century: Cuba, Chile, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. None of these countries were or have so far  
been successful in constructing a community media system that could significantly displace, much less  
replace, commercial, public service, or state-controlled systems. Nonetheless, an analysis of their efforts  
reveals  evidence  of  a  general  progression  from  state-centric,  hierarchical  models  toward  a  more  
decentralized, heterarchical system that offers valuable insight for theorizing community media outside of  
socialist contexts. We will therefore turn our attention to such an analysis in the following chapters.
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Chapter 2: Participatory Communication and the Civil State in 20 th Century Latin American 
Socialism
As we have seen, recent work in community media studies suggests that community media be  
seen as an articulating mechanism for civil society. In this context, community media might surpass its oft  
assumed limitations as a marginal means of micro-level empowerment. It might become, instead, the  
basis for a robust media system powerful enough to displace conventional commercial and state models.  
Achieving this  goal  will  require  the  formulation  of  a  scaleable  organizational  logic.  In  the previous  
chapter I suggested that this logic might usefully draw on a heterarchic public sphere theory, which I will  
develop  further  in  the  conclusion.  Though  innovative,  this  approach  is  not  without  precedent.  In  
Venezuela, for over a decade now, community media practitioners and government officials have been  
working to create organizational and funding models that will nurture and sustain a community media  
sector capable of facilitating a broader system of participatory governance. This is  just one of many  
projects endorsed under the rubric of “Socialism of the 21st Century”.
Though the term is attributable to Heinz Dieterich (cf. 2007), 21st Century Socialism is less a  
discrete  political  economic  philosophy  than  it  is  a  rhetorical  tag  for  a  political  orientation  that  has  
developed within  and  alongside  grassroots  social  movements,  especially  in  Latin  America,  over  the  
previous  three  decades.  Indeed,  as  I  hope  to  illustrate  in  this  chapter  with  particular  reference  to  
communications theory,  21st  Century  Socialism in Latin  America can be usefully  understood as  the  
product of a continuous reinterpretation of socialist theory and practice that takes Cuba's revolutionary  
process  as  its  primary  (though  sometimes  implicit)  point  of  reference.  Two  other  crucial  points  of  
reference that will be discussed in this chapter are the socialist administrations that were established in  
Chile (1970 - 73) and Nicaragua (1979 - 90). In order to make sense of this progression, it will be useful  
to invoke Gouldner's (1980) distinction between Scientific and Critical interpretations of Marxism. If, as  
Gouldner argues, the Cuban revolution is exemplary of Critical Marxism, then we can view 21st Century  
Socialism as a Neo-Critical Marxism that attempts to account for certain theoretical blind spots which  
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weighed heavily on “actually existing socialism” in the 20th century. Primary among these is the role of  
civil society within a mediated public sphere.
Ideology and Civil Society in Scientific and Critical Marxisms
 Gouldner's analysis of Marxist theory derives from the “nuclear contradiction” that “generates  
and recurrently reproduces (at least) two boundaried subsystems of elaborated theory” (8) that he calls  
Scientific Marxism and Critical  Marxism. For our present purposes, the following summaries should  
provide a  sufficient point of entry: Scientific Marxism is precisely that which constructs itself in the vein  
of the natural sciences, deducing a set of ineluctable laws that determine social history. It was presented  
by  Marx  and Engels  as  historical  materialism,  a  unique  contribution  to  political  economy in  which  
political and cultural facets of human society (the superstructure) are overdetermined by the mode of  
production and other material economic conditions (the base and infrastructure). Critical Marxism, on the  
other hand, views itself not as a science but a philosophical critique. It posits a dialectic political economy  
in which political and cultural facets both determine and are determined by the mode of production and  
other  material  economic  conditions.  Gouldner  is  careful  to  stress  that  both  of  these  are  valid  
interpretations of a central set of contradictions that remained unresolved within Marx's corpus. At the  
same time, however, he finds that Marx and Engels tended to emphasize Scientific Marxism and suppress  
Critical Marxism in the presentation of their own work.
Crucially,  these  distinct  orientations  produce  counterposed  perspectives  on  the  nature  of  
proletarian revolution. Scientific Marxism foresees a definite and immutable path toward the collapse of  
capitalism in which the bourgeois mode of production must necessarily increase in productivity until  
material scarcity is eradicated. Only at that point can the proletariat successfully rise up and take control 
of the means of production. As a result of this determinism, Scientific Marxists are prone to counsel  
patience, arguing that attempts at revolution are premature and doomed to failure if they outpace the  
inexorable march of history.  Critical  Marxism, however,  “pursues a  policy of active interventionism,  
68
organizing instruments such as the Party 'vanguard' or military forces that facilitate intervention” (59) into  
both the economic order and the march of history. This distinction hinges on the role of ideology. From  
the Scientific Marxist perspective, ideology is framed as “false ideology”, a symptom of class oppression.  
Critical Marxists are more apt to believe that the proletariat,  if endowed with the proper ideological  
perspective,  can  wrest  the  means  of  production  away  from the  bourgeoisie  and initiate  a  period  of  
socialist transformation that will lead to utopian communism. Thus, ideology also has a positive role to  
play.  In  addition to  the Russian case,  where Lenin explicitly endorsed the concept of the party as a  
vanguard, Gouldner identifies Cuban Marxism as “converging” (51) with Critical Marxism, precisely  
because of the emphasis placed on a voluntarism inspired by the ideological commitment of a vanguard  
group. Indeed, the Critical Marxist commitment to class consciousness and ideological education remains  
central  to the communications policies of each of the Latin American socialist  administrations under  
consideration here.
We will be primarily interested, however, in reviewing how the Critical notion of vanguardism  
relates to the concept of civil society. As with ideology, Scientific Marxism views civil society in negative 
terms. This results from Marx's historical analysis of the rise of the bourgeoisie from within the feudal  
state,  in  which he views civil  society as  a  corruption  of  society's  “natural  bonds” (357)  that  serves  
instrumentally as a “transmission belt for ruling-class values” (346). From this emphatically historical  
materialist perspective, Marx and Engels called for a takeover of the state, which would become entirely  
representative of the proletariat and would thus no longer have any use for a manipulative civil society.  
Rather, civil society would be subsumed within the socialist state. As Gouldner has it:
when the bourgeoisie is overthrown and replaced by the working class, the latter are now  
defined as the new proprietary class. The state is then seen as the proletariat's 'executive  
committee,'  as the agency of the majority class in society and, thus, as not needing to  
exploit the majority. The state then presumably loses its partisan political character and  
becomes a fully public realm devoid of its own special exploitative interests.... In effect,  
the Marxist theory of the state and of the ruling class, here interwoven, had misled Marxist  
politics by profoundly underestimating the dangers to human emancipation inherent in the  
state bureaucracy and its capacity to be a new ruling class. (345)
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As evidenced by the Soviet example, these dangers are in no way diminished by pairing a Critical Marxist  
emphasis on vanguardist ideology with a Scientific Marxist suppression of civil society. 
Certain  of  Marx's  writings,  however,  contradict  the  above  analysis.  Gouldner  points  to  his  
journalistic histories, such as The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, where the struggle to explain 
actual events using his theoretical framework leads Marx to acknowledge that civil society is not always  
merely a tool of the ruling class (302-3). 52 Moreover, Marx's own professional work as a journalist and  
some of his earliest writings demonstrate his recognition of the value of a free and robust press that can  
check the power of the state.53 Nonetheless, one would be hard pressed to argue that Marx articulates  
anything resembling a vision for the structuration of an autonomous civil sector in a socialist society.  
Gouldner concludes his analysis by situating this lacuna as the central task of contemporary Marxist  
theorization:
In socialist, no less than capitalist societies, then, a central and increasingly urgent problem  
is how may persons avoid dependence on the state; how may patterns of mutual and self-
help –   and of the self-management that is part of this – be strengthened; how may society  
resist the enveloping superintendence by the state? From a Marxist standpoint, the growing  
question is how may civil society be fortified, so that Marxism's own liberative aspirations  
can be realized? (371)
Gramsci, of course, had already made significant contributions to this project. Just as the Critical  
Marxist notion of vanguardism had imbued the concept of ideology with a positive significance, Gramsci  
expanded the Marxist perspective on civil society to also include a positive orientation. “Civil society, in  
Gramsci's thinking, is the realm in which the existing social order is grounded; and it can also be the  
realm in which a new social order can be founded” (Cox 1999, 4). Gramsci is able to simultaneously  
maintain both of these propositions in relation to the interdependent concept of hegemony. In Gramsci's  
view, for a ruling class to establish hegemonic power, it  must gain control over the juridico-politico  
apparatus of the state, but it must also succeed in winning consent within civil society. 54 “The site of 
52 See also Cox (1999, 6).
53 See Marx (1975, 1977).
54 “The acquisition of a hegemonic position in civil society is ultimately more important to the ruling classes than 
the acquisition of control over the juridico-political apparatus of government. The latter, it is true, allows the 
dominant interest groups in a society to impose their will by force should it prove necessary, but if it were their 
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hegemony is civil society; in other words, civil society is the arena wherein the ruling class extends and  
reinforces its power by non-violent means” (Buttigieg 1995, 26). Once in power, the ruling class tends to  
manipulate civil society in a “top-down” manner. This is precisely the understanding of civil society that  
leads to its rejection within Scientific Marxism. At the same time, however, the space created in civil  
society can also be used to propagate, from the “bottom-up”, a counter-hegemonic ideology. This is the  
understanding of civil society that is neglected by Scientific Marxism, but embraced by Critical Marxism.
The Gramscian notion of “bottom-up”, counter-hegemonic ideological work, however, should not  
be confused with the Leninist conception of vanguardism. Lenin cast vanguardism as agitational work to  
be carried out as ideological preparation for a revolutionary takeover of the state. Gramsci referred to this  
as a “war of maneuver” and opposed it  as a revolutionary strategy. He proposed, instead, a “war of  
position”, which:
is a strategy for the long-term construction of self-conscious social groups into a concerted  
emancipatory  bloc  within  society.  It  is  only  when  the  war  of  position  has  built  up  a  
combination of organized social forces strong enough to challenge the dominant power in  
society that political authority in the state can be effectively challenged and replaced. (Cox  
16)55
Clearly, then, within Critical Marxism there are at least two paths to revolution. The first relies on an  
ideological call to revolutionary action, whereas the second relies on an ideological call to civic action.  
Both stress the importance of communicating ideology, but only the latter is explicitly concerned with  
constructing  a  counter-hegemonic  bloc  within  civil  society.  As  a  result,  the  first  path  –  the  war  of  
maneuver – can easily bend back around to the Scientific Marxist framework in which civil society is  
subsumed by the socialist state. Such was the case in the Soviet context. The second path – the war of  
only source of power, they would be rendered defenseless by a coup d'etat. Hegemony, by contrast, insures the 
dominant groups against the consequences of a coup d'etat and, in all likelihood, even prevents a successful coup 
d'etat from occurring in the first place.” (Buttigieg 1995, 30-1)
55 “Revolutionary activity, for Gramsci, has little or nothing to do with inciting people to rebel; instead, it consists 
in a painstaking process of disseminating and instilling an alternative forma mentis by means of cultural 
preparation (i.e., intellectual development and education) on a mass scale, critical and theoretical elaboration, 
and thoroughgoing organization. These kinds of activities can only be carried out in civil society; indeed, at one 
and the same time, they require the creation of, and help to extend, new spaces in civil society beyond the reach 
of the governmental, administrative, and juridical apparatuses of the state.” (Buttigieg 14)
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position – necessarily avoids this framework. In fact, it is meant to lead to just the opposite scenario, in  
which the state  (i.e.  political  society)  is  subsumed by an ever expanding civil  society:  “The society  
without a state, which Gramsci calls regulated society, comes from the enlarging of civil society and,  
therefore, of the moment of hegemony, until it eliminates all the space which is occupied by political  
society” (Bobbio 1988, 94).
While the subsumption of the state by civil society is Gramsci's ideal, this is not what occurred in  
the  Latin  American  cases  examples  reviewed  below.  We  must  therefore  discuss,  as  a  final  point,  
Gramsci's vision for the relationship between civil society and a socialist state in the period prior to the  
stateless,  “regulated”  society.  In  this  situation,  Gramsci's  preference  was  for  a  “civil  state”  that  is  
legitimated by the same civil society that it (at least in part) nurtures. 56 In other words, Gramsci “suggests 
that the State should rest upon the support of an active, self-conscious and variegated civil society and  
should, in turn, sustain and promote the development of the constructive forces in that society” (Cox 7).  
The party, meanwhile, “must always seek to carry out its function in civil society, even if, or when, it  
accedes to  government power” (Buttigieg 29).  Here,  then, we can begin to situate the media,  which  
Gramsci recognized as “the most dynamic part of the ideological structure” of a ruling class (Buttigieg  
26), within the Critical Marxist framework.
In the previous chapter we identified community media as an articulating mechanism of civil  
society. Community media, in other words, is the media of civil society. As such, it is precisely the type of 
“constructive force” that should be sustained and promoted by a civil state. A commercial media system  
would  only  correspond,  at  best,  to  the  “top  down” version  of  civil  society  employed by  the  liberal  
capitalist state. The Scientific Marxist impulse to see civil society subsumed by the state, meanwhile,  
leads to an authoritarian, state-controlled media system. Even where a socialist state aspires to become a  
civil  state, however, it  can not implement a community media system outside of a robust theoretical  
56 I have adapted the term 'civil state' from Cox, who has expressed the same concept by using the term 'civic state', 
which he credits to Sakamoto (11).
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framework that describes its essential features. Such a framework did not exist at the time of the Cuban  
revolution; while examples of participatory media existed in Latin America (e.g. miners' radio in Bolivia  
and Radio Sutatenza in Colombia), concerted theoretical development did not begin until the late sixties.  
This  theoretical  development  occurred,  therefore,  in  a  dialectical  engagement  with  the  socialist  
experiences discussed below and we can make use of them to trace its evolution.
Revolutionary Cuba (1959 – 1989): Vanguardism and a Tightly Tethered Civil Society
During the 1950s, Fidel Castro spoke positively of the long history of liberal political thought and  
portrayed the Cuban republic in the period prior to Batista's coup as a happy incarnation of its ideals, with  
a thriving public sphere anchored in a free civil society. 57 At some point along the way, however, Cuba's  
revolutionary leaders came to view the liberal framework of civil society from the Scientific Marxist  
perspective, as the corrupted conveyor of a capitalist ruling class ideology. In particular, they feared that  
business interests, in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency, would manipulate civil society  
institutions in order to manufacture an oppositional movement and facilitate a coup, just as the young  
Ernesto “Che” Guevara had witnessed in Guatemala in 1953 (Kinzer 2006, 206; McChesney 2006). Thus,  
in the years following the revolutionary victory in 1959, the Cuban government not only nationalized the  
vast majority of the economy but also severely restricted the space available for autonomous civil society  
organization and expression.
Civil society was not extinguished, however. It was reformed within a  hegemonic apparatus that 
comprises both the state and a particularly Cuban form of civil society, where the latter does not accord  
57 “Let me tell you a story: Once upon a time there was a Republic. It had its Constitution, its laws, its freedoms, its 
President, its Congress and its Courts of Law. Everyone could assemble, associate, speak and write with 
complete freedom. The people were not satisfied with the government, but they had the power to elect a new one 
and it was only a few days before they could do so. Public opinion was respected and obeyed, and all shared 
problems were freely discussed. There were political parties, radio and television debates, public meetings, and 
the whole nation throbbed with enthusiasm. This people had suffered greatly and if it was unhappy, it longed to 
be happy and had a right to be happy. It had been deceived many times and it looked upon the past with real 
horror. This people innocently believed that such a past could not return; they were proud of their love of 
freedom and were convinced that freedom would be respected as a sacred right. They felt confident in the 
certainty that no one would dare commit the crime of attempting against their democratic institutions. They 
wanted change, improvement, advancement and they saw all this at hand. They had hope in the future.” (Castro 
1998, 98)
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with the liberal model of independence from the state. Indeed, Cuban civil society during the several  
decades following the revolution existed only with the sanction of the state,  and at  least one Cuban  
academic has identified “Cuban political practices of [the 1960s] with the Marxist theory of merging civil  
and political societies” (Dilla 1987, cited in Roman 1999, 65) . Nonetheless, civil society was not entirely  
subsumed by the state, as per the Scientific Marxist vision adopted in the USSR. To be sure, the two are  
tightly tethered, but:
...Cuban civil society has never been absorbed by the state, as happened in many other  
socialist countries, but interacts with it in a creative, if not always equal, dynamic. This  
continuous partnership also contrasts starkly with representative democracy, in which …  
civil society and the state are seen to be separate entities.... [and] has produced a deep  
interaction between the state and civil society that blurs the distinction between the two...  
(Lambie 2010, 147)
The  primary  components  of  this  state-sanctioned  civil  society  have  been  the  “mass  organizations”,  
including the Cuban Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Cuba / PCC), the Workers' Central Union 
of  Cuba  (Central  de  Trajabadores  de  Cuba /  CTC),  The  National  Association  of  Small  Farmers  
(Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños / ANAP), the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación 
de  Mujeres  Cubanos /  FMC),  the  Federation  of  University  Students  (Federación  de  Estudiantes  
Universitarios / FEU), the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution ( Comités para la Defensa de la  
Revolución / CDR), and the Young Communist League (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas / UJC). There are 
also  “smaller  professional  and  interest-specific  associations  that  represent  other  sectors  of  society”  
(152).58
While the roots of the PCC and the CTC extend to the pre-revolutionary era, Cuba's civil society  
organizations were largely created and molded by the revolutionary leadership during the 1960s. That  
decade also saw two attempts to establish systems of popular local government, including the creation of  
Coordination, Delivery and Inspection Committees (Juntas de Coordinación, Ejecución e Inspección  / 
58 Those in the media sector include the Union of Cuban Journalists (Unión de Periodistas de Cuba / UPEC), the 
National Union of Cuban Writers and Artists (Unión Nacional de Escritores y Artistas de Cuba / UNEAC), the 
Central Institute of Radio and Television (Instituto Central de Radio y Televisión / ICRT), and the Cuban 
Institute of Cinema Arts (Instituto Cubano de Arte e Industria Cinematográficos / ICAIC).
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JUCEI) in 1961, and their replacement in 1966 by a system known as Local Power ( Poder Local) (153). 
Across all of these initiatives, however, participation was primarily framed as voluntaristic contribution to  
the revolutionary project, so that “[a]ctive participation came at the level of implementing goals, not  
setting them" (154). Moreover, the leadership's failure to institutionalize the participatory system proved  
drastically counterproductive. During the late 60s, the Local Power system, always of a “transitional and  
provisional  nature”,  became  “an  administrative  unit  with  few  real  powers”,  while  important  mass  
organizations like the CDR and the FMC grew increasingly weaker, and “the CTC practically ceased  
functioning” (Roman 1999, 68; see also Bresnahan 1985, 311). At the same time, the national government  
suffered from “intense bureaucratic centralization” and an “invasion by the Party into state administrative  
spheres [that] weakened not only the capacity of the Party to exercise its political leadership role, but also  
the very efficacy of the administrative body” (Dilla, cited in Roman 68).
This fledgling system was put to the test in 1970 as the leadership called for an unprecedented  
sugar harvest of 10 million tons in an attempt to overcome a dire shortage of hard currency. Resources  
were shifted toward the effort and the people were asked to maximize their voluntary labor. The effort  
failed, having produced only 8.5 million tons. Worse yet, the massive redirection of resources had proved  
wasteful  and  left  other  sectors  of  society  significantly  weakened,  inspiring  widespread  resentment  
amongst  the  population.  These  events  prompted  Castro  to  publicly  admit  failure,  drastically  reform  
economic policy,  and initiate the institutionalization of the participatory system. Throughout  1970 he 
called for the revitalization of the mass organizations, the separation of the PCC from the administrative  
functions  of  the  state,  and  the  decentralization  of  those  functions  (69-71).  The   fortification  and  
institutionalization process lasted six years and culminated with the adoption of a new constitution and a  
new system of governance known as the Organs of Popular Power (Organos de Poder Popular / OPP).
The OPP, however, represented only a partial decentralization, since it was instituted according to  
“the Leninist  concept of dual subordination [under which g]eneral  regulations would come from the  
center but the administration from the local level” (71). Within this framework, “norms, procedures, and  
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methods were still to be set on a national level” (73) and “centralization and paternalism” (96) remained  
significant issues. The PCC, meanwhile, remained ensconced within the administrative functions of the  
government  (91)  and  has,  ever  since,  proven  to  be  consistently  over-represented  in  the  elected  
assemblies.59 In this context, and for a host of reasons, including “bureaucratic inefficiency, diffidence,  
lack of authority of delegates … [and] a shortage of resources” (Lambie 168), the system has been most  
useful as a means of providing information to and generating feedback from the population, but is “not  
always  as  effective  at  the  stage  of  implementation  and  action”  ( ibid.).  The  mass  organizations, 
meanwhile, continued to operate within the boundaries imposed by the state and often in the service of  
state policy. Thus, real input into the decision-making process remained minimal, as in the 1960s, but the  
system itself became more stable. 
Cuba's “partnership” between the state and a state-sanctioned civil society thus manifests only a  
weak variant of the Gramscian civil state. Though the state and civil society are not entirely merged, the  
boundaries are blurred significantly by the role of the PCC; and while the mass organizations retain  
greater autonomy, they follow the lead of the state and party, and not vice versa as Gramsci would have it.  
This is not to say that the Cuban system has no space for participation, but the final balance between the  
autonomy of civic organization and centralized direction is tilted heavily toward the latter, with the result  
that  participation  generally  manifests  as  mobilization.  As  we  have  seen,  Cuba's  adherence  to  the  
vanguardist  model  persisted  even  as  its  leadership  acknowledged  the  need  for  greater  popular  
participation in decision-making. One reason for the persistence of centralized authority, especially in  
relation to foreign and national policy, has been the precariousness of the revolutionary state in the face of  
US  aggression  and  recurring  economic  crisis.  Another  contributing  factor  that  must  be  considered,  
however, is the range of options presented by Marxist theory itself. These causal factors do not work in  
isolation, but are dialectically enjoined, as can be illustrated with reference to the intense debate over  
59 Between 60 and 75 percent of municipal representatives belong to the party and the percentage is close to 100 at 
the provincial and national levels (Lambie 167, Roman 94, Domínguez 1982).
76
Cuba's political economic structure that was conducted during the 1960s.
On one side of this debate were those who favored the Soviet model of a highly technocratic  
system of centralized planning and state execution in which there was little need for civil society. Guevara  
himself championed the opposite position, which proposed channelling “socially co-operative work and  
self-sacrifice” through both state-owned economic units as well as civil society institutions such as the  
mass organizations in  order  to  forge “a socialist  consciousness  … in parallel  with the creation of  a  
socialist  economy”  (144).  Those  siding  with  Guevara  pointed  to  the  vital  role  that  popular  mass  
mobilization  had  played  in  consolidating  the  revolutionary  victory,  including  the  organization  of  
voluntary  labor  by  the  CDR,  as  well  as  the  national  literacy  campaign  of  1961.  Guevara's  position  
remained decidedly vanguardist, as he made clear in his 1965 exposition of “the man and socialism in  
Cuba”:
The vanguard group is ideologically more advanced than the mass; the latter is acquainted  
with the new values, but insufficiently. While in the former a qualitative change takes  
place which permits them to make sacrifices as a function of their vanguard character, the  
latter  see  only  the  halves  and  must  be  subjected  to  incentives  and  pressure  of  some  
intensity; it is the dictatorship of the proletariat being exercised not only upon the defeated  
class but also individually upon the victorious class.  (Guevara 1965)
At  the  same  time,  however,  he  signals  an  awareness  that  the  classic  vanguardist  framework  was  
insufficient to accommodate truly effective popular participation:
Looking at things from a superficial standpoint, it might seem that those who speak of the  
submission of the individual to the State  are right;  with incomparable enthusiasm and  
discipline, the mass carries out the tasks set by the government whatever their nature:  
economic, cultural, defense, sports, etc. The initiative generally comes from Fidel or the  
high command of the revolution; it is explained to the people, who make it their own....  
However, the State at times makes mistakes.... This mechanism is obviously not sufficient  
to  ensure  a  sequence  of  sensible  measures;  what  is  missing  is  a  more  structured  
relationship with the mass....  We are  seeking something new that will  allow a perfect  
identification  between the government  and the community  as  a  whole,  adapted to  the  
special  conditions  of  the  building  of  socialism  and  avoiding  to  the  utmost  the  
commonplaces of bourgeois democracy transplanted to the society in formation (such as  
legislative houses, for example). Some experiments have been carried out with the aim of  
gradually creating the institutionalization of the Revolution, but without too much hurry.  
We have been greatly restrained by the fear that any formal aspect might make us lose  
sight of the ultimate and most important revolutionary aspiration: to see man freed form  
alienation. (ibid.)
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In this desire for “a more structured relationship” that would “allow a perfect identification between the  
government  and  the  community  as  a  whole”  we  find  a  gesture  toward  Gramsci's  emphasis  on  the  
construction of a hegemonic bloc within a civil state. Indeed, although there is no direct evidence that  
Guevara read Gramsci, there was a definite affinity between their ideas (Kohan 1997, Massardo 1999;  
cited in Lambie 148). Translated versions of Gramsci's work first appeared in Latin America in 1958 and  
were available in Cuba during the 1960s, where they “had some influence on the intellectual debate”,  
although “those who took up his ideas were regarded as 'heretics'” ( ibid.).
In any case, Guevara's position had won out by 1966. Following the disastrous sugar harvest of  
1970, however, Cuba became increasingly dependent on the USSR and largely adopted its more orthodox,  
centralized, and technocratic economic policy in  which there was little concern for  participation and  
ideological transformation. This did not mean that Cuba had entirely abandoned the goal of incorporating  
popular participation within the political sphere, but a desire for stability overcome the Guevarist fear that  
institutionalization would lead to continued alienation. Thus, even as the state moved forward with a  
revitalization of the mass organizations and the institutionalization of the OPP framework, debate among  
Cuban intellectuals was stifled and “the works of Guevara and the few copies of Gramsci were also  
removed from bookshop shelves, and replaced by Soviet manuals and the writings of Nikita Khruschev,  
Leonid  Brezhnev  and  other  luminaries  of  'scientific  socialism'”  (Lambie  158).  From  that  point  on,  
structural experimentation was subordinate to the exigencies of stability.
This is not to say that wider circulation of the work of Gramsci – or any other theorist – would  
have led to a civil state in which popular participation extended to all spheres of decision-making. The  
point, rather, is that the political economic situation of the 1970s induced the Cuban leadership to restrain  
a very real impulse toward a framework for popular participation that could move beyond the top-heavy  
model of party vanguardism. Had this impulse not been so inchoate, and the theoretical framework for its  
instantiation so incipient, other routes may have been pursued. Instead, the system was institutionalized in  
a form that had only begun to move beyond the prevailing Marxist Leninist model of socialist hegemony.  
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This pattern is especially manifest in the history of Cuba's media system, where the constraints of a  
vanguardist framework persisted despite repeated acknowledgement of a need for change.
Lenin's  ideas circulated within Cuba during the decades prior to the revolution and Castro  is 
known to have read Lenin at least as early as his imprisonment from 1953 to 1955 (147). Whether or not  
he personally embraced Lenin's theory of the vanguard at that time is not known, but the labor-oriented  
clandestine paper  associated with his  July 26 Movement  was called Workers'  Vanguard ( Vanguardia 
Obrera), and Castro's prioritization of propaganda was made clear in letters to his collaborators:
Our mission now, I want you to be completely convinced, is not to organize revolutionary  
cells in order to have more or less men available; that would be a terrible mistake. Our  
immediate task is to mobilize public opinion in our favor; to spread our ideas and earn the  
support of the masses of the people. Our revolutionary program is the most complete, our  
line the most clear, and we have sacrificed the most: we have the right to earn the faith of  
the people, without which, I repeat a thousand times, there is no possibility of revolution.  
(cited in Harnecker 1985, 268-9; my translation) 60
Castro did indeed repeat himself on this point, writing in a separate letter: “I think that at this moment  
propaganda is vital; without propaganda there is no mass movement; and without a mass movement there  
is no possibility of revolution” (ibid.; my translation). 61 Propaganda remained a priority throughout the 
guerrilla campaign. Although the radio transmitter brought from Mexico in 1956 was lost in battle before  
it could be utilized (Soley & Nichols 1987, 167), Guevara reintroduced the idea of a clandestine radio  
station  in  late  1957.62 Despite  the  severely  limited  resources  at  his  disposal,  Castro  authorized  five  
hundred dollars for the project. Radio Rebelde (Rebellious Radio) went on the air in February 1958, and  
by the time of the revolutionary victory on January 1, 1959, it had grown into “the most sophisticated  
clandestine radio operation in the history of the western Hemisphere,” with “a network of 48 domestic  
60 “Nuestra misión ahora, quiero que se convenzan completamente, no es organizar células revolucionarias para 
poder disponer de más o menos hombres; eso sería un error funesto. La tarea nuestra ahora de inmediato es 
movilizar a nuestro favor la opinión pública; divulgar muestras ideas y ganarnos el respaldo de las masas del  
pueblo. Nuestro programa revolucionario es el más completo, nuestra línea la más clara, nuestra historia la 
más sacrificada: tenemos derecho a ganarnos la fe del pueblo. sin la cual, lo repito mi veces, no hay revolución 
posible.”
61 “Considero que en estos momentos la propaganda es vital; sin propaganda no hay movimiento de masas; y sin 
movimiento de masas no hay revolución posible.”
62 During the campaign Guevara also oversaw the publication of “a primitive mimeograph newspaper, El Cubano 
Libre, which was distributed in the guerilla zone” (Soley & Nichols  1987, 169).
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transmitters  linked  to  several  foreign  stations  [that]  could  be  heard  easily  throughout  the  entire  
Caribbean” (163).
The prioritization of vanguardist propaganda notwithstanding, it does not appear that Castro was  
planning  a  state-controlled  media  system  during  these  years.  In  interviews  with  North  American  
journalists  during  the  guerrilla  campaign  he  “repeatedly  promised  to  end  'arbitrary  censorship  and  
systematic  corruption'  and  to  restore  'full  and  untrammeled  freedom  of  public  information  for  all  
communication media"'.  He repeated those assertions upon his victorious arrival in  Havana (Nichols  
1979, 85) and again during a 1959 speech before the United Nations (Carty 1978 np). Indeed, until mid-
1960 “the media had considerable latitude to criticize the revolutionary government” (Nichols 1982c, 5).  
Criticism increased precipitously after  agrarian reforms were announced in May 1959, however,  and  
relations with commercial media outlets grew more tense. Then, in March 1960 US President Eisenhower  
approved a “powerful propaganda campaign” to influence the Cuban people and “essentially the same  
CIA team that had successfully overthrown the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954 went to work in 
planning a similar demise for the Castro government” (Soley & Nichols 177). As Guevara's warning  
proved prescient, “Castro felt that an adversary press was not functional to the process and, in late 1960,  
by intimidation, expropriation and economic pressures, he had closed most of the privately owned printed  
media and gained complete government ownership of the broadcasting media” (Nichols 1982c, 5). Of the  
six newspapers that remained in February of 1961, five were either government-owned or operated by  
government  supporters,  and  “[a]ll  previously  independent  magazines,  publishing  houses  and  film  
companies were then controlled by the government or had disappeared entirely”. Nonetheless, bookstores  
remained free to import and sell all manner of texts, Cuban writers remained unrestricted, and debates  
over the proper direction for the socialist government were conducted in literary journals, the cinema, and  
– to a  more limited degree – among competing newspapers (Nichols 1979, 87). Over the course of the  
decade,  however,  the press  would  be  increasingly  consolidated  and the  space for  intellectual  debate  
further restricted.
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During this period the government became increasingly committed to the Marxist-Leninist model  
of a vanguard press. In a 1965 interview Castro stated that “under the present circumstances journalism  
can have [no] function more important than that of contributing to the political and revolutionary goals of  
our country. We have a goal, a program, an objective to fulfill, and that objective essentially controls the  
activity of the journalists” (Nichols 1982c, 24). In that same year, the newspapers of Castro's 26 th of July 
Movement and the pre-revolutionary communist party were consolidated and converted into  Granma,63 
the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the newly reconstituted PCC, and vanguardist rhetoric  
was employed to justify  the continued consolidation of government control over the media. For example:
a very popular periodical, Cuba Socialista, which carried news of the party and analysis of  
political,  economic  and  social  conditions,  was  terminated  in  1967.  Officials  said  that  
Cubans  did  not  have  sufficient  political  education  to  appreciate  the  monthly  and that  
debate on the subjects it covered should be postponed. (Nichols 1979, 89)
In 1974, Ernesto Vera Méndez, then serving as President of the Union of Cuban Journalists ( Unión de  
Perodistas de Cuba / UPEC), wrote that the role of the Cuban press as an “...organizer of the masses  
[was] demonstrated by Lenin when he founded and encouraged the newspaper 'Iskra” in the preparatory  
stage of the October Revolution” (Vera Méndez 1974, 9; my translation). 64
When the mass media were accounted for within the post-1970 institutionalization of Cuba's  
hegemonic system, their role in the articulation of civil and political society was cast as secondary. For  
example, in 1975, the First Congress of the PCC adopted a resolution which declared the mass media to  
be an: “organic part  of the complex of institutions responsible for the moral, aesthetic, and political-
ideological  education  of  the  population”  whose  mission  was  “ to  complement the  process  of  direct 
communication with the masses, which is realized through the structure of the Party, the State, the Union  
of Communist Youth, and the social and mass organizations” (cited in Goutman 1979, 49; my emphasis  
63 The newspaper was named after the boat that brought Castro's guerrilla force from Mexico to Cuba in 1956.
64 “...organizadora de las masas [fue] demostrado por Lenin al fundar y alentar el periódico 'Iskra' en la etapa 
preparatoria de la Revolución de Octubre....”; Vera Méndez had a long career at the forefront of Cuba's press 
system, beginning in 1955 with his work for clandestine newspapers aligned with Castro's rebel movement. He 
was director of two prominent dailies from 1960 to 1965, when he became the founding director of Granma, the 
official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba and from then on one of only two nationally distributed 
dailies on the island. His tenure as President of Cuba's Union of Journalists lasted from 1966 until 1987.
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and translation).65 Some observers viewed this “supplanting of the mass media by the mass organizations  
as the principal means of mass communication” as “the revolutionary breakthrough in communication  
practice in Cuba” (Bresnahan 1985, 285), and indeed it might have been if, in actual practice, the mass  
organizations had truly facilitated a multi-directional, deliberative process by which civil society shaped  
the political decision-making process. As we have seen, however, this was not the case, and once this  
shortcoming is acknowledged, it becomes impossible to endorse celebratory pronouncements of a new  
transmission mechanism, such as the following: 
...talking about the media in Cuba is almost an indiscretion. Because political organization  
there  allows  for  communication  to  be  exercised  in  all  of  the  tasks  assumed  by  the  
population whether as a means of subsistence or in support of the revolutionary process  
proper. Is there any more effective and complete center of information than the [CDR] that,  
organized by the neighbors on each block, take care of everything from the distribution of  
elements  necessary  for  domestic  life  to  the  discussion  of  tasks  belonging  to  the  
construction of socialism, regarding literature, sport, the attitude of compañeros in shared 
work, etcetera? School, factory assemblies, the mass organizations, in the end … are all  
transmitters of information and political education. (Goutman 1979, 35-6; my emphasis  
and translation)66
Even if the mass organizations had succeeded in comprising a vibrant, deliberative, and directive civil  
society, there would still be a crucial need for the media to help coordinate their activity. As we have  
noted, community media outlets have the potential to serve as this articulating mechanism of civil society . 
The vanguardist framework adopted by the Cuban system, however, does not easily accommodate such a  
system. In fact, it has led Cuba's leaders to misinterpret this lack of articulation as a lack of criticism.
In a speech to Cuba's artists and intellectuals in June 1961, Castro famously asked: “What are the  
rights  of  revolutionary  or  non-revolutionary  writers  and  artists?  Within  the  Revolution,  everything;  
65 “...los medios de difusión masiva pasan a formar parte orgánica del complejo de instituciones responsabilizadas 
con la educación político-ideológica, moral y estética de la población y asumen la misión de complementar el 
proceso de comunicación directa con las masas, que se realiza a través de la estructura del Partido, del Estado, 
de la Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas. y de las organizaciones de masas y sociales.”
66 “… hablar de medios de comunicación en Cuba es casi una ligereza. Porque allí la organización política 
permite que la comunicación se ejerza en todas las tareas que la población asume ya como medio de 
subsistencia, ya como apoyo al proceso revolucionario propiamente dicho. ¿Hay algún centro de información 
más completo y eficaz que los comités de defensa de la Revolución que, organizados por los vecinos de cada 
manzana, se ocupan desde la distribución de los elementos necesarios para la vida doméstica hasta la discusión 
de las tareas propias a la construcción del socialismo, en los temas de la literatura, el deporte, la actitud de los  
compañeros en la tarea ·común, etcétera? La escuela, las asambleas de fábrica, la organización, finalmente, de 
los organismos de masa ... son todos órganos transmisores de información y educación política.”
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against the Revolution, no rights at all” (Castro 1961). While interpretation of this speech is debatable,  
Castro clearly did not mean to prohibit all forms of criticism, as he made clear in a 1965 interview with a  
US journalist:
There is very little criticism in the Cuban press. An enemy of Socialism cannot write in our  
newspapers – but we don't deny it, and we don't go around proclaiming a hypothetical  
freedom of the press where it actually doesn't exist, the way you people do. Furthermore, I  
admit that our press is deficient in this respect. I don't believe that this lack of criticism is a  
healthy thing. Rather, criticism is a very useful and positive instrument, and I think that all  
of us must learn to make use of it... (Nichols 1982c, 24)
This was hardly an isolated statement. Cuba's leadership would continue to recognize this deficiency and  
call for its amelioration. Speaking after the failed sugar harvest of 1970, Castro:
...maintained that the failure, in part, was due to an inbreeding of ideas. For the past few  
years, he had been hearing nothing but his own echo within his inner circle of advisers....  
He called on the masses to criticize government inefficiency (although not revolutionary  
goals) and to propose solutions to domestic problems and suggested that the press should  
be one of the channels for this new public dialogue. (Nichols 1979, 89)
In his main report to the Second Congress of the PCC in 1980, Castro noted that “[o]ne of the factors that  
contributed to a certain degree of laxity in socioeconomic activity was that frequently people were not as  
critical and self-critical as necessary” and he urged UPEC to “redouble its commitment to constructive  
criticism of the revolution”. During that same year, in a speech to UPEC's Fourth Congress, Raúl Castro  
had called on journalists to “...delve deeper into basic problems and place greater emphasis on questions  
that really define the progress being made in the construction of socialism.... Criticism within our ranks is  
a political duty and social responsibility”. 67
These  comments  were  only  reflections  of  a  document  produced in  1979  by  the  Ninth  Joint  
Session  of  the  Party's  Central  Committee,  titled  “Concerning  the  Strengthening  of  the  Exercise  of  
Criticism  in  the  Mass  Media”.  Among  its  main  points  were  that  “[c]riticism  is  a  constitutionally  
guaranteed right for all citizens”, that “effective criticism should be fraternal in spirit, constructive in  
67 Fidel Castro's brother Raúl commanded the eastern front during the guerrilla campaign and served as Minister of 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces from 1959 to 2008. In 1980 he was a member of the Central Committee of the 
PCC, Second Secretary of its Politburo, and First Vice President of the Cuban Council of State, the National 
Assembly, and the Council of Ministers.
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objectives, and precise in target,” and that the “mere process of criticism is educational for the masses and  
stimulated public participation in solving problems” (Nichols 1982b 102-3). Nonetheless, over a quarter  
of a century later, Raúl Castro would find himself once again calling – in 2006 – “for more self-criticism  
and open discussion in the state-run media” (Lambie 199) and – in 2011 – for a more professional press to  
help root out corruption (Ravsberg 2012).
The obvious question, it would seem, is why the lack of criticism within the press has not been  
rectified throughout all these decades. Cuban leaders have emphasized the “professionalism” of the press  
and  critiqued  its  rhetorical  style, 68 but  the  answer  lies  in  a  fundamental  structural  problem.  Cuba's  
vanguardist framework casts the press as a mechanism for articulating an a priori ideologically correct 
leadership to the a priori ideologically immature masses. So long as it remains structured as a mechanism  
for this type of top-down transmission, the press will be unable to generate the self-conscious criticism  
that the leadership continues to request and that the people doubtlessly want. That reflexivity would have  
to be generated through a process of open dialogue within a more autonomous civil society than has  
existed in revolutionary Cuba (cf. Sakamoto 1997, 208). As we have seen, however, Cuba's leadership  
rejected an autonomous civil society as necessarily liberal, bourgeois, and corrupted. This dilemma lies at  
the heart of Cuba's media problem and it remains unsolved.
One significant obstacle has been the degree to which Cuba's unions restrict access to the media.  
All professional print journalists, for example, must belong to UPEC and:
[t]hose who violate  union policies can lose their  accreditation and, thus,  their  right to  
publish. The unions also have less overt methods of controlling their membership, such as  
the power to select the writers who will be published by the major publishing houses,  
publication of journalism or literary reviews that criticize deviations from policy, regular  
evaluations of writers' work as a basis for pay raises, and the responsibility for ideological  
and technical training of their members. (Nichols 1982c, 15)
Here, then, is an example of how Cuba's hegemonic system, in which civil society organizations are  
tightly tethered to the state, has severely restricted the degree to which citizens can participate in civic  
68 For instance, the 1979 PCC Central Committee document stated that “[j]ournalistic style should be less 
mechanical and more creative” and “[t]he use of humor as a creative tool for making media messages more 
readable and convincing was specifically mentioned” (Nichols 1982b 103).
84
activity. Some attempts have been made to mitigate these restrictions in the media sector. For example,  
UPEC established a Voluntary Correspondents' Movement within which, by 1974, over 15,000 workers  
and members of the mass organizations had participated. Ostensibly, this was to allow non-professionals  
to express their own perspective. At the same time, since many of the volunteers were participants in the  
mass organizations, there was some potential for further articulation of state-sanctioned civil society (Vera  
Méndez 11). These volunteers, however, were reported to have been “recruited, indoctrinated and trained  
to collect and write articles for the provincial and national media” (Nichols 1982c, 18), implying that they  
still had to pass through a double filter of ideological orientation and editorial review. Not surprisingly,  
therefore, one observer has characterized the output as consisting chiefly of “dull propaganda, rather than  
objective news articles” (Carty, np). Here again, participation was largely limited to voluntaristic service  
to the goals of the revolutionary project. In any case, the volunteer contribution seems to have never  
reached more than a small fraction of the items published, with one content analysis of four major print  
publications finding that it represented only 0.4 percent in 1970, 1.5 percent in 1975, and 1.3 percent in  
1980 (Nichols 1982b, 93).69
Letters and other forms of feedback represent another channel of public participation in Cuba's  
media  system.  Though letters-to-the-editor  had  previously  been  published  in  Cuban magazines,  they  
began to appear in newspapers only in 1974. As a complement to the incipient popular power system, 70 
Granma “launched a 'consumer action' column used to force bureaucrats to account for their mistakes and  
inefficiency and to relay reader concerns to the government” (Nichols 1979, 93). 71 Juventud Rebelde later 
followed  suit  and,  in  a  similar  vein,  the  national  radio  system broadcast  a  “weekly  program titled  
'Criticism of Radio and Television' in which audience members are encouraged to write or call in with  
69 The publications were Granma, Juventud Rebelde (see following note), Verde Olivo (Olive Green, the magazine 
of the Cuban armed forces), and Bohemia, a non-specialized cultural magazine.
70 Although the Popular Power system was instituted nationwide in 1976, a pilot program was set up in 1974 in 
Matanzas province.
71 The column itself invited letters “soliciting specific information, offering suggestions for journalistic 
assignments, to make known some fact or outstanding event, or to demand some information or answer on 
diverse subjects of general interest" (Rodriguez 1978, 56).
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their comments on programming on Cuban broadcasting”. The public definitely took advantage of the  
opportunity,  with  some  media  receiving  “as  many  as  1,000  letters  per  week”  (Nichols  1982,  17), 72 
although as a percentage of total content, citizen feedback remained minimal. In 1975 they made up only  
0.7 percent of total items in Granma, though by 1980 the figures stood at 2.7 percent in Juventud Rebelde  
and 2.1 percent in Vanguardia, the official PCC daily for the province of Santa Clara. 73
In the case of Granma, at least, these columns were subject to an editorial filter, as “[t]he letters  
were  rarely  produced verbatim,  but  rather  were  excerpted,  explained,  or  reported  by  an  editor,  who  
usually gave the writer's name and address.” Multiple letters on similar subjects were often treated with a  
single reply (Rodriguez 1978, 53). Nonetheless, the letters played a truly critical role, as “some readers  
actually  [did]  make  complaints,  protests,  and  demands”  (54),  while  “[e]ditors  usually  responded  by  
consulting  the  appropriate  authorities,  printing  their  recommendations,  and  doing  some investigative  
reporting of their own” (57). One content analysis of letters referenced in  Granma between 1974 and 
1976 found that 36 percent could be classified as negative, 10 percent positive, and 54 percent “neither  
positive nor negative, but rather of an information or service/favor-demanding nature”. Negative criticism  
was sometimes directed against the behavior of fellows citizens, or the newspaper itself, but more often  
addressed the functioning of “the state, its bureaucracies, and the national economic system” (62). For  
example, relatively common themes included “irregularities or deficiencies in pricing”, “availability of  
services” such as mass transit or garbage collection, or the quality of state-produced bread and ice cream  
(57-8). Grander ideological themes, however, such as  revolutionary ideals, were never addressed. Also  
conspicuously absent from the column were references to important internal political issues, such as the  
deployment of the Cuban military to  Angola or the project for a new constitution (60). In 1980 the  
72 The editor of Juventud Rebelde reported that “his paper receives 800-900 letters per week and part of the reason 
for the daily's expansion from four to six pages [was] to handle the influx of letters” (Nichols 1979, 93).
73 Citizen feedback, in the study cited, was defined as “[l]etters-to-the-editor, essays, and so forth written by 
readers, ordinary citizens, and others desiring to comment on public matters” (Nichols 1982b 101). As discussed 
below, by 1980 Granma had ceased running the letters column, which had been transferred to the the regional 
party newspapers. In 1970, 75, and 80, citizen feedback as a percentage of total items for Verde Olivo stood at 
3.2, 1.2, and 3.9 (respectively) and for Bohemia at 1.1, 3.8, and 3.4.
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feedback mechanism was geographically decentralized, with the column  moving from  Granma  to the 
provincial dailies. On one hand, this shift can be interpreted as contributing to greater efficiency and  
efficacy, since much of the feedback already pertained to more local matters and was therefore better  
handled by the regional press. On the other hand, one observer suggested that “by handling a complaint in  
the fragmented environment of the municipality, the government prevents a snowball effect of complaints  
that might occur if it appeared in the national media” (Nichols 1982b, 102).
Ultimately,  outside  of  providing  another  channel  for  government  officials  to  gauge  public  
opinion, this type of feedback did little to increase participation in decision-making. In fact, it sometimes  
provided yet another platform for vanguardism, as:
[e]ditors and official respondents [were] quick to use those opportunities easily identifiable  
as  constructive  criticism  not  only  to  moralize  to  the  readership  but  also  to  use  
revolutionary  rhetoric  to  encourage  specific  policies  and  behaviors.  Thus,  the  column  
[could] be useful to the regime as an instrument of transmission for "revolutionary themes"  
and values to be internalized... (59)
Meanwhile, although on occasion a letter was sent in the name of a local CDR, the columns did not  
enable Cuban civil society organizations to collectively respond to the issues raised. In fact, they can be  
interpreted to have had an opposite effect, as they were to some extent “treated by the reading public ... as  
an alternative to social action and demand making from both the personal and collective levels”  (63; my 
emphasis).  Also,  as  suggested  above,  geographical  decentralization  further  reduced  the  potential  for  
coordinated  civil  action.74 Thus,  while  the  letters  columns  may  have  created  a  limited  avenue  for  
reflexivity, there was no increase in autonomy for Cuban civil society.
Another form of increased decentralization within the print media during this period may also  
have  been  an  attempt  to  respond  to  appeals  by  Cuban  leaders  for  increased  criticism.   This  effort  
involved the diversification of content producers, as “major sectors” of Cuba's hegemonic system “gained  
74 Meanwhile, the Cuban broadcasting sector, which since the revolution had been more tightly controlled than any 
other, became even more centralized. Studios for the national broadcasters (five radio and two television) had 
long been located in Havana, where the majority of programming for the regional radio networks was also 
produced. In 1978, a “third television channel which was centered in an eastern province and carried regional 
programming was consolidated into the national networks” (Nichols 1982c, 6).
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control of their own media” or “upgraded the media they previously controlled”. This resulted in the  
publication  of  over  50  magazines  and  journals,  each  “governed  by  a  specific  sector  of  the  Cuban  
government or by one of the mass organizations”. Cuba's state-sanctioned civil society thus had a means  
of expression free from direct supervision that allowed “greater latitude to comment on political issues”  
from the perspective of their constituents. These publications were nonetheless restricted by the same  
tight  tethers  between  civil  society  and  the  state,  so  that  “party  ideological  planners  and  central  
government officials ha[d] coordinating powers and considerable influence on matters of policy” (Nichols  
1982c, 6-7).
Although academic attention has been scant, there is little to suggest that the broad contours of  
the  Cuban  media  system have  changed  drastically  over  the  last  three  decades.  Despite  the  popular  
stereotype, the system is not a uni-central fount of hagiographic lies. The Cuban people have access to  
reliable information about internal developments and external affairs. There have been acts of overt state  
censorship and space for debate and criticism is restricted, especially in the broadcast media.  State-
controlled cinema production, on the other hand, has generally provided significant leeway for cultural  
and political critique. What has been largely absent, however, has been a mechanism for autonomous  
coordination between civil society groups. As will be reviewed below, there are indications that new  
opportunities for this type of activity may have begun to develop in the period following the collapse of  
the Soviet Union, when Cuba's economic structure was once again thrown into disarray. Before reviewing  
these changes, however, we will examine two other Latin American approaches toward the organization  
of a socialist media system.
Chile's Popular Unity Government (1970 – 73): Vanguardism and Participatory Communication  
within a Liberal Civil Society Framework
The circumstances in which Chile's Popular Unity (Unidad Popular / UP) administration rose to 
power in 1970 are in several important respects diametrically opposed to the Cuban experience. Whereas  
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Cuba's post-colonial political history was marked by overt US intervention, significant  corruption, and 
multiple coups, by 1970 Chile’s multi-party democratic tradition was among the most robust and longest  
standing in Latin America. Whereas Cuban socialism emerged from the military victory of a popular  
egalitarian  nationalist  guerrilla  movement  over  a  widely  detested  military  tyrant,  Chile's  socialist  
administration resulted from the union of multiple leftist parties behind a prominent career politician who  
won a three-candidate presidential election with a bare plurality of the popular vote. Thus, whereas the  
Cuban revolutionary leadership was able to consolidate all political and economic power with the backing  
of a majority of the population, the UP's hold on executive power was severely restricted by its minority  
position in the congress, a lack of sympathy from key members of both the judiciary and the military, and  
outright opposition from a powerful bourgeoisie. An understanding of this radically distinct context is  
critical to any discussion of the communications policy of the short lived UP government, which was  
overthrown by a brutal military coup in September 1973. 
The Chilean left had practiced a coalitional form of electoral politics for decades. Since the early  
1950s, the primary powers had been the Communist Party ( Partido Comunista / PC) and the Socialist 
Party (Partido Socialista / PS). The Soviet-oriented PC generally adhered to the orthodox Marxist “stages  
of history” theory, although adapted to the Chilean context (Casals 2010, 50). PC leaders, therefore, were  
inclined  to  form  coalitions  with  centrist  parties,  so  long  as  they  represented  a  “progressive,  anti-
oligarchic, anti-imperialist, and anti-feudal” bourgeoisie (44, my translation). 75 The PS, on the other hand, 
generally opposed building coalitions with centrist parties representing the bourgeoisie. Both of the leftist  
parties,  however,  envisioned  a  pacific  “Chilean  road  to  socialism”  that  adhered  to  the  institutional  
framework of liberal representative democracy as a “legitimate and feasible way toward the structural  
modification of the social order in the socialist perspective” (58). 76
Castro's victory in Cuba had provided a new paradigm for socialist revolution in Latin America,  
75 All quotes from Casals are my translation.; “progresista, antioligárquica, antiimperialista y antifeudal”
76 “...un camino legítimo y factible de modificación estructural del orden social en la perspectiva del socialismo.”
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however, and new tensions developed within the Chilean left during the 1960s. A significant portion of  
the  PS  was  enticed  by  the  idea  of  armed  rebellion  and  a  contingent  of  radical  students  eventually  
separated from the party in 1964. The following year they formed the Revolutionary Left Movement  
(Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria /  MIR) around a Marxist-Leninist ideology inspired by the  
Cuban experience. Meanwhile, the radicalized climate of the late 1960s also led younger members of the  
then-governing centrist Christian Democratic Party (Democracia Cristiana / DC) to split off and form, in  
1969, the Popular Unitary Action Movement (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario / MAPU). It was 
in this radicalized climate that the UP –  which included the PS, PC, and MAPU, along with the more  
moderate Radical and Social Democratic Parties, but not the MIR 77 – endorsed Allende,  a multiple-term 
Senator and leader of the PS, as its candidate for the 1970 presidential election.
Allende won a tight three-way race with only a  plurality  of the popular  vote,  less  than two  
percentage points ahead of his closest challenger, Jorge Allesandri of the conservative National Party  
(Partido Nacional / PN).78 According to Chile’s 1925 constitution, if no presidential candidate received a  
majority  of  the  popular  vote,  the  contest  was  to  be  decided  by  a  vote  in  congress.  Traditionally,  
ratification of the leading candidate in cases such as these had been a mere formality and the 1970 result  
was not without precedent; it was more or less the inverse of the 1958 election, in which Alessandri had  
won a five-way race with under a third of the popular vote, less than three percentage points ahead of  
Allende.79 Nonetheless, the outcome of the 1970 congressional vote was very much up in the air as a  
result of the radicalized climate of Chilean politics.
Both the PN and the DC had long been suspicious of the Chilean left's links with the Soviet  
Union, and those suspicions were now compounded by support on the left for the Cuban revolution. The  
77 Allende's nephew, Andrés Pascal Allende, was an early leader in the MIR, which did not officially join the UP 
but supported Allende's administration despite its criticism of the reformist path.
78 Different sources provide slightly varying results. Allende is generally credited with between 36.2 and 36.6 
percent of the popular vote, Allesandri with between 34.9 and 35.2 percent, and Radomiro Tomic of the DC with 
between 27.8 and 28.2 percent (see Francis 1973, Needler 1977).
79 Allende had been a founding member of one section of the PS in 1937. He had run unsuccessfully for president 
in 1952, 1956, 1960, and 1964. He had served in the lower house of the Chilean Congress from 1937-41 and in 
the Senate since 1945, including as President of the Senate from 1966-69.
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US government, meanwhile, which had long been wary of Allende, had actively intervened during and  
after the election in an attempt to keep him out of power. This intervention included not only pressuring  
the Chilean Congress to select Alessandri, but also covert support for a botched military coup that led to  
the kidnapping and murder of General René Schneider, Chile's highest ranking military officer. These  
schemes backfired, as Schneider's murder led a horrified Chilean Congress to refuse to undermine the  
constitutional order by selecting Alessandri over Allende. The DC also sought to guarantee that order,  
however,  by  making  its  ratification  of  Allende  contingent  upon  his  agreement  to  a  “Constitutional  
Guarantees  Pact”  that  “limited government  interference in  the  legal  framework surrounding political  
parties, the educational system, the ‘free press,’ and the armed forces” (Aguilera & Fredes 2003, 73).  In 
essence, the DC sought to respect the electoral decision while ensuring that the UP would not take Chile  
down the Cuban path of single party, authoritarian hegemony.
The Constitutional Guarantees Pact actually comprised two laws, the first of which, The Statute  
of Democratic Guarantees (Law 17.398), “guaranteed the right of all individuals and political parties to  
publish newspapers and magazines and operate radio stations”, required congressional approval for the  
expropriation  of  any  existing  media,  and  barred  “any  discrimination  by  state-owned  companies  in  
imports,  licensing, or the distribution of papers,  ink or printing equipment” (Catalán 1988,  51).  The  
second piece of legislation was a television law, the basis for which had been proposed earlier in 1970 by  
the DC. In its final form, this law formalized the sector's existing structure by granting broadcast licenses  
to the executive branch of the national government as well as the University of Chile and the Catholic  
Universities  of  Santiago  and  Valparaíso.80 It  specified  that  40  percent  of  government  funding  for  
80 By the time television was introduced to Chile in the early 1960s, the development of radio had left policy 
makers leery of commercialized mass culture. At the same time, intensifying power struggles between the 
various parties made the state an undesirable administrator of television operations. “Hence, by exclusion rather 
than any specific policy, television was assigned to the universities”, which were the only public institutions 
“considered free from political manipulation and commercial exploitation”. Television was expected to follow in 
the tradition of extension education in the arts and music but, unable to produce sufficient programming, the 
universities began selling advertising space and showing cheap imported material, primarily from the US. After 
winning the presidency in 1966, the DC shifted media power away from the conservative parties via a series of 
actions that included the creation of a national television station (Catalán 1988, 47-9).
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television would go to the national station and 20 percent to each of the university stations and, as an  
additional source of financing, it allowed for up to six minutes of advertising per hour. The law also  
guaranteed airtime to the established political parties in proportion to the votes they had received in the  
previous  parliamentary  election.  Additionally,  the  law  institutionalized  governance  of  the  television  
sector.  First,  it  established  a  National  Television  Council,  composed  of  representatives  from  the  
presidency, the congress, and the Supreme Court, as well as the presidents of and employees from each of  
the stations, to oversee the system. Second, it declared that station presidents would be appointed by the  
Chilean President and ratified by the Senate. Third, it mandated oversight of the university station by  
University Corporations composed of university officials and advisors (50). In a related move, in January  
of 1971, the opposition controlled congress enacted a series of constitutional reforms, one of which “gave  
both the government and the universities the right to set up and operate television channels,” thus making  
it  “possible for the opposition to  set  up new channels in any university” (53).  Taken together,  these  
measures ensured that UP influence within the television sector would be checked at all levels. 
The broad result of these legal maneuvers was to guarantee the preservation of a pluralist and  
autonomous civil society according to a liberal framework. While television had been institutionalized as  
a special case, it was nonetheless partially opened to commercial operation. For the remainder of the  
media system the Constitutional Guarantees meant a continuance of the primarily commercial orientation  
that was implicit in the 1925 constitution, which constructed freedom of expression not:
as a right in itself but as a freedom of the individual to manifest his or her own thought.  
There is a basic difference. As long as it is not a right, there is no application to a group….  
The notion of freedom means that everybody can exercise it but without having the social  
and economic conditions that would make it possible.  (Mera & Ruiz 1990, 25)
As a result, the practice of freedom of expression had been restricted to the “hegemonic sector … [that]  
had the wealth to buy and maintain a medium of communication … [and] present its own political and  
cultural values in a favorable light” ( ibid.). This critique, which aligns with Marx's critique of civil society  
as a transmission belt for bourgeois values, was widely shared amongst supporters of the UP. Mattelart,  
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for example, declared in no uncertain terms that “the freedom of press in a bourgeois society is only the  
freedom of property” (1971, 128). Allende himself had invoked the same critique when, in a speech to the  
Senate  following  his  defeat  in  the  1964  presidential  election,  he  recognized  that  “[t]he  tremendous  
strength of the mass media in the hands of powerful national and international economic sectors hinders  
the electoral struggle of the popular movements, even when they are a majority” (Catalán 52). Indeed,  
throughout the late 1960s, as Latin American communications researchers extended the arguments of  
economic dependency theory to the media, the Chilean left had increasingly incorporated the issue into its  
platforms and rhetoric (ibid.).81 
Despite this explicit critique of the commercial media, however, and despite the more general  
trend of radicalism on the Chilean left and within Allende's own PS, the constitutional guarantees were  
probably  not  solely  nor  even  predominately  responsible  for  the  maintenance  of  Chile's  institutional  
framework under the UP. Given the UP's weak hold on state power and the obvious evidence of plots  
against the administration, Allende was all too aware that maintaining legitimacy was essential to any  
hope of further advance. In fact, the opposition continuously warned of the supposed threat to a “free  
press” that was represented by UP policies and Allende went out of his way to avoid playing into this  
trap.
As we have seen though, Allende had long been committed to a “Chilean road to socialism” that  
passed through the institutional structures of liberal political theory. His support for a pluralist media  
sector was therefore anchored in a long term political strategy that ran much deeper than a mere defensive  
reaction to oppositional attacks. He sought to reassure doubters on this point:
I want to insist that Chile is not a socialist country, and my government is not a socialist  
government. Neither, as the press likes to say, is it a Marxist government. I am a Marxist,  
that’s  something  else.  But  the  government  is  made  up  of  Marxists,  laymen,  and  
Christians.  This is  a popular,  democratic,  national revolutionary government which is  
anti-imperialist.  There  is  genuine  democracy  here.  There  is  incredible  freedom here,  
particularly freedom of the press and freedom of speech. (Allende 1973, np)
He also candidly disavowed any intention to emulate the Cuban path even as he lauded it:
81 On dependency theory and communication studies, see chapter 1.
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The revolution that we want to carry out, without social cost and according to our history,  
is  very different  from the heroically  and dramatically  thriving Cuban revolution that I  
know deeply, because I've been in Cuba more than ten times and because I have the right  
to say that I was a friend of Che Guevara, I'm a friend of Fidel Castro, which doesn't imply  
that I  separate and distinguish the cuban reality, fighting against a standing and brutal  
Batista dictatorship of yesterday, and the Chilean reality that didn't combat a dictatorship  
but a regime and a system, a  revolution that reached power with arms in hand and a  
revolution that we're going to carry out via legal channels according to our commitment to  
the people. (Lihn 1971, 31)82
Allende thus rejected the Scientific Marxist implication that civil society was necessarily bourgeois and 
must be subsumed by the state. Rather, he remained confident that a political movement could overcome  
the structural constraints of the liberal framework in order to organize and mobilize a popular social  
movement that, once it reached critical mass, would ultimately restructure that framework and remove the  
obstacles to a socialist system. He reiterated this point on the first anniversary of his election: “…one has  
to  be aware of  what  Chilean life  is  and of the path that is  authentically  ours,  which is  the path of  
pluralism, democracy, and freedom, the path that opens the doors of socialism” (Allende 2000, 123-4). In  
this sense, his position was closer to that of Gramsci, who advocated for the construction of a counter-
hegemonic civil society movement that would ultimately subsume the state. For Allende, UP control of 
the executive branch was one more tool available for this larger task. We can therefore see Allende's  
conception of executive power as converging with the Gramscian notion of a civil state apparatus whose  
role is to facilitate popular organization within a relatively autonomous civil society.
Within this broad conceptualization, however,  the UP's constituent parties were never able to  
agree on a unified framework for communications policy.  The PC, for its part, was most interested in the  
greater circulation of so-called “high culture,” which it considered to belong to a “universal patrimony.”  
In opposition to this viewpoint, some sectors of the PS, joined by the MAPU, argued that the goal should 
82 All quotations from Lihn are my translation.; “Es muy distinta la revolución que queremos hacer, nosotros, sin 
costo social y de acuerdo con nuestra historia, a la heroica y dramáticamente pujante revolución cubana que yo 
conozco a fondo, porque he estado más de diez veces en Cuba y porque sí tengo el derecho a decir que fui amigo 
del Che Guevara, soy amigo de Fidel Castro, lo cual no implíca que separe y distinga la realidad cubana 
luchando contra una dictadura enhiesta y brutal de ayer de Batista, y la realidad chilena que no combatió 
contra una dictadura sino contra un régimen y un sistema, una revolución que alcanzó el poder con las armas 
en la mano y una revolución que vamos a hacer por los cauces legales de acuerdo con el compromiso del 
pueblo."
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be to nurture an existent popular counter-culture. Additionally, more militant members of the PS, along  
with the MIR, advocated for a new, alternative culture that emphasized active participation and would  
transform the Chilean populace into militant and creative revolutionaries (Catalán et. al. 1987, 35-7).  
Each of these three positions can be seen as a distinct interpretation of the relationship between the state  
and civil society. In the first, the role of the state was to elevate the masses to a higher cultural position,  
thus reconstructing civil society according to preconceived notions. In the second, the role of the state was  
to shape the cultural energy of the masses, thus forming and channeling an existent but limited civil  
society. In the third, the role of the state was to organize opportunities for the masses to express and  
evolve their own culture, thus nurturing and expanding an incipient civil society. The latter strategy held  
the  greatest  potential  for  instantiating  an  effective  civil  state  according  to  the  Gramscian  counter-
hegemonic framework.83
Each of the three strategies found some expression in UP communications policy, which can been  
usefully understood as an interaction of four modalities (37-38). A first and largely indirect modality  
hinged on UP economic policy (including fixed prices, import restrictions, differentiated tariff structures,  
etc.), which impelled private enterprises within the media sector to adopt a “conservative and cautious  
attitude that definitively slowed any impulse toward renovation and expansion” ( ibid.; my translation).84 
Also,  because  other  sectors  of  the  economy were  similarly  affected,  decreased  advertising  revenues  
further  constrained  commercial  media  operations  (Schiller  & Smythe  1972,  39).  A second modality  
concerned the continuation and intensification of the previous (DC) government’s support for popular  
cultural organizations, resulting in a notable increase in their output, “although with highly accentuated  
83 Subercaseaux (2003) has interpreted UP cultural policy as a “policy of extension” (política extensionista) that, 
on one hand, sought to integrate a bourgeois, middle class culture with not only the popular but also the subaltern 
cultures of the society, and, on the other hand, sought to create “a New Popular Culture that would gradually 
acquire a hegemonic character” (una Nueva Cultura Popular, que debía adquirir gradualmente un carácter 
hegemónico) (270). This schema generally concords with that offered by Catalán et. al. and reenforces our view 
of the UP as moving toward the instantiation of a civil state. By more precisely identifying the various tendencies 
and also linking them to specific parties, however, the tripartite schema that we have borrowed from Catalan et. 
al. facilitates a more nuanced analysis.
84 All quotations from Catalán et al. are my translation.; “una actitud conservadora y cautelosa que en definitiva 
frenó todo impulso a su renovación y expansión”
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politico-militant connotations” (Catalán et. al. 37). 85 The third modality involved the acquisition of private  
companies, including the country's largest publishing house, a record label, and the telecommunications  
monopoly, which were then operated as state enterprises (37). The final modality resulted from a set of  
legal initiatives and institutional redefinitions that, given the disparate perspectives of the UP's various  
constituents, produced “not only a legislative impasse but a high degree of operative incoherence” as each  
faction used whatever influence it could muster to direct individual government entities according to their  
own theoretical position (38).86
The latter two of these modalities are nicely illustrated by the UP acquisition of Editorial Zig Zag,  
the massive publishing entity that had dominated the Chilean magazine sector, publishing 40 titles with a  
total monthly circulation of over 5 million. Zig Zag's catalog included Selecciones del Reader’s Digest 
(the spanish-language version of Reader's Digest), Telguía (the Chilean TV Guide), and a host of others 
that imitated the style of US magazines. 87 It also held a near monopoly on cinema fan magazines and  
photo-romances (Schiller & Smythe 38). 88 Zig Zag was owned by a Chilean investment group linked to  
the DC, but following the 1970 elections a workers' strike and pressure from the UP led the principal  
shareholder to sell (ibid.; “El Fin de Zig Zag” 1971; Mattelart 1980 [1974], 4; Subercaseaux 2003, 271).  
Thus,  in  February  1971,  the  government  “obtained  the  physical  properties  and  the  rights  to  certain  
magazines, Zig-Zag’s big debt, and a labor force of about 1,000 workers”. Zig-Zag, meanwhile, remained  
a legal entity with rights to some of its magazines, which were from then on “printed under contract by  
the new government publishing house” (Schiller & Smythe 38). Under this arrangement, “[t]he [DC]  
continue[d] to control all  North American comics published in Chile (between 650,000 and 750,000  
copies per month)” (Mattelart 1980 [1974], 94). The new state run company was named Quimantú. 89 
85 “aunque con connotaciones político-militantes muy acentuadas”
86 “no sólo un impasse legislativo sino también un alto grado de incoherencia operativa”
87 The company's name, Zig Zag, was taken from the “widely sold local imitation of Life magazine” (Schiller & 
Smythe 38) that had for decades been the enterprise's flagship title.
88 The term “photo-romance” refers to adult-themed pulp fiction magazines whose panel layout resembles a comic 
strip but makes use of photos, as opposed to drawings.
89 The name was derived from the Mapuche indigenous language (kim: to know, antu: sun) and suggests the “idea 
of a state protective of cultural patrimony” (la idea de un Estado protector del patrimonio cultural) 
96
Despite  acquiring  the  rights  to  Selecciones  del  Reader’s  Digest and  Visión,  a  transposed  American 
magazine  (International  Organization  of  Journalists  1974b,  61),  Quimantú  took  on  a  much different  
editorial policy than its precursor.
Whereas Zig-Zag had focused primarily on magazines, Quimantú drastically expanded its book  
publishing operations, which were structured according to three fundamental objectives (Catalán et. al.  
45). The first of these – the massive growth of book consumption – was decisively attained. By 1972,  
Quimantú was publishing in one month the amount of books that Zig-Zag had published in a year, a rate  
four times greater than Chile's total output prior to the UP. Prices, meanwhile, were considerably reduced,  
as a result of both the high volume and Quimantú's ability to operate at a loss (see below). In fact, a  
portion of the production was distributed without cost (Subercaseaux 2003, 281). Of the remainder, some  
70  percent  were  sold  through  an  innovative  and  “profound  transformation  of  the  traditional  book  
marketing system” in which,  alongside the usual  bookstores,  distribution took place through “a vast  
network”  that  included  “newspaper  kiosks  and  even  non-commercial  sites  such  as  labor  unions,  
neighborhood councils, cultural organizations, etc.” and was thus accessible by almost all social sectors  
(Catalán et. al.  45). A vast increase in book consumption was thus made possible by several factors,  
including favorable economic conditions (reduced prices, high employment, and a relative scarcity of  
other consumer goods), the incorporation of new social actors within the cultural sphere, and a political 
project that emphasized the social value of knowledge among all classes (Subercaseaux 2003, 283).
Quimantú's second objective was “the diffusion of a national and universal literary heritage”,  
which responded to the cultural strategy advanced by the PC and was especially evident in a collection  
called “Quimantú For Everyone” (Quimantú para todos)  in which great works of national and world  
literature were printed in runs of up to 50,000 copies. In roughly two and a half years, 44 titles and over  
one million copies were produced within this series. Authors included Gorki, García Lorca,  Chekov,  
Neruda,  and  Rojas  (a  Chilean  novelist),  among  others.  In  a  similar  vein,  Quimantú  also  published  
(Subercaseaux 2003, 272).
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“Minibooks” (Minilibros), a series of pocket books printed in runs of 50,000 to 80,000 copies whose 55  
titles amounted to 3,660,000 total copies in circulation and included authors from Europe (23), the US  
(12), the USSR (8), and Latin America (12). Other collections focused on more experimental authors and  
children's literature (Catalán et. al. 45-6; Subercaseaux 2003).
Additional collections addressed Quimantú's third objective, which was to promulgate socialist  
theory  and  political  thought.  “Open  Path”  (Camino  Abierto)  and  “Popular  Education  Notebooks” 
(Cuadernos de Educación Popular) were “explicitly designed to promote the classic works of Marxism  
and the political thought of the Chilean Left” (which had the added effect of producing “disputes and  
polemics” among Quimantú workers aligned with the various parties of the UP coalition). Meanwhile,  
“We the Chileans” (Nosotros los Chilenos) encompassed works of a “historical-testimonial nature [and]  
sought the most outstanding expressions of what might be called the national popular identity of Chilean  
society” (Catalán et. al. 46).
We can see, therefore, that Quimantú's book division predominately catered to the PC tendency of  
promoting high culture, although “We the Chileans” coincided more with the PS/MAPU inclination to  
engage with an existent popular counterculture. Within the magazine publishing division, however, the  
latter was prioritized. In this medium, Quimantú sought to “substitute a group outlook for the prevailing 
individualistic one,” to respect and promote indigenous capabilities at the expense of foreign styles, and  
to avoid “superman heroics and similar escapist means of handling social problems” (Schiller & Smythe  
39).  These  goals  found  form  in  magazines  known  as  las  contra (as  in  counter-culture  or  counter-
hegemonic), “which maintained the classic comic book format but attempted to emit a cultural message  
that was not angry but in solidarity with the process of transformations put forth by the [UP]”. One new  
title was:
Cabrochico, a new comic book intended to compete with the Disney product…. The first  
issue carried an updated version of the old Puss’n’Boots fairy tale, only in this rendition  
the castle which the cat delivers to his master is returned to the peasants who work its  
land.
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Other examples include  Firme,  “a weekly comic book [offering] simple explanations of the complex  
social changes occurring in the country”; Paloma, a women’s magazine; and two new journals directed  
toward young workers and “youth who are neither political nor organized” (Catalán et. al. 46).
Almost  entirely  unrepresented  by  Quimantú's  output,  however,  is  the  PS/MIR  emphasis  on  
popular  participation.  Outside  of  one  small  and  short-lived  youth  journalism  initiative  that  will  be  
discussed below, this tendency was only expressed to the extent that Quimantú books were incorporated  
into literacy campaigns,  both  government  sponsored and otherwise,  which  sought  to  address  Chile’s  
illiteracy rates of 10 percent in urban areas and 16 percent nationally (Catalán 1988, 45). Though inspired  
by the Cuban experience, Chilean literacy educators were also able to draw on Paulo Freire's radical  
participatory pedagogy, which he had been developing and publishing in Chile following his forced exile  
from Brazil in 1964. The following anecdote, related by a 40 year-old MAPU activist and full-time trade  
union  organizer,  nicely  illustrates  the  potential  of  these  programs  in  combination  with  Quimantú’s  
editorial policy:
All this time I’d had no connection with any political party. Then I came into contact with  
some young people working in a literacy programme. They were using the methods of  
Paulo Freire,  which include the raising of political  awareness.  One day I  heard Freire  
speak, and we got into a debate – I felt he was overlooking things which were important to  
factory workers. Later we came to know one another, and this got me reading seriously.  
Marx,  especially.  It  wasn’t  easy,  but  what  gripped me was  how it  explained  my own  
experience. The reading was a real struggle though. Some nights I’d sleep only two or  
three hours,  I’d read and read, and even so I  might cover only twenty pages – I  was  
determined to take it all in. I’d left school at twelve, you see, and although I’d learnt to  
read and write I was functionally illiterate. Like most Chileans I’d had nothing to read.  
(Henfrey & Sorj 1977, 41)
Not  all  Chilean  workers,  of  course,  had  the  benefit  of  conversing  with  Freire  himself.  Moreover,  
Quimantú seems to have not  coordinated its  content and distribution in close relation to the literacy  
campaigns, much less Freirian pedagogical theories.
Despite  the  successful  increase  in  the  production,  distribution,  and  consumption  of  reading  
material,  especially  amongst  Chile's  popular  classes,  Quimantú's  history  illustrates  some  of  the  
deficiencies in UP communications policy. First, we must recognize that Quimantú, once it had ramped  
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up book publication in 1972, failed to recoup its costs. The payroll had increased from less than 1,000  
workers in 1971 to around 1,600 in 1973 and the company relied on private sector loans, preferential  
credit from Chile's state-owned Production Development Corporation ( Corporación de Fomento de la  
Producción /  CORFO), and discounted prices on imported paper (Subercaseaux 2003; 272, 276).  Of  
course, as the minutes of a 1972 Quimantú workers' assembly state, “[i]t's not always bad if a business  
loses money if other objectives, such as reaching a great mass of readers, are achieved” (272), 90 but the 
question becomes whether that objective deserves the priority assigned to it, since the resources required  
for  operating  at  a  loss  might  be  directed  toward  some other  social  need.  The  resources  devoted  to  
Quimantú represented “a valuation of the book product as a medium superior to other media” based on  
“an enlightenment vision of culture that emphasizes it  as  high culture” (275).  As such, the decision  
reflected a prioritization of the PC's cultural policy. Sustaining this policy required:
...channeling the greatest cultural efforts of the government and of the intellectuals that  
supported it, at the expense of having channeled them in less erudite intellectual activities,  
or in areas that were probably also decisive for the dispute that was being carried out (like  
the media, fundamentally TV, which at that time had recently become widespread). ( ibid.)91
The PC strategy thus reveals itself as a particular type of vanguardism that not only embodies a top-down  
transmission  model,  but  also  incorporates  a  bourgeois  understanding  of  “proper”  culture.  Prominent 
intellectuals aligned with the PS duly rejected this “paternalist attitude” which supposed “a culture ready  
to be packaged, labeled, and distributed” that only needed to be “placed within the reach of the masses”  
(in an essay entitled For the Creation of a Popular and National Culture [ Por la Creación de una Cultura  
Popular y Nacional], cited in Lihn 28-9). The most important result in relation to our present analysis,  
however, was that:
...rather than serving as a channel for new cultural and creative spaces of civil society , 
[the policy] proposed to satisfy necessities predefined by the state and the parties , effecting 
90 All quotations from Subercaseaux are my translation.; "[n]o siempre es malo que una empresa tenga pérdidas si 
se están cumpliendo otros objetivos, como es llegar a una gran masa de lectores”
91 “...canalizando los mayores esfuerzos culturales del gobierno y de los intelectuales que lo apoyaban, en 
desmedro de haberlos canalizado en actividades no cultas de la vida intelectual, o en áreas que probablemente 
también eran decisivas para la disputa que se estaba llevando a cabo (como los medios de comunicación, 
fundamentalmente la por entonces recien masificada T.V.).”
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a redistribution of the cultural capital that society already possessed. ( ibid.; my emphasis)92
The  degree  to  which  printed  content  was  or  was  not  bourgeois  was  less  consequential  than  the  
constraining effect that  the policy had on the autonomous evolution of civil  society. In sum, the PC  
strategy offered little for those seeking a civil state.
The approach backed by members of the PS and the MAPU sought to make use of existent forms  
of popular culture within political communication strategies. This was perhaps most successful in the  
music  sector,  where  already  during  the  1960s  Chile's  “New  Song”  movement  had  begun  to  merge  
traditional Chilean folk styles with elements of international pop music and progressive political themes.  
The UP administration found several ways to support this genre. Most generally, UP economic policy  
increased the spending power of  the popular  classes,  making more resources available  for  attending  
concerts and purchasing recorded music. More specifically, the government expanded on existing cultural  
policy to foment the recording industry. The importation of records had previously been restricted through  
foreign exchange controls and executive policy had been coordinated with RCA Victor, one of two major  
domestically  located  record  manufacturers.  The  UP administration,  however,  bought  out  RCA and  
reorganized the company as Radio and Television Industries ( Industrías de Radio y Televisión / IRT). This 
new  company  continued  to  produce  records  for  other  labels,  even  as  the  IRT label  itself  achieved  
considerable success. In 1971, 2,859,000 records were sold in Chile. In 1972, 3,250,000 were sold on the  
IRT label alone, with 6,307,000 sold in total (Catalán et. al. 41-44). An additional element of support for  
Chile's domestic music industry came in the form of a 1971 law which stipulated that in most live musical  
performances, whether presented directly or broadcast, at least 85 percent of the performers that “express  
themselves in the spanish language” must be Chilean, and that these performers must include a Chilean  
folklore group or soloists accompanied by harp, guitar, or accordion (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión  
Social 1971).93
92 “...más que servir de cauce a los nuevos espacios culturales y creativos de la sociedad civil, [la política] se 
propone satisfacer necesidades predefinidas desde el Estado y los partidos, llevando a cabo una redistribución 
del capital cultural que ya poseía la sociedad.”
93 Foreign musical acts were exempted from the law. The law also mandated the inclusion of Chilean folklore 
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Chilean folklore music  and the New Song movement  were not,  however,  the only genres  to  
benefit  during  this  period.  Record  sales  of  North  American  pop  music,  romantic  ballads,  and  other  
popular music (boleros, rancheras, cumbias, ritmos tropicales, etc.), also rose dramatically (Catalán et. al.  
43-4). Meanwhile, although the UP further restricted record imports (from US $35,900 in 1970 to a mere  
US $2,200 in 1972), commercial importers switched to cassettes, importing almost three times as many  
(in terms of monetary value) in 1971 as they had records in 1970 (42). Thus, even in a sector where UP  
policy seemingly had considerable success, state support of “revolutionary” content in the commercial  
market produced only mixed results.
In other sectors, the results of the PS/MAPU strategy were even less encouraging. To a great  
extent, this strategy called for beating the opposition at its own game, on its home turf, by merging  
vanguardist ideology with popular cultural forms and inserting the resulting texts into a media apparatus  
that remained largely determined by the liberal framework of a commercial civil society.  In other words,  
the belief was that socialist ideas could compete and win in a commercial marketplace (Portales 1983,  
64). Ultimately, this strategy proved unsuccessful. This occurred in part because the opposition made use  
of legal constraints and underhanded tactics to retain and even augment its dominance in the commercial  
sphere. The strategy also failed, however, because the Chilean people were often not compelled by the  
types of vanguardist content made available.
These results are partially illustrated by events in the Chilean television sector, which had recently  
moved out of its experimental phase to become a significant force in the Chilean public sphere. 94 As 
discussed  above,  regulation  of  the  television  sector  comprised  a  major  part  of  the  Constitutional 
Guarantees Pact and the opposition was quick to leverage the constraints it had put in place. Of Chile's  
music and dance in public school music curricula, and directed tax revenues toward the construction and 
maintenance of a headquarters (sede social) for the Professional Union of Folklore Musicians and Guitarists of 
Chile (Sindicato Profesional de Folkloristas y Guitarristas de Chile).
94 Thanks in part to the DC government's subsidization of domestically assembled televisions, the number of sets in 
use had risen from 56,000 in 1966 to 300,000 in 1969 (Catalán 49). By mid-1971 the number had climbed to 
500,000, with national broadcasts reaching 30 percent of Chilean families and up to 60 percent of urban 
populations (Schiller & Smythe 36).
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four  television  channels,  only  the  state-operated  Channel  7  had  a  national  reach,  but  the  crucial  
competition for viewers took place in Santiago, where the dominant station was the Catholic University's  
Channel 13, which as of June 1971 had a 56 percent share of the metro audience. 95 Its market dominance 
depended on content produced in the US (primarily by ABC), which accounted for some 45 percent of  
total programming and 96 percent of series and films, including Bonanza,  Mission Impossible, and The 
Dean Martin Show.
In December 1971, however, pro-UP candidates won the station's union elections and by 1972 its  
news  department  was  reported  to  have  “had  a  leftist  orientation”,  with  its  commentaries  generally  
supporting the UP (Schiller & Smythe 37). As a result, the Student Federation of the Catholic University,  
controlled by the DC, accused the news department of bias and university officials called elections for a  
new board of directors. The election produced a divided board, with three members supporting the UP  
and three opposed. Thanks to the 1970 television law, university administrators were able to break the tie  
by appointing a priest as the station's director, with the result that, “[i]nstead of acting as a mediator  
between the two sides, [he] fired the news director and shifted the orientation of the channel towards the  
opposition” (Catalán 53). The station then began receiving technical aid and financial assistance from the  
US (Fagen 61).
The constraints of the Constitutional Guarantees Pact enabled other opposition actions, including  
congressional rejection of the budget for the government operated National Television Channel and a  
proposal, based on the constitutional reform, to expand the number of university stations (Catalán 53).  
The University of Chile's Channel 9, meanwhile, became the site of the most heated and prolonged battle  
in the television sector. Considered to be the only channel offering access to the left prior to the UP  
government (International Organization of Journalists 1974b, 54), Channel 9 was favored by the Chilean  
working class (Mattelart 1980 [1974], 143) and its director and employees supported the UP. Anti-UP  
95 Of Chile's four television stations, only three served Santiago. The fourth was operated by the Catholic 
University of Valparaíso.
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university  administrators,  however,  sought  to  gain  control  of  the  station.  When  this  failed,  the  
administrators  began  broadcasting  illegally  on  channel  6.  “Litigation  followed  between  the  public  
services, the courts, the Association of Journalists and the Ministry of Justice.” The National Council of  
Television, which had been created as a result of the 1970 television law and “in which the opposition  
held a majority, suspended Channel 9 and recognized Channel 6 as the legal university channel” (Catalán  
54).  Meanwhile,  however,  the workers of  Channel  9,  “supported by the working class  of the whole  
country”, refused to abandon their positions and resisted the decision from January through August 1973,  
when an “order by the Court of Appeal authorised the use of force to dislodge them” (Mattelart 1980,  
143; see also Aguirre 1979, 260).
These examples show that the legal constraints of the liberal framework produced tangible and  
negative results for the UP, and more could be provided in relation to other media. It is far from clear,  
however, that UP content would have prevailed had it not been for the opposition's exploitation of these  
constraints. Even in 1970, prior to the campaign against it, Channel 9 only garnered some 10 percent of  
viewers, compared to 50 percent for Channel 13. Meanwhile, as the UP began to consolidate control over  
the National Television Channel, Channel 7, it saw its audience share drop from 40 to 30 percent between  
1970 and 1971, with the lost 10 percent shifting to Channel 13.
In absolute terms, audience distribution in 1971 was more or less as follows: Channel 13,  
720,000  viewers;  Channel  7,  350,000;  Channel  9,  120,000.  Channel  13  won  this  
competition by buying in [sic] the greatest number of imported programmes, generally  
North American.... For example, when The High Chaparral was shown, it snapped up 84% 
of the television audience;  Bonanza attracted 76%,  Combat 74%,  The FBI 72%,  Johnny 
Quest 69%. The only occasions on which the pro-government stations obtained majority  
audiences  were  when  they  showed  programmes  such  as  Mod  Squad (62%)  and 
Simplemente Maria (80%). (Mattelart 1980 [1974], 96)96
Similar results appear in relation to the aforementioned, ideologically alternative magazine and  
comic  book  titles  that  Quimantú  introduced.  Although  the  state-owned  publishing  house  had  a  
96 Simplemente María was a telenovela that has been remade multiple times in different Latin American countries. 
Although the first version appeared in Argentina in 1967, the reference here is most likely to the 1969 Peruvian 
version that found considerable success across the hemisphere. Brazilian and Venezuelan versions were produced 
in 1970 and 1972, respectively.
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competitive advantage in the form of imported paper at subsidized prices (International Organization of  
Journalists 1974b, 61), its new titles did not always find success. In early 1973, Quimantú “decided to  
close down its  children’s  weekly,  its  popular  news magazine and several  comics that  it  had tried to  
redesign.” Circulation of the children’s weekly, which had been at 300,000 when it began in March 1971,  
had dropped to just 35,000 (Mattelart 1980 [1974], 143) and “standard North American comic books far  
outsold” the UP alternatives (Fagen 63). Contemporary observers noted that one “major difficulty” in the  
comic book sector was that the Chilean audience was “conditioned to regard the fare of commercial  
publishers as simple recreation” whereas Quimantú’s “offerings, in contrast, are likely to be viewed with  
suspicion as propaganda” (Schiller & Smythe 39). Whether or not this particular distinction was entirely  
justified,  it  signals  an  important  weakness  in  the  PS/MAPU  strategy.  Mattelart  offered  the  clearest  
contemporary account of the deficiencies of this approach:
Having adopted the bourgeois genres, [the UP] then set about the reorientation of their  
contents, while remaining with these traditional forms of leisure... The first problem is that  
the adoption of the genre, with the intention of subverting it from within, generally results  
in a simple inversion of the signs of the bourgeois message and in the adoption of the  
ruling class's unilateral notion of politics. In the place of the manicheism of the forces of  
reaction we are presented with the manicheism of the progressive forces.... In every case  
there is a rearrangement of the ingredients, but no real alteration of meaning.
Even when this sectarian and sloganistic notion of politics is abandoned, however,  
and there is a genuine attempt to introduce 'implicit content' into the established genres,  
another kind of problem arises. The implicit content of bourgeois messages refers to a  
mode of life and an organisation of social relations which everyone lives every day. That  
of the left's messages, however, inevitably refers to a superstructural project which is not  
rooted in everyday life. (1980 [1974], 104-5)
Mattelart's argument, in other words, was that in order for media content to become widely accepted by  
Chile's popular classes, its production would have to be organically linked to the lived experience of those  
classes. This could not be achieved by simply swapping out content while largely maintaining both form  
and, most crucially, the organizational context of production. 
This same pattern manifested in the predominant UP approach to print journalism, arguably the  
most important field of mediated political debate in Chile during Allende's administration. Professional  
journalism,  according  to  the  norms  of  objectivity  popularized  in  the  US,  became  standard  in  Chile  
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between 1930 and 1950 (Mera & Ruiz 34). For the Chilean left, however, the ideal of an objective press  
was a facade that only served to legitimate the bourgeois institutional order (cf. Mattelart 1971, 1980  
[1974], 37-40; Revolutionary Left Movement 1979 [1971]; Biedma 1973; Taufic 1973; Garretón Merino  
1974). The mainstream media “in the big cities between 1940 and 1973”, whether “prestige or populist”,  
was considered “both selective and stereotyped” as a result of the following types of misrepresentations: 
Working-class people and their problems are under-represented. They are present either as  
solely politicized actors or as subjects of ‘mass culture’; that is, as semi-delinquents or  
characters  of  ‘real  life’ melodrama.  In  the  prestige  press,  they  assume  the  roles  of  
communist agitators. Women, too, are under-represented. They are present either as sexual  
objects or mothers or as characters for melodrama, crimes of passion, etc. Similarly, youth,  
ethnic minorities, intellectual, creative workers are seldom featured and are depicted in  
negative stereotypes when they are present. (Mera & Ruíz 35)
Following Allende's election, however, “the pretense of journalistic objectivity [was] gradually replaced  
by open association and identification with political parties” (Schiller & Smythe 38). On one hand, this  
devalued the press, as facts and rational arguments, on both sides, were often obscured by prejudice. On  
the other hand, it enriched the national debate, as Chileans were better situated “to consider and discuss  
issues free of what is regarded as a spurious classlessness and to judge therefore the merits of an argument  
on its relationship to social transformation” (61).
In general, however, the approach did not work in the UP's favor. To a great extent, this was due  
to  the  structural  imbalance  caused  by  private  ownership  and  commercial  operation  that  allowed  
opposition voices to enjoy much greater reach than those sympathetic to the UP. T abloid style papers 
utilized  a  “biting,  strident,  and  insolent”  tone  to  disparage  UP politicians and generate  public  alarm  
regarding supposed threats to state institutions (including freedom of the press) and grave shortages of  
food items. They also provoked fears of violent repression from the left and, in some cases, called for a  
military coup. The “serious” right wing press, meanwhile, made use of “prudent” editorials, “cryptic”  
messages, and “an affective neutrality” in order to treat the same themes (Dooner 1989, 81).
Exemplary of these tendencies were the papers controlled by the El Mercurio Company, which 
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was, in 1970, Chile’s dominant media conglomerate. It was also one of over 60 enterprises controlled by  
the A. Edwards Bank, which was aligned with the conservative PN. The company not only controlled  
seven provincial newspapers and accounted for some 50 percent of Chile’s total newspaper circulation, it  
also  controlled  one  of  the  country's  most  extensive  national  radio  networks  and  one  of  the  largest  
publishing houses (Mattelart 1980 [1974] 4, Schiller & Smythe 38). El Mercurio,  the firm's flagship  
Santiago daily, had been founded in 1827 and acquired in the 1920s by Agustin Edwards Ross, “one of  
the biggest bankers and entrepreneurs in Chile.” It was then inherited by Agustin Edwards Jr., who grew it  
into Chile’s most important and prestigious national paper by  maintaining an “avoidance of any kind of  
critical attitude toward [the] state on which it [was] dependent” (31, 33). El Mercurio held the exclusive  
rights to the services of the major international press agencies (AP, UPI, Reuters, AFP, and The New York  
Times), all of whose teleprinters were housed on its premises, meaning that “[t]he news provided by these  
agencies therefore passed through a double process of filtration before reaching the reader – in New York  
or Europe, and in Santiago. Of 120,000 words received by the teleprinter, only 9,000 reached the public”  
(Mattelart 1980 [1974], 4).
As a result of UP economic policies, however, advertising revenue at El Mercurio  fell by 50 
percent (Schiller & Smythe 38).97 This, combined with a government mandated increase in journalists'  
wages, had by 1972 brought the paper close to its credit limit (Kornbluh 2003, 91). El Mercurio, however,  
was able  to  count  on financial  support  from the US government.  Funding from the US, which was  
channeled through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), also found its way to other oppositional media  
outlets  (including  radio  stations,  individual  radio  journalists,  television  programs  on  at  least  three  
broadcasting channels, and the CD newspaper  La Prensa) and totaled as much as eight million dollars  
97 Schiller & Smythe explain the correlation as follows: “...the government's successful effort to redistribute 
income has channeled a heavy stream of purchasing power into the lower and (especially) the middle classes. 
Consequently, demand for consumer goods is high and the sellers have little need to advertise their supplies. 
Also, the preceding government's law limiting public service advertising by the government has reduced 
revenues still further. As the rapid nationalization of industry has confirmed the private sector's fears, investors 
have opted for luxury spending and Swiss bank accounts. As a leading executive in the private mass media put it, 
'Advertising is an investment and investment is falling off.' Besides, the nationalization of many industries has 
also had the effect of cutting back their advertising budgets” (37).
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(Drago 2003, 114; Aguilera & Fredes 73, 74, 80). 98 El Mercurio, however, received the lion's share, and  
was viewed by the CIA as one of the main private-sector organizations that had “set as their objective  
creation of conflict and confrontation which will lead to some sort of military intervention” (Kornbluh  
93).99 For example, in the days before the failed coup attempt of June 29, 1973, when tanks rolled through  
the streets of downtown Santiago and surrounded the presidential palace, El Mercurio published essays  
which argued that in the case of internal chaos or a grave threat to the country’s sovereignty, the Armed  
Forces had not only the right, but the obligation, to intervene (Drago 113). Moreover, “the presentation of 
stories and photographs in El Mercurio followed closely the US Army's Psychological Warfare Manual”  
(Landis 1975, cited in Fields 2007, 7). By the CIA’s own admission, the US propaganda effort, focusing  
on El Mercurio, “played a significant role in setting the stage for the military coup of 11 September 1973”  
(Kornbluh 94).
This  covert  collaboration  between  the  US  government  and  Chile's  oligarchy,  with  all  its  
similarities to the Guatemalan coup of 1953, precisely illustrates the bourgeois dominance of liberal civil  
society that Marx had rejected and that had led the Cuban government to exert an authoritarian control  
over the press. As we have seen, however, the long tradition of a “Chilean road to socialism” rejected the  
Cuban model, a point on which Allende continued to insist in his speech to the First Assembly of Left  
Journalists in April 1971:
...we are given the battles within the framework of bourgeois democracy, and the laws that  
this bourgeois democracy has dictated.... We must note, therefore, that we have committed  
ourselves to the freedom of information. By this we mean that we are not looking for a  
news monopoly. Thus the struggle of the people's government within this framework is  
much more difficult than that of other nations, who, by means of insurgency or weapons,  
have taken power and control of the government. We are voluntarily limited, because of  
98 Fields (2007) cites the San Francisco Chronicle (12/5/75) and a figure of $4.3 million in total support to Chilean 
media. The $8 million figure is given by the International Organization of Journalists (1974a, 1) and Klein 
(2007, 66). For a thorough treatment of US support for Chile’s oppositional media, see Landis (1975). For 
overviews of the larger US role in bringing about the 1973 coup, see Uribe (1975) and Kornbluh.
99 Duran (1976), citing the New York Times, gives a figure of $11.5 million going to El Mercurio alone; the New 
York Times article, however, actually reported a figure of $1.5 million. The actual amount funneled to El 
Mercurio appears to have been higher: $700,000 was personally authorized by President Nixon in September 
1971, $300,000 by Henry Kissinger in October 1971, and another $965,000 was approved on April 11, 1972 
(Aguilera & Fredes 75; Kornbluh 2003, 91-3).
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previous commitments. (Allende 1983 [1971], 369)
Perhaps surprisingly, even more radical groups like the MIR, which had adopted the armed guerrilla  
tactics of the Cuban revolution, also refrained from calling for the nationalization of the media. Instead,  
they primarily professed the more mainstream PS opinion that “[o]nly a political battle, related to the  
general interests of the oppressed sectors – who in this moment of the Chilean process are the vanguard –  
will be able to advance journalistic practice towards a truly revolutionary movement” (Revolutionary Left  
Movement 135).100 Where expropriation was invoked, it was cast as not the initial, but the final action of  
the political battle. Mattelart, for instance, also speaking before the First Assembly of Left Journalists,  
declared that “the absolute expropriation of the information media must be understood as the culmination  
of a process, and the outcome of the confrontation with the bourgeoisie” (Mattelart 1971, 3). 101
For the Chilean left, the primary mode of this confrontation was for professional journalists to  
openly acknowledge the political context of their work:
...the demand for freedom of the press, for the individual concrete journalist, will always  
be  abstract  and  perhaps  even  reactionary,  if  it  is  not  accompanied  by  a  growing  
consciousness of his condition as an intellectual worker, socially privileged, and whose  
social  status  corresponds  strictly  to  the  social  relation  which  bourgeois  society  has  
determined  for  it.  The  newspaper  workers  must  raise  the  banner  of  freedom  as  a  
declaration of battle against the social division of labor and challenge this social division  
in  their  own professional  policy.  How? By trying  to  permanently  relate  their  specific  
practice to  a global conception of  society,  and by lucidly and resolutely incorporating  
themselves  into  the  political  struggles  of  the  oppressed  sectors.  (Revolutionary  Left  
Movement 134)
Allende himself cast this approach in explicitly voluntarist and vanguardist terms:
...it seems justified to me to point out that objectivity, as such, cannot exist if we believe  
that in this bourgeois society there is and must be a confrontation between groups and  
sectors, between social  classes....  You therefore must be the vanguard of revolutionary  
thought, a thought sustained and augmented by the daily struggle that we are living.... A  
great political consciousness is needed to raise the level of the masses and to make of  
every  left  journalist  someone  not  only  committed  in  his  professional  practice  to  the  
revolutionary tasks of the Popular Government and the people of Chile, but also someone  
linked with the popular masses who will take upon himself, in addition to his working  
100Mattelart (1979) relates that the MIR's “class analysis of the role of the journalist circulated in the form of a 
mimeographed article” (24).
101“la expropriación absoluta de los medios de información debe concebirse como un punto de llegada de un 
proceso, y el desenlace victorioso del enfrentamiento con la burguesía”
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hours,  the  voluntary  work  of  raising  the  political  level  of  the  immense  majority  of  
Chileans, so that they understand our determination to take these historical steps. (Allende  
1983 [1971]; 367, 369)
As in other sectors of the media, then, the UP believed that vanguardist practice and content, reinforced  
by support from the executive branch of the state, would win the allegiance of uncommitted citizens. 
In accordance with this strategy, the government ordered a 50 percent increase in journalists’  
salaries (Mattelart 1980 [1974], 38) and sympathetic journalists began to organize. The Association of  
Journalists of Chile (Colegio de Periodistas de Chile) had been established by law in 1956 to regulate the  
professional  practice  of  journalism,  with  membership  restricted  to  those  with  a  pertinent  university  
degree. As such, it was viewed by the left as a primary component of the institutionalized bourgeois  
communications  apparatus  and member journalists  sympathetic  to  the  UP organized  themselves  into  
internal blocs that contested its power structure (Díaz 2003). For example, in the Association's December  
1971 elections, UP candidates “received 3,339 votes and the ‘free press’ journalists, 3,750, resulting in a  
[National] Council composed … of seven members of the opposition and three of the left. In the regional 
college of the central provinces of Santiago and O’Higgins, seven ‘free press’ journalists were elected and  
four from the left” (Mattelart 1980 [1974], 96).
Not wholly confident in their ability to transform professional journalism from within the official  
association, left journalists also convened the aforementioned First Assembly of Left Journalists in 1971,  
in part to share ideas about how to organize within their workplaces. For example, it was reported that  
“[a]t the newspapers El Sur of Concepción and La Mañana of Talca which belong to ultra-reactionary  
groups, the journalists have battled bravely and have won the right to express their  own opinions in  
signed columns in the same paper” (Schiller & Smythe 38). Following the assembly, workers in some  
communication enterprises, such as the newspaper  Clarín, organized under the Revolutionary Workers 
Front (Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios / FTR) and competed for administrative positions within  
the company unions (J.C.M. 1971, 10). 102 In his speech to the Assembly, Allende suggested “that in  
102In the case of Clarín, at least, these workers were initially opposed by workers aligned with the PC. As of 
October 1971, however, FTR members held four of the five directorial posts in Clarín’s company union and had 
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journalism also, there is the possibility of cooperatives which would make the owners of the broadcast  
media not the businessmen, but rather all of the workers of these firms” (Allende 1983 [1971], 372). Press  
production workers, meanwhile, were reported to be “organizing into trade unions rather than employer-
controlled company unions” and there were “long-range plans by the Socialists to establish a national  
union  of  newspaper  workers  and  to  use  the  dues  from such  an  organization  to  publish  a  workers’  
newspaper” (Schiller & Smythe 38). These long-range plans, of course, were crushed by the coup of  
1973.
The coup notwithstanding, however, the left's attempt to counter the bourgeois controlled media  
with a politicized professional press corps was largely a failure.  From February 1972 until September 
1973 there were 64 daily papers in Chile, of which 45 were aligned with the right, ten with the left, and  
nine self-defined as “independent” (Mattelart 1980 [1974], 143), and during the UP administration press  
outlets aligned with the left “never came closer than having 25 percent of the national audiences” (Mera  
& Ruíz 35). In Santiago, prior to the UP victory there were only three newspapers on the left, with a total  
circulation of 140,000 (Mattelart 1980, 4-5). During the UP administration these numbers improved to  
five dailies and a total circulation of 312,000. The opposition press, however, managed to grow from four  
dailies with a circulation of 425,000 in the pre-UP period, to six dailies with a circulation of 551,000, of  
which El Mercurio alone accounted for 300,000 (International Organization of Journalists 1974b, 62;  
Mattelart  1980 [1974];  4,  94).  Worse yet,  while  El Mercurio continued to represent the standard for  
professional objectivity, many of the papers supportive of the UP were popular tabloids that incorporated  
sensationalized portrayals of crime and violence ( ibid. 48; J.C.M. 10) and exhibited elements of racism,  
religious intolerance, and the exploitation of sexual themes and vulgarity (Dooner). In other words, the  
imperatives  of  competing  in  a  commercial  market  often  overshadowed  the  political  sympathies  and  
intentions of the journalists.103
managed to form a united front with the communists (J.C.M. 10).
103As Mattelart (1980 [1974]) points out, “[w]ithout falling into the moralism characteristic of petty-bourgeois 
criticism of such journalism, it is true to say that the amount of space devoted by the left press to coverage of 
crime has the effect of portraying the people as an inexhaustible source of crime and violence. This amount of 
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Frustration with the left press was evident in interviews conducted during July and August of  
1973 with militant labor leaders in Santiago, who were all  too aware of the continuing influence of  
commercial concerns and bourgeois professionalism on the production and presentation of content:
I don't think any of the left papers represent the proletariat's aspirations right now – and  
most of the workers think the same. I've discussed this with several left journalists. Often  
they admit it themselves; they're under the editor's thumb, and the censor's. They have to  
follow the newspaper's political line. They're dependent on certain economic interests, or a  
particular publicity line – in short, a whole load of things which cut them off from the  
working class. All these pressures castrate the content the workers can provide. And it's  
not only that.  Most of the time the papers  distort  this  content completely.  Papers like  
Clarín (a populist left paper), for example, have a way of trivialising the serious problems  
facing the working class and treating them in a stupidly humorous way.... 104 The left papers 
seem to be trapped in a mould manufactured by the schools. Its 'Journalism', with its laws  
and rules. The basic problem is that journalists have to sell their journalism. It has to have  
impact; they need their bits of news to appear under banner headlines. That's why they're  
so keen on tit-bits [sic] of news, like crimes, because they are the topics which sell lots of  
copies. But this kind of selling doesn't interest us. (Mattelart 1980 [1974], 190-1)
The left press goes on writing for the person who passes the newspaper kiosk and buys a  
paper because he's attracted by the headline or likes the tone in which the report is written.  
They don't really write for people who are caught up in living the process. Only those who  
stay outside the struggle feel themselves interpreted by what they read in these papers.  
(206)
Take the front  page of  Clarín.  There's  never  anything there that's  to  do with the real  
meaning of the revolution. It's always the same thing; nothing to do with us. They go on  
showing girls instead of hitting out at the bourgeoisie. (202)
This type of analysis coincided with the last of the three UP communications policy tendencies discussed  
earlier and attributed to more radical members of the PS, as well as the MIR, who sought to construct  
new, non-commercial structures for the production and distribution of media texts that were organically  
linked to and incorporated the active participation of the popular classes.
Although participatory communications theory continued to gain prominence and increasingly  
informed all socialist communications strategies, it produced very little in the way of concrete policy  
coverage inevitably means the underestimation of other events in which the people also participate, events which 
are a good deal more positive and, moreover, illustrative of a new kind of life” (48). Similar complaints came 
from students and workers (cf. J.C.M. 10).
104Clarín had one of the highest national circulations of any daily paper in Chile (International Organization of 
Journalists 1974b, 69). While it was seen to be sympathetic to the UP, the president of Clarín’s FTR complained 
that its owner was out of the country for long periods and that its management censored pieces critical of “the 
‘big fish’ of the previous [DC] administration, including the ex-President Frei,” discriminated against unionized 
workers, refused small advances, and did “not obey the law”  (J.C.M. 10).
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initiatives within the UP government. The PC's National Cultural Commission did call for an “extensive  
network of Centers for Popular Culture” that would incorporate “workers' theater” alongside libraries,  
educational programs, and art workshops (Kunzle 1983 [1973], 373), but the plan was never executed.  
Nonetheless,  the general  climate of  increased support  for  popular  culture  of  all  forms under the UP  
administration led to a modest flourishing of participatory cultural initiatives, such as amateur theater  
groups that incorporated peasants and workers (Fagen 59), including those “under the aegis” of Chile's  
amalgamated central  labor  union  (Central  Unitaria  de Trabajadores de  Chile  /  CUT) (Kunzle 373). 
Another example can be found in the government's tolerance and occasional legitimation of “guerrilla  
muralist brigades” composed of youth activists that painted pro-UP propaganda and artwork in public  
spaces (Kunzle).  These types of  projects,  however,  largely  relied on the  voluntarism,  ingenuity,  and  
finances of artists and activists. There was no concerted policy effort on the part of the UP to scale such 
enterprises up to a level that might be able to displace commercial media forms.
The  government  did,  however,  directly  sponsor  at  least  one  participatory  journalism project.  
Compañero  was  a  bimonthly  newspaper  published  by  Quimantú that  contained  information  directed 
toward youth laborers (Aguirre 259). The publication itself could be displayed as a broadsheet affixed to a  
wall or folded into a more conventional newspaper format. The paper's staff of eight young journalists  
trained  and  provided  technical  assistance  to  small,  local  youth  worker  publications  that  were  then  
distributed along with Compañero itself. Content was culled from the smaller papers, so that Compañero 
became “a  kind  of  'umbrella-paper',  fed  by  the  local  [participatory]  media  and  producing  a  sort  of  
generalization  of  the  concrete  problems  expressed”  therein. 105 The  objective  of  the  project  was  “to 
contribute to the mobilization and participation of youth, through a process of permanent questioning  
about [their] daily life”.106 Tellingly, however, just as the project was starting to show results, “it was  
interrupted due to political differences within the [UP] related to the central question: the process of  
105“una especie de “periódico-sombrilla”, alimentado por los medios locales y produciendo una suerte de 
generalización de los problemas concretos expresados”
106“contribuir a la movilización y la participación juvenil, mediante un proceso de permanente cuestionamiento de 
[su] vida cotidiana”
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mobilization and its meaning” (ibid., my translation).107 That direct government support for participatory  
media was limited to such a tentative project, that it was oriented only toward youth (who presumably  
were seen to be more responsive to such experimental efforts), and that it  was ultimately suspended,  
indicates  the  degree  to  which  UP communications  policy  remained  invested  in  the  institutional  and  
professionalized division of labor of the capitalist system.
Far and away, therefore, participatory communications initiatives during the UP administration  
were executed at the periphery or entirely outside of the official bureaucracy, where they complemented a  
greater  movement  toward  “popular  power”  that  was  rooted  in  over  half  a  century  of  “organization,  
struggle, and ideological development … through a revolutionary syndicalism” (256).  Adopted as the 
goal  of  the  more  radical  elements  of  the  Chilean  left,  popular  power  referred  to  modes  of  self-
organization  that  outpaced  the  official  UP policy  structure,  especially  after  they  gained  significant  
momentum  in  the  second  half  of  1972.  One  example  of  the  relation  between  popular  power  and  
participatory communication occurred in the southern province of Concepción. In August of 1972, the  
provincial PS office convened a Syndicalist Conference whose participants resolved to create Workers  
Councils (Consejos de los Trabajadores) that would serve as the basis for a socialist system of popular  
governance (270). It was against this background that, during a nationwide lockout that took place two  
months later  (and by  which  the  opposition  hoped to  paralyze Chile's  economy),  the  workers  of  the  
newspaper El Sur, in the provincial capital,  responded by occupying their workplace. They quickly put 
out an alternative newspaper, El Surazo, which appeared regularly over the next two weeks. Two- thirds of 
the news carried in El Surazo came from “non-traditional” sources, including unions, organized factory  
occupations, and individual workers. Moreover, 30 percent of the items published were not written by  
professional journalists, but by members of popular organizations and non-journalist workers (260).
Participatory media production, however, was not usually a spontaneous reaction to particular  
107All quotations from Aguirre are my translation.; “fue interrumpIda debido a diferencias políticas en el marco de 
la [UP] en cuanto a la cuestion central planteada: el proceso de movilización y su sentido”
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events  on  the  part  of  media  professionals,  but  rather  the  product  of  directed  engagement  between  
committed activists and members of the popular classes. In this sense the strategy also incorporates an  
element of vanguardism, but whereas the previously discussed UP strategies focused on the transmission  
of vanguardist content, the role of the vanguard in the participatory strategy was to enable popular groups  
to create their own content. The MIR had articulated this possibility when, in its critique of objectivity, it  
noted that “[a]s an alternative to the communication between the world of bourgeois knowledge and its  
assimilation  by  the  dominated,  and  between  the  bourgeois  state  and  the  oppressed  classes,  we  can  
envisage communication between the dominant sectors themselves” (Revolutionary Left Movement 134).  
Indeed, shantytowns organized by the MIR produced some of the first regularly distributed participatory  
newspapers,  with  the  earliest  appearing  in  February  of  1972  (Mattelart  1980  [1974],  189).  Some  
professional journalists and educators also took it upon themselves to train workers, peasants, and other  
non-professionals in media production. This type of intervention was planned at the University of the  
North (Mattelart 1971, 8; 1980 [1974], 96) and undertaken at the University of Chile’s Santiago campus,  
where one student activist reported that:
In  journalism,  much of  the  training  was  taken out  of  the  University.  Each group of  
students went with a teacher to a union branch or shantytown and started producing a  
paper with the local workers or residents, to deal with their particular problems. This  
taught the students that a journalist’s job wasn’t simply to hand news down to the people,  
but to get them to express themselves, through a medium which they controlled. These  
papers  became  a  regular  feature  of  dozens  of  local  organizations,  however  modest.  
Gradually  the  students  would  reduce  their  contributions,  until  the  paper  was  self-
sufficient. This gave a tremendous boost to popular communication, creative, political  
and purely informative. The workers who wrote in these papers used the style of their  
everyday life – which also widened the students’ experience and sense of language. The  
papers themselves became a source of important changes suggested at a popular level.  
For instance, in one such news-sheet a housewife in one of the shantytowns produced  
some completely new ideas for improving local food distribution. They were discussed in  
the shantytown and eventually implemented. No public official could have devised them,  
because they depended on a knowledge of day-to-day problems and living conditions in  
the locality. (Henfrey & Sorj 1977, 157)
The most advanced examples of participatory forms of communication as a component of Chilean  
popular power emerged within the industrial cordons (cordones industriales) that began to appear in mid-
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1972 as militant workers occupied factories outside of any official process of expropriation. Unable to  
count  on  state  protection from retaliation by  factory  owners  and right  wing militants,  workers  from  
occupied  factories  in  close  proximity  created  joint  security  zones.  As  these  cordons  stabilized,  the  
workers began to organize forms of governance that encompassed more than just security. Outside of the  
industrial zones, parallel processes of popular organization emerged in response to other problems that UP  
supporters felt were going unaddressed by the government, including adequate distribution of food and  
household supplies, as well as enforcement of official price controls. Participants in these various organs  
of popular power not only felt as if they deserved greater support from the official leadership of the UP,  
they also felt that their views were not properly represented in the left press, as workers participating in  
the cordons made clear:
All that pornography filling our Sunday papers should be got rid of, and a page should be  
given  over  to  the  workers  so  that  they  can  feel  that  their  own  experience  is  being  
interpreted by the paper, and the people can get to know what the anonymous trade union  
leaders are thinking. We have our own ideas about what's going on – but usually they  
never get beyond the four walls of our meeting or union assembly. (Mattelart 1980 [1974],  
204)
It's  what  you'd  expect,  because  they  talk  to  the  bourgeoisie,  because  there's  a  left  
bourgeoisie just as there's a right bourgeoisie. [The left] press talks to those people and not  
to the workers.... (205)
The journalists prefer to talk to the top blokes, the administrators and ministers, perhaps  
because they know them, or because they share more or less the same level of education.  
Or perhaps – at least, this is my experience – because they underestimate the workers and  
think they're  not going to understand them. Or maybe it's  because they think that the  
workers  are  going  to  talk  to  them  as  workers  do  talk  and  therefore  they'll  feel  
uncomfortable because they live at a different level and have a different kind of education.  
Whatever it is, the journalists have done nothing to learn how to talk to the workers. (206)
Once we wanted to get our criticisms of the boss and shareholders published in a left  
paper. It was during the invisible boycott. It wasn't just a whim of ours, but something very  
real. The journalists noted down our denunciations, but nothing was published. That kind  
of thing happens because of the context in which the left press is formed and which keeps  
it within the limits of the bourgeois system. There's always this unwillingness to break out  
of certain limits. (207)
In this context, workers began to create their own newspapers:
It's the moment we're living through which explains why our own papers have sprung up.  
It's due exclusively to the fact that the working class hasn't been listened to by the official  
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organs of the left. What has been going on, in fact? The workers have had to create their  
own papers because they wanted their problems to be seen – and in the traditional press  
no-one listened to the workers. (ibid.)
Some of these papers were created by the workers themselves, but some were the result of collaborations  
with “militant journalists involved in teaching worker correspondents” (189). The products varied greatly,  
with some taking the form of “stencilled sheets, while others were printed on neighbourhood presses or  
even sometimes on the presses of the government newspaper ( La Nación) after working hours” (ibid.). As 
these initiatives were consolidated they also grew in complexity. One of the worker papers, Tarea Urgente  
(Urgent Task), carried a price of ten escudos (220) and began serving “as a link between all the cordons,  
even though it [was] edited by only one of them” (194).
Organizations  of  popular  power  also  emerged in  rural  areas,  partly  because  existing  peasant  
unions  excluded  important  sectors  of  the  rural  population,  such  as  temporary  workers  and  small  
landholders.  Thus,  in  1971,  rural  residents  began to  create  Peasant  Councils  ( Consejos  Campesinos) 
(Aguirre  268).  Towards  the  middle  of  1972  rural  residents  began  to  seek  out  support  from  urban  
organizations  of  popular  power  (269).  Following  these  encounters,  and  with  the  encouragement  of  
“militant  officials  of  the  agrarian  institutions”,  some  Peasant  Councils  began  to  produce  popular  
newspapers in the form of “duplicated sheets or wall newspapers” (Mattelart 1980 [1974], 189). 
The participatory newspapers of Chilean popular power as they existed in 1972 and 73 were  
limited in their capabilities. Much of their content does not appear to have been “news”, understood as  
reportage of ongoing events, so much as information and exhortations designed to reinforce a reader's  
identification with the socialist movement (see 218-221). Nonetheless, the role of the workers' papers was  
“not only that of an echo chamber, but of a place for the re-elaboration of a general political matrix”  
(Munizaga 1985, 3).108 The needs and desires of the organizations of popular power often went beyond  
what the official UP policy structure considered viable and workers saw this reflected in the left press:
Generally the traditional press want to calm down public opinion. They tone down the  
information a bit so it won't be too alarmist, or direct it down the middle of the road. And  
108“solo de caja de resonancia, sino de lugar de re-elaboración de una matriz política general.”
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that's not always in the workers' interests. (Mattelart 1980 [1974], 205)
There's always this unwillingness to break out of certain limits. I don't know why – no  
doubt it's because of the traditional reformism of the press. And the rest of us, we believe  
that what the working class needs at this moment is not reformism. (207)
The participatory papers thus provided a space in which some marginalized members of Chilean society  
could  articulate  an  engagement  with  the  UP  political  project  outside  of  commercialized  and/or  
bureaucratized spheres determined by exclusive social hierarchies.
This  is  not  to  say  that  UP policy  makers  were the  intended audience.  The  papers  were  not  
designed to produce such a direct influence. As one worker made clear, the intended audience of  the 
participatory workers'  papers was composed of the workers themselves: “It's  important that there are  
papers like  Tarea Urgente, whose main aim is to get the workers to know one another and to agitate,  
attack and guide the worker's opinions, and express what he's thinking” (203). This function of “getting  
the workers to know one another” was also perceived as lacking in the traditional left press:
By following this norm of focussing on the average man, who is seen as living in the  
town, the left  press  continues to  cut different sectors of workers off from each other.  
Without being aware of it, they divide them. They don't show the common interests shared  
by workers and peasants. Part of my family is peasant. They criticise me – or not so much  
me as the press – for underestimating the peasants just because we work in factories and  
live in the town. (207)
Some of the papers were created as a conscientious response to this very problem. For example, one of  
the papers produced by a Peasant Council, La Picana (The Cattle Prod) , took on the task of “linking the 
industrial cordons with the peasant councils in a province in the South” (221). Alongside short items from  
various locales that reported problems, needs, and successes (223-37), La Picana carried the following  
call for submissions:
Everyone must write in La Picana. This is your paper – peasant, fisherman or worker from  
the city. All the poor people from the countryside and the towns must be represented here.  
No worker must remain out of touch with the ideas expressed here, because La Picana is  
the voice of the poor of the countryside and the town. Pick up your pen and write. (221)
Crucially, therefore, these media were already beginning to serve as articulating mechanisms for a new  
form of civil society that remained quite autonomous from a state apparatus whose support it sought and  
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whose policy it hoped to influence.
Participatory media during the UP administration never surpassed an embryonic stage and the  
initiatives, along with the larger movement toward popular power, were crushed by the brutal coup and its  
aftermath. We can not know, therefore, whether UP communications policy would have shifted toward  
providing greater support for the organizations of popular power or how their media outlets would have  
grown in diversity and complexity (if at all). Mattelart, however, did provide one contemporaneous vision  
for a Chilean participatory media system. The first step would be to organize “information cells” within  
factories, on farms, within community and women’s organizations, and other already existent sites; in  
other words, they “would simply be extensions of organs of mass participation” (49). 109 Within these cells, 
groups would discuss the news, “which means analyzing the class enemy’s ideological offensive” (50).  
More importantly, however, the cells should “take on the responsibility of elaborating information,” thus  
converting “the organized masses [into] the producers of their own messages” in any media, including  
print, film, and TV (51). At first, members of the cells would be aided by specialists “who little by little  
would pass on their skills.” Eventually, the cells would reach a state of self-sufficiency, at least in terms of  
technical capabilities. Finally, the media products would be distributed throughout society:
Such material could serve as a basis for increasing consciousness among other groups.  
After being criticized by these other groups, it  could return to its point of origin, thus  
completing  a  dialectical  circle  and  giving  the  workers  transmitting  the  message  the  
possibility  of  synthesising   criticisms  made  by  other  groups,  thereby  converting  the  
material into a source of increased social awareness…. The goal of this circulation would  
be  to  provide  a  bridge  of  solidarity  and  genuine  communication  between the  various  
sectors of the economy, from peasants to miners. Such a process would be a negation of  
the  reformist  perspective,  which  consists  in  promoting  compartmentalised  initiatives,  
campaigns and strategies limited to particular sectors, and thereby creates enclaves and  
heightens the divisions between the world of the worker, for example, and that of the  
peasant. (50)
In Mattelart's vision, a professional media apparatus would have continued to exist alongside the new  
participatory structures (1971, 6-7) and perhaps even distribute some of their content (1980 [1974], 50).  
As to the economic structure and context of the participatory information cells, Mattelart says nothing.  
109Mattelart presented these ideas in a more rudimentary form in his address to the First National Assembly of Left 
Journalists (1971, 8).
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The questions of how they would sustain themselves financially and if / how the work performed within  
them would be remunerated are simply not addressed.
What is clear, however, is that participatory media initiatives during the UP period broke new  
conceptual ground regarding the role of the media in a socialist system. There are several important points  
to  note.  First,  Chile's  popular  power  movement  took  advantage  of  the  space  provided  by  the  UP's  
commitment to maintaining the pluralist order of liberal representative democracy. Thus, while UP policy  
makers were concerned with maintaining legitimacy in relation to debates that revolved around “free  
speech” in a primarily commercial context, militant activists were able to exploit the open ground of civil  
society in order to advance a media system oriented toward access, participation, and self-management.  
Second, participatory media emerged within an autonomous civil society that understood itself to be at  
odds with the dominant civil society of the institutionalized liberal order. To be sure, this emergent civil  
society looked to the state  for support  and legitimation. It  also grew out  of  Marxist  and syndicalist  
traditions that focused primarily on the rights of workers and thus maintained a somewhat myopically  
economistic perspective, as evidenced by the overt emphasis on participatory media as workers' papers.  
Nonetheless, the popular power movement also included marginalized rural populations and shantytown  
residents, and participatory media initiatives had begun to take on the task of articulating these sectors  
with workers' organizations. Third, participatory media were, by and large, not a product of specific UP  
policies. In the construction of popular power, generally, and participatory media, specifically, radicalized  
sectors of the population forged ahead of official policy. This dynamic would not have been possible in  
Cuba, where a consolidated party/state apparatus was cast as the vanguard of a tightly tethered and state-
sanctioned civil society. 
Sandinista Nicaragua (1979-1990): Participatory Media and the Quest for Democratic Hegemony
The military victory of Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front ( Frente Sandinista de  
Liberación  Nacional /  FSLN)  in  1979  created  a  new  context  for  the  structuration  of  a  socialist  
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participatory communication system. On the surface, revolutionary Nicaragua appeared quite similar to  
revolutionary Cuba. Both small nations were economically dependent on an agricultural sector organized  
around large landholders, both had experienced US military intervention, and both had been governed by  
a  reviled  dictatorship  that  was  politically  dependent  on  the  US.  Both  revolutionary  movements,  
meanwhile, had formed around a nationalist ideology anchored by the mythification of an anti-imperialist  
hero110 and both had come to embrace Marxist-Leninist vanguardism. Both also saw broad, cross-class  
alliances  break  down  soon  after  military  victory  was  achieved.  Moreover,  once  in  power,  both  
revolutionary governments set about constructing a hegemonic system based on the interrelation of the  
state,  the party, and the mass organizations.  Indeed, at  least one observer has treated the Cuban and  
Nicaraguan mass organizations as if they were identical (Bresnahan 1985).
A closer look at the relationship between the revolutionary state and civil society, however, must  
take into account important differences between the Cuban and Nicaraguan context.  Whereas Cuba's  
revolutionary  leaders  ultimately  nationalized  nearly  the  entire  economy,  the  Sandinistas  remained  
committed to a mixed economy in which capital accumulation continued to play a significant role. And  
whereas the Cuban revolution had entirely dissolved liberal, bourgeois civil society, Sandinista leaders  
remained committed to a pluralist system, including multi-party elections and a commercial press, even as  
they sought to institutionalize participatory models of democratic practice (Serra 1991, 73). Additionally,  
whereas  the  Cuban  government  has  viewed  foreign  non-governmental  organizations  with  extreme  
distrust,  the  Sandinistas  recognized  them as  a  potentially  beneficial  source of  resources  and created  
dedicated government ministries and civil society organizations in order to manage their contributions  
(MacDonald 1997). In sum, whereas the Cuban revolutionary state relied primarily on the establishment  
of authoritarian hegemony, the Sandinista state tended toward the construction of a democratic hegemony  
that gave considerable space and some support to an autonomous civil society based on socialist ideals  
110Whereas Castro had invoked José Martí, FSLN leaders (as the name of the movement indicates) drew inspiration 
from Augusto Cesar Sandino, who led a rebel army against US marines from 1927 to 1933 and was later 
murdered by the Nicaraguan National Guard (see Black 1981, 15-27).
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(Brown 1990). In this sense, the Sandinista project moved further toward the instantiation of a Gramscian  
civil  state than either the Cuban or the Chilean administrations discussed above.  This is  particularly  
evident  in  the  increased  autonomy afforded to  Sandinistan  mass  organizations  vis-a-vis  their  Cuban  
counterparts.
While Cuba's mass organizations were largely the product of state initiatives undertaken after the  
revolutionary victory,  many of  Nicaragua's  mass organizations were rooted in  pre-revolutionary civil  
society movements that  were,  at  least  initially,  not affiliated with the FSLN. For instance,  the Rural  
Workers' Association (Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo / ATC) and the Civil Defense Committees  
(Comites de Defensa Civil / CDC) derived in part from organizations sponsored by the  Catholic church  
(Brown  48;  Bresnahan  287-8).  The  'Luisa  Amanda  Espinoza'  Association  of  Nicaraguan  Women  
(Asociacion de Mujeres Nicaraguenses 'Luisa Amanda Espinoza'  / AMNLAE), on the other hand, could 
trace its roots to middle class housewives that began to organize as “mothers clubs” in 1977 (Brown  
48).111 Having thus emerged from independent civil society organizations, these mass organizations were  
more inclined than their Cuban counterparts to situate themselves as autonomous representatives of their  
constituent populations. Indeed, as the FSLN began to consolidate the new Nicaraguan state, its leaders  
urged the mass organizations to make use of “internal criticism, public criticism and the utilization of all  
the methods of communication, including the staging of demonstrations to demand the measures required  
to  guarantee  that  your  plans  are  heard”  (cited  in  Serra  1991,  62).  On  various  occasions  the  mass  
organizations  did  just  that.  One  oft  discussed  example  occurred  in  1980-81 when  the  ATC and the  
Sandinista Workers' Federation (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores / CST) joined with other labor groups  
in a series of strikes and workplace occupations to force state controls on decapitalization and private  
enterprise (ibid.).
This is not to say that Nicaragua's mass organizations were not tethered to the Sandinista state /  
party system. Directors of the mass organizations were frequently affiliated with the FSLN, which meant  
111Luisa Amanda Espinoza was the first woman to die in combat during the Sandinista uprising.
122
that the organizations often simply carried out state policy in a manner similar to the Cuban experience  
(60). Moreover, their collective autonomy declined as the Sandinista project evolved. One cause for this  
decline was institutional. The mass organizations had been directly represented in Nicaragua's Council of  
State until 1984, after which point representation was determined by the election of political parties and  
the  mass  organizations  lost  an  important  channel  of  influence  over  state  policy  (59).  Perhaps  more 
significantly, however, as the war against the contras intensified and economic crisis deepened in the mid-
1980s, the mass organizations increasingly found themselves competing for scarce resources and further  
subordinated to a party and state focused on emergency measures (65). As the war abated in the late  
1980s, however, the FSLN made a concerted effort to revitalize the mass organizations and augment  
opportunities for popular participation. Thus, in the final years before the FSLN lost power in the 1990  
election, the mass organizations displayed signs of renewed autonomy (65- 71). The Sandinista impulse 
toward democratic hegemony was less absolute than vacillating (Brown 41).
Even during those periods when the mass organizations were most tightly tethered to the FSLN  
and the Nicraguan state, however, they maintained a degree of autonomy that was unparalleled by their  
Cuban counterparts. Exemplary in this respect was the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers ( Unión 
Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos  / UNAG), which was formed in 1981 by independent small- and  
medium-scale farmers who felt insufficiently represented by the ATC and its focus on wage laborers.  
Through their organization into “peasant assemblies” UNAG's constituents “helped attain recognition of  
the right to land in the July 1981 Agricultural Reform Law”, thus modifying the FSLN's emphasis on  
state  ownership (ibid.).  By 1984,  however,  when the contra  war was in  full  swing,  UNAG came to  
recognize that “its isolation from the peasantry was leading to gains by the right wing”. As a result,  
UNAG's leadership pushed for greater independence from the FSLN and “gained greater influence over  
state land reform policies” (MacDonald 1997, 56) in an effort to win over the rural population. Here, then,  
was a case where counterrevolutionary pressure, rather than reenforcing state-directed verticalization, led  
to greater autonomy for one sector of Sandinista-aligned civil society. In later years, UNAG's continued  
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insistence on autonomy led to specific opportunities for popular participation, as evidenced by the results  
of its increased leadership role in an integrated rural development program called Sandino Vive (Sandino 
Lives). Prior to the program's reorganization in 1989, “peasants had little knowledge of the program  and  
were almost entirely excluded from decision-making.” After UNAG assumed a leadership role, however,  
it was “led into a position of partial confrontation with the state on the terrain of civil society” with one  
result  being new avenues for  popular  participation in  the program (129-131). 112 It  would be hard to 
imagine a Cuban mass organization maintaining this type of contentious relationship with the state / party  
apparatus.
The vacillation between authoritarian and democratic hegemony, with the latter characterized by a  
turn toward a Gramscian civil state, was tightly bound up with Sandinista communications policy, which  
also vacillated between two competing logics. Mattelart (1986) identified these as:
...on  the  one  hand,  the  well-developed  system  for  the  socialization  of  agitation  and  
propaganda ideas and its related journalism practice from the socialist countries, and on  
the other, the abundant but unsystematic development of ideas, studies and experiments  
from a wide range of groups in Latin America, Europe, and North America [since 1970].  
(27)
The former of these was a “logic of war, and of propaganda and censorship” (16) that still bore a heavy  
imprint of Leninist vanguardism. The latter was “an alternative project” (17) that sought to construct  
“popular hegemony” (24) by drawing on dialogic and participatory theories. These logics played out  
within a pluralist system that included an antagonistic commercial press, making Chile's socialist project  
under the UP “[t]he only historical situation with some similarity to that of Nicaragua” (19). Indeed, as  
had been the case with the UP, the Sandinistas had no unified communications policy. Various media  
outlets and initiatives were assigned to or sponsored by a wide array of government institutions, mass  
organizations, and the FSLN itself. Also similar to the Chilean experience were Sandinista attempts to  
create  a  vanguardist  press  and to  harness popular  forms and genres  in  order  to  compete against  the  
112Following the 1989 reorganization, control of the program was shared between UNAG and the Augosto C. 
Sandino Foundation (Fundación Augusto C. Sandino / FACS), which represented Nicaraguan mass organizations 
and trade unions with foreign NGOs. 
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offerings of commercial outlets, both explicitly oppositional and otherwise.  There were, however, at least  
two significant differences between the UP and the Sandinista periods.
While vanguardism, freedom of the press, and state censorship were highly charged nodes within  
the  Chilean  media  context,  the  militarized  climate  of  Sandinista  Nicaragua  generated  even  greater  
intensity around these issues. The UP had gained executive power through the polls; the Sandinistas had  
won it under arms. This meant that FSLN media initiatives during the guerilla period were conceived  
primarily in relation to their propaganda value, as had been the case in Cuba, and such tendencies carried  
over  into the hegemonic project.  Thus,  Radio  Sandino went  from a  clandestine network  to  a  party-
controlled  station  with  national  reach  (see  Soley  &  Nichols  231-8).  Similarly,  the  Leonel  Rugama  
Brigade, a photography and film unit set up in April 1979 to provide international publicity to the FSLN,  
gave rise to the Nicaraguan Institute of Cinema ( Instituto Nicaragüense de Cinema / INCINE), which 
came  to  rely  on  its  Cuban  counterpart  for  funding,  technical  expertise,  and  theoretical  guidance  
(Buchsbaum 2003). Other examples of vanguardist, state- and party-controlled outlets could be listed.  
Significantly, their tendencies toward propaganda were exacerbated by the exigencies of the contra war  
and the economic crises of the mid- and late-1980s, as well as the antagonism of stridently oppositional  
media outlets, some of which were broadcasting from outside Nicaragua (see Valdivia 1991).  The war, in  
particular, was also invoked to justify the imposition of a state of emergency and state censorship of  
oppositional media outlets, the most infamous example of which was the La Prensa newspaper. 113 As a 
result of the militarized context, therefore, Sandinista communications policy experienced a strong pull  
toward authoritarian hegemony.
At the same time, however, the relatively mature state of participatory media theory and practice  
provided opportunities for establishing democratic hegemony that had not been available to the Cuban  
and Chilean governments during the 1960s and early 70s, as Mattelart made clear:
113The role of La Prensa has been central to discussions of freedom of the press in Nicaragua; see Nichols (1982, 
1983, 1985, 1986, 1988), Kriesberg (1983), Rothschuh Villanueva (1983), Wheelock (1984), Chamorro (1985), 
Ulibarri (1985), Kunzle (1986), Chamorro Cardenal (1987), Kornbluh (1987), Diaz Arbelaez (1988), Valdivia 
(1991), Jones (2002), Leiken (2003), Darling (2008).
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If the Nicaraguans find themselves in some respects on the same road as that once taken  
by certain sectors of the Chilean revolution, they do not begin from the same starting  
point. An important body of studies, research and individual and collective experiences on  
all these questions in Latin America and elsewhere has accumulated since 1970. In one  
way or another, the theoretical and practical advances in the domains of the international  
imbalance of information flow, popular communication, alternative culture, and horizontal  
communication,  among  others,  are  being  reinvested  in  Nicaragua  today.  Even  if  the  
transplant is not always a harmonious one. (19)
The participatory impulse found its way into the Sandinista milieu along a number of different avenues. 
One of  the  earliest  and most  significant  was  the collaboration between the FSLN and those  
sectors  of  the  Catholic  church  whose  emphasis  on  liberation  theology  inspired  their  solidarity  with  
marginalized sectors of Nicaraguan society. "Especially important was [the Center for Educational and  
Agricultural Promotion / Centro de Educación Promocional Agrária] CEPA, an NGO established by the 
Jesuits  in  1969  to  combine  religious  training  and  conscientisation”  according  to  a  Freirian  dialogic  
framework.  CEPA moved closer  to  the FSLN throughout  the 1970s and some of  its  members  were  
instrumental in establishing the ATC. Through CEPA and other Christian organizations, the liberation  
theology  movement  played  a  crucial  role  in  establishing  popular  education  as  a  basis  for  popular  
participation in the Sandinista project.
FSLN guerillas had also stressed the importance of participatory education as a component of  
their struggle against Somoza. Sandino's “commitment to literacy as a tool for liberation” inspired Carlos  
Fonseca, a founding member of the FSLN, to instruct his comrades to teach not only military skills but  
also literacy to their peasant recruits,. This attitude informed FSLN political education during the 1970s  
and Fonseca's instruction to “also teach them to read” was adopted as the slogan for the 1979 Literacy  
Crusade, which was the first national project initiated by the revolutionary government (Barndt 1985,  
320-2). In planning for the Crusade, the Sandinistas “consulted the literacy experience of many other  
countries  and  drew  theoretical  inspiration  from  the  approach  developed  by  …  Freire”,  whose  
methodologies they adapted “to fit their own historical context and political objectives”. Freire himself  
travelled to Nicaragua and was one of the “many internationalists consulted” (326).
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Following the Literacy Crusade, the theory and methodology that came to be known as the New  
Education  was  woven into  the  fabric  of  Sandinista  democratic  hegemony.  A Vice-Ministry  of  Adult  
Education was established and “continued to be a program of 'strategic priority'” (334). Moreover, “most  
state  institutions  and  mass  organizations  established  popular  education  departments  within  their  
structures”  (339).  CEPA,  the  Jesuit  organization,  remained  active  in  these  efforts  and,  in  1983,  
collaborated  with  the  Ministry  of  Agricultural  Development  and  Agrarian  Reform  ( Ministerio  de  
Desarrollo  Agropecuario  y  Reforma  Agraria /  MIDINRA)  in  “setting  up  the  first  'Methodological  
School,' which provided systematic training in popular education methodology” for over twenty other  
organizations (341). Meanwhile, those who had taught during the Crusade “set up learning groups called  
Popular Education Collectives (CEPs) and selected outstanding new literates to coordinate them” ( ibid.). 
By 1983,  19,100 CEPs had  been created  and the  role  they  played went  beyond even the expanded  
boundaries of the New Education (Serra 1991, 52). The CEPs became “daily assemblies where the plans  
and problems of the Revolution [were] discussed” (Barndt 334) and thus began to serve as nodes of a  
burgeoning civil society.
Where Sandinista civil society was informed by the New Education it was often accompanied by  
other  participatory  cultural  forms.  Theater,  for  instance,  has  been  employed as  part  of  the  guerillas  
political education process during the 1970s: 
Borrowing from Augusto Boal and other proponents of the New Popular Theater in Latin  
America,  university  students,  including  the  future  minister  of  Agriculture  Jaime  
Wheelock,  taught  basic  theater  techniques  to  peasants  as  a  way  of  generating  self  
confidence and presenting grievances. (Ryan 1996, 260)
Following the revolutionary victory, professional theater workers continued to employ the technique in  
rural  areas  and  the  use  of  “sociodramas”  was  “encouraged  by  the  Ministry  of  Culture,  the  ASTC  
(Association of Sandinista Cultural Workers) and other organizations” (261).
Exemplary of the linkage between the New Education and participatory communication in the  
construction of Sandinistan civil society was an experience which took place in the rural municipality of 
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Belén. In 1980, members of an agricultural cooperative joined with CEPs and a small women's collective  
to create a music and theater group called Frente Sur (Southern Front), which played a major role in the  
Peasant  Theater  movement  of  the  1980s  and  also  launched  Los  Baldeomares,  a  popular  traditional  
musical group. Frente Sur also became a founding member of the Movement for Peasant Artistic and  
Theatric Expression (Movimiento de Expresión Campesina Artística y Teatral  / MECATE), which was 
supported by the ATC. In 1986, in response to the expressed needs of the community, the emphasis of the  
Frente Sur project shifted from cultural to agricultural production. In 1989, Cantera (Quarry), a group  
specializing in popular education that had branched off from CEPA, began working within the Belén  
project (Cantera 1992, 17-19).
One testimony to the autonomy of the civil society nurtured by the Sandinista emphasis on the  
New Education is that the Belén project continued to function even after the FSLN was voted out of  
office in 1990 (ibid.). Further evidence can be drawn from the experience of the Nixtayolero Theater  
Collective, whose members “spent several months living in different peasant communities in order to  
become more familiar with popular traditions, customs, language, and myths, and to discover the primary  
concerns of the population at the moment”. The actors then returned to their workshop “to distill this  
reality to its essence, which then became the central theme of a play”. Tellingly, when the collective  
performed in Cuba “it was criticized for tending to concentrate on the problems that emerged in the  
course of the struggle to transform society” (Dore 419-20). Although the Sandinista project continued to  
vacillate between authoritarian and democratic hegemony, sectors of its civil society had clearly created a  
more autonomous space for cultural and political development than had been achieved in Cuba.
Fertilized as it was by the New Education, Sandinista civil society provided fecund ground for the  
emergence of participatory media. Gramsci, with his emphasis on education as the basis of ideological  
transition and hegemonic construction, provided a theoretical framework for this project. Thus, Guillermo 
Rothschuh,  one  of  Nicaragua's  foremost  journalists  and  communications  theorists,  suggested  that  
Gramsci's perspective should apply not only to the institutional educational apparatus, “but fundamentally  
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as a method, form and content, in order to drive the circulation of ideological discourse” (cited in Ryan  
1996, 42).114 Tomás Borge, a founding member of the FSLN, invoked Gramsci in his closing speech to the  
First Seminar on Participatory Radio, held in 1984 at the newly established Communication Studies and  
Training Center  (Centro de Estudios y Capacitación en Comunicación) on the campus of the Jesuit  
administered Central American University (Universidad Centroamericana) in Managua:115
It  has  been fruitless  for  theoreticians to  try  to  agree on which communication  
instrument has priority. However, what still seems to predominate … is the thesis that the  
school is the fundamental means of communication. Antonio Gramsci said this... Later it  
was given impetus by Louis Althusser who gave the school priority followed by social  
organizations, religion, the print media, audiovisual media, and, almost at the end, radio.
This ranking, in my opinion – and it is almost a sacrilege to contradict Gramsci –  
has  ceased  to  be  valid  in  global  terms....  For  this  reason  ...  the  few  means  of  
communication which we have at  our  disposal in  direct  competition with the enemy's  
communication media, should be converted into an important complement to the school...
This is why on other occasions we have emphasized the revolutionary need to  
further horizontal communication. (Borge 1986, 110)
Nonetheless, despite Borge's assurance that “[w]e are in a position to go beyond the level of artisan  
communication” (110), there was no unified Sandinista approach to communications policy, much less to  
the institution of a participatory media system. Government ministries, mass organizations, and other civil  
society groups tended to engage in isolated initiatives that manifested a wide variety of approaches.
Though he referenced Gramsci and not Lenin, Borge's speech retains the FSLN emphasis on  
vanguardism  and  manifests  a  persistent  ambiguity  regarding  the  nature  of  participatory  media  in  a  
socialist system. He says, for example, “that the role of the transmitter in our society is to share the  
revolutionary ideological message by sending it to the receivers who by virtue of their social condition are  
disposed to receive it”, though he goes on to declare that “[o]ne must go to the masses to learn from the  
masses and to teach the masses” (111). Perhaps most indicative of his middle-ground position are the  
examples of participatory media that he said “must become the rule rather than the exception” (110): Cara  
114Rothschuh founded the Media Bureau (Dirección General de Medios de Comunicación) of the Ministry of 
Culture (Ministerio de Cultura) in 1979, served as the dean of the School of Journalism at Managua's Central 
American University in the mid-1980s, and founded the Center for Communications Research (Centro de 
Investigación de la Comunicación / CINCO) in 1990.
115In the Sandinista government, Borge served as a member of the National Directorate (Dirección Nacional) and 
head of the Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio del Interior).
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al Pueblo (Face the People), a television program that aired on the state operated SSTV network which  
featured high ranking FSLN leaders traveling to popular neighborhoods and responding to questions in  
open assemblies; and Contacto 6-20, a radio program broadcast nationally on a station administered by  
the Ministry of Communication that invited listeners to call in with criticism and commentary. 116 While 
these programs undeniably offered an outlet for citizen concerns and proved to be extremely popular, 117 
they restricted participation to the same feedback model discussed above in relation to Cuban newspapers.  
Cara al Pueblo, for instance, positioned FSLN leaders as supremely knowledgeable and powerful, thus  
projecting the state and party as superior to civil society and potentially undermining the construction of a  
civil state. Meanwhile, although the format of Contacto 6-20  was copied by some state-operated radio 
broadcasters who felt the program encouraged “open, direct participation” and “active responsibility for  
problems in the country”, other radio administrators found its form of participation to be “too passive and  
individualistic” to “encourage horizontal communication in the community and a more authentic cultural  
expression” (White 1990, 13).
More  radical  forms  of  participatory  media  were  often  significantly  influenced  by  the  many  
theorists,  activists,  and practitioners  who came to  Nicaragua in  order  to  work  in  solidarity  with  the  
Sandinista project. Two examples, in particular, benefitted substantially from the wide body of theory and  
practical experience that had been developed during the 1970s and early 80s. The Timoteo Velásquez  
Popular Video Workshop (Taller Popular de Video Timoteo Velásquez) and the regional  stations of the 
People's  Radio  Corporation  (Corporación  de  Radiodifusión  del  Pueblo /  CORADEP)  exemplify  the 
advances that the Sandinista project was able to achieve in the direction of a participatory media system.  
They also illustrate the considerable obstacles that remained along the path.
The Video Workshop grew out of a 1981 Super 8 film workshop that was set up as one among  
many media components of the Economic Literacy Campaign that was administrated by the Ministry of 
116On Cara al Pueblo, see Jonas & Dixon (1984) and Halleck (1986, 119). On Contacto 6-20, see “Radio ‘Contacto 
6-20’ -- A Hot Line For Criticism” (1986) and White (1990, 13). 
117Contacto 6-20 originally aired in 1983 and for more than six years “had the highest audience rating of any 
medium in the country” (White 1990, 13).
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Planning (Ministerio de Planificación / MIPLAN) (Ryan 1996, 156). Some funding ($22,000) came from  
MIPLAN itself, while the bulk ($44,000) was provided by the United Nations Development Program.  
Alfonso Gumucio, a Bolivian filmmaker, communications theorist, and activist, was brought in to design  
and lead the workshop. His plan was to provide the participants with “a theoretical  overview of the  
history of creating a popular and political cinema in Latin America” (165), train them in the basics of  
filmmaking, and allow them to gain experience on a collaborative project that  could be used in  the  
economic  literacy  campaign.  Afterwards,  the  newly  trained  filmmakers  would  not  only  continue  to  
produce cinema, but would replicate the workshop for other participants.
Gumucio had written about the “Third Cinema”, a revolutionary cinema praxis that was closely  
associated with Latin America during the 1960s and 70s, and he was familiar with the Bolivian miners'  
radio stations and the participatory media debates that had swirled around the NWICO project. In essence,  
he sought to merge these threads through “ a technological transfer to the hands of the workers organized  
on a class platform” (Gumucio 1983, 28). 118 Gumucio had previously studied in Paris with Jean Rouch,  
who had conducted super 8 workshops in Mozambique in 1978, and Rouch's workshops served as a  
model for the Nicaraguan workshop.119 Gumucio was convinced that Super 8 was preferable to video,  
especially for the Nicaraguan context, because “it was easier to learn how to use; it was lightweight and  
portable; [and] the post-production techniques were mechanical and required much less complicated, non-
electronic equipment” (Ryan 157). Super 8 could also be projected to a larger audience than would be  
able to view video on the television screens available in Nicaragua at that time, especially since “the  
anticipated audiences for the workshop's films were other workers in a non-broadcast setting” (159).
Invitations were extended to the government ministries and the mass organizations asking for  
participants.  At  the  outset,  representatives  from  the  CST,  ATC,  CDC,  Sandinista  Youth  ( Juventud 
Sandinista / JS), MIPLAN, Ministry of the Interior (Ministerio del Interior / MINT), and INCINE were 
118“una transferencia tecnológica a manos de los trabajadores organizados sobre una plataforma clasista.”
119After gaining its independence from Portugal in 1975, Mozambique was led by a socialist government until 
1986. For discussion of Mozambican communications policy during this period, see Casullo (1982) and 
Mattelart (1982).
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present.120 By the end of the twelve week workshop, however, only five participants remained - three from  
the CST, one from the ATC, and one from MINT. The group produced several documentary shorts as well  
as the final collaborative project, Cooperative Sandino, which combined documentary footage with re-
enactments in order to portray “a variety of problems that Nicaragua would have to deal with in the post-
revolutionary period” (164). Gumucio played a significant role in conceptualizing and editing the final  
film, which was screened at a closing ceremony but not distributed widely. The group went on to make a  
few shorts in the following months, and they used these and other films to facilitate discussions with  
workers about what they had learned in the workshop. Nonetheless, “[d]espite continued assistance from  
foreign filmmakers, the costs of developing and the arrangements needed to ship the negative outside the  
country proved prohibitive” (166).121 The group was forced to cease production within a few months.
The following year, however, two foreign independent filmmakers (one of whom had worked in  
Chile during the UP period), along with three graduates of the Super 8 workshop, began collaborating  
with the CST and ATC in order to create a video production group comprised of workers. 122 A Dutch 
organization provided funding for video equipment and two years of “training and further specialization”,  
and “the CST and ATC agreed to pay the basic salaries of the video collective”. 123 With the addition of 
three new participants from the ATC, the  Timoteo Velásquez Popular Video Workshop was born. The 
project began with eight weeks of training in all aspects of video production, thus enabling them to  
perform multiple roles  and make collective decisions regarding content and form. “Before becoming  
120Significantly, in the planning stages of the workshop, INCINE's Director “said that INCINE should have all of 
the cameras, including the super 8, and that the workers would be able to borrow them when needed. Gumucio 
refused” (Ryan 208, n43). This anecdote nicely illustrates INCINE's inclination towards professionalization and 
the still marginal state of the participatory perspective within the Sandinista media apparatus.
121Funding for Rouch's Mozambique workshops had provided for a laboratory on site.
122The filmmakers, Jan Kees De Rooy and Wolf Tirado, were in Nicaragua filming documentaries for their own 
production company, Tercer Cine. Tirado had worked in Chile and Kees De Rooy “had produced films on Third 
World issues for a progressive Dutch television station”. While they recalled approaching the mass organizations 
with the idea of forming a production group, members of the Super 8 workshop reported that they had initially 
proposed the idea to the filmmakers (Ryan 167).
123“Each of the members received a salary equivalent to other activists and organizers within the unions (roughly 
$20/month) along with basic food supplies and gas for their vehicles, a valuable commodity during this period” 
(Ryan 172). 
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videomakers[,] group members had worked in a variety of occupations including those of a receptionist,  
secretary, union organizer, and veterinarian” (168), and as such they brought a working-class mentality to  
the “more than 150 documentaries, vignettes, co-productions, and video letters with foreign solidarity  
groups” (173) that they produced from 1982 to 1987.
The members of the Workshop generated most of the ideas for the videos themselves, although  
there was a “general understanding” with leaders of the CST and ATC that the themes would relate “to the  
role of industrial and agricultural workers in the revolution” (172-3). Since the videomakers were of the  
working class and had been instructed in the mode of popular video, their productions tended to focus on  
workers, peasants, and their families, not party and organizational leaders. Also, since “generally at least  
half of the [Workshop's] members were women at any one time”, many of the videos were “devoted to  
women”  or  represented  female  perspectives  (186).  The  videos  thus  presented  a  variety  of  voices,  
including criticism and suggestions related to government and party policy. Nonetheless. the Workshop's  
first priority, “as it was for the mass organizations, was the defense and support of the revolution” (202).  
As a result, the videos did not “represent the full spectrum of public opinion” and some of the videos  
produced “in later years uncritically toe[d] the official Sandinista line” (203). 124
The Workshop provided training, equipment, and financial support to members of Nicaragua's  
working class that would not otherwise have had access to video production technology. Ryan classifies  
their output as community video inasmuch as they present “a community speaking to itself” (192) and  
views not only the members of the Workshop, but also the “agricultural and factory workers interviewed  
within their videos” as Gramscian “organic intellectuals because they also act as 'permanent persuaders' in  
a way that would not be possible in their own lives” (193). Without denying these conclusions, we must  
recognize  the  limitations  of  the  workshop  as  a  community  media  organization  in  relation  to  the  
fundamental goals of participation, access, and self-management. While these were available to members  
of the Workshop, there do not seem to have been structured avenues of entry for the members of the large  
124Ryan (173-98) offers detailed descriptions and analysis of multiple videos produced by the workshop. 
133
community represented by the CST and ATC. At the very least, opportunities for training and sustained  
participation would have been limited to residents of Managua, where the workshop was located, but it  
also appears that it would have depended on the ability to obtain a salary from the mass organizations. In  
this sense, the Workshop is less a community media organization than a highly autonomous in-house  
video production unit that, because of the background of its members and its conscientious focus on  
methodology and content, was uniquely capable of producing popular forms of video.
In many ways, the limitations of the Workshop were a product of the structural constraints within  
which it operated. The group's autonomy was, in a certain sense, a double-edged sword, since it partially  
resulted from the fact that, despite their rhetoric, leaders of the mass organizations did not fully appreciate  
the theoretical framework and/or practical potential of participatory media. A spokesperson for the CST  
later remarked that:
this was not understood in its magnitude by the principal directors of the CST who gave  
priority to direct work with the workers and viewed the project as less than secondary  
because they saw that the financing had come, that someone was teaching, but they didn't  
look any further. (cited in Ryan 201)
This meant that, for their own projects, CST leaders “preferred to work with professionals or outside  
groups rather than they [sic] worker group they had created” ( ibid.). In this environment, there would 
have been little hope of expanding the Workshop, either to take on additional salaried members or to  
replicate  the  group  in  locations  outside  of  Managua.  The  members  themselves  certainly  lacked  the  
wherewithal to do so, as significant deficiencies of resources were already impacting their own efforts.
Distribution was especially affected by the lack of resources. The original plan was to screen the  
Workshop's productions at local “work centers” (centros de trabajo) attached to the mass organizations  
and facilitate post-screening discussions with workers. 125 In practice, however:
work-site screenings were a limited success reaching only about 1200 workers connected  
with the CST in Managua. Because of the difficulties  in  traveling, often times due to  
shortages of gas, they were rarely able to travel far from Managua... (199)
125In 1982, some members of the Workshop had gained experience with this format when they participated in a 
“mobile cinema” program, sponsored by INCINE, in which they screened foreign films (including treatments of 
US interventions in Cuba and Chile) and facilitated post-screening discussions (Ryan 198, 217 n135).
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When Workshop members could not travel, betamax tapes were sometimes sent to the work centers, but it  
became apparent that workers were not readily inclined to attend screenings. Their free time was already  
reduced  due  to  demands  for  increased  production  resulting  from  the  national  economic  plans  and,  
especially in the north where the contra war was most intense, the need to participate in voluntary defense  
activities. Moreover, as workers and their families were already exposed to revolutionary themes through  
other activities and media outlets, the videos failed to attract audiences that “often preferred watching  
imported telenovelas and police dramas on their home televisions” ( ibid.).
An alternative means of distribution had begun to develop at the final screening of the original  
Super 8 workshop, where members met the head of SSTV. This contact eventually led SSTV to broadcast  
a series of short  (nine to fifteen minute) documentaries produced by the Workshop in 1983. 126 Following 
this, SSTV agreed to show Workshop videos twice monthly, although the group had campaigned for a  
weekly time slot. The collaboration with SSTV was not without difficulties, however. As with the mass  
organizations,  Workshop members felt  as if  they were perceived as unprofessional and discriminated  
against. This, they believed, led to their inability to obtain a guaranteed and consistent time slot. Instead,  
their work was “[h]aphazardly scheduled in the midst of ... commercial imported programs” and “never  
presented with a special introduction as a series by and for the workers” (192). As a result, their work was  
not as well received as it might have been, since audiences judged it against the standards of commercial  
content.
Although SSTV was owned and operated by  the  state,  it  generated  revenue  by charging for  
broadcast time. While some of the video groups attached to government ministries may have been able to  
work out special arrangements, the Workshop had “very few high level contacts even within the CST and  
ATC to argue on their behalf”. Thus, as the economic crisis worsened the Workshop became increasingly  
unable to cover the cost of television placement and by 1986 had altogether ceased broadcasting their  
126The series, called “Asalto al Cielo” (Assault on the Sky) was “commissioned” in celebration of May Day, 
though Ryan does not specify by who. Also unclear is whether the series was comprised of six or nine videos, 
though Ryan's account (184-198) seems to indicate that the original plan was for six and that nine were 
ultimately produced during a single month.
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productions. This was just one of several serious setbacks that occurred within a short period. Funding  
from the CST and ATC, which were also dealing with the economic crisis, was cut off, and “a personality  
conflict ... caused the collective to split back into two groups, one aligned with the ATC, the other with  
the CST”. Without institutional support, both groups turned to a commercial model and, although they  
found some work with “organizations within Nicaragua and foreign television”, it was “hardly enough to  
support all the members” (200).
The  dissolution  of  the  Workshop  underscores  the  degree  to  which  participatory  media  must  
ultimately rely on a stable institutional framework for not only funding, but also growth and integration  
with  civil  society.  In  Sandinista  Nicaragua,  the  most  extensive  and  successful  such  framework  was  
developed within the  radio  sector  as  CORADEP began to shift  its  state-owned network  of  eighteen  
regional stations toward the format of community media. While exemplifying the extent of Sandinista  
success in creating space for popular participation in the articulation of civil society, the project also  
illustrates the difficult balance between stability and autonomy that continually exacerbated the tension  
between authoritarian and democratic hegemony.
As the FSLN-led revolution swept aside the dictatorship in 1979, the rebels took control over  
nineteen radio stations that had either been owned by the Somozas or their close allies. 127 While some of 
the  previous  personnel  remained  in  place,  in  other  cases  youthful  revolutionaries  with  little  or  no  
experience set to work learning how to operate the low-power, antiquated transmitters, which broadcast  
with 1, 3, 5, or 10 kilowatts on the AM band. 128 For the first couple of years following the victory, while  
the Sandinista government was largely concerned with the centralized, national media outlets located in  
Managua,  the  new  operators  of  the  regional  stations  improvised,  struggling  to  keep  the  equipment  
127Unless otherwise noted, information regarding the regional CORADEP stations has been drawn from White 
(1990) and Crabtree (1996). While the broad contours of both accounts match up, there are some discrepancies 
in the details that do not affect the summary presented here. Crabtree's research was more thorough and her 
unpublished doctoral dissertation (1992) offers an extended analysis. The stations are also discussed in Lewis & 
Booth (1990).
128“In some cases, equipment had seen 30 years of service. Radio Xalteva in Granada, for example, was using the 
first radio transmitter in the country, approximately 60 years old” (Crabtree 1996, 227). For a discussion of 
problems associated with integrating previous personnel with new, ideologically motivated workers, see p226.
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working  and  broadcasting  a  mix  of  music  and  information  that  borrowed  from  the  vanguardist,  
propagandistic style employed by FSLN media efforts during the insurrection.
In April 1981, a governmental decree brought all of the regional stations under the direction of  
the  newly  created  CORADEP.  Although  CORADEP  was  administered  by  the  Ministry  of  
Communications (itself dependent on the Ministry of the President), the legal and administrative structure  
of  the  stations  was  relatively  autonomous  when  compared  to  national,  state-operated  stations.  
CORADEP's central office began providing support and coordination for the regional stations, including  
funding for salaries, equipment, and training. It conducted an assessment of the stations performance and  
found  that  the  propagandistic  content  was  alienating  all  but  the  staunchest  FSLN supporters.  These  
finding  catalyzed  a  period  of  professionalization  during  which  the  CORADEP  stations  reformed  
themselves  in  an  effort  to  compete  with  private  broadcasters.  Stations  began  to   broadcast  more  
international pop and rock at the expense of revolutionary and folk songs; a national news department was  
created in 1983 and tasked with the production of a flagship news program and development of news  
production at the regional stations; 129 and all programming underwent a process of regionalization, so that  
content was more tailored to the concerns of audiences in relation to issues such as agriculture and health.  
Despite this push toward professionalization, news remained “more slanted to the FSLN” (White 1990,  
13),  and,  though greater  emphasis  was  placed  on  selling  advertising,  most  of  the  time was  sold  to  
government  ministries  and  other  Sandinista  organizations  for  public  service  and  other  propaganda  
campaigns.
A key element of the professionalization process was an increased emphasis on training. In 1983  
CORADEP opened its national Center for Education and Training (Centro de Educación y Capacitación / 
CECAP) with a dedicated staff and capacity for 60 trainees at any one time. As a result of multiple  
influences,  CECAP's  staff  became  the  guiding  force  behind  CORADEP's  shift  toward  a  more  
129While carriage of the national program was voluntary, Crabtree (1996) found that it was broadcast at least once 
per day at all of the stations she visited. Local and regional news production was also voluntary, and “[t]he 
amount of news produced by a given station depended upon the staffing resources available and on the 
availability of alternative news sources in the area” (225).
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participatory model.  One impetus for this  shift  was the general  emphasis on participation within the  
Sandinista  process.  CORADEP's  staff  wanted  to  promote  the  type  of  popular  participation  that  had  
marked  the  Literacy  Crusade  and  defined  the  success  of  shows  like  Contacto  6-20.  Contact  with 
communications  researchers  and  activists,  however,  convinced  them that  the  regional  stations  could  
advance even further toward a community media model. Rothschuh, who coordinated the First Seminar  
on Participatory Radio for station directors in 1984, was one crucial guide, as were international figures,  
such as Mattelart, who spent a month in Nicaragua in early 1985 as an expert consultant with financial  
support  from UNESCO (Crabtree 227; Mattelart & Rothschuh 1985, 7). Especially important in  this  
regard  was  the  Latin  American  Association  of  Educational  Radio  ( Asociación  Latinoamericana  de  
Educación  Radiofónica /  ALER),  which  helped  CECAP create  a  customized  series  of  courses  in  
participatory radio.130 From 1986 to 88 over 600 workers attended courses at CECAP. Moreover, these  
national courses were “closely coordinated with continued on-site training in the stations in close co-
operation with station directors” (White 1990, 13). Most of the stations also created training committees  
to evaluate and develop the skills of workers. 
Throughout this period, the administration and practice of the regional stations began to change.  
From 1984 to 86 many stations enlisted the help of sociologists and other specialists to conduct audience  
analyses and re-evaluate programming. The staff of two stations in the north took their analyses even  
further by splitting up into groups of five or six, each of which lived in a different rural community for  
two months. Staff members immersed themselves in the daily lives of the peasants, learning about their  
rhythms and tastes. They also incorporated the people into the production and evaluation of content. This  
immersive strategy was reported to CORADEP's central office and shared with other regional stations,  
some of which applied it in modified form.
In sum, these analyses led to important changes. Generally, programming was scheduled to fit the  
130ALER was formed in 1972 by eighteen educational radio stations belonging to the Catholic Church, soon 
thereafter began advocating for popular radio (radio popular), and remains active. See White (1983) and 
www.aler.org
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predominant daily rhythm of the audience. In rural areas, for example, the broadcast day began earlier,  
with traditional folk music that was appreciated by agricultural workers preparing for work. In urban  
areas,  on  the  other  hand,  contemporary  pop  music  was  scheduled  for  the  after-school  hours.  More  
importantly, however, the analyses led to new forms of participation. The rural stations began to oblige  
the many listeners who wanted to hear recordings of local musicians. They also discovered the popularity  
of local storytelling traditions and began to invite listeners to record “their versions of legends, their  
memories of historical events in the region, their humorous stories and jokes, etc.” (14). Some of these  
were  dramatized  and  followed  by  open  discussions  of  the  story.  One  station  solicited  recipes  for  
traditional  medicines,  submitted  them  for  review  by  health  professionals  in  Managua,  and  then  
incorporated them into fictionalized vignettes in order to pass on the information to a population that  
could not afford pharmaceuticals. In these and other ways, listening populations began to hear their own  
customs and voices reflected in the content of the regional stations.
The most significant mode of popular participation, however,  not only preceded the analyses  
described above, but emerged outside of CORADEP. During the insurrection, the ATC had published a  
clandestine newsletter called El Machete (The Machete).131 Following the Sandinista victory, El Machete 
became the most important newspaper for rural workers, reaching a monthly circulation of 10,000. In  
1982, the ATC's leaders decided to institute a Movement of Worker Reporters ( Movimiento de Reporteros  
Obreros). The ATC's National Team of Propaganda began offering workshops in basic communication to  
its  members  and El  Machete  began running their  stories in  a  dedicated column.  As more and more  
workers were trained as reporters,  the flow of submissions overwhelmed El Machete and a  separate  
newsletter was created to distribute them all. 132 In 1983 the FSLN offered its support to the program, the  
name of which was changed to Movement of Popular Correspondents ( Movimiento de Corresponsales  
131Unless otherwise indicated, my account of the Movement of Popular Correspondents is drawn from Rodriguez 
(2001, 65-82), which itself is a version of Rodriguez (1994).
132“...from April 1982 to the following April, El Machete published 151 articles written by reporteros obreros.... 
Later, the flow of articles submitted had risen to between 200 and 400 every month, with El Machete publishing 
only 10% of them” (Rodriguez 2001, 69).
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Populares).  Increased  funding  meant  more  workshops  and  at  the  First  Congress  of  Popular  
Correspondents in 1987 it was reported that a total of 963 popular correspondents (PCs) had been trained  
between 1981 and 1986.133 PCs ranged in age from sixteen to sixty, and “although mostly men, many  
women also participated” (Rodriguez 2001, 70). 134 Many of the PCs had only learned to read and write  
during the Literacy Crusade and on average they had a third grade level of education. All of their work  
was voluntary and, while some were given time off from their work duties in order to participate, many  
wrote their reports in their minimal free time. 135
In  1983,  “several  workers'  organizations”  and  two  of  the  CORADEP radio  stations,  Radio  
Liberación (Liberation Radio) and Radio Segovia, “signed an agreement to work toward strengthening the  
Movement of Popular Correspondents” (75). By the late 1980s, roughly half of the regional stations were  
broadcasting reports from PCs (White 1990, 15). Radio Liberación, for instance, developed a network of  
nearly 150 PCs and “instituted a work collective which included community members”. Some of the PCs  
learned radio production in the program and went on to become salaried workers at the station (Crabtree  
1996, 229). By 1986 PCs were responsible for 30 percent of the news carried by Radio Liberación and  
Radio Segovia, and their contribution may have climbed as high as 40 or 50 percent by 1989. 136 PC 
stories, which “depicted everyday life, culture, and the successes and sorrows of isolated communities”  
(Rodriguez 2001, 73), helped to raise the profile of rural residents and their contributions to Nicaraguan  
society and the Sandinistan project. They also enabled local populations to voice their criticism of poorly  
133“In 1983, there were 116 popular correspondents. In 1984, 115 more popular correspondents were trained, and 
by 1985, the number had risen to 205. This same year, students from the School of Journalism (Escuela de 
Periodismo) at Universidad Centroamericana joined as instructors. In 1986, ATC and FSLN activists trained 166 
popular correspondents in Region I alone. By 1987, 250 popular correspondents were working in Region I ” 
(Rodriguez 2001, 70).
134For example, of  the 92 articles published in El Machete between April 1982 and April 1983 that had a byline, 
“22 were authored by women from isolated rural areas in northern Nicaragua” (Rodriguez  2001, 69).
135Rodriguez (2001) offers two anecdotes to support her claim that the writing “was all done during their 'free 
time'” (72-3), but Crabtree (1996) states that PCs “were allowed the time to conduct their work as volunteer 
journalists (and other community service work) within the workplace and the community” (234).
136“In August of 1985, PCs sent fifty-five stories to regional stations Radio Liberación and Radio Segovia. In 
September, they sent out seventy-five stories; in October, eighty-nine stories; and in November, 147 stories ... By 
1987, each of the 205 PCs in Region I was sending an average of four stories per month...” (Rodriguez 2001, 
70). Rodriguez does not explain the discrepancy between the two different figures given regarding the number of 
PCs in Region I during 1987 (see note 82).
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managed  and/or  exploitative  public  services  (White  1990,  15).  Perhaps  more  than  any  of  the  other  
participatory  components  adopted  by  the  CORADEP  stations,  the  PC  movement  empowered  
marginalized populations by channeling popular voices through the media. As will be discussed below,  
however, these results were not unmitigated.
By 1988, “the CORADEP stations in the rural areas had top status within their communities”  
(Crabtree 1996, 229). In August of that year CORADEP hosted the third international assembly of the  
World Association of  Community Radio Broadcasters  (known as AMARC, for  its  French acronym),  
which brought representatives from over 50 nations and:
gathered the human and information resources needed to refine the participatory model....  
Workshops covered technical aspects of participation, contributing to community culture,  
self-financing, music, information networks, community movements, indigenous people,  
community correspondents, training to encourage participation and management. ( ibid.)
More generally, the conference focused international attention on one of the most democratic impulses of  
the Sandinista media system and generated pledges of material support. In a certain sense,  AMARC's  
assembly represented a high water mark for the CORADEP program.
As a result of the contra war, a US-imposed economic blockade, and a series of poor policy  
decisions, Nicaragua found itself in an increasingly dire economic situation. Thus, on January 1, 1989, “in  
order to maintain as much of the education and health budgets as possible … CORADEP was cut from  
the federal budget” (231). As a result of the cut, staff at CORADEP's central office were reduced to the  
minimal  level  and  the  prized  training  program  was  ended  (White  15).  The  Director  of  Financing  
“described the change as going from an administrative body to a regulatory one, concerned with general  
policy making and external relations”. CORADEP's individual stations, meanwhile, had lost their budget  
for salaries  and operating costs.  During the first  months of 1989 CORADEP's international  relations  
department  tried  to  soften  the  blow  by  connecting  the  stations  with  international  aid  organizations.  
Nonetheless,  they “were told they must become self-sufficient”, which meant reductions in staff  and  
broadcasting hours, as well as an increased reliance on advertising. As many government ministries had  
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also  seen  their  budgets  reduced,  however,  stations  sought  alternative  means  of  revenue  generation,  
including the sale of classified advertising, community-sponsored programming (“in honor of a birthday,  
for example”) and fundraising at public events. In this manner, the CORADEP stations limped along until  
the FSLN was voted out of power in 1990 (Crabtree 231).
The CORADEP regional stations, in conjunction with the PC movement, illustrate the degree to  
which the Sandinista  project of  democratic  hegemony was able  to  coordinate  state  and civil  society  
resources in order to advance toward a system of participatory media. The successes of these interrelated  
initiatives should not be diminished. At the same time, however, at least two important caveats must be  
recognized. First, while the system increased channels for access and participation, “[m]any radio station  
personnel ... did not see much difference between writing to request a favorite song as opposed to actual  
participation in decision-making and management,” of which there was precious little (230). Indeed:
[s]tation directors and CORADEP administrators generally felt that participation in long-
term planning and management was unrealistic given the economic conditions of those in  
the rural communities. Such persons had no time to volunteer. Further, while the level of  
sophistication  among  community  volunteers  was  improving  with  training,  that  of  the  
general population was not. (ibid.)
Some, of course, did believe that community self-management was a valuable ideal, and one station even  
managed to initiate such a process by turning a transmitter over to a small mountain community, but that  
project  came  late  and  was  quickly  derailed  by  the  budget  cuts  (232).  The  CORADEP system had  
produced  popular  radio  with  a  significant  degree  of  participation,  but  it  had  not  instituted  a  viable  
institutional framework for a sustainable community media system.
Even in the PC movement, where administration was ostensibly in the hands of civil society via  
the mass organizations, self-management and autonomy were highly compromised. To the degree that the  
system fell short, the failure was directly linked to the unresolved tension between authoritarian and  
democratic hegemony, and its exacerbation by the economic crisis and contra war. When the first two  
CORADEP stations agreed to begin broadcasting PC reports, the agreement they signed was brokered  
“under the leadership of the FSLN Regional Committee of Region I” (Rodriguez 75), which was located  
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in the northern part of the country. Indeed, most of the stations that ultimately participated were located in  
the north (White 15), where not only the military conflict, but also the anti-Sandinista propaganda barrage  
from radio  stations  inside  Honduras,  were  most  intense.  Already  by  1983,  when the  stations  began  
broadcasting  PC  reports,  the  FSLN  had  surveyed  two  rural  counties  and  discovered  that  half  the  
population  were  listening  to  the  foreign  stations.  Rodriguez  has  concluded  that  the  FSLN  already  
envisioned  “that  the  Movement  of  Popular  Correspondents  could  be  transformed  into  a  force  to  
counterbalance anti-Sandinista propaganda” (76).
Following FSLN involvement in the program, PC trainees were increasingly selected for their  
commitment  to  Sandinista  ideology.  Moreover,  while  an  original  charter  specified  that  a  National  
Coordinating Committee, including representatives of the major grassroots organizations and eight PCs,  
would govern the PC movement,  the FSLN progressively “implemented a  firm policy of centralized  
authority  over  the  [Movement  of  Popular  Correspondents]”  (77). 137 This  impulse  towards 
bureaucratization and centralization  was also manifest  in  the transfer  of  many experienced PCs into  
leadership positions within either the FSLN or ATC. “Popular correspondents had to leave their rural  
communities behind in order to serve as press personnel for the FSLN central structures” (79). Those that  
did remain in their  communities resented that they were increasingly asked to report  back on public  
opinion in relation to FSLN policy. In some cases, PC reports that criticized FSLN policy and government  
services were directly censored by local party members. In 1988, for the same reasons that CORADEP's  
funding was later cut, the “government ceased subsidizing those regional structures in charge of the [PC  
movement] in regions I and II. Almost immediately, the [movement] began to deteriorate” (80). Though  
137In 1985, for example, the FSLN Regional Committee organized a Regional Press and Information Center that 
“consisted of the director of information and media from the FSLN Department of Press and Propaganda 
(DEPEP), the director of public relations  from the Ministry of the Interior, the director of public relations and 
political action from the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS), the regional coordinator from UPN [the Association of 
Nicaraguan Journalists / Unión de Periodistas de Nicaragua], the editor of the Segovia Newscast (regional 
radio), the director of Radio Segovia, and the director of Radio Liberación.... The FSLN describe[d] the need for 
the Center:  'to confront military, economic, political and ideological aggression it is necessary to create the 
[Regional Press and Information Center] in order to orient the media in Region I” (Rodriguez 78; emphasis 
added by Rodriguez).
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created within a mass organization and thus ostensibly a civil society initiative, the PC movement had  
become overly dependent on a party and state whose need for self-preservation had taken priority.
Conclusions: Lessons Learned, Changes in Cuba, and Socialism for the 21 st Century
In sum, the participatory media efforts of the Sandinista project demonstrate a persistent tension  
between  impulses  toward  authoritarian  and  democratic  hegemony.  In  comparison  with  previously  
established socialist administrations in Cuba and Chile, however,  the Sandinista project evidences an  
important advance in  the struggle to establish a socialist  civil  state that  might facilitate civil  society  
leadership within a structure of democratic governance. In both Cuba and Chile, socialist policy was  
largely formulated in reaction to the dominance of the liberal model of civil society.
Cuba's  revolutionary  government,  drawing  on  recent  history  and  its  own experience,  rightly  
believed that the US government would manipulate civil society in order to undermine challenges to its  
neo-imperial  ambitions.  The  Castro  administration  therefore  dismantled  the  pre-existent  liberal  civil  
society and established an authoritarian hegemony within which socialist forms of civil society were  
tightly tethered to the state. As a result of its severely diminished autonomy, especially in the media  
sector, Cuban civil society was unable to develop avenues for self-critical reflexivity, which negatively  
impacted the country's ability to respond creatively to adversity.
In a distinct historical context, Chile's UP administration found itself forced to preserve the liberal  
framework of civil society. As a result, it adopted a communications policy oriented toward besting its  
political  adversaries  in  open  ideological  competition.  While  this  represented  a  conscious  attempt  to  
establish  democratic  as  opposed to  authoritarian  hegemony,  contemporary  participants  and  observers  
quickly realized that the simple substitution of content was insufficient for overcoming the structural  
constraints of a media system designed for capital accumulation. The great benefit of maintaining open  
space for autonomous civil society organization, however, was that UP sympathizers were able to explore  
alternative  structures  of  counter-hegemonic  organization.  Drawing  in  part  on  burgeoning  modes  of  
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communication theorization, Chileans began constructing participatory media collectives and networks  
that suggested a  new direction for  socialist  communication policies.  How this might have ultimately  
affected UP policy is, of course, unknown, as the administration was crushed just as the media efforts  
were gathering momentum.
As in Cuba and Chile, the tension between authoritarian and democratic hegemony was central to  
debates surrounding communications policy in Nicaragua during the 1980s. Significantly, however, the  
FSLN insurrection had been increasingly shaped by the concept of dialogic participation in the decade  
prior to its victory. As Sandinista governance took shape, it continued to be influenced by the dramatic  
acceleration  in  participatory  media  theorization  and  experimentation  that  had  been  catalyzed  by  the  
NWICO movement. The Sandinista commitment to a mixed economy and a pluralist civil society created  
space for experimentation regarding media production and distribution. Unlike in Chile, however, state  
policy and state support  for  civil  society organizations helped nurture participatory media initiatives.  
Although  still  incipient,  this  gesture  towards  a  civil  state  seemed  to  open  up  the  possibility  of  an  
institutional  framework  for  the  systematization  of  a  community  media  model  that  prioritized  self-
management  alongside  access  and  participation.  War  and  economic  crisis  thwarted  this  potential,  
however, and not only because they induced a fatigued and demoralized populace to elect an alternative  
government. Even prior to that outcome, the FSLN's anxiety to preserve its hold on power had led the  
government to shape the system according to its  own propagandistic goals. Rather than viewing this  
reversion toward authoritarianism as inherent to socialist media projects, however, we can recognize it as  
symptomatic of the lack of tested and replicable alternative models. For better or worse, the FSLN felt  
itself unable to wait on the results of a participatory tendency for which, outside of the exigencies of self  
preservation, its support was sincere. Despite continued research and the development of international  
networks of community media practitioners, the Sandinistas were unable to count on any coherent model  
for the construction of scalable community media systems, nor were they able to construct their own  
during a precarious decade in power.
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 Despite the incomplete state of its central project, communications policy in Latin American  
socialist administrations had contributed significantly to a dialectic of theorization and experimentation  
within which a new conception of socialist hegemony was slowly emerging. Also extremely important in  
the formulation of this dialectic were the social movements that emerged in resistance to the right-wing,  
authoritarian military regimes that came to power across Latin America in the 1960s and 70s in countries  
like Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. Though acting in opposition to state power, these movements engaged  
the same questions regarding the role of civil society in hegemony and counter-hegemony that had proved  
central to theorization regarding socialist governance. By the late 1980s, Latin American socialism had  
been  indelibly  marked  by  these  theoretical  debates.  Orlando  Fals-Borda  (1991),  in  a  1988  lecture,  
articulated the nature of this shift even as it continued to play out:
People's power thus expressed and built up from base to top and from rim to centre - with  
research, conscience-training, and education for popular unity in the struggle for a full and  
fitting life for all classes - such power, vested in the people, acquires its own dynamics,  
and little by little reformulates the rules of the traditional political game, whilst calling for  
proper  ideological  definitions.  There  is  then  an  advance  from  tactical  claims  to  a  
presentation of structural exigencies, which, if the circumstances so require, might well  
turn  out  to  be  revolutionary;  there  is  not,  however,  a  fixed  rule.  Hence  the  recent  
appearance  of  movement-parties,  which  are  less  hierarchical,  less  vertical  and  more  
consensus-based, with a supra-party, pluralistic tendency. (25)
Let us begin by stating that the self-proclaimed and vertical vanguards, as is obvious, have  
turned  out  to  be  opposed  in  practice  to  participation....  The  discovery  of  these  
counterrevolutionary dangers by guiding spirits in the social movements of today has led  
to  a  redefinition  of  the  vanguard  as  'the  enlightened  people'  exalting  such  leaders  as  
deserve it by reason of their honest, disinterested and efficacious work, and for their spirit  
of service, and also because they maintain a respectful and symbiotic contact with the base  
from which they derive their authority and their very right to exist. This is how it has been  
understood in Nicaragua, for instance. (31)
Of  this  there  was a  patent  example  at  the  Latin-American  Socialist  Congress  held  in  
Montevideo in April 1987, when those present declared: 'We believe neither in guide-
parties nor in guide-States, but in guide-ideas.' An unprecedented statement, which would  
not have been heard five years before. (27)
Significantly,  these  changes  were  powerful  enough  to  affect  Cuba's  deeply  institutionalized  
hegemonic apparatus. One important impetus in this regard was, of course, the Sandinista project itself,  
with which the Cuban state had collaborated since long before the 1979 victory. Although Cuban media,  
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especially the cinema, had significantly shaped Sandinista media production, it was inevitable that the  
prevalence of participatory theory would have a reciprocal effect on Cuban advisors and technicians who  
carried it back to the island (see Mattelart 1986, 17-8). Cuba, of course, participated actively in the Non-
Aligned Movement and the NWICO debates, and Nicaragua was not the only channel through which the  
rising pan-American emphasis on participatory communications reached the island.
By 1986, the effects of this broad shift were already visible at Havana's annual Festival of the  
New Latin American Cinema, which now included video work and where the symbolically important first  
speech of the final awards ceremony was delivered by Luis Santoro, who:
work[ed]  with  small-format  video  not  to  create  products,  but  to  facilitate  dialogue....  
Santoro's speech was no homage to Latin cinema, but a direct challenge to the old guard of  
Latin American film to recognize the vitality of community video. Santoro's key position  
in the ceremony was an obvious recognition by the festival committee of that vitality. The  
presence in Cuba of community video activists from all over the region was a coming  
together of a movement that is parallel to what the Cuban festival did for Latin film [in  
1979]. (Halleck 2002, 311-12)
In Cuba, where the cinema had provided more space for criticism and artistic innovation than any other  
medium,  and  where  the  film  festival  was  an  important  showcase  of  Cuba's  contributions  to  Latin  
America's visual culture, the newfound inclusion of participatory video evidenced a significant shift. As  
Halleck witnessed at the festival's meeting for television and video representatives, the Cuban officials  
were:
genuinely interested in the guerrilla video work. They took their problems quite seriously,  
taking notes and on occasion even cutting off the longwinded TV officials to allow more  
of the grassroots video producers to speak.... There is a new wind blowing at Cuban TV...  
For years visitors to Cuba would complain about the tired dogmatic forms and dull visuals  
of Cuban TV. Gonzalez [the new President of the Cuban Institute of TV and Radio] brings  
a fresh approach. He comes not with a broadcasting background, but a background in  
psychology,  of  working  with  group  empowerment.  [Sergio]  Corielli  [co-chair  of  the  
meeting and former film star] comes from an acting career, but he quit movie acting to  
work in street theater - forming collectives that worked in communities throughout the  
island. He brings to Cuban television a spirit of experiment and collaboration. One of the  
best examples of the new Cuban TV I saw used a highly stylized commedia dell-arte  
pantomime  troupe  combined  with  the  spontaneous  exuberance  of  a  group  of  urban  
children in a highly conscious experimental video work combining guerilla video, street  
theater, and conceptual art. (311)
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Despite this awareness of and engagement with more participatory modes of production, Cuba's media  
system  did  not  undergo  a  radical  shift.  Participatory  communication  was,  however,  increasingly  
incorporated into Cuban civil society, beginning in the late 1980s, as part of a much broader political  
economic reorientation.
The Soviet Union began to diminish its material assistance to Cuba several years prior to its  
formal dissolution in 1991, ushering in what came to be known in Cuba as a “special period” of acute  
economic hardship. Cuban leaders recognized that the maintenance of socialist hegemony would require  
political  adjustments.  While  authoritarian measures  continued to be enacted, especially  in  relation to  
outright dissent, the special period also witnessed new openings for a more democratic civil society, as:
the surging needs of the population, together with the lack of resources and the hardship of  
daily life, quickly overwhelmed the capacity of the mass organizations. Their structures  
and their proclivity for waiting for ‘‘orientaciones’’ (directions) before stepping out of the  
usual line of work meant that they were limited in the leadership or response they could  
provide to the specifics of the crisis facing individual communities. Although an important  
element  in  the  fabric  of  Cuban society,  mass organizations proved not  to  be the best  
vehicles for more proactive efforts. (Uriarte Gastón 2004, 124)
In  this  context,  there  emerged  an  urban  “neighborhood  movement”  which  focused  attention  “most  
particularly on horizontal networks at the community level” and included “the participation of many  
actors:  local  governments,  the  mass  organizations,  Cuban  NGOs,  international  development  
organizations, institutions of higher education, and, most important, the neighbors themselves” ( ibid.).  
Throughout this process, in part due to the increased influence from outside organizations, Cuban  
civil  society adopted participatory community development methodologies  that had been increasingly  
employed  throughout  Latin  America  over  the  previous  several  decades.  Especially  important  were  
Freirian  methods  of  popular  education  that,  as  we  have  seen,  formed  the  substrate  of  Sandinista  
participatory  communication  initiatives.  Significantly,  practitioners  have  spoken  of  the  need  to  
“Cubanize” these popular education methodologies in order to account for the high educational level of  
the population, as well as its  “practice of being members of organizations,  the clear link established  
between organizational and educational processes, and the widely spread idea that individual realization is 
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linked to a collective project” (126). At the same time, however, the entrenched and limited understanding  
of participation as the execution of centrally designed projects has led some to question whether the  
Cuban context will allow for the participation in decision-making that is required for effective community  
development, much less a transition toward a civil state ( ibid.).
Nonetheless, some evidence for the profundity of the changes sparked by the special period can  
be  found  in  their  codification  into  law.  For  example,  in  2000  the  National  Assembly  passed  a  law  
formalizing the role of the Popular Councils, which were founded in 1988 to give more decision-making  
power to local communities (Lambie 165). The Popular Councils “came into their own in the middle of  
the  Special  Period,  [and]  are  today  the  institutions  best  poised  to  take  good  advantage  of  the  new  
experience acquired at the community level” (124) by coordinating efforts between municipal assemblies,  
the mass organizations, and new civil society actors.
Given the  Cuban  government's  generally  tight  control  of  the  media  sector,  it  should  not  be  
surprising that the increased space for civil society activity afforded by the special period did not translate  
into broad experimentation with participatory and community media. This is not to say, however, that  
there was no effect whatsoever. Fernandes (2006) has argued that the special period impelled Cuba's  
hegemonic apparatus to incorporate new social actors through a process that gave a greater public profile  
to “artistic public spheres”, which she defines as “sites of interaction and discussion among ordinary  
citizens generated through the media of art and popular culture” (3). Coryat (2009) has taken up this idea  
and suggested that these artistic public spheres have also created space for community media initiatives  
that work within the parameters of the state even as they push against its limits.
One such example is  Televisión Serrana (Mountain Television /  TVS), a community  oriented 
video group that began in 1993 with support from UNESCO, the Cuban government, and the Cuban  
Institute of Radio and Television (Instituto Cubano de Radio y Televisión  / ICRT). Following the initial 
investment  period,  the  project  has  been  housed  within  the  institutional  apparatus  of  the  National  
Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños / ANAP), one of Cuba's 
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mass organizations. TVS aims to “rescue the culture of peasant communities” and “facilitate alternative  
communication for communities to reflect their daily lives and participate in the search for solutions to  
the problems that affect them” (cited in Gumucio 2001, 144).
Significantly, TVS did not grow organically from the small community of Buey Arriba, where it  
operates. Rather, the project was founded by a filmmaker working within the Cuban Institute of Cinema  
Arts (Instituto Cubano de Arte e Industria Cinematográficos  / ICAIC) who created a coalition by aligning 
the “initiative's mission with the agendas of international funding organizations, Cuban governmental and  
nongovernmental agencies, and local organizations and communities” (Stock 2009, 79). Only after the  
project had been approved was the Sierra Maestra region selected as the appropriate site, for its historical  
significance, its continued developmental needs, and a desire to further integrate rural culture into Cuba's  
national imaginary (81-2).
During  its  first  decade,  TVS  produced  over  600  hours  of  video  (77),  largely  dedicated  to  
showcasing and celebrating the culture and inhabitants of the region, and many of the TVS productions  
have won national and international recognition. Moreover, TVS has succeeded in training many local  
residents in video production; its production team now consists “almost exclusively” of local residents.  
Also,  through  its  connection  with  Cuba's  International  School  for  Cinema  and  Television  ( Escuela  
Internacional de Cine y Televisión / EICTV), TVS provides opportunities for student filmmakers from  
across the island (94). At the same time, TVS appears to have maintained a largely hierarchical internal  
organization,  and  local  residents  who  are  not  part  of  the  TVS  team have  limited  opportunities  for  
participating in administrative decision-making and project planning. 138 Thus, when measured against the 
definitional elements of community media – access, participation, and self-management – there is room  
for improvement. Nonetheless, the project has succeeded in its aims, as TVS productions are viewed  
138According to Stock, “[i]n 2002, the staff numbered 15 – 3 camera operators, 3 directors, 2 editors, 2 producers, 2 
sound assistants, and 3 drivers who doubled as lighting specialists when shoots required illumination” (94). 
Gumucio (2001) notes that “[s]cripts proposed by individual members of the staff are discussed within the group, 
which includes all those related to production. There is no direct participation of the community at this stage” 
(146).
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“locally through community discussions and events, regionally through festivals, nationally on television,  
and internationally through various networks” (102). UNESCO evaluations, meanwhile, have found the  
project's objectives to be “fully achieved” (98).
TVS came about during the crisis of the special period, when the Cuban state was increasingly  
dependent on outside assistance and open to new initiatives that would preserve its legitimacy and, thus,  
hegemonic position. While the project has served those ends, it has also served as a conduit for theories of  
participatory communication that were developed outside of Cuba. As such, “it is indicative of the new  
generation  of  Cuban  videomakers  who  value  alternative  media  and  community  ownership  of  
communication tools, something unthinkable” prior to the special period (Gumucio 2001, 145). Thus,  
while TVS remains significantly constrained by the Cuban system, it has also created new possibilities for  
more autonomous civil society activity that intersects with democratic governance. For example, during a  
discussion following the presentation of TVS videos,  the contamination of  a  local  river by a  coffee  
processing  plant  was  mentioned.  This  became  the  basis  for  a  documentary  that  “pushed  for  the  
implementation of corrective measures” (146). While such outcomes appear to be the exception rather  
than the norm, this example nonetheless testifies to a potential that seems to have been absent prior to  
Cuba's special period. 
Visión Común (Common Vision / VC), a youth video collective in a small town on the Eastern  
part of the island, is another participatory video project that has made use of the expanded possibilities for  
civil society organization generated during the special period. Unlike TVS, however, VC did not begin  
with support from the state. Rather, it emerged upon the initiative of a group of young people who were  
inspired by a 2004 screening of videos made by youth from New York City (Coryat 2009; 68, 71).  
Despite  having no access  to  official  funding,  by 2008 VC was able  to  hold several  workshops  and  
organize  Cuba's  first  cinema  festival  devoted  to  “media  made  by  and  for  the  community”  (74).  
Significantly, VC's growth was spurred by the participation of a young man who had trained at the Cuban 
Institute of Radio and Television (Instituto Cubano de Radio y Televisión / ICRT) but had been unable to 
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find work in Havana (71), and some of their first video productions were edited at the nearest Telecentro , 
one of Cuba's regional television broadcasters. 139 In other words, VC has benefited from state resources,  
even if  the project has  not been officially  sanctioned or funded. The group has also begun to form  
partnerships  with established  civil  society organizations,  including  Casa del  Caribe  (which  promotes 
Caribbean culture) and the Humberto Solas International Festival of Poor Cinema (Festival Internacional  
del Cine Pobre de Humberto Solas) (74-5). As of 2009, VC was “in its infancy” (75) and it remains to be  
seen how far the project will be able to advance toward its goals of “produc[ing] media by and about  
Cobre’s inhabitants, ... creat[ing] an audiovisual archive accessible to the community[,] ... [and] helping to  
create conditions for community-driven economic, social and cultural development” (74).
Both TVS and VC are relatively autonomous community media projects that have been able to  
draw on state resources in order to grow. Despite the success of TVS and the promise of VC, however,  
there is little evidence to suggest that they represent a national shift toward a robust system of community  
media or even a proliferation of similar projects (see Coryat 76). Moreover, both projects seem to be more  
focused on cultural representation than conscientiously pursuing a role as an articulating mechanism for  
civil society governance, and it remains unclear how much space their communities and the Cuban state  
will afford for critical voices, should they be represented. Nevertheless, the projects testify to a new era in  
the relationship between the state and civil society in Cuba. While civil society remains tightly tethered to  
the state, which continues to dominate the hegemonic apparatus, the reorganization that occurred during  
the special period has both granted greater autonomy to civil society and generated a robust discussion  
about  its  role  within  socialist  governance  (see  Recio  1999).  In  1997,  for  example,  the  official  
announcement of the Fifth Congress of the PCC noted that during the previous five years “our socialist  
civil society has undergone a process of growth”. 140 This was only the second time that the PCC had  
officially mentioned civil society in a positive light; the first came in the Report of the Political Bureau of  
139Although TVS is not a broadcaster, it is formally affiliated with the Telecentro system and it seems likely that 
the renown of that community video project facilitated the assistance provided to VC.
140“se ha desarrollado un proceso de fortalecimiento de nuestra sociedad civil socialista.”
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the Central Committee in 1996, which was “the first official text from a communist party in the tradition  
of real socialism to recognize and value the existence of civil society” (López 1997). 141
The changing relationship between the state and civil society in Cuba, as well as the limited but  
important opportunities it has created for community media, were not necessary outcomes of the crisis of  
the special period. The state might have chosen to rely entirely on increased authoritarianism in order to  
maintain its dominance, rather than facilitating a reorganization that opened space for increased civil  
society participation. The emergence of the latter outcome resulted, in part, from the longstanding ethos  
of  the  Cuban  revolution  and  its  leaders,  who  have  always  –  at  least  rhetorically  –  valued  public  
participation as necessary to socialist governance. The specific adjustments to policy and practice that  
resulted  from  this  critical  juncture,  however,  were  facilitated  and  shaped  by  decades  of  theoretical  
advance  and  practical  experimentation  regarding  participatory  communication  and  its  crucial  role  in  
democratic governance, education, and media production. Latin America has long served as a primary  
locus of this dialectical advance and twentieth century Latin American socialism provided opportunities  
to  experiment  with  different  manners  of  incorporating  participatory  communication  into  
counterhegemonic  movements  and  (would  be)  hegemonic  apparatuses  of  governance.  All  of  these  
activities ultimately informed the continued evolution of Cuba's revolutionary project.
The  interrelated  lessons  of  twentieth  century  Latin  American  socialism  and  participatory  
communication did much more, however, than merely reorient the political ground in Cuba. Throughout  
the 1990s, while many observers were celebrating the collapse of the Soviet Union as a final victory for a  
capitalist  world  order,  the  Latin  American  left  was  beginning  to  coalesce  around  a  loosely  defined  
perspective  that  has  come  to  be  known  as  “21 st century  socialism”  and  which  has  influenced 
democratically elected, left-leaning governments across the region. While the term itself remains highly  
contested regarding both its origin and import, we employ it here because, as a loose constellation of  
141“el primer texto oficial de un partido comunista en la tradición del socialismo real que reconoce y valora la 
existencia de la sociedad civil.”
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ideas, the notion of 21 st century socialism provides a heuristic point of transition for the history that we  
have traced above.
Twentieth century socialist  projects in  Cuba, Chile,  and Nicaragua were all  undertaken, both  
explicitly and implicitly, in relation to a what Gouldner has classified as a Critical Marxist interpretation  
that prioritized a vanguard party and the primacy of the state over and above civil society. As we have  
seen, these projects also demonstrated a resistance to that interpretation and in so doing they expanded  
neo-Critical Marxist interpretations by increasingly mitigating the role of the vanguard and elevating the  
role of civil society relative to the state. We have discussed this in terms of a general movement toward a  
Gramscian civil  state  in  which  governance is  primarily  directed  by civil  society.  By the late  1990s,  
mainstream Latin American socialism had largely abandoned not only the strict Scientific, but also the  
Critical Marxist framework in favor of a neo-Critical position that prioritizes participatory democracy. 21 st 
Century Socialism provides a name for this new framework that has been a primary point of reference for  
social movements and governments across Latin America.
Heinz  Dieterich,  who has claimed credit  for  coining  the  term,  has  summarized  21 st Century 
Socialism as  “a  socialism in  which  the  majorities  have  the  greatest  historically  possible  degree  of  
decision-making power in the economic,  political,  cultural, and military institutions that govern their  
lives”. Nonetheless, much of Dieterich's explication of 21 st Century Socialism has focused on replacing 
“the regulating principle of market economy, price,  by the regulating principle of  socialist  economy,  
value, understood as time inputs … necessary for the creation of a product” (Marcano & Dieterich 2007;  
see also Dieterich 2005, 109-181). In this sense, Dieterich's presentation remains narrowly economistic  
relative  to  those  who  have  interpreted  21 st Century  Socialism as  “question[ing]  the  preeminent  role  
attributed to the working class [by 20 th century Marxism] to the exclusion of broad segments of the  
population including the urban poor, the informal sector, religious communities, the indigenous, the Afro-
descendent,  and women” (Ellner 2012, 106). All  proponents of 21 st Century Socialism, however, are 
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agreed that its fundamental component is a maximization of democratic participation in governance. 142
Of special interest to the present discussion is Moulian's (2000) call for 21 st Century Socialism “to 
recuperate in a new form [Marx's] original idea of the disappearance of the state”. 143 Though he does not 
invoke Gramsci explicitly, Moulian clearly endorses a Gramscian notion of a civil state: “The best State is  
that  from  within  which  the  State  itself  can  be  combatted,  developing  the  collaboration  of  citizens,  
workers, producers” (111).144 The construction of such a state will be the result of neither revolution nor  
reform, but a “transformation” predicated on the creation of “socialist institutions at a realistic scale (often  
microsocial)  inside  of  capitalism  itself”  (113). 145 21st Century  Socialism  therefore  requires  the  
“fragmentation and scattering of political power” alongside “open and plural public space, compatible  
with a deliberative society” (123). 146 Within this context, a media sector anchored in civil society is a  
necessary component of any viable path forward:
A deliberative society must be an informed society. Fundamental to this is pluralist access  
to the property and management of communication media, for persons, parties, or social  
organizations. Here a regulatory role belongs to a public,  not state,  entity that reflects 
social and cultural pluralities.... In order to realize this strategy it is important to nurture  
public discussion in local popular spaces. This can make use of communication across  
segmented media of reduced reach, which are easier to access and can be combined with  
the communicational practice of face-to-face dialogue. (132-3, my emphasis) 147
Moulian is careful to note that these “forms of institutional arrangement” are suggested as “indexes that  
allow  for  visualizing  horizons  of  struggle”  (123)  and  thus  not  meant  to  be  “descriptive”,  but  his  
formulation should induce us to ask how the civil state of 21 st century socialism might best establish a  
142For an overview of 21st Century Socialism in Latin America, see Harnecker & Bellamy Foster (2010).
143“recuperar de forma nueva el ideal originario de la desestatización.”; Significantly, Moulian is a Chilean 
sociologist and historian, and his conceptualization of 21st Century Socialism draws on an intimate knowledge of 
the history of the UP period (see Moulian 1983, 1998, 2006).
144“El mejor Estado es aquel desde donde se puede combatir contra el propio Estado, desarrollando la 
asociatividad de ciudadanos, trabajadores, productores.”
145“instituciones socialistas a una escala posible (muchas veces microsocial) dentro del mismo capitalismo.”
146“fragmentación y esparcimiento del poder político”; “espacio público abierto y plural, compatible con una 
sociedad deliberativa”
147“Una sociedad deliberativa debe ser una sociedad informada. Por ello es básico el acceso pluralista a la 
propiedad y gestión de los medios de comunicación, para personas, partidos u organizaciones sociales. Aquí le 
corresponde un papel regulador a un ente público, no estatal, que refleje las pluralidades sociales y culturales.... 
Para realizar esta estrategia es importante la alimentación de la discusión pública en los espacios locales 
populares. Allí se puede trabajar la comunicación a través de medios de alcance reducido y segmentado, de más 
fácil accesibilidad, la cual se puede combinar con la práctica comunicacional del diálogo cara a cara.”
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media system regulated by and at the service of civil society. 148
In our search for an answer to that question, we can turn to those countries that have embarked  
upon the construction of a 21 st century socialist society. Most radical among them has been Venezuela,  
whose “Bolivarian Revolution” has been led by President Hugo Chávez since his first electoral victory in  
1998. Although Chávez's first public use of the term 21 st Century Socialism did not occur until 2005, 149 
his administration's commitment to participatory democracy was already in evidence in 1999, when he  
convened  a  constituent  assembly  to  produce  a  new  constitution  and  establish  the  country's  “Fifth  
Republic”. Article 62 of that constitution states that “the participation of the people in the formation,  
execution  and  control  of  public  matters  is  the  means  necessary  to  accomplish  the  protagonism  
(protagonismo)  that  will  guarantee their  complete development,  both as individuals and collectively”  
(cited in Burbach & Piñeiro 2007). Venezuela's Fifth Republic is thus Latin America's longest standing  
experiment in 21st century socialism.
Even prior to Chávez's election Venezuela had a growing community media sector, and under the  
fifth  republic  that  sector  has  consolidated  and  organized  itself,  seeking  legitimation,  support,  and  
autonomy from the state apparatus. The following three chapters examine that history, highlighting the  
continuously  evolving  dialectic  between  the  state  and  civil  society,  as  well  as  the  degree  to  which  
organizational, legal, and financial structures have or have not contributed to the establishment of a civil  
state and participatory democratic governance, both in the media sector and beyond.
148“formas de arreglo institucional”; “indicios que permiten visualizar horizontes de lucha”
149Chávez used the term in January 2005, during his closing speech to the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil (Wilpert 2006). He first employed the term domestically a year later, in February 2006, during a broadcast 
of his weekly television show (Burbach & Piñeiro 2007).
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Chapter 3 – Community Media and Civil Society in Puntofijista Venezuela
Following  his  election  to  the  presidency  in  1998,  Hugo  Chávez  nurtured  a  very  public  
relationship  with  Fidel  Castro  and  positioned  Venezuela  as  Cuba's  closest  ally.  Chávez's  political  
opponents have consistently claimed that he and his Bolivarian Revolution have sought to lead Venezuela  
into a totalitarian communist system modeled after revolutionary Cuba. There are, indeed, some historical  
parallels between Chávez and Castro. Both initially framed their movements with an ideology that was  
more overtly nationalist than socialist, and both sought to take political control via a military uprising.  
Chávez, however, ultimately came to the presidency via the electoral path and the most apt comparison  
between his Bolivarian movement and any previous Latin American socialist project is to Allende and the  
UP government in Chile, not Castro.
At the time that the Allende and Chavéz administrations came to power, the political economies  
of both Chile and Venezuela were dominated by a single natural resource (copper and oil, respectively)  
whose exploitation was  largely  controlled  by foreign  interests.  Both  countries,  meanwhile,  had  been  
widely praised as among Latin America's most stable democracies, having operated within the liberal  
representative framework for multiple decades. Moreover, although both Allende and Chávez came to  
power promising to respect pluralist civil society and private property, both administrations incited an  
increasingly strident opposition that complained of diminishing respect for press freedoms and predicted  
economic ruin due to the mismanagement of state enterprises and a lack of foreign investment. In Chile,  
the Allende administration had been in power for less than three years when the socialist project was  
crushed with a brutal military coup. In Venezuela, the Chávez administration had been in power just over  
three years when its opponents launched a civic-military coup. Unlike in Chile, however, the Venezuelan  
coup failed and Chávez was restored to power within a few days. He went on to win multiple popular  
elections before passing away in early 2013, just prior to being inaugurated for a third full term in office.  
Chávez's chosen successor, Francisco Maduro, was elected to the presidency soon after and the Bolivarian  
movement is now well into its second decade of state control.
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For all their similarities, though, the Chilean and Venezuelan cases differ regarding much more  
than their duration. As suggested in the previous chapter, Venezuela's Bolivarian Revolution emerged  
during a moment in the history of Latin American socialism when Scientific Marxism and vanguardism  
had been eclipsed by Critical approaches that de-emphasized the role of the state and accentuated the role  
of social movements. The Latin American social landscape had also been significantly altered by severe  
economic  crisis,  which  led  to  the  so-called  “lost  decade”  of  the  1980s  and  a  subsequent  wave  of  
neoliberal reforms. These phenomena were especially significant in Venezuela, where they set the stage  
for Chávez's rise to power.
Understanding the role  of participatory communications in  Venezuela's  Bolivarian Revolution  
will  therefore  be greatly  facilitated  by  an  overview of  the  social  context  within  which  the  chavista 
movement emerged. This chapter thus begins with an examination of  Venezuela's  political  economic  
history during the latter part of the twentieth century and its relation to the evolving role of civil society. It  
then recounts the emergence of Hugo Chávez as a national figure in the early 1990s, the role of civil  
society  within  his  Bolivarian  movement,  and  the  evolving  policy  framework  within  which  his  
administration  attempted  to  inculcate  participatory  governance  following his  election  as  president  in  
1998. Once this context has been established, we will move on to a discussion of the community media  
sector as it emerged in the latter half of the twentieth century and was subsequently consolidated within a  
framework of state support during the early years of the Chávez administration. Although there is no  
definitive moment of rupture, this chapter will focus on the period up until 2007, around which time  
Bolivarian policy initiatives began to cohere within a more unitary system of “Popular Power”. That  
system, and attempts to integrate community media within it, will be discussed in the following chapter.
Civil Society in the Rise and Fall of Puntofijismo
Venezuela emerged from a military dictatorship in 1958 following the unification of its four major  
political parties in a Patriotic Junta (Junta Patriótica), which catalyzed resistance from business, church,  
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and civil society leaders (Ellner 2010, 45-8). The toppling of the dictatorship inspired a sense of national  
unity, “infused the rank and file of political and social organizations with a sense of empowerment[,] and  
brought  to  the fore  opportunities  for the achievement  of ambitious popular measures and nationalist  
goals”, including a resumption of labor organization and greater state control of the oil sector (58-9).  
While some prominent actors sought to channel this energy through popular mobilization, political power  
was  quickly  consolidated  by  leaders  of  three  of  the  four  political  parties  –  the  social  democratic  
Democratic Action (Acción Democrática / AD), the Christian democratic Independent Political Electoral  
Organization Committee (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente  / COPEI), and the 
center left Democratic Republican Union (Unión Republicana Democrática / URD) – who signed a series 
of  accords  that  “embraced  unity  from  above  within  a  corporatist  framework  that  excluded  the  
[Communist Party of Venezuela (Partido Communista de Venezuela / PCV)]”. These agreements bound 
the three parties  to  form coalition  governments  (regardless  of  which  party  won the  presidency)  and  
support policies designed to placate important interest groups, especially the Catholic church, the business  
sector,  and  the  armed  forces,  “which  were  to  be  consulted  on  decisions  affecting  their  respective  
organizations” (59). The first and most infamous of these agreements, the Pact of Punto Fijo, was signed  
in secret and ultimately lent its name to the  “pacted democracy” that it inaugurated, which has come to be  
known as puntofijismo.
Longtime AD leader Rómulo Betancourt, who was the first president elected in the puntofijista 
period, sought “to proceed with economic and social reforms and viable forms of representation of the  
nonprivileged,  without  contributing  to  a  sense  of  popular  empowerment  that  would  have  unleashed  
radicalization and scared off powerful groups” (61). This meant simultaneously appeasing the Venezuelan  
Federation  of  Chambers  and Associations  of  Commerce  and Production  ( Federación  de  Cámaras  y  
Asociaciones  de  Comercio  y  Producción  de  Venezuela  /  FEDECAMERAS),  which  represented 
Venezuela's  business  sector,  as  well  as  the  Workers'  Confederation  of  Venezuela  ( Confederación  de  
Trabajadores de Venezuela / CTV), the country's labor central. He accomplished this with policies that  
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included marginalizing the PCV and other radical leftist currents (including those within his own party),  
dissuading strikes and encouraging a moderate orientation toward labor contracts, and implementing a  
cautious economic policy that supported anemic land reform, import substitution industrialization, and  
greater  state  participation  in  the  oil  industry  and  other  sectors  while  stopping  short  of  drastically  
disrupting Venezuela's dependent relationship on foreign capital and technology (61-3).
Betancourt  thus  established  the  basic  framework  of  puntofijista corporatist,  clientelistic 
governance. After the URD decided to abandon the coalition government in 1962, partly in reaction to  
Betancourt's  anti-communism,  Venezuela  became  a  de  facto  two  party  state.  The  PCV  and  URD 
continued to run or endorse candidates, and new leftist parties split off from AD, the PCV, and even  
COPEI, but none were able to significantly alter the power sharing structure of puntofijismo, within which 
AD and COPEI traded off control of the presidency and the National Assembly for several decades. The  
steady marginalization of popular leftist movements throughout the 1960s and 70s was accomplished, in  
part, by the implementation of progressive macroeconomic policies, the most salient of which came about  
during the administration of AD's  Carlos  Andrés Pérez,  who took office in  1974 as  oil  prices  were  
skyrocketing. Pérez nationalized the iron and petroleum industries and began investing oil revenues in  
heavy  industry  and  electricity  production.  He  also  directed  investment  toward  research  designed  to  
promote  technological  independence  in  the  petroleum  sector  and  introduced  social  welfare  and  
employment programs, including legislation providing all workers with severance pay benefits (71-3).  
Between 1973 and 78  public  spending nearly  doubled,  the middle class  continued to  grow, and the  
poverty level dropped to 10 percent (Buxton 2003, 115).
Pérez's policies often ran counter to the moderate wing of his own party, but they nonetheless  
remained within  the  social  democratic  bounds  of  the  puntofijista system.  When necessary,  he  made 
conciliatory gestures to FEDECAMERAS and foreign investors. 150 Especially significant in the context of  
150For example, in response to criticism from FEDECAMERAS, Pérez scaled back his proposals for labor 
legislation. He also provided generous terms for the nationalization of the iron and petroleum industries, leaving 
open the possibility for foreign investment in mixed companies and undisclosed subcontracting to foreign firms 
(Ellner 2010, 74).
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the current discussion was Pérez's desire to refrain from:
...encouraging  mobilizations  and  taking  his  causes  directly  to  the  people.  As  a  loyal  
member of AD, he was averse to factional struggle and thus relied on technocrats and  
probusiness allies to fill many top government positions, rather than appointing labor and  
social movement followers within the party. (Ellner 2010, 76)
Stability and prosperity, in other words, continued to rely on state intervention, patronage networks, and  
corporatist negotiations between elites at the expense of popular participation in governance through civil  
society organizations.
During the 1970s, however, two alternatives to the puntofijista model of corporatist civil society  
gained prominence. By the early 1970s, some leftists (following currents in Latin American socialism  
discussed  in  the  previous  chapter)  had  grown  disillusioned  with  the  vanguardist  framework  and 
hierarchical  organization  of  the  PCV  and  other  socialist  parties.  They  adopted  a  more  Gramscian  
approach that emphasized organizing within existent, albeit incipient, popular movements and working  
toward long-term goals. Especially significant was a group that came to be called  Causa R and, in the 
mid-1970s, began organizing workers in Venezuela's state-owned steel industry to challenge AD control  
of the union. Their work was instrumental  in fomenting the “new syndicalism” ( nuevo sindicalismo) 
movement that stressed internal democracy and became influential in Venezuelan labor unions during the  
1980s (López Maya 1995, 214-216; see also Hellinger 1996, López Maya 1997).  Causa R also began 
organizing among the residents of Catia, a large sector on the east side of Caracas whose population of  
half a million had a history of political struggle and represented a mixture of class interests (López Maya  
1995, 214). The group's efforts resulted in an organization called Pro Catia  whose initiatives included 
petitioning for a municipal council that would be responsive to Catia's residents, winning improvements  
in public services and access to consumer goods, advocating for the construction of a large public park,  
and organizing youth sporting events (218). 
Not all of the civil society initiatives that challenged the puntofijista framework emerged from the 
left. From early on in the puntofijista period, residents of middle- and upper-class urbanizaciones began 
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organizing neighborhood associations (asociaciones de vecinos) in an effort to secure and maintain public  
services  in  the face of neglect  by the local government. 151 In  1971, fourteen such associations from 
southeastern Caracas joined together as the Federation of Urban Community Associations ( Federación de  
Asociaciones  de  Comunidades  Urbanas /  FACUR).  By  the  middle  of  the  decade  the  burgeoning  
neighborhood  movement  had  gained  prominence  and  in  1978  the  Fundamental  Law  of  Municipal  
Governance  (Ley  Orgánica  de  Régimen  Municipal)  provided  a  legal  framework  for  the  new  
organizational  model.152 Neighborhood  associations  across  the  country  began  organizing  in  regional  
coordinating committees (coordinadoras) and the Escuela de Vecinos de Venezuela formed in 1980, as an 
affiliate of FACUR, to provide guidance and training.
Thus,  even  during  the  boom  years  of  the  Pérez  presidency,  frustration  with  puntofijismo, 
especially in relation to local service provision and intra-organizational democracy, spurred new forms of  
civil society organization. Criticism remained relatively muted, however, so long as the rising tide of  
economic prosperity continued to float most boats. Economic policy during the Pérez administration was 
not, however, without serious drawbacks. Despite the massive increase in revenues generated by high oil  
prices, Pérez had borrowed heavily on international markets and incurred a substantial foreign debt. The  
influx of money had generated significant growth, but it had also spurred high inflation. COPEI's Luis  
Herrera  Campins  won  the  1978  presidential  election  by  appealing  to  right  wing  critics  of  Pérez's  
developmental policies and high debt load. Upon assuming office, he scaled back state participation in the  
economy, reduced protectionist measures, increased interest rates, and regulated prices in an effort to slow  
151Urban residential neighborhoods in Venezuela are referred to as urbanizaciones and barrios. The former term 
generally refers to a planned residential community of professionally constructed homes in a geographically 
preferential area.The latter generally indicates either a mixed zone (with both commercial and residential 
buildings) located in a (frequently neglected) central area open to through-traffic or, most commonly, an 
unplanned, primarily residential community, often comprised of precariously constructed housing and located in 
a geographically marginal area of the city (frequently, and especially in Caracas, a steep hillside). Barrios are 
often not (or only poorly) integrated into the public service infrastructure. While urbanizaciones may be walled 
and enjoy private security guards, barrios are generally considered insecure. In any case, the nomenclature 
connotes class differences and, in cases where the geographic and architectural facets of two zones are roughly 
comparable, the choice of terminology may derive entirely from considerations of class (cf. Lander 1995, 140).
152One example of the movement's rising prominence can be found in the decision of the magazine Resumen to 
name “the neighbors” as its “persons of the year” (personajes del año) in 1976 (Rivero 1995, 7).
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growth and cut inflation. Instead of reducing the foreign debt, however, Herrera doubled it (Ellner 2010,  
78-9). This policy mix set the country up for economic disaster.
Global  oil  prices  dropped  precipitously  in  1981,  severely  reducing  state  revenues.  Then,  
following the Mexican debt crisis of 1982, international lenders tightened capital flows and demanded  
payment  on  previous  loans.  This  spurred  capital  flight,  a  decrease  in  international  reserves,  and,  in  
February of 1983, a sharp devaluation of the Venezuelan currency. Herrera instituted a system of currency  
exchange controls, but its oversight agency was corrupt from the outset and only grew more so under  
Herrera's AD successor, Jaime Lusinchi (83). Public spending dropped dramatically, but capital flight,  
inflation, and the country's high debt load all persisted. From 1983 onward, Venezuela was a country in  
crisis.  By 1988, the rates  of inflation and poverty were both around 40 percent,  unemployment  was  
nearing double figures, and real salary levels had fallen by almost one-fifth since 1983 (Buxton 113, 116,  
118).153
The economic crisis crystallized public exasperation with the puntofijista system and its principal 
corporatist units, especially the political parties and labor unions. Discontent transcended interest groups  
and class divisions, and observers from a wide spectrum of Venezuelan society endorsed reforms that  
centered on decentralization of the government,  democratization of parties and  unions,  and increased 
participation in governance, especially at the local level, through civil society initiatives. For example,  
business leaders endorsed Causa R's work to democratize the labor movement (Ellner 2010, 84) and they  
joined with the CTV, the Catholic Church, and the neighborhood associations in calling for electoral  
reforms that  included the direct  election of  state governors (as  opposed to  their  appointment by the  
President). The neighborhood associations also pushed for changes in municipal election procedures and,  
in both 1983 and 88, called for presidential candidates to present programs for political reform (Ellner  
1993, 6). They were thus influential in forcing Lusinchi to create, soon after his election, the Presidential  
153For the years 1988 and 89, Lander (1995) reports inflation rates of 29.48 and 84.46 percent, poverty rates of 46 
and 62 percent, and extreme poverty rates of 14 and 30 percent, respectively. He reports unemployment dropping 
steadily from 13.4 to 6.9 percent from 1984 to 1988, then rising again to 9.6 percent in 1989 (97-8, 123).
163
Commission for the Reform of the State ( Comisión Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado  / COPRE), 
whose proposals echoed those coming from civil society (15; Lander 1995, 37-43; López Maya 1995,  
207-8).
As evidenced by its newfound role in political advocacy, the neighborhood movement continued  
to grow and consolidate throughout the 1980s, with both FACUR and the  Escuela serving, in different 
capacities, as national “interlocutors” (Ellner 1999, 78-82). Meanwhile, although Pro Catia dissolved in  
1983,  barrio organization continued in the form of “weak but crucial social networks, encouraged by  
Jesuit priests, [that] developed around vital issues of food distribution, personal security, and elementary  
education” that were particular to impoverished sectors (Buxton 117). Fernandes (2010) emphasizes that  
these barrio organizations “engaged in strikes, hijackings of public vehicles, and other protest actions that  
were outside the repertoire of the more advocacy-oriented neighborhood movements” (60). Nonetheless,  
the neighborhood movement sought to expand beyond its middle- and upper-class base by building off of  
these  networks  and  forming  new  associations  in  popular  barrios.  To  a  certain  extent,  therefore,  
Venezuela's neighborhood associations appeared to fit into the broader Latin American phenomenon of  
the “new social movements” which had emerged in resistance to military dictatorships and in relation to  
the socialist reappraisal of civil society (Ellner 1999, 77; Ellner 1993, 23). Their rhetoric reinforced this  
conception by emphasizing a “democracy of citizens” that would replace the “democracy of parties”  
(Lander 2007, 24) and presenting the associations as “the movement of movements” (Salamanca 1987,  
cited in Yi Ng 14), which was precisely the terminology that  Causa R  had used to describe its own 
organizing vision since the early 1970s (López Maya 1995, 216).154 
On the surface, the economic crisis of the 1980s appeared to have catalyzed the formation of a  
154In 1986, Elías Santana, a prominent leader of the Escuela, spoke of a “citizen movement” (movimiento 
ciudadano) that was “the sum of sectoral and partial movements” (la suma de movimientos sectorales y 
parciales), but then went on to say that “the space where they all constantly coincide on a daily basis is the 
community... the neighborhood... [which] has been the generator of the movement of neighborhood associations 
and community groups” (el espacio donde todas coinciden constante y cotidianamente es la comunidad... el 
vecindario... [lo cual] ha sido el generador del movimento de las asociaciones de vecinos y de los grupos 
comunitarios) (Santana 1988, 133-4); “el fenómeno más importante ocurrido en los últimos años de la 
democracia venezolana”; “movimiento de movimientos”
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unified, broad-based civil society that would play a decisive role in reforming – or perhaps even replacing  
– the puntofijista  framework. Below the surface, however, there were significant ideological and social  
fault lines that would continually disrupt the search for a shared path forward. Most critics agreed on the  
basic outline of political reforms, but serious differences arose in relation to the economic policy that  
should  accompany  them.  One  current,  which  was  “generally  linked  to  business  circles[,]  drew  a  
connection  between  the  deepening  of  democracy  and  the  reduction  of  centralized  political  power,  
including party control, on the one hand, and 'economic liberty' and privatization on the other” (Ellner  
2010, 83-4). Another current opposed privatization and other forms of economic liberalization. Within  
this current, some groups, such as Causa R, represented working class and impoverished citizens. There  
were also, however, significant numbers of middle class citizens who rejected puntofijismo but continued 
to  endorse  state  intervention  in  the  economy,  especially  in  relation  to  petroleum  and  other  natural  
resources. This, along with the fact that the puntofijista party system (of which AD had always been the  
linchpin) remained in place, helps to explain why Pérez was elected to another term of office in December  
of 1988. Pérez campaigned on the interventionist policies that had marked his first term and Venezuelans  
hoped that he could accomplish the impossible task of restoring the prosperity of that era under totally  
different macroeconomic circumstances.
Within weeks of taking office,  however,  Pérez performed an about face and accepted a four  
billion dollar loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for implementing a package  
of neoliberal austerity measures that adhered to the so-called “Washington consensus”. Pérez's neoliberal  
framework included rolling back gasoline subsidies, which caused an increase in public transportation  
costs and prompted public protests that, on February 27, 1989, gave way to widespread looting in urban  
centers across the country. The government called on the armed forces to put down the uprising and, over  
the course of several days, hundreds,  if not thousands, of Venezuelans were killed, with many more  
injured.155 These events, which came to be known as the Caracazo, inaugurated a period of social unrest  
155The official count lists 277 killed and 1,009 wounded, but other estimates place the number of dead in the 
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that would shake the puntofijista system to its core.
The CTV, in defiance of Pérez and AD, organized a general strike on May 18, 1989 and  protests  
in several cities in February of 1990 (Ellner 2010, 97). Meanwhile, both AD and COPEI were internally  
divided over whether to take the neoliberal path and, if so, how far to follow it. Some of Pérez's proposals  
were thus held up or blocked in the Congress, but he nonetheless pushed ahead with economic “shock  
therapy”, drastically cutting public spending and lifting controls on interest rates, currency exchange, and  
consumer prices. By 1991 he had privatized the state-owned telecommunications monopoly and instituted  
a deregulatory framework that would gradually open the sector to competition. Restrictions on foreign  
investment were also lowered and a 1992 Privatization Law led to the sale of many more state firms.  
Pérez also implemented state and electoral reforms, some of which had been proposed by COPRE but  
resisted  by  the  Lusinchi  administration.  Although  decentralization  was  widely  viewed  as  part  of  a 
necessary reform of  puntofijismo, as carried out by the Pérez administration it served to reinforce the  
neoliberal direction of the country. Responsibilities that had formerly rested with the federal government,  
such  as  the  administration  of  ports,  commercial  airports,  and  highways,  were  turned  over  to  state  
governments that lacked the resources to manage them, leading to privatization and layoffs of union  
workers (92-3).
Electoral  reforms passed during the Pérez administration included the direct  election of state  
governors and the ability to select specific candidates, as opposed to party slates, in state and municipal  
elections. Although these did not directly reinforce the neoliberal economic framework, they were meant  
to  bolster  the  administration's  democratic  credibility  in  the  face  of  widespread  outrage  toward  its  
economic  policy.  The  plan  backfired,  however,  as  the  reforms  created  opportunities  for  formerly  
marginalized parties. For example, in December of 1989 AD lost control of 9 state governorships, one of  
which went to  Causa R (in Bolívar, where they had been organizing the steel workers since the mid-
thousands.
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1970s).156 The  Movement  Toward  Socialism  (Movimiento  al  Socialismo /  MAS)  was  another  long 
marginalized leftist party that gained substantially under the new system. 157 New parties also arose and the 
reforms played a significant role in enabling the political fragmentation that marked Venezuelan politics  
during the 1990s.
Despite the electoral reforms, Pérez continued to lose credibility as the country slid further into  
crisis. The government ran fiscal surpluses in 1990 and 91, and made timely repayment on existing debt,  
but the absorption of new debt and the accumulation of interest meant that the amount of outstanding debt  
actually increased. Moreover, although GDP growth was positive between 1990 and 93, thanks in large  
part to a rise in oil prices spurred by the Gulf War, inflation remained above 30 percent and income  
inequality grew steadily worse (Lander 1995, 96-9). Pérez managed to put down attempted military coups  
in February and November of 1992, but both generated significant popular support for his removal from  
office. In this context, the attorney general issued a report alleging that Pérez had embezzled official  
funds and the Senate authorized a trial  against him. Pérez finally resigned in May of 1993 and was  
replaced by an interim president.
Cognizant of widespread disgust with the neoliberal reforms, Rafael Caldera, who had founded  
COPEI and won the presidency on its ticket in 1969, broke with his old party and successfully regained  
the presidency in 1993 at the head of a multi-party coalition (which included the MAS and the PCV)  
whose platform rejected the neoliberal  approach and promised a return to state intervention. Caldera  
reinstated controls on exchange and interest rates, and resisted further privatization of the state sector.  
Shortly after his election, however, crisis erupted in the financial sector as the rapid growth that had  
resulted from Pérez's  deregulation caused  a  series  of  bank failures.  The government  ultimately took  
control of 18 private banks representing 70 percent of all deposits and instituted a bailout that amounted  
to 12 percent of GDP in 1994. The bankers fled with as much capital as they could get out of the country,  
156For a discussion of the electoral reforms and their effect on Causa R, see López Maya 1995.
157The MAS, which broke from the PCV in 1971, tended to attract a more middle-class membership than Causa R 
(Ellner 2010, 83).
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leading to a drop in international reserves, a devaluation of the currency, and a sharp rise in inflation,  
which averaged 70.8 percent in 1994 (Buxton 120; Ellner 2010, 100). With the government out of money  
and the country's infrastructure failing, Caldera was forced to break his promise and, in 1995, negotiate an  
emergency loan from the IMF. The conditions of that loan resulted in the imposition of the neoliberal  
“Venezuela Agenda” in 1996, which included privatization of the steel industry, laxer restrictions on  
foreign participation in the petroleum industry, and reforms to the social security administration (101-3).  
Currency exchange controls were also relaxed, leading to further devaluation and an inflation rate of  
103.2 percent in 1996. By the end of that year, over 80 percent of the country was living in poverty  
(Buxton 121).
Amongst  the  general  population,  which  blamed  its  suffering  on  neoliberal  policies,  the  
puntofijista system, along with the established parties, had lost all credibility. AD and COPEI candidates  
had supported neoliberalism in the 1993 election, AD dissenters and the MAS had joined Caldera in  
supporting the “Venezuela Agenda”, and even some Causa R leaders began supporting certain neoliberal  
policies. Causa R eventually split, with the more moderate faction keeping the name and, at least in the  
eyes of the public, incorporating itself into the  puntofijista framework (López Maya 2003, 84; Buxton 
122).  Both the CTV, which was deemed to have insufficiently resisted privatizations and, especially,  
social  security  reforms,  and  FEDECAMERAS,  which  had  long  supported  liberalization,  were  also  
tarnished with the neoliberal brush ( ibid.).
In sum, the period from 1989 to 1998 had shown that the  puntofijista system was no longer 
viable, but that elites could find no alternative to the neoliberal economic framework, which came at a  
heavy cost  to  a  majority  of  the population.  Again and again,  in  their  protests  and electoral  choices,  
Venezuelans demonstrated that they wanted drastic reforms to the corporatist, clientelistic, and corrupt  
puntofijista  system, but not in the form of neoliberalism . In relation to this historical context and the  
purposes of the present discussion, one question becomes salient: Why did non-corporatist civil society –  
specifically the highly auspicious neighborhood movement – not generate an alternative framework of  
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governance or, at least, contribute more to the maintenance of political stability? The answer seems to be  
that  the  apparent  unity  of  an  emerging  civil  society  sector  under  the  banner  of  the  neighborhood  
movement  was  only  superficial.  At  a  deeper  level,  the  movement  was  divided  over  fundamental  
assumptions regarding the nature of civil society. The civil society movement, in other words, was unable  
to provide an alternative to the progressive polarization of Venezuelan society because it was caught up in  
that very same process.
In its official literature, the neighborhood movement predicated its autonomy on financial self  
sufficiency. For example, the “Neighbor's  Manual: The Basic Course of Neighborhood Associations”  
(Manual del Vecino: Curso Básico de Asovecinos),  produced by the  Escuela,  stated that  “[t]he great 
majority of the associations of our country have as their sole form of financing contributions from the  
directors, the members that provide a regular contribution, and the occasional in-kind or cash donation”  
(Santana 1988, 171, my translation). 158 These donations, to be clear, came from “private enterprise, local  
businesses,  and  individuals,  and  many  times  not  area  residents”  (Rodríguez  et  al.  1989,  124,  my  
translation).159 There is no evidence that the movement planned to change this arrangement. A section of  
the manual entitled “A Proposal for an Agenda and Common Plan” mentions financing only once and in  
that  instance  merely  proposes  “[t]o  design  formulas  for  collecting  secure  and  periodic  monetary  
contributions that afford [the association] autonomy in its functioning” (175, my translation). 160
Lacking from this perspective is any recognition that the privately conferred contributions would  
to a great extent be dependent on the contributors' positions within a larger political economy. Autonomy  
in this sense encompasses freedom from  direct political or ideological intervention, but not from the  
maintenance of economic standards that allow members and commercial  entities to direct disposable  
income and profits toward the associations. It is thus  hard to argue with the conclusion that, at least  
158“[l]a gran mayoría de las asociaciones de nuestro país tienen como única forma de financiamiento el aporte de 
los directivos, de los afiliados que cumplen con su aporte regular y alguna donación eventual en materiales o en 
efectivo.”
159“empresas privadas, comercios de la zona y personas en particular, y muchas veces no habitantes de la zona”
160“Una Propuesta de Agenda y Plan Común”; “[d]iseñar formulas de recaudación de aportes monetarios seguras 
y periódicas que le brinden autonomía en su funcionamiento.”
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implicitly, the movement embraced a “concept of civil society … based on the model of the market”  
(Lander  1996,  54).  It  endorsed,  in  other  words,  a  classically  liberal  notion  of  civil  society  as  the  
expression of private interests, themselves an outgrowth of the private commercial sector, in the public  
sphere.
For  associations  from middle-  and  upper-class  urbanizaciones,  which  could  draw  on  higher 
incomes, higher levels of education, professional expertise, and greater levels of “social capital”, this  
conception of civil society autonomy could pass unquestioned. In the barrios, however, organization and 
activism existed in a much different matrix, with scarcer resources, more pressing problems, and a distinct  
set of social relations that provided additional leverage to party leaders (Rivero 1995, 6). 161 Moreover, 
association leaders from urbanizaciones and barrios often sharply disagreed over solutions to issues that  
hinged on class differences,  such as gang crime and land tenure (Ellner 1999, 88-91).   Middle-class  
leaders of the movement failed to recognize that their conception of civil society was not necessarily  
applicable to both contexts. Thus, the  Escuela “attributed the stagnation of neighbourhood associations in  
the barrios to their excessive politicisation” (Ellner 1999, 79), when the relationship might have more  
properly  been  seen  in  reverse  terms:  the  associations  were  reluctantly  politicized  in  order  to  make  
whatever gains they could in the face of entrenched structural obstacles. Meanwhile, the “Neighbor's  
Manua” includes a section on “The Neighborhood Struggle” (La Lucha Vecinal)  which offers seven 
anecdotes meant to illustrate creative forms of protest. The first of these relates how one association  
pressured a bank to ensure that the shopping center it was financing had sufficient parking spots. Another  
refers to a campaign to pressure authorities to remove sidewalk vendors (Santana 161-3). Such campaigns  
were unlikely to register with the many Venezuelans that did not own a car, could not afford to shop at  
161As one barrio leader noted in 1992: “...while urbanizaciones like Santa Mónica have been able to confront the 
governor's office regarding the uncontrolled proliferation of condominiums in their neighborhood, we have to 
depend on leaders of the local government, many of whom are our neighbors and members of political parties, to 
dispatch a truck with potable water up hill [sic] to the cerro ... it isn't a matter of dialogue but a matter of 
necessity ... and if that comes tied up with a vote for their party in the next election or for the member of the 
community they favor to win the elections in the neighborhood association, what can we do? ... they [political 
leaders] make us feel as if they are doing us a favor when in fact, isn't that our right?" (cited in Rivero 1995, 11 
n24).
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upscale  shopping  centers,  or  depended  on  work  within  an  informal  economy.  As  one  Venezuelan  
sociologist has concluded, “[t]he model of citizenship emerging from these middle class associations  
[was] thus an excluding one, accounting only for a minority of the population. It cannot be extended to  
the other social sectors” (Lander 1996, 56).
This issue was further exacerbated by the unintended consequences of the very mechanisms of  
decentralization for which the movement had long advocated. Movement leaders had sought the creation  
of smaller units of decision-making that would allow for greater community influence, but many of the  
new municipalities created during the 1990s, including the three located in Caracas, ended up separating  
affluent  from  impoverished  areas  and  only  further  contributed  to  the  country's  socio-economic  
polarization (Lander 1995, 140-1, n29; Ellner 1999, 89-90). The movement's leaders only made things  
worse through their preference for coordinating committees “which grouped associations of similar social  
backgrounds” as opposed to “city-wide federations with their multi-class constituency” (94). Moreover,  
due to their fear of creating a potentially easy target for co-optation the leaders resisted creating a formal,  
national-level organization within which the various coordinating committees might share experiences  
and  work  to  overcome  class  and  other  social  divisions  (83).  They  prioritized,  in  other  words,  
decentralization over integration.162
Beyond dividing the urbanizaciones from the barrios, the indeterminacy of the liberal notion of 
autonomy also led to a division within the movement's largely middle-class leadership. Since its creation, 
the Escuela had been formally affiliated with FACUR and, as mentioned previously, both organizations  
played a role in coordinating the movement at the national level. By the late 1980s, however, it became  
evident that the two groups differed in relation to the practical interpretation of autonomy. Leaders of the  
Escuela favored an absolute  separation of civil  society from not  only political  parties,  but from the  
machinations of the state more generally. They viewed neighborhood associations:
162Regardless of their ultimate effects, fears of co-optation were well founded. Both COPEI and AD had sought to 
gain control over the neighborhood associations since the passage of the Fundamental Law of Municipal 
Governance in 1978 ( 8). AD was especially keen to compensate for its loss of influence within the labor 
movement (Ellner 1999, 82).
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...along the lines of 'interest groups' which refrain from participating in electoral politics or  
assuming  functions  which  correspond  to  the  state.  For  this  reason  they  adamantly  
criticise[d] neighbourhood association leaders who run for public office.... One  Escuela 
instructor pointed out that the role of civil society is to oversee state activity and thus 'it  
can  not  be  an  umpire  and  ball  player  in  the  same  game.'  He  added  that  all  Escuela 
instructors  are  independents,  even  though  'nothing  prohibits  us  from  belonging  to  a  
political party since it is a constitutional right'. (Ellner 1999, 81-2)
FACUR  leaders,  on  the  other  hand,  often  belonged  to  political  parties.  During  the  1980s  various  
presidents of the association belonged to AD, “which had also heavily subsidised the organisation” (80).  
While the practice of accepting donations from parties was later eliminated, FACUR's presidents and  
board members continued to maintain membership in parties,  including AD, COPEI, and MAS (85).  
Moreover, FACUR leaders felt that neighborhood association members should take advantage of hard  
won  electoral  and  political  reforms  by  running  for  local  office.  From  this  perspective,  individual  
associations were not to endorse candidates, but they might create “electoral groups at the local- and  
state-levels to support prestigious neighbourhood leaders who were candidates in municipal elections”  
(84). 
This  difference,  which  played  a  principal  role  in  the  acrimonious  separation  of  the  two  
organizations in 1989, parallels the broader political economic debate that was increasingly consuming  
Venezuelan society during the period. FACUR leaders believed that the Escuela, by rejecting any contact 
with political parties and any assumption of the duties of the state, was casting its lot with  the private 
sector. They viewed the anti-party discourse of  La Escuela as:
...a cover  for drawing close to  business interests,  which [it]  hoped would displace the  
parties as props of the neighbourhood movement. One FACUR leader who accused [Elías]  
Santana[,  the  long  serving  Director  of  the  Escuela,]  of  catering  to  business  interests  
claimed that 'the national bourgeoisie was intent on using the neighbourhood movement as  
a Trojan Horse in order to wrest political power from the political parties'. (Ellner 1999,  
80)163
163Santana was serving as president of FACUR in 1989 when he founded the National Coordinating Committee of 
Neighborhood Association Federations (Coordinadora Nacional de Federaciones de Asociaciones de Vecinos / 
Confevecinos), which he believed would do a better job of representing the neighborhood movement at the 
national level and promoting the creation of neighborhood associations in the nation's interior than FACUR, 
which was primarily composed of associations from Caracas. This move was met with retaliatory actions by 
Carmelo Moreno, Santana's successor as president of FACUR and a member of MAS, and led to the Escuela 
breaking away from FACUR.
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To back up their accusations, they pointed out that  Escuela courses, as well as its radio and television  
programs, were sponsored by business interests (81). This perspective aligns the  Escuela model of civil 
society more closely with the neoliberal reform path, which would dismantle the  puntofijista system, 
minimize the state, and establish the private sector as the anchor of a new political economic framework.  
Significantly, this is the model of civil society that barrio residents would have primarily associated with  
the neighborhood movement, since Escuela leaders “were more active in slum areas than the generally  
middle-class FACUR” (79).
Escuela leaders, meanwhile, continued to view FACUR as a “federation of political parties” long  
after the organization had ceased accepting donations from them (86). From the  Escuela perspective, 
autonomy was lost not only by accepting funding or other forms of direct party control, but also by  
becoming  too  enmeshed  in  the  formal  system  of  governance.  FACUR  leaders,  however,  felt  that  
neighborhood associations could play a much more active role in representative politics. In this sense,  
although they advocated for significant reforms to the  puntofijista system, their view of civil society 
amounted to a variation on the corporatist model that had underpinned the old order and tended to favor  
organization in more affluent sectors. 
In  sum,  the  neighborhood  movement,  which  carried  the  banner  of  Venezuelan  civil  society,  
represented two approaches to reforming the political system, each of which was grounded in the liberal  
framework and neither of which was truly inclusive of marginalized populations. The movement's own  
discourse from the 1970s through the 90s reenforced this conclusion, as “[i]ts self identification as part of  
'the popular world'[,] … frequently found in the first doctrinaire or conceptual documents, progressively  
disappear[ed]” (Lander 1996, 62 n18). The neighborhood movement thus  offered little space for the types 
of  experiments  in  the  organization  of  civil  society  that  had  been  incubated  for  decades  by  leftist  
community organizers and, amidst the decay of the puntofijista system in the early 1990s, begun taking  
root in newly open and increasingly fertile terrain .
For example, in 1993 Aristóbulo Istúriz of  Causa R became mayor of Libertador, the largest  
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municipality  in  Caracas,  and  shortly  thereafter  facilitated  the  creation  of  “water  advisory  councils”  
(mesas técnicas de agua) that were designed to channel community input into the improvement of water  
provision, one of the most pressing needs facing unplanned barrios.164 Rather than situating civil society 
in opposition to the state, here the influence of civil society on governance was facilitated by the state in 
order to ensure inclusive participation regardless of economic stratification. In these and other initiatives,  
popular organizations continued to defend “a project of radical democracy emphasizing social justice and  
equality” that, although more fragmented and less visible, stood in stark contrast to “the project of liberal  
democracy based on economic freedom and the defense of private property” with which the middle- and  
upper-class neighborhood movement, and thus the hegemonic connotation of civil society, had become  
associated (García-Gaudilla 2007, 143).
These, then, were the multiple and contested notions of civil society at play in Venezuela during  
the 1990s. A majority of the population had rejected both corporatist and commercial models of civil  
society due to their respective associations with the failed puntofijista system and the intolerably painful 
consequences of neoliberal reform. A third model, in which the state facilitated new modes of governance  
in  conjunction with an  inclusive civil  society,  drew on two decades of  populist  experimentation but  
remained in  embryonic form. The astonishingly rapid ascension of  Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian  
movement depended, to a significant degree, on the adoption and promulgation of this populist model. 
The Beginning of the Bolivarian Revolution
Hugo Chávez was a young military officer when, in 1982, he and several fellow soldiers formed a  
clandestine organization called the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200 ( Movimiento Bolivariano  
Revolucionario 200 /  MBR-200).  Their  initial  ideological  orientation  was  vague  and  principally  
nationalist,  but  their  subsequent  readings  and  discussions  on  Latin  American  politics  led  them  to  
“conclusions reflecting a leftist perspective” (López Maya 2003, 75). Over the course of the following  
decade, MBR-200 members dialogued with leaders of 1960s guerrilla groups and other radical leftist  
164Libertador includes Catia, where Causa R had begun organizing in the 1970s.
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parties, as well as prominent leftist intellectuals and activists. Their goal became the formation of “a civil-
military alliance in order to stimulate revolutionary change” ( ibid.).
As with the popular movements discussed previously, the events of February 1989 imbued the  
MBR-200 with a sense of urgency. The vulnerability of state institutions and their dependence on the  
repressive capacity of the armed forces had been starkly demonstrated. Officers within the MBR-200,  
having obeyed orders to put down the uprising, “felt shame, indignation, and a sense of having defended  
the wrong side” (77). The movement attracted officers with similar feelings and began collaborating more  
consistently with civilian leftists, including Causa R leaders.165
On the morning of February 4, 1992 Chávez led the MBR-200 and its civilian allies into a coup  
attempt. Although officers across the country secured many important positions, Chávez was unable to  
achieve his unit's goal of arresting Pérez in Caracas. By nine in the morning, Chávez had surrendered and  
been given permission to speak live on national television in order to ask his co-conspirators to stand  
down and thus prevent further bloodshed. In a brief statement, Chávez did two things that endeared him  
to many viewers. First, he took full responsibility for the coup attempt, displaying a sense of honor that  
many felt to have been long absent from Venezuelan politics. Second, he stated that the MBR-200 had  
failed to accomplish it's goals “for now” (por ahora), thus implying that the group would continue to  
resist. For many Venezuelans who felt impotent in the face of puntofijista corruption and betrayed by the 
imposition of  neoliberal  reforms, Chávez and the MBR-200 provided a  dramatic  expression of  their  
frustrations and a rare burst of hope.
Chávez and his collaborators were jailed, but Rafael Caldera, Aristobulo Istúriz, and governors  
from prominent parties, including COPEI, all issued declarations that “attributed the coup to the errors of  
recent  political  leaders  and to  the  desperation  of  poor  people confronting  a  crisis  without  any  easy  
solution” (79). The 1993 presidential elections lent credence to that analysis, as the Causa R candidate 
165López Maya (2003, 77-8) states that the MBR-200 was also close to leaders of the Party of the Venezuelan 
Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Venezolana / PRV), which had formed in 1966 to fight in the guerrilla 
movement and remained active after disarming. Distrust of the civilians by the officers, however, led to the exit 
of several PRV leaders and tensions with Causa R that lasted for many years (see also Ellner 2010, 177).
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took  over  20  percent  of  the  vote  and Caldera,  as  discussed  above,  won the  presidency on  an  anti-
neoliberal  platform.  In  this  climate,  the  MBR-200  continued  to  grow  even  as  its  principal  leaders  
remained in prison (80).
Following Caldera's pardon of the MBR-200 leaders in March of 1994, the movement set about  
forming a national political organization based on the creation of small local groups, called “Bolivarian  
Circles”,  that  were  coordinated  at  the  municipal,  regional,  and  national  levels.  In  and of  itself,  this  
organizational  strategy  was  similar  to  many  other  Venezuelan  political  parties  ( ibid.).  The  circles 
organized local assemblies to discuss politics and develop relationships “meant to strengthen democratic  
attitudes and horizontal relationships” (81). As with other leftist parties, decision-making was conducted 
by consensus. In this manner, the MBR-200 went about elaborating a shared ideological perspective that  
was rooted in reverence for Simón Bolívar and other members of Venezuela's historical pantheon.
Since  1992  the  MBR-200  had  maintained  that  Venezuela's  political  system  was  irreparably  
corrupted and that the only nonviolent path forward was to convene a national constituent assembly that  
would author a new constitution. In these early years, this position was the movement's most conspicuous  
demonstration of its commitment to a participatory democracy rooted in an active civil society and o n this 
basis it  declined to participate in the regional elections of 1995. In 1996 the movement produced its  
Bolivarian Alternative Agenda MBR-200 (Agenda Alternativa Bolivariana MBR-200) which:
...included a vague proposal to stimulate what was defined as a 'humanist self-managing  
economy'  that  was designed to promote cooperatives,  small  family businesses,  and, in  
general, small and medium-sized firms as part of an effort to encourage 'solidarity'. (Parker  
2005, 67)
During this period the MBR-200 was primarily finding its political legs, but it continued to emphasize the  
need for a radical break with puntofijismo and a rejection of neoliberal economic policy.
Municipal,  state,  and  national  elections  were  all  scheduled  for  the  end of  1998.  Sensing  an  
important opportunity to solidify its internal structure and make political gains, the MBR-200 announced  
in 1997 that it would participate, with Chávez as its presidential candidate. Out of a concern for protecting  
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its  ideological  coherence,  the  movement  created  a  parallel  structure  called  the  “Fifth  Republic  
Movement” (Movimiento Quinta Republica / MVR) that would coordinate the participation of outsiders  
in the campaign and serve as a buffer for the MBR-200 itself.  By invoking a transition from a Fourth to a  
Fifth Republic, the MVR name reinforced the movement's call for a “refounding” of Venezuela's political  
order via a constituent assembly (López Maya 2003, 82-3). 166
Caldera's implementation of the Venezuela Agenda, which was widely viewed as hypocritical and  
in any case had failed to prevent a return to economic recession in 1997 following a drop in oil prices,  
insured that the 1998 elections took place in a climate of extreme hostility to the  puntofijista system, 
neoliberal reforms, and any party deemed to be tainted by them (83). The MVR capitalized on this by  
refusing  to  ally  with  traditional  parties  and  instead  creating  a  unified  coalition  of  oppositional  
organizations known as the Patriotic Pole (Polo Patriótico). As a result of this strategy, Chávez won the  
presidency with 56 percent of the popular vote. 167 The MVR also won 8 seats (out of 54) in the Senate and  
35 seats (out of 207) in the Chamber of Deputies, gaining the second greatest number of representatives in  
each.
Chávez  and  the  MVR  rose  to  power  by  harnessing  populist  anger  toward  puntofijismo, its 
principal parties, and neoliberal economic reforms. In their stead, they proposed a constituent assembly  
and a vaguely articulated vision for an alternate economic model. They had said very little about civil  
society, at least in concrete terms, but they had won the support of many who had been active in populist  
community organization over the previous decades. The country had most certainly voted for a change,  
but just what kind of change it was in for was still largely unknown and the entire country was waiting  
166The “V” in the MVR acronym is the Roman numeral for five and stands in for the word “fifth”. This choice was 
partly induced, however, by a legal prohibition against the use of the name Bolívar in the registration of political 
organizations. In Spanish, the “V” is pronounced identically to the “B”, making MVR and MBR phonetically 
equal. Although chavistas today employ the term “Fourth Republic” as a deprecating reference to the 
puntofijista era, the MBR-200 originally applied it to the period beginning with Venezuela's separation from 
Gran Colombia in 1830. (López Maya 2003, 82-3).
167Chávez's closest competitor, Henrique Salas Römer took 40 percent. Römer was the candidate of Project 
Venezuela (Proyecto Venezuela), an alternative party that he had founded in his home state of Carabobo, where 
he had served as governor until 1996. In a last-ditch attempt to defeat Chávez, both AD and COPEI had 
withdrawn their candidates and thrown their support to Römer in the last days of the campaign.
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with baited breath to find out. In the following chapter we will examine the policies and actions of the  
Chávez administration's early years and we will examine how the community and alternative media sector  
evolved  in  relation  to  them.  In  preparation  for  that  analysis,  we  must  first  review  the  history  of  
Venezuelan participatory media during the puntofijista era.
The Emergence of Participatory Media in the 1960s and 70s
Venezuela's participatory media sector emerged in the late 1960s and grew throughout the 70s. As  
was the case throughout Latin America, most of the projects in this early period were either inspired by  
militant leftist theory or undertaken by the Catholic Church in accordance with the Liberation Theology  
associated with its more progressive wing. Before reviewing these projects and their place in the structure  
of  puntofijista civil society, however, we should note that (although the history is not conspicuous in  
English language accounts) Venezuelan intellectuals and the Venezuelan government played prominent  
roles  in  the  NWICO debates  of  the  1970s  and,  moreover,  that  concomitant  attempts  to  incorporate  
NWICO  principles  into  domestic  media  policy  were  carried  out  in  the  same  period.  While  these  
discussions played out largely in academic and policy-making circles, and although the historical record  
does not point to any direct linkages between their participants and the meso- and micro-level practical  
initiatives that will be discussed below, they certainly informed the perspective of Jesuit practitioner-
scholars during that period and shaped the terrain upon which a movement of community and alternative  
media practitioners would take root in the 1980s and 90s. As such, it is worth including them in our  
historical survey.
Antonio  Pasquali's  Communication  and  Mass  Culture:  The  Mass  Production  of  Culture  in  
Audiovisual Media in Underdeveloped Regions (Comunicación y cultura de masas: la masificación de la  
cultura por medios audiovisuales en las regiones subdesarrolladas , 1964) is not only one of the very 
earliest  but  also  one  of  the  fundamental  texts  in  the  field  of  critical  international  communications  
research. Pasquali, whose work was deeply influenced by the Frankfurt school (Aguirre 1995), served for  
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many years as the Director of the National Institute for Communication Research ( Instituto Nacional de  
Investigación  de  la  Comunicación /  ININCO)  at  the  Central  University  of  Venezuela  (Universidad  
Central de Venezuela / UCV) and was hailed by Luís Ramiro Beltrán (1982) as “the outstanding figure...  
[of]  Latin  America's  most  important  combative  academic  nucleus”  (9).  Other  critical  Venezuelan  
researchers of note during that era include Hector Mujica (The Empire of News [ El imperio de la noticia], 
1967), Marta Colomina (The Alienating Host: A study on the Audience and Effects of Radio Soap Operas  
in Venezuela [El huesped alienante: un estudio sobre audiencia y efectos de las radio-telenovelas en  
Venezuela], 1968), and Oswaldo Capriles (The State and the Media in Venezuela [ El estado y los medios  
de comunicación en Venezuela], 1976), the latter of whom succeeded Pasquali as Director of ININCO.  
The work of journalist Eleazar Díaz Rangel (Underinformed Peoples [ Pueblos Subinformados], 1967), 
was also well respected within the international academic community (Beltrán 1982, 9). 168
The work of these Venezuelan intellectuals had a salient, though ultimately ephemeral, effect on  
the policies of the first Pérez administration. At the international level, Peréz's Minister of Information,  
Guido  Grooscors,  played  a  leading  role  in  the  NWICO  movement,  most  notably  by  ensuring  the  
successful  completion  of  the  First  Intergovernmental  Conference  on  Communication  Policy  in  Latin  
America and the Caribbean, which took place in Costa Rica in 1976 despite intense pressure from the  
Inter  American  Radio  Association  and  the  Inter  American  Press  Association.  At  the  second  such  
conference, held in Bogota in 1978, the Venezuelan delegation, led once again by Grooscors, submitted  
proposals for national communication and cultural policies, and for UNESCO assistance in establishing  
them, that were ultimately adopted in the face of resistance (Beltrán 1982, 7-8). Venezuela's delegation  
also defended NWICO at UNESCO general assemblies in 1976 and 1978 (Escobar 2008, 22).
168As will be discussed below, Pasquali has publicly opposed the communications policies of the Bolivarian 
Revolution on multiple occasions (cf. Coronel, Aug 5, 2005; Pasquali, Jan 24, 2007; May 2, 2007; May 27, 2007 
and Jun 18, 2007; Bisbal et al. Jun 18, 2012).  Colomina went on to a career as both an academic and a 
journalist; she was an outspoken critic of Chávez during his first presidential campaign and has since become 
one of the Bolivarian Revolution's fiercest critics. Rangel now wields considerable clout as Editor of Últimas 
Noticias, which has stood for decades as one of Venezuela's most respected national dailies and has consistently 
maintained a neutral editorial stance in the extremely polarized climate of the Bolivarian era. Rangel's own 
columns address a wide variety of issues, offering both praise for and criticism of the Bolivarian government.
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In Venezuela's domestic policy sphere, Pérez's seemingly populist platform had fanned hopes for  
the inclusion of a  Cultural  Plan (Plan de Cultura)  in  his  administration's five year plan for national  
development (Capriles 1996, 80; cited in Escobar 2008, 18). The most ambitious and concrete policy  
initiative of the period, however,  was a 1975 proposal created as a joint endeavor of ININCO (with  
Pasquali's  personal  participation)  and  the  National  Cultural  Commission  ( Comisión  National  de  la  
Cultura / CONAC), that called for a State Radio and Television Institute ( Instituto de Radio y Televisión  
del Estado / RATELVE) that would have established, as Pasquali has put it, “the figure of a radically non-
government controlled public broadcasting service, to escape the double governmental and commercial  
manipulations” (Colonel, Aug 5, 2005).169 The Pérez administration's initial support for the RATELVE 
project withered, however, in the face of opposition, much of it fomented by the commercial media sector  
whose support was seen as vital to Pérez's hopes for reelection ( ibid.; Capriles 1996, 136, cited in Escobar 
2008, 18). Opposition to these policies was so significant, in fact, that “pre-electoral pressures and risks”  
eventually led Pérez to dismiss Grooscors from his cabinet as he prepared his ultimately failed campaign  
169Filmmakers, scholars, and cinema enthusiasts had long been calling for state support for cinema production and 
the drafting of a proposal for a Cinema Law (Ley de Cine) was a principle theme of the first three National 
Cinema Conferences (Encuentros de Cine Nacional), held annually beginning in 1967 (Coordinación de 
Investigación y Documentación, Fundación Cinemateca Nacional, Oct 17, 2007; Capriles 1981, 161; Hernández 
[2005, 72] suggests that the first such conference was held in 1966). Both Pasquali and Capriles were active in 
this sector. Already in 1951, Pasquali – who had not yet graduated high school(!) - was a founding member of a 
“University Cinema Circle” (Círculo Universitario de Cine) whose mission was to promote academic 
conferences on the UCV campus (Pérez 2010, 17). In 1960 he formed part of a group that unsuccessfully 
proposed the creation of a Venezuelan film archive in the UCV library (19). Both Pasquali and Capriles sat on 
the editorial board of Cine al Día, which became one of Venezuela's most important film magazines upon its 
launch in 1967 (Coordinación de Investigación y Documentación, Fundación Cinemateca Nacional, Oct 17, 
2007; Hernández 72). The state did begin to play an active role in the cinema sector during the 1970s, but 
policies that reflected ININCO thinking were largely absent. The first Caldera administration created a Cinema 
Office (Dirección de Cine) in 1971, under the Ministry of Economic Development (Ministerio de Fomento), 
which in 1975, under the first Pérez administration and via agreements with two public corporations 
(Corpoturismo and Corpoindustria), began financing cinema production (Fuenmayor 2006). In 1977 the 
Ministries of Economic Development and Information and Tourism (Información y Turismo), without the 
participation of the National Cultural Council (Consejo Nacional de la Cultura / CONAC), formed an inter-
ministerial commission to oversee the funding process, which operated “with exclusively economistic criteria 
that neglected the cultural aspects of the cinema” (con criterios exclusivamente economicistas que descuidan los 
aspectos culturales del cine) (Izaguirre 1988; see also Hernádez 2005, 88). In 1981 the Herrera administration 
established a Cinematographic Development Fund (Fondo de Fomento Cinematográfico / Foncine), but the 
economic crisis of the 1980s crippled Venezuela's film production sector.
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for a second term (Beltrán 1982, 9).170
Herrera, the winner of the 1978 election, took a page from his predecessor's playbook, paying lip  
service to NWICO in both a 1979 visit to UNESCO's offices and in his own five year plan (Escobar 2008,  
22; Alfonzo 1982, 25). That same plan billed “Communication [sic] for participation in the development  
process” as one of the “basic principles” of the domestic communications policy that it expressed in only  
very  general terms (22-23).171 The true nature of Herrera's commitment to participation, however, did not  
surpass a narrow liberal interpretation of the term, as his administration's rhetoric made clear in hollow  
calls for “the participation of citizens  in the evaluative orientation of communicational messages” and 
“the best conditions for allowing the socially organized population to have real access to communication  
media – without diminishment of the rights, duties and responsibilities of their owners, editors, directors,  
and administrators” (24, my emphasis).172 The hypocritical use of seemingly progressive rhetoric to cover  
continued tolerance for the status quo of pro-business media policy revealed the narrow limits of populist  
governance  within  the  puntofijista system  and,  not  surprisingly,  left  Venezuelan  communications  
researchers embittered. In any case, the failed policy initiatives of the 1970s, in conjunction with the onset  
of economic crisis in the early 1980s and the general decline of the NWICO movement shortly thereafter,  
meant that participatory media projects would continue to receive little help from the state. 173
170“presiones y riesgos preelectorales”
171“La Comunicación para la participación en el proceso de desarrollo” [sic]; “principios básicos”
172“la participación de los ciudadanos en la orientación valorativa de los mensajes comunicacionales”; “las  
mejores condiciones para que la población socialmente organizada pueda tener accesso real a los medios de 
comunicación - sin desmedro de los derechos, deberes y responsabilidades de sus propietarios, editores, 
directores y administradores”
173Capriles (1981) succinctly articulated both this state of affairs and the deep intellectual resentment that 
accompanied it: “In this manner, inevitable bridges are beginning to be constructed between the still blurry 
model of the 'alternative' experiences and the elaborated and new model of communication policy. But these 
bridges are shaky, uncertain, and extremely slippery for both groups waiting on their respective shores. Things 
are beginning to take place as if 'policy' was merely an interminable discussion, an infinite moratorium on real 
transformation, a mockery or trick of power; and so, manipulating anxious researchers, playing at third-
worldism, duping UNESCO, Latin American governments slap the owners of the media and the transnational 
information services corporations on the wrist, to better establish their respective responsibilities and 
commitments without acknowledging terrifying reports, evidence, allegations, assessments and investigations of 
all kinds that place the owners of media, advertising, and information services companies on the dock for social 
crimes, only interested in serving their colleagues from the big transnational advertisers” (162, my translation). 
(De esa manera, empiezan a tenderse puentes inevitables entre el modelo aun desdibujado de las experiencias 
'alternativas' y el modelo repujado y nuevo de la política comunicacional. Pero puentes temblorosos, equívocos 
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The Catholic church, on the other hand, provided significant and systematic institutional support  
to both the theoretical  and practical development of participatory media in Venezuela.  As previously  
noted, much of this support has emanated from those sectors of the Church that were influenced by the  
Liberation Theology movement and the primary emphasis in this sector has been on the use of media for  
popular education. Jesuit professors associated with the Catholic University ( Universidad Católica) in 
Caracas comprised one important locus of activity in this area and much of their work was carried out  
under the auspices of two interrelated facilities, the Gumilla Center ( Centro Gumilla) and the Jesús María 
Pellín Communication Center (Centro de Comunicación Social Jesús María Pellín ). Each published an 
influential journal (respectively entitled  SIC and Communication Review: Venezuelan Studies [Revista  
Comunicación: Estudios Venezolanos]) (Capriles 1981, 165 n1). Capriles characterized the Pellín Center's  
use of alternative media in their work with  barrio residents as imparting “a militant aspect of political  
criticism  in  the  majority  of  its  concrete  manifestations”  ( ibid. 156).174 Another  important  facility 
associated with the Catholic church was the Center for Service in Popular Action ( Centro al Servicio de  
la Acción Popular / CESAP), in which Mario Kaplún, one of Latin America's preeminent theorists of  
participatory communication in the service of popular education, served as coordinator of the Division of  
Communication and Culture (División de Comunicación y Cultura) while exiled from his home country  
of Uruguay from 1978 to 1985.175
Beyond  making  important  contributions  to  the  academic  discourse  of  the  era,  including  
collaborative  work  with  ININCO,  these  centers  conducted  training  programs  for  practitioners  and  
y sumamente resbaladizos para ambos bandos a la expectativa en las riberas respectivas. Pues las cosas 
comienzan a suceder como si en efecto, las 'políticas' no fuesen sino una interminable discusión, una moratoria 
infinita a la transformación real, una burla o triquiñuela del poder; y es que, manipulando investigadores  
ansiosos, jugando al tercermundismo, engatusando a la UNESCO, los gobiernos latinoamericanos se daban 
zarpazos de cachorros con los dueños de los medios y con las transnacionales de la información, para 
establecer mejor sus obligaciones y compromisos respectivos a espaldas de dossiers, pruebas, alegatos,  
diagnósticos aterradores e investigaciones de toda índole que ponían en el banquillo de los crímenes sociales a 
los empresarios de los medios, de la publicidad y de la información, sólo atentos a servir a sus congéneres de la 
gran empresa anunciante transnacional.)
174“un cariz militante de crítica política en la mayoría de sus manifestaciones concretas”
175CESAP was established in 1965. In 1995 Rivero referred to it as “[t]he largest NGO in Venezuela” (11, n22).
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facilitated  practical  initiatives  with  barrio residents.  By  the  time  Kaplún  arrived  in  Venezuela,  for  
example, the Pellí Center had already begun applying the “cassette forum” ( casete-foro) methodology that 
he and his wife, Ana, among others, had developed in Uruguay (Aguirre 2005, 20). In Venezuela Kaplun 
elaborated  a  methodology for  training  popular  communicators  that  was  used  in  the  Latin  American  
Communication  Workshops  (Talleres  Latinoamericanos  de  Comunicación),  in  which  more  than  100 
educators from sixteen different countries received training over the course of four years (18, 26 n1), and  
he published what is arguably his most influential work, A Pedagogy of Communication: The Popular  
Communicator (Una pedagogía de la Comunicación: el Comunicador Popular, 1985) in the final year of 
his residency.
Another important  Jesuit  institution,  the Faith  and Happiness Movement  for Integral  Popular  
Education and Social Promotion (Movimiento de Educación Popular Integral y Promoción Social Fe y  
Alegría)  has  played  an  extensive  role  in  the  Venezuelan  participatory  mediascape.  Established  in  
Venezuela in 1955, Fe y Alegría has grown into an international federation with a presence in nineteen  
countries, primarily in Latin America. Within Venezuela,  Fe y Alegría operates an extensive national 
network of outreach centers, schools, and other points of contact with marginalized populations. At least  
as early as the 1970s, many of the Fe y Alegría schools operated mobile sound systems (radioparlantes) 
that  were used to  “broadcast” informational announcements and religious content to the surrounding  
neighborhood.  Community  members,  however,  would  often  appropriate  the  sound  systems  to  make  
announcements of their own or, especially on weekends, to operate as DJs, playing music within a format  
modeled on wireless radio broadcasting (Méndez 2011). Mobile sound systems thus became a familiar  
medium, a ready tool for political agitation and community organization, and an important element in the  
history of Venezuela's participatory media sector. 176
176This is not to suggest that Fe y Alegría was the only source of mobile sound systems. They were doubtless 
employed by other institutions, especially political parties, as well as commercial operators. In Jamaica during 
the 1960s, for instance, the commercial use of mobile sound systems to host outdoor dance parties in 
impoverished urban neighborhoods was a crucial factor in the development of that country's recording industry, 
not to mention reggae and related musical styles. Assumedly they were put to use in a similar fashion elsewhere 
in the region. Even today, in Venezuela and elsewhere in Latin America, mobile sound systems mounted on 
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The most significant contribution that  Fe y Alegría made to  Venezuelan participatory media,  
however, occurred primarily in relation to broadcast  radio. Father José María Vélaz,  the movement's  
founder, established the Faith and Happiness Radiophonic Institute ( Instituto Radiofónico Fe y Alegría  / 
IRFA) in 1974 with “the aim of responding to illiterate adults from marginalized  barrios” (Soto 2002, 
5).177 IRFA began by establishing offices in both Caracas and Maracaibo (Zulia), and over the years has  
grown  to  encompass  thirteen  broadcasting  stations  networked  via  satellite,  as  well  as  an  extensive  
network of non-broadcast outreach units in areas without radio service (García 2008, 67). 178
IRFA has reformulated its methodology multiple times over its decades of existence, emphasizing  
to  differing  degrees  programs  directed  toward  youth  and  adults  in  urban,  rural,  and  indigenous  
populations, but always offered multiple levels of basic adult education that mixes distance learning with  
less  regular  face-to-face  orientation.  This  orientation  is  generally  a  volunteer  service  provided  by  a  
member of the community in which the IRFA orientation center operates (Soto 7). The participatory  
nature of IRFA's educational programming is thus founded on both the interactive use of the medium by  
the student and the community level interaction that is integral to the process. The various methodologies  
employed by IRFA, moreover, have drawn to a greater or lesser extent on Freire's pedagogical theory and  
its  emphasis  on  conscientization,  thus  imbuing  the  educational  process  with  a  deep  socio-political  
component.
IRFA programming  is  not,  however,  limited  to  educational  content,  but  also  includes  news,  
opinion, and entertainment content directed toward the civic and Christian values of the Fe y Alegría  
movement. This dual focus has allowed IRFA stations to play an even more significant role in Venezuela's  
trucks are used for political campaigns and commercial publicity (often to announce fresh produce available 
from the same truck). I am unaware of any historical treatment of the medium, in Venezuela or elsewhere.
177“el fin de dar respuesta a aquellos adultos analfabetos provenientes de los barrios marginados”
178The first Catholic educational radio station in Venezuela was Radio Tovar, which began broadcasting in 1961 in 
Tovar (Mérida) and followed the radio Sutatenza model of programming oriented toward agricultural workers 
and their communities. After acquiring a 10 kilowatt transmitter the station changed its name to Radio Occidente  
(Occidental Radio), but its reach remained remained relatively local and the project did not expand 
geographically (Cardona & Gondelles 1989).  Capriles (1981) names Radio Nacional / FUDECO in 
Barquisimeto (Lara) as one of the few early “rural radio-fora” (radio-foros agrarios) in the country.
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participatory  media  sector.  One  experience  that  took  place  during  the  1970s,  however,  is  especially  
salient, as it exemplifies the complex but loose interrelation that permeated the sector. Between 1973 and 
1978 a three-person team supported by CESAP carried out a literacy project in the La Vega  barrio of 
Caracas using Freirian methodology. In 1979 this experience grew into the production of a two hour  
program called “Barrio People” (Gente de Barrio) which aired for two years on the Caracas IRFA station.  
The promotors of this project would go on to study the literacy campaign undertaken by the Sandinista  
government in Nicaragua, applying their experiences elsewhere in Latin America. Some of the residents  
of La Vega that participated in the project, meanwhile, would go on to serve as volunteer facilitators  
within a later IRFA initiative that will be discussed below (9-12).
Significantly, years earlier, in 1969 and 70, Venezuela's National Agricultural Institute ( Instituto  
Agrario Nacional) had employed a team of psychologists, social workers, and sociologists to carry out a  
Freirian literacy campaign in rural areas. The group was the first in Latin America to publish pedagogical  
materials, including a book titled “Communication” (Comunicación), “based on Freire's writings using an 
anthropological focus”.179 The national government pulled its support from the program, however, after it  
became worried by “[t]he significant transformations achieved within the rural population groups” (Soto  
9), thus once again exemplifying the very narrow limits of populist policies under puntofijismo, especially 
in the period in which leftist guerrilla groups remained active. 180 As with civil society more generally, the  
state was hesitant, if not altogether unwilling, to countenance communicational projects that threatened to  
exceed the bound of a liberal model that concentrated power in a select few corporate institutions, the two  
major political parties chief among them. 
The state's successful “pacification” of the guerrilla movement in the late 1960s and early 70s,  
however, had the effect of channeling the energy of the Venezuelan left into “a rebirthing of the popular  
cultural struggle” as “a legal relief of the lost insurrection”. 181 At the same time, Venezuela's population  
179“basado en los escritos de Freire bajo enfoque antropológico”
180“[l]as transformaciones significativas logradas entre los grupos campesinos”
181“un renacer de la lucha cultural popular”; “un relevo legal a la perdida insurrección”
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was over-represented by a younger generation that, having witnessed the failure of armed resistance and  
grown up in  an increasingly bourgeois  society,  preferred aesthetic  and moral rebellion.  These trends  
manifested  in  an  explosion  of  politicized,  alternative  media,  much  of  it  guided  by  the  international  
currents  represented  in  the  mass  media  (Capriles  1981,  156). 182 On  the  margins  of  this  youthful 
counterculture, however, the scope of participatory communications expanded in line with and influenced  
by the theoretical and practical trends discussed above.
The first truly participatory media project reflected in Venezuela's historical record emerged in  
1968, amidst a brief but brilliant burst of documentary film production that was arguably the country's  
most significant contribution to the Third Cinema movement. One small group of filmmakers, calling  
itself Cine Urgente (Urgent Cinema), elaborated a precociously radical participatory methodology:
The work was based on establishing contacts in the barrios … that surround Caracas … 
and the most burning problems, frequently a single theme, were filmed; those involved  
were  encouraged  to  participate  in  a  critical,  direct,  and  concrete  action  to  attack  the  
problem; the filmed results were projected before the protagonists and neighbors and also  
served  [to  add]  a  new  dimension  of  discussion  and  to  amplify  the  number  of  those  
involved;  the  process  was  repeated  successively  as  often  as  necessary  to  achieve  an  
incorporation  [of  the  community]  in  the  concrete  struggles  so  long  as  the  problem  
persisted, then maintaining the relationship and arriving at an advanced stage to leave the  
continuation of  the experiences in the hands of the collective-public  protagonist  itself.  
(Capriles 1981, 159)183
The last of the Cine Urgente documentaries was produced in 1973. Some of the projects were stunning  
successes,  in  both  cinematic  and political  terms,  while  others  suffered  from “the vicissitudes  of  the  
production team and the hazardous life of the barrios [that] didn't allow for the continuity of the process  
182During this period, youth under the age of 16 were in the majority of Venezuela's population and fond of 
proclaiming “Youth Power” (Poder Joven) in their rampant street art. “Paradigmatic” of this moment was a 
wholly irreverent magazine called Reventón that was produced young adults and helped usher in not only a more 
cynical and edgier era of pop culture, but a permanent shift toward informality in the linguistic habits of the 
nation (Capriles 1981, 157). Reventón is untranslatable, but is perhaps somewhat adequately rendered as The Big 
Blow Up.
183“Se trabajaba sobre el establecimiento de contactos en los barrios... que rodean a Caracas… y se filmaban los 
problemas mas candentes, con frecuencia un solo asunto; se estimulaba la participación de los involucrados en 
una acción a la vez crítica, directa y concreta para atacar el problema; los resultados filmados se proyectaban 
ante protagonistas y vecinos y servían a la vez para [dar] una nueva dimensión de la discusión y para ampliar 
el número de los interesados; sucesivamente el proceso se repetía en tanto fuese necesario para lograr una 
incorporación [de la comunidad] a las luchas concretas mientras perdurarse el problema, manteniendo luego la 
relación y llegando en una etapa avanzada a dejar en manos del protagonista colectivo-público de sí mismo, la 
continuación de las experiencias.”
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nor the persistence of the project itself” (160). 184 In the late 1970s two members of the original group  
formed the  Grupo Feminista  Miércoles  (Wednesday Feminist  Group),  an  “all-female  collective” that  
applied the Cine Urgente methodology (Radstone & Kuhn 1990, 413).
As Capriles notes, the “theoretical-practical vision of an alternative communication” manifested  
in  Cine Urgente was a “pioneer experience probably in all of Latin America” (160). 185 It was certainly 
representative of the Latin American left's theoretical turn away from Leninist, vanguardist notions of  
communications and toward a more Gramscian conceptualization of revolutionary media production. This  
shift was articulated by Jacobo Borges, a co-founder of Cine Urgente who, when asked in 1971 to reflect  
on  Venezuela's  unique  characteristics  in  relation  to  Third  Cinema,  delineated  four  distinct  types  of  
cinema, including “agitational cinema” (cine agitativo), “propagandistic cinema” (cine propagandístico), 
“national cinema” (cine nacional), and “urgent cinema” (cine urgente).186 He defined agitational cinema 
as trying “to respond to each manifestation of the violence of the dominant classes” and noted that the  
failure of such work resulted largely from the filmmakers' “scarce participation in popular struggles”. 187 
He saw propagandistic cinema as existing “for the politicized vanguard” and presenting “many ideas for  
one or a few people” (as opposed to agitational cinema, which presented “one idea for many people”). 188 
National cinema, meanwhile, was still “framed within traditional structures [although] it has extremely  
important  elements  of  rupture”.189 Against  all  of  these  he  defined  urgent  cinema  (the  only  category  
without a pre-existing name) as:
Continuous  cinema,  created  not  as  a  verification,  but  as  a  participation  in  an  active  
184“las vicisitudes del equipo y la azarosa vida misma de los ranchos [que] no facilitaban la continuidad del  
proceso ni la persistencia del proyecto mismo”
185“vision teórico-práctica de una comunicación alternativa”; “experiencia pionera probablemente en toda 
America Latina”
186King (2000, 219) identifies Borges as the founder of the group, while Radstone & Kuhn mention Jordán Josefina 
as a co-founder (413). Capriles (1981) does not specify founders, but lists “Jacobo Borges, Josefina Jordán, 
Franca Dona, Pedro Martínez, Luis Luksic, Emilio Ramos and others” (159) as members. The cinematographer 
Pedro Laya was one of these others (Chávez; Aug 28, 2007).
187“responder a cada manifestación de la violencia de las clases dominantes”; “escasa participación en las luchas 
populares”
188“para la vanguardia politizada”; “muchas ideas para una o pocas personas”; “una idea para muchas personas”
189“enmarcadas dentro de estructuras tradicionales [aunque] tienen elementos de ruptura sumamente importantes”
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process.... Cinema made not only by militants, but also by the participants in the action,  
who reflect and discuss throughout the whole process, which dialectically encompasses the  
action itself, the act of the filming and the cinematographic visualization, until arriving at  
the critique of the ideas that the action itself generates. In these experiences, which are still  
elemental, is the kernel of a work that reformulates the categories of cinema, theater, etc.,  
in  order  to  become a  revolutionary  cultural  action.  (Borges  et  al.,  1971,  np,  original  
emphasis, my translation)190
The degree to  which  Cine Urgente influenced subsequent  Venezuelan participatory media initiatives,  
especially those in the audiovisual sector, is a question worthy of further historical research. Hernández  
(2005) credits it  with “foment[ing] the first  grassroots technical and ideological  training workshops”  
(73).191 Capriles  (1981)  suggests  that  groups  other  than  the  Grupo  Feminista  Miércoles applied  the 
methodology in the late 1970s using video, although he finds the results inferior to those obtained by  
Cine Urgente.192
Elements of the  Cine Urgente process can be found in some applications of a cultural  event  
known as the  cineforo (cinema forum) that is historically linked to Venezuela's  cineclub (film society) 
movement. By the time Cine Urgente formed in 1968, the cineclub movement in Caracas was strong and 
it seems plausible that the filmmakers' experiences with the collective screening and discussion of films  
contributed to the development of their methodology. 193 What is certain, however, is that the  cineclub 
190“Cine continuo, realizado no como una verificación, sino como una participación en un proceso activo.... Cine 
hecho no sólo por militantes, sino también por los participantes en la acción, quienes van reflexionando y 
discutiendo durante todo el proceso, que engloba dialécticamente la acción misma, el acto de la filmación y la 
visualización cinematográfica, hasta llegar a la crítica de las ideas que generan la propia acción. En estas 
experiencias, que aún son elementales, está el germen de un trabajo que rebasa las categorías cine, teatro, etc., 
para convertirse en una acción cultural revolucionaria.”
191“fomenta[r] los primeros talleres de formación técnica y ideológica de grupos de base”
192“Later attempts, realized using portable video in recent years have succeeded neither in inserting themselves to 
the same degree in the social problematic nor in generating their own dynamic to contribute in confronting it, 
perhaps because such attempts were made by less belligerent groups, in less appropriate conjunctures, and 
without a political project” (Capriles 1981, 160). It seems unlikely that these comments reference the Grupo 
Feminista Miércoles, which was founded by Jordán Josefina and Franca Donda, members of the original Cine 
Urgente team, who would seemingly have brought sufficient belligerence and political orientation.; “Ulteriores  
intentos, realizados en video portatil en años recientes, no han logrado insertarse de igual manera en la 
problemática social ni generar una dinámica propia para contribuir a enfrentarla, quizas porque tales intentos  
provenían de grupos del menor beligerancia, en coyunturas menos apropiadas y sin proyecto politico.”
193If the cineforo model did influence Cine Urgente, it was probably in conjunction with the founding members' 
participation in an event called Image of Caracas (Imagen de Caracas) that Capriles (1981, 165 n4) describes as 
“an extremely interesting multimedia experience with 'participatory' pretensions [that combined] an ad hoc 
architectural area, gigantic movies in which the same sequence was distributed across multiple screens that 
surrounded the spectators, movements of actors and extras that leapt from roofs, circus acts, sounds, music, 
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movement played a crucial role in Venezuela's participatory mediascape by providing a framework for the  
creation  of  community  media  initiatives.  In  its  initial  and  still  most  common form,  the  Venezuelan  
cineclub is  a legally established civil society organization whose primary function is to facilitate the  
screening of films that would not be otherwise available. These screenings are generally followed by a  
discussion among the audience members concerning various aspects of the film. This two step process – a  
screening and then a discussion – is what has come to be known as a cineforo (or videoforo).
The very first Venezuelan cineclub, based on the European model, formed in Caracas in 1933 and  
lasted only a few years. Venezuela's second  cineclub appeared in 1950, also in Caracas, but this time  
sparked national growth, with cineclubes forming in Maracay (Aragua) in 1954, on the UCV campus in  
1958, and at the University of Zulia in Maracaibo in 1962 (Pérez 2010). The  movement's growth then 
accelerated rapidly in the late 60s, and the cineclub remained a mainstay of Venezuelan culture from the  
70s through the 90s. 
The cineclub movement experienced three important and interrelated shifts during the accelerated  
growth period of the late 60s and early 70s. The first of these centered on the content of  screenings. Until  
the mid-60s,  cineclubes primarily screened critically acclaimed films from the US and Europe, often  
within historical retrospectives (cf. Pérez 2010, 2011). In the late 60s, however, many cineclubes, often 
newly formed, began showcasing the then booming and politically charged Latin American cinema, with  
a particular emphasis on Venezuelan contributions.
The second shift centered on the context of screenings. Early cineclubes aspired to create spaces 
for a distanced, intellectual, aesthetic, and sometimes elitist appreciation of the cinema. Beginning in the  
additional and continuous slide projections, etc.” Officials from the Caracas municipal government sponsored 
the event, but apparently got cold feet upon witnessing what they had set in motion. According to Capriles, it 
withdrew its support, the event was closed, and the crowd dispersed. Nonetheless, the event established “the 
popular [communications] movement, the collective impulse, and the active spectator” (Hernández 2005, 72). 
Cine Urgente began soon afterward.; “una interesantísima experiencia multimedia de pretensión 'participativa' 
[que entremezcló] recinto arquitectural ad hoc, cine gigante en que la misma secueneia se repartía en pantallas 
multiples que rodeaban a los espectadores, movimientos de actores y figurantes que saltaban desde los techos, 
circo, sonidos, música, proyecciones complementarias en diapositivas, [sic] continuas, etcetera.”; “el 
movimiento popular [de comunicaciones], el aliento colectivo, y el espectador activo”
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late  60s,  however,  many  cineclubes were  created  or  appropriated  as  spaces  for  progressive  and/or  
revolutionary fomentation within which the cineforo process was viewed as a spur to social organization 
and action. Many of these initiatives, moreover, were undertaken in relation to broader projects and/or  
movements.  While  cineclubes in  the  former  category  made  use  of  institutional  spaces,  such  as  
universities, museums, and cultural centers that relied on government support, those in the latter category  
sometimes acquired mobile facilities and conducted screenings in public spaces, frequently outdoors,  
within urban neighborhoods or rural villages whose residents might not otherwise have known about,  
much less sought out, the films screened.
The third shift in the cineclub movement centered on the scope of the cineclubes themselves. As 
early as the late 60s, and with increasing frequency throughout the 70s,  cineclubes attracted (aspiring) 
filmmakers  and  other  media  practitioners  looking  for  fellowship  and  support  in  an  environment  of 
extremely limited resources. Many cineclubes thus became not only centers of exhibition but also spaces  
for advancing cinematic and other forms of media production. This emphasis on production, however,  
was shaped by the shifts discussed above. Many within the cineclub movement focused on the creation of 
a sustainable and professionalized, if not wholly commercial, national cinema along the lines of those in  
Argentina, Brazil,  or Europe. Others, however, viewed  cineclubes as vehicles for participatory media 
initiatives that would function in concert with social and political movements, especially at the level of  
community organization.
As a result of these three broad shifts, cineclubes either became or contributed to the formation of  
some of Venezuela's earliest and historically most important participatory media initiatives. Perhaps even  
more  importantly,  however,  the  cineclub movement  laid  the  groundwork  for  the  community  and  
alternative media movement that emerged in the 1980s and coalesced in the late 1990s. Of particular  
importance  in  this  regard  was  the  Venezuelan  Federation  of  Cinematographic  Cultural  Centers  
(Federación Venezolana de Centros de Cultura Cinematográfica  / FEVEC), which was formed “by a 
group of  progressive artists  and  intellectuals”  (Schiller  2009,  79)  in  1974 and held  its  first  national  
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conference the following year.
Retrospective accounts often associate FEVEC exclusively with the cineclub movement, but it is 
important to recognize that, at least initially, it organized a variety of entities seeking to contribute to  
alternative circuits of distribution and exhibition. Izaguirre, for example, described FEVEC in the early  
1980s as “an organization that oversees and acts for the free circulation and exhibition of culturally  
oriented cinema and groups all centers of cinematographic culture, cineclubes, experimental film centers, 
film centers, and popular exhibit circuits.” 194 Reflecting the tensions inherent in the three broad shifts  
outlined above, FEVEC's members had varying perspectives on their role as exhibitors, varying degrees  
of interest in cinema production, and varying attitudes toward state policy. One historical account, offered  
by a participant who was very active in the participatory media sector, notes that  FEVEC's policies:
permitted the coalescence of the alternative media, press, mobile sound systems, radio,  
cineclubes,  film  societies,  independent  directors,  photographers,  theater  people,  
puppeteers,  etc.  in  a  country  where  there  was  no  alternative  and free  communication  
movement, [although] the scope of their errors must also be recognized, particularly in  
relation to the commercialization of alternative, independent, and community audiovisual  
production. (Hernández 2005, 88)195
These differences led to factionalism and in-fighting that detracted from the organization's coordinating  
capacity.196 Nonetheless, over the decades FEVEC directed resources to cineclubes, created an articulating 
framework for the participatory media sector, and served as a collective voice on questions of state policy.  
FEVEC also played a significant role in orienting CONAC's efforts to stimulate audiovisual production  
and  exhibition,  especially  through  its  Nucleus  of  Cinematographic  Support  ( Núcleo  de  Apoyo  
194“un organismo que vela y actúa por la libre circulación y exhibición cinematográfica de índole cultural y 
agrupa a todos los centros de cultura cinematográfica, cineclubes, centros de cine experimental, cinematecas y 
circuitos populares de exhibición.”
195“permitió el aglutinamiento de los medios alternativos, prensa, radioparlante y de señal abierta, cineclubes,  
cinematecas, realizadores independientes, fotógrafos, teatraras, titiriteros, etc. en un país donde no existía un 
movimiento de comunicación alternativa y libre, pero tarnbien se debe apreciar la dimensión de sus errores, 
particularmente en el plano de la comercialización de la producción audiovisual alternativa, independiente y 
comunitaria”
196Hernández Castillo's informative but frustratingly organized account of the history of participatory media in 
Venezuela weaves multiple references to this factionalism into its descriptions without offering much in the way 
of detail. The most concrete references to the organizational fallout suggest the departure of the founding 
directors, perhaps in 1979 (87-8), and an internal evaluation that began at a national conference in 1996 and led 
to the cessation of operations in 1997 and ultimately the dissolution of the organization in 1998 (75, 102-3).
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Cinematográfico / NAC), which was established in 1978 (82). 197 As the cineclub movement grew, support 
also came from the Foundation for  Culture  and the Arts ( Fundación para la  Cultura y  las  Artes  / 
FUNDARTE), an institution established in 1975 by the office of the mayor of the Libertador municipality  
in  Caracas,  which  “[s]tructured  a  cineclub  training  plan  that  facilitated  the  consolidation  of  some  
cineclubes with experience in community participation” (76). 198
In broad terms, the overarching historical trajectory of the cineclub movement leads away from a 
relatively passive and aesthetically-oriented movement focused on spectators,  and toward an actively  
engaged movement of cultural facilitators,  policy advocates,  and producers working in a diversity of  
media and toward a variety of goals, from the commercial to the activist. 199 This trajectory was, no doubt, 
the  manifestation  of  several  broad  trends  that  occurred  on  a  transnational  level  during  the  period,  
including an increase in the expression of critical and radical political perspectives, especially among  
young people; a growing emphasis on the use of cinema for political ends, especially in Latin America;  
and  the  spread  of  critical  theories  of  communication  that  emphasized  active  audiences,  dialogic  
interaction, and participatory production. The expansion and politicization of the  cineclub movement, 
however, was also a manifestation of that broad shift,  discussed above, in which the Venezuelan left  
turned from armed struggle and vanguardist agitation to efforts at community and sectoral organization.  
Many of those who made use of the cineclubes as a forum for political organization “were coming from a  
197Without elaborating on the relationship, Hernández states that CONAC's cinema policy during this period “was 
developed in an ineffective manner that was dependent on FEVEC” (88).
198“[e]structuró un plan de capacitación cineclubista que facilitó la consolidación de algunos cineclubes con 
experiencia de participación comunitaria”
199Contemporary encapsulations of this trajectory are sometimes overly narrow. Marcano (2009), for example, 
wholly equates “cineclubismo” in the 1960s and 70s with “barrio cinema” (cine de barrio), although many 
cineclubes continued to operate in institutional settings and cater to relatively elitist cultural interests. On the 
other hand, Blanca Eekhout – a co-founder of one of Venezuela's most famous cineclubes in the 1990s who 
would become a leader of the community media movement and then a powerful Bolivarian politician – has 
stated that “[t]he cineclub movement started in the 1960s, but at the time it was linked to the client networks and 
patronage of the major political parties. In the 1980s, it moved away from that and gained a certain 
independence, and the cineclubs became instruments of the organized communities” (Podur, Sept 13, 2004). I 
know of no evidence to prove or disprove the assertion that the early cineclubes were under the influence of the 
political parties. Nonetheless, it seems certain that many cineclubes were operating quite independently at least 
as early as the late 60s, and it would be more accurate to say that some, not all, cineclubes in the 80s operated as 
instruments of the organized communities.
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politically defeated left – some even from the ranks of the armed struggle; they were the ones who little  
by little transformed the cinema into their bastion of ideological resistance” (Marcano 2009). 200
Important Tendencies in Participatory Media during the 1970s and 80s
Venezuela's  first  sustained  participatory  video  initiative,  TV  Caricuao,  exemplifies  the 
convergence of the left's cultural turn with an expanding awareness of participatory communications. It  
may also be the only participatory media project from the 1970s to become an active member of the  
Bolivarian community media sector during the Chávez administration. To a great degree,  TV Caricuao 
grew out of the varied life experiences of Jesús Blanco, who grew up in Lídice, a working class barrio on 
the outskirts of Caracas (Blanco 2011).201 In the early 1970s a friend invited Blanco, a lifelong musician  
who had studied communication, to participate in “social work” ( trabajo social) being carried out in 
Lídice by Ruptura (Rupture), which was the legally recognized political and cultural front of the outlawed  
Venezuelan Revolution Party (Partido de la Revolución Venezolana / PRV) and its associated guerrilla 
group, the National Liberation Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional / FALN). In his 
efforts to steer adolescents away from “delinquency”, Blanco designed projects that incorporated music,  
photography, and video, and often involved recording and presenting cultural activities in various barrios 
throughout Caracas.202 These projects drew on Blanco's experience in the commercial television sector,  
where he had worked for Renny Ottolina (a very popular entertainer comparable to Ed Sullivan), first as a  
musician and then in a variety of production roles. 203
Based  on  his  efforts  with  Ruptura,  Blanco  was  invited  to  work  at  the  Simón  Rodríguez  
Experimental  University  (Universidad  Experimental  Simón  Rodríguez  /  UESR),  which  had  been 
200“venían de una izquierda derrotada políticamente – algunos incluso de las filas de la lucha armada – ; fueron 
ellos los que poco a poco transformaron al cine en su bastión de resistencia ideológica”
201Unless otherwise noted, all information pertaining to TV Caricuao is based on interviews with Blanco.
202One such project, entitled Repicar de un Pueblo (The Sounding of a People), involved the simultaneous 
projection on two screens of images from the festivities associated with the celebration of St. John (San Juan). 
The similarity to the cinematic portion of the Imagen de Caracas event described above (note 44) is probably 
coincidental but still noteworthy.
203Blanco had also already produced a documentary on the history of Lídice. It was not clear in our interview if this 
was in relation to his work with Ruptura.
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established  earlier  in  the  decade  with  significant  support  from  the  Pérez  administration  and  the  
participation  of  progressive  members  of  AD, among others. 204 UESR had acquired video  production 
equipment, but no one on the staff had the technical capacity to make use of it until Blanco was hired.  
Soon after he arrived, however, Blanco decided that he needed more space for his audiovisual work and  
the  university  agreed  to  transfer  him  to  the  site  of  an  affiliated  unit,  the  Experimental  Center  for  
Permanent Learning (Centro Experimental para el Aprendizaje Permanente  / CEPAP), which was located 
in Caricuao and whose focus on popular education was influenced by Freirian methodologies. One of  
CEPAP's professors had initiated, and then abandoned, a project designed to emulate Sesame Street. Upon  
discovering the audiovisual studio that had been meant for this project, Blanco's first impulse was to  
simultaneously build on his work with Ruptura and address his frustrations with  commercial television  
by establishing an alternative television station that would make good on the medium's untapped potential  
for progressive social organization.205
Blanco found allies for this project in the  Frente Cultural Caricuao (Caricuao Cultural Front), 
which was a coalition of local cultural groups, including cineclubes, writers, and musical groups, with a 
leftist  political  orientation.206 The  Frente had  already  been  hoping  to  make  use  of  CEPAP's  video  
equipment, which included one portable and two studio cameras, and, in 1978 or 79, its members began  
collaborating with Blanco on  TV Caricuao.207 Meetings of  this  initial  group,  which were held every  
204Simón Rodríguez is most famous for having tutored the young Simón Bolivar and today serves as an icon of 
pedagogical wisdom.
205At some point, Blanco conducted research on community radio in Europe, though it was not clear if this was 
before or after his arrival at CEPAP. In his recollection of that research, he emphasized an awareness that most of 
the European projects had either become commercial ventures or dissolved after the original motivation for the 
project (such as protesting a proposed nuclear plant) had dissipated.
206Julio Valdés, a founding member of TV Caricuao, recalled the Taller Experimental Cinematográfico Imágenes 
(Images Experimental Cinematographic Workshop), as well as three musical groups, Madera (Wood), Ayer y 
Hoy (Yesterday and Today), and Cumbe (whose name refers to a West African musical rhythm), as among the 
groups making up the Frente (Mujica 2013, 8). Blanco identified the cinema group as simply Imagen (Image), 
and he referred to Cumbe, which used their music as a vehicle for political ideas and continued to perform as of 
2011, as belonging to the “cultural heritage of the parish” (patrimonia de la parroquia). Following his 
collaboration with TV Caricuao, Valdés went on to graduate from the UESR, serve as Director of CEPAP, and, in 
2010, become UESR's Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
207Blanco cited “a bad memory for dates” (una mala memoria con las fechas) and provided only rough 
periodization in our interviews. Rodner (2008, 30) and Mujica (7), each working from interviews with TV 
Caricuao founders and staff, give 1978 and 1979, respectively, as the initial year of the project. Rodner also 
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Wednesday, quickly grew to include 60 to 100 people, many of them students from the UESB, but also  
residents of not only Caricuao, but neighboring areas.
The founding members of TV Caricuao were intent on establishing a horizontal, non-centralized  
structured  that would prevent any single group from establishing a dominant leadership role. They thus  
established coordinating councils for each of three areas – organization, production, and training  – that  
were meant to hold equal power in relation to decisions affecting the project as a whole. They also  
mandated that every participating cultural group nominate a representative for each of the three councils.  
The structure was thus envisioned as a sort of loose federation of cultural groups that would jointly  
operate the television station. While the group was sincerely invested in internal democracy, the emphasis  
on horizontal, non-centralized leadership was also partly a reaction to fears that political parties, whether  
AD, COPEI, or those on the left, would attempt to infiltrate and appropriate the organization. Such fears  
illustrate once again the degree to which puntofijista civil society was dominated by the most powerful  
corporatist institutions.
Another motive for dividing decision-making authority between three councils was to  increase 
efficiency by reducing the number of participants in any single discussion. As it turned out, however,  
coordinating the three councils proved difficult and the group would often have to meet in a full assembly  
in order to decide important issues. As the project progressed this cumbersome process was informally  
abandoned  and  a  group  of  the  most  active  participants  assumed  a  de  facto but  unquestioned  and 
apparently unexploited control over the project.
For the first quarter century of its existence,  TV Caricuao possessed neither a transmitter nor a  
broadcasting  license  and  did  not  operate  as  a  television  station  in  the  sense  of  producing  regular  
programming.  It  made  its  cameras  and  facilities  available  to  community  groups  and  also  offered  
production  workshops  that  accorded with  CEPAP's  focus  on  experiential  learning.  The  content  thus  
states that TV Caricuao only began operating within the UESR facilities in 1980, but this does not seem to 
accord with the account Blanco provided in my interviews, which has TV Caricuao operating on the UESR site 
from the beginning.
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produced was screened in cineforos within the community, on university campuses, and frequently at the  
Aquiles Nazoa branch of the national library system. 208 Most of this content was documentary in nature.  
Usually these were recordings of community events and activities, though sometimes on a fairly large  
scale, as was the case with “The Bolivarian March” (La Marcha Bolivariana, 1983), which documented a 
march that celebrated the bicentennial of the birth of Simón Bolivar by retracing his path during the  
Admirable Campaign of 1813 and ended in Caracas with a concert by Alí Primera. 209 TV Caricuao also 
occasionally facilitated narrative work, such as “On the Way: A Biographical Sketch of the Teacher Don  
Simón Rodríguez” (En el camino: Semblanza biográfica del Maestro Don Simón Rodríguez  / 1985), a 
short docudrama on the life of Simón Rodríguez. 210 Not all of the productions were local. For example,  
the documentary  “Píritu,  a  Lake for  Life” (Píritu  una laguna para  la  vida /  1987),  which won the 
Humboldt Environmental  Prize (Premio Ambiental  Humboldt),  dealt  with ecological issues and their  
impact on the fishing community of Nuevo Unare (Anzoátegui) (Prensa CONATEL 2012; Mujica 8).  
“The Death of the Liberator” (La Muerte del Libertador / 1987[?]), a docudrama depicting the final days  
of Bolivar's life, was produced in Canoabo, in the central state of Carabobo ( ibid.).
“The Death of the Liberator” is interesting for two reasons. First, it included an introduction that  
suggests the potential for community participation in TV Caricuao productions:
Bricelda García,  a  university  student  and  housewife,  one fine day  decided to  direct  a  
production of the moments of the last days of Bolívar[,] and her mother Isabel Lara, an  
Artisan [sic] and secretary of the Agricultural Technical School[,] gave her total support,  
Alba de Martínez[,] a cook at the university and longtime collaborator in all Canoaban  
208The Aquiles Nazoa had a reputation for attracting leftists. As Blanco recalled: “The people that were reading in 
that library were always very combative.... That was one of the place where the 'communists' went to work...; 
“La gente que estaba leyendo en esa biblioteca siempre fue muy combativa.... Eso era uno de los lugares donde 
fueron a trabajar los 'comunistas'...”
209Bolivar's march during the Admirable Campaign took him from Cúcuta, in what is now Columbia, to Caracas. 
Alí Primera was Venezuela's most beloved performer of the overtly political Nueva Canción (New Song) genre. 
He died in a car accident in 1985 and has been elevated to iconic status within the Bolivarian movement.
210Blanco recalled that José Ignacio Cabrujas, a celebrated stage and screenwriter who authored some of 
Venezuela's best and most beloved telenovelas, attended one or more of the group's early meetings and proposed 
a community produced telenovela project. Unfortunately, it never materialized. Separately, María de Stefano, 
who has been a leader of TV Caricuao almost as long as Blanco, told me that Colomina's critical study of 
Venezuelan telenovelas (“The Alienating Host” [1968], mentioned above), influenced the group's vision during 
those early years (de Stefano 2011).
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cultural activity, put her sewing machine to work, her son Jesús Martínez[,] the director of  
the Little Devils of Canoabo and a farmer asked to be the doctor Prospero Reverendo, a  
young engineering student, Romel Alselmi joined the project together with Juan Flores[,] a  
student of food engineering, farmer, and tailor in his spare time, Edgar Henrique[,] the  
owner of the los Henríquez restaurant asked for the role of the parish priest[,] perhaps to  
cure  his  shyness...  the  role  of  the  liberator's  [sic]  nephew  was  entrusted  to  Emilio  
Gueves[,] a hot dog vendor and owner of the town's mobile sound system, they went out to  
find the liberator [sic] and came across the student Antonio Migliory who[,] somewhat  
startled[,] accepted the responsibility... (9) 211
Second, it appears to have been the centerpiece of a special four hour transmission that took place in  
Canoabo in 1987 and for which TV Caricuao received special permission from the state to broadcast. 212 
This was most likely the first authorized transmission by a Venezuelan community television broadcaster  
(ibid.).213
The story of this broadcast does not end there, however, and aside from being an item of historical  
curiosity, it can help us understand the status of TV Caricuao and Venezuelan community media within 
puntofijista civil society. The temporary license granted to TV Caricuao was not accompanied by the  
provision of a transmitter, which was not only an expensive device of which there were relatively few in  
211This appears to be Mujica's transcription of a spoken introduction. It is not clear from Mujica's account why TV 
Caricuao facilitated this production; my assumption is that Bricelda García was a student in the UESR, perhaps 
in one of CEPAP's extension programs.; “Bricelda García estudiante universitaria y ama de casa, un buen día 
decidió realizar el montaje de los momentos de los últimos días de Bolívar[,] y su madre Isabel Lara, Artesana y 
secretaria de la Escuela Técnica Agropecuaria[,] le dieron su total apoyo, Alba de Martínez[,] cocinera de la 
universidad y gran colaboradora de todo lo que es actividad cultural canaobera, puso andar su máquina de 
coser, su hijo Jesús Martínez director de los Diablitos de Canoabo y agricultor pidió ser el doctor Prospero 
Reverendo, un joven estudiante de ingeniería, Romel Alselmi se integró al trabajo junto a Juan Flores[,] 
estudiantes [sic] de ingeniería de alimentos, agricultor y sastre en sus ratos libres, Edgar Henrique[,]  
propietario del restaurant los Henríquez pidió el papel del párroco quizás para curar sus penas... el papel del  
sobrino del libertador [sic] le fue encargado a Emilio Gueves[,] vendedor de perros calientes y dueño de la 
miniteca del pueblo, salieron a buscar al libertador [sic] y se encontraron con el estudiante Antonio Migliory 
quien[,] algo asustado[,] acepto el compromiso…”
212Mujica attributes the authorization to Venezuela's National Telecommunications Commission (Comisión 
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones / CONATEL), but that entity was not established until 1991, as part of the 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector. Assumedly, the temporary license would have been granted by 
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (Ministerio de Transporte y Comunicaciones), which 
handled broadcast licensing during that period.
213Ávila (2008, 44) reports an interview with Ayán Vergara, a community radio practitioner in Maracaibo, who 
began his career in the early 1980s with unauthorized broadcasts on VHF channel 7, though the content and 
extent of these broadcasts is unclear. Hernández Castillo reports that in 1982 a group called “Los Tamunangueros 
del Oeste”, apparently working with or drawn from various cineclubes, used “recycled” technology to make an 
unauthorized television broadcast on UHF channel 14 in Barquisimeto (Lara) as part of a larger 
“Cinematographic Cultural Identity and Audiovisual Education” (Identidad Cultural Cinematográfica y  
Educación Audiovisual) project called “Memory of the Waters” (Memoria de Las Aguas) (100).
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Venezuela, but also one whose operation required significant technical knowledge. TV Caricuao was able 
to procure one, however, from a resident of a Caracas barrio who had been broadcasting commercial  
movies from a pirate television station that he operated out of his house using a homemade transmitter.  
According to Blanco, this enterprise was “violently aborted” ( abortada violentamente) and its proprietor 
detained  by  Venezuelan  authorities  acting  at  the  behest  of  the  country's  most  powerful  media  
conglomerate, Radio Caracas Television (RCTV) (ibid.).
While this anecdote pertains to the unauthorized transmission of copyrighted content, it illustrates  
the tight control maintained by the state and the major media companies over the broadcast spectrum. As  
will be discussed below, unauthorized community broadcasters in the 1990s would also be subject to  
repression. Nor was repression restricted to the broadcast sector, as the state remained extremely wary of  
any civil society initiative that operated outside the control of the puntofijista corporate framework. For 
instance, the more radical cineclubes of the 1960s and 70s “were persecuted – and even tortured – by the  
police and national guard of those years” (Marcano). 214 Blanco and the other leaders of TV Caricuao 
recognized that their leftist tendencies and their connection to Ruptura made them especially suspect in 
the eyes of the major parties that controlled the state.
As Blanco recalled, “when we started the station, we always kept a low profile... because we  
knew that we could be victims at any moment of it being over, of them dispersing us”. They recognized,  
however, that they enjoyed a certain amount of protection by dint of their relationship with CEPAP. As  
mentioned above, the UESR was established with strong support from members of AD and, at least from  
Blanco's perspective, its officials remained responsive to the party. Blanco believes they maintained a  
great  deal  of  respect  for  CEPAP,  whose  faculty  and  administration  were  truly  invested  in  popular  
education but in the end remained liberals: “Nor were they totally on the left or anything like that...  
Progressives, but nothing more.”215 This respect for CEPAP translated into a toleration of TV Caricuao: 
214“eran perseguidos – e incluso torturados - por la policía y los guardias nacionales de aquellos años”
215“Tampoco eran totalmente de izquierda ni nada por el estilo... Progresistas, pero más nada.”
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“They would say... 'Leave those hot heads over there alone.' They said 'hot heads' like that, [meaning  
something] like 'communists'.”216
Nonetheless, the tension between  TV Caricuao and the UESR was ever present, and it fell to  
Blanco, as the member of the project who was employed by the University, to respond:
The project was always half underground. Because the university was always fighting over  
whether that project was theirs or the community's... I remember the administration asking  
me, “Look, that TV Caricuao project is  the University's,  right?” [I said:]  “No, it's  the  
community's  project  that's  inside  the  university.”  Because...  the  [UESR]  philosophy  
allowed it.  That you could have a project inside the university but that it  was another  
community's. But that was on paper, it wasn't true that they wanted that to happen.....  In  
the end, the adecos [AD members] wanted the project to be theirs.217
As might be expected, the tension tended to increase when the university administration changed:
We started to have small confrontations with the policy inside the university, because they  
started to change the administration. And some administrations started to realize that the  
project was a political inconvenience for their process, of the adecos [AD members] and 
copeianos [COPEI  members].  One  Chancellor  practically  eliminated  the  television  
station... he changed everything, everything was taken to a different site... 218
Operating in this environment created a chilling effect on the groups's activities, as Blanco indicates with  
his references to keeping a low profile and operating half underground. Too much exposure could bring  
negative consequences from the puntofijista corporatist power structure. For example, TV Caricuao once 
lent a camera to a group of students from a different university. They recorded a street protest in which  
some students were beaten by the police. They then used the TV Caricuao facilities to produce an edited 
video that they showed to other students in their university, all without the TV Caricuao leadership group 
having any knowledge of the content. Soon after, Blanco received a call from the Chancellor, who herself  
216“Decían... 'Dejen esas cabezas calientes allí.' Decían 'cabezas calientes' como así, [queriendo decir algo] como 
'comunistas'.”
217“Siempre el proyecto estuvo medio subteráneo, no? Porque la universidad siempre estaba peleando si ese 
proyecto era de ellos o era de la comunidad.... Yo me acuerdo que la autoridad me preguntaba, 'Mira, pero ese 
proyecto de TV Caricuao es de la Universidad?' [Dije:] 'No, es un proyecto de la comunidad que esta dentro de 
la Universidad.' Porque ... la filosofía de la Simón Rodríguez lo permitía. Que tu podías tener un proyecto 
dentro de la universidad pero que fuera de otra comunidad. Pero era en papel, no era en verdad que ellos 
querían que eso pasara.... En el fondo, los adecos querían que el proyecto fuera de ellos.”
218Blanco appears to be referring to a temporary relocation of equipment, as TV Caricuao has operated on the same 
site since its founding.; “Empezamos a tener pequeñas confrontaciones con la misma política dentro de la 
universidad, porque empezaron a cambiar las autoridades. Y algunas autoridades empezaron a darse cuenta de 
que el proyecto era un inconveniente político para su proceso, de los adecos y los copeianos, no? Llegó un 
rector que eliminó practicamente la televisora de aquí... cambió todo, se llevó todo para otro sitio...”
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had just received an angry call from an official in the national government. Blanco played down the  
involvement  of  TV Caricuao and  the  repercussions were  minor,  but  the incident  illustrates  how  TV 
Caricuao walked a fine line between fulfilling the original vision of the project and destabilizing its  
tenuous perch on the margins of puntofijista civil society.
The  precariousness  of  the  project  was  exacerbated  by  financial  conditions.  The  university  
provided the fundamental stability by paying Blanco's salary, maintaining the studio and office space,  
and, at least initially, supplying the basic audiovisual equipment. Functioning as a unit of CEPAP required  
TV Caricuao to emphasize the educational aspects of the project, which primarily meant structuring their  
productions in such a way as to fit into the university's curriculum. One of the primary results was that TV 
Caricuao regularly held workshops that would earn credit for university students but were also open to  
community members. The group also devoted considerable attention to documenting the results of their  
work, in the form of both paper-based reports that went to administrators and a well organized archive of  
all of their video productions that remains today as perhaps TV Caricuao's greatest contribution to the  
community.
During the crisis of the 1980s, however, resources for production grew scarce and the participants  
found it necessary to pool their own money, hold raffles, or otherwise raise funds outside the university  
structure.  In  the  80s,  TV Caricuao  obtained annual  funding  from  the  National  Council  of  Culture  
(Consejo Nacional de la Cultura / CONAC) (de Stefano 2011).219 In perhaps 1989 or 1990, TV Caricuao 
brought a proposal to the Ministry of Youth Affairs ( Ministerio de la Juventud) for a series of workshops 
that  would  be  geared  toward  adolescents  and  accredited  by  CEPAP.  Blanco  emphasizes  that  this  
accreditation was key to gaining Ministry funds as well as participation: “For the people that did the  
training, that wanted to work in media, community or not, it was better to come do a workshop here, that  
was going to have a certificate from a university [that would let them say] 'Look, I studied with the  
219I was unable to verify whether this funding was channelled through the NAC.
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[UESB]...' It gave them prestige.” 220 In other words, the imprimatur of the university once again created  
space  within  the  puntofijista system that  would  not  have  been  available  to  other  community  media  
initiatives with similar ideological perspectives.
The  youth  workshops,  which  TV  Caricuao facilitated  once  or  twice  a  year,  became  the  
organization's primary funding source, providing work to participants and allowing the acquisition of  
equipment  that  could  be used outside of  the workshops.  Blanco recalled,  however,  that  there was a  
significant downside to this mode of operation:
[The project] began to lose that first organizational form. A group of people ended up  
inside the television station, they were no longer from groups from different community  
experiences, it  was more like a group of people that remained devoted...  Some twenty  
people, perhaps... The organization no longer came from the small organizations, now it  
was an organization that was under the same plan. Now the group was the television  
station. That took away a certain beauty from the beginning. 221
What Blanco seems to be lamenting here is  a loss of structural articulation with the community.  TV 
Caricuao remained oriented toward the community, in the sense that it continued to record community  
activities and make its equipment available to community groups, but its active membership was now  
primarily focused on the internal operations of the organization, including producing the youth and other  
workshops,  documenting the results,  and assuring the continuance of funding.  TV Caricuao,  in other 
words, had to a certain extent ceased being a means and had become an end. Instead of  facilitating the  
work of outside groups, it focused on its own operations. It was now less of the community than at the  
service of the community. This problematic would become endemic to Venezuelan community media  
initiatives following the rapid growth of the sector during the first half of Chávez's presidency, and we  
should take special note of the link that Blanco draws between it and the organization's dependence on  
220“Para la gente que hacía cursos de formación, que quería trabajar en un medio, comunitario o no, era mejor 
venir a hacer un taller aquí, que iba a tener un certificado de una universidad [que le permitiera decir] 'Mira, 
yo estudié con la Simón Rodríguez...' Le daba prestigio.”
221“[El proyecto] comenzó a perder esa primera forma organizativa. Un grupo de gente se quedó dentro de la 
televisora, ya no eran de los grupos de las diferentes experiencias comunitarias, sino más bien era un grupo de 
gente que se quedó militando... Unos veinte personas, sería... La organización ya no partía de las 
organizaciones pequeñas, sino que ahora era una organización que estaba dentro de la misma plan. Ahora el 
grupo era la televisora. Eso le quitó cierta hermosura del comienzo.”
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government funding for the workshops. We would do well, however, to hold off on an analysis of this  
issue until we have made a more thorough review of the sector's history. 
In  Venezuela,  as  elsewhere,  print  had  long  been  the  primary  communicative  medium  for  
marginalized political projects, and Venezuela's leftist parties continued to produce newspapers through  
the  1970s.222 Towards  the  end  of  this  decade,  however,  community  organizers  influenced  by  leftist  
ideologies began producing alternative newspapers as vehicles for their efforts. Capriles (1981) provides a  
sense  of  their  scope  and  impact  during  this  period  when  he  mentions  “the  proliferation  of  printed  
periodicals from barrios or urban zones, dedicated to specific problems and the defense of the interests of  
their inhabitants. Some of these publications have print qualities, print runs, and distribution patterns that  
make them true newspapers” (160).223 Details  of most of these papers are  absent from the historical  
record, presumably due to the familiarity, low cost, and discardable nature of the medium. 224
The most well known of these early community papers, at least contemporarily, is La Vega Dice, 
which  was founded in September 1979 as  the “mouthpiece” (vocero)  of  a  local  neighborhood labor 
organization.  By  1981  it  was  aligned  with  three  other  community  groups  (and  no  longer  the  labor  
222Beginning a historical survey of Venezuelan participatory media in the late 1960s leaves aside a long history of 
the alternative press associated with parties, unions, and other political and social movements. It is not 
uncommon for those in the Bolivarian community and alternative media sector to stretch their lineage back to the 
revolutionary press that facilitated the struggle for independence in the early 19th century (see Grases 1967). 
One such example can be found in the preamble to the proposed Law of Communication of Popular Power (Ley 
de Comunicación del Poder Popular) that will be discussed at length in chapter 5. This rhetorical maneuver 
dovetails with the Bolivarian discourse more generally. Since 2009, for example, the government has published 
and widely distributed, a newspaper called El Correo del Orinoco (The Orinoco Mail), which was the name of a 
newspaper founded by Simón Bolívar in 1818.
As one might expect, chavista accounts of participatory media in the puntofijista period tend to 
emphasize the clandestine initiatives that were repressed by the government of the Fourth Republic, at the 
expense of projects carried out in association with the Catholic church or legitimated civil society organizations. 
As for the party newspapers of the left in the 1970s, Morales (2004, 43) lists the Tribunal Popular (Popular 
Tribune) of the PCV, Punto (Point) of MAS, Triunfo Socialista (Socialist Triumph) of The People Advance (El 
Pueblo Avanza / EPA), and Basirruque of the Socialist League (Liga Socialista).
223“la proliferación de órganos periódicos impresos de barrios o zonas urbanas, dedicados a problemas  
específicos y a la defensa de los intereses de sus habitantes. Algunas de estas publicaciones tienen 
características de impresión, tirada y distribución que las convierten en verdaderos periódicos.”
224At least two early community newspapers are specifically mentioned in academic accounts, though their 
ideological affinities are unspecified: El Tiempo de Caricuao (The Caricuao Times), which was produced for 
some period of the 1970s (Morales 2004, 43); and La Panela Ilustrada (Panela Illustrated), which appeared in 
San Joaquín (Carabobo) in 1981 (Castro & Rojas 2004, cited in Leal 2007, 57). (Panela can refer to a type of 
raw sugar and also a traditional Venezuelan citrus drink sweetened with it.)
202
organization), with the staff aspiring “to become definitively the mouthpieces [sic] of all the popular  
sectors of La Vega” (La Vega Dice 1981, 22). 225 Members of the collective were politically active in the  
community  beyond  their  work  on  the  paper,  winning  “several  elections  in  the  unions  and  local  
government” and participating in advocacy campaigns. Some of them continued to work in culturally  
focused community organization after the paper ceased publishing (Fernandes 2010, 61). 226
While the  La Vega Dice staff may have lived and/or worked in the community, it  was not a  
community  newspaper  in  the  sense  that  it  focused  on  providing  access  so  that  all  members  of  the  
community could participate in the production process. In its first years, at least, the staff employed a  
professionalized division of labor and organized its  reporting into three categories:  “labor” ( laboral), 
“neighborhood” (barrial), and “culture-sport” (cultural-deportiva).  There was a strong tendency toward 
explicitly politicized “exposés” (denuncias) of corruption and neglect. The workers viewed the paper's  
function in relation to the community as primarily “didactic” ( didáctica) and there was clearly something 
of a vanguardist sentiment in this posture: “...our newspapers are directed to the popular sectors and these  
popular sectors are mainly constituted by [individuals from] marginal classes, our principal duty is that of  
educating, since the members of these sectors, in their majority, lack an adequate level of education...”  
(23).227 Nonetheless,  in  a  reflective piece published after  the first  two years  of publication, the staff  
articulated their awareness of a need for changes that are directly in line with the broader shift in leftist  
media praxis that had marked the previous decade across Latin America.
225“convertirnos definitivamente en voceros de todos los sectores populares de la Vega”
226Fernandes does not state when La Vega Dice stopped publishing.  The group had begun with 25 people but 
“continuous desertions” (continuas deserciones) had left an active staff of only “six or seven” by late 1981. By 
that time the group had published fourteen editions of sixteen pages each, including photos but not 
advertisements, on an irregular schedule. Using two different offset printing houses, it had run 2,000 copies of 
the first eleven editions (in black and white), 5,000 of the twelfth and thirteenth (black, white, and red), and 
3,500 of the fourteenth (color scheme not specified). It sold the paper (cost not specified) within labor unions and 
by canvassing the neighborhood [sistema de batidas], and was self-financed, though it had initially received 
support from foundations and by organizing a raffle, and at one point had received “money from Peru” (dinero 
de Perú) (La Vega Dice 22).
227“nuestros periódicos están dirigidos a los sectores populares y estos sectores populares están constituidos en su  
mayoria por [individuos de] las c1ases marginales, nuestro principal deber es el de educar, debido a que los 
integrantes de esos sectores, en su mayoría, carecen de un adecuado nivel de educación...”
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These changes built  on the paper's  ongoing shift  from a somewhat  exclusive focus on labor  
toward the inclusion of class issues more widely,  and in this regard the staff  called for “a profound  
reflection on what popular culture  truly is”,  with a recognition that it  can not be simply reduced to  
“autochthonous” (autóctonas) dance and music, but must encompass the lived experiences of daily life.  
Beyond this shift in content, however, the staff called for a shift in the very conception of alternative  
media, in which “[t]he popular newspaper must abandon its role of being only a point of reference to  
become an organizer and promoter of the unity of the people”. 228 This would involve, on one hand, “a true  
participation of the masses in the newspaper”, and on the other, “the creation of more popular newspapers  
in  other  parishes  and  …  a  very  close  relationship  with  them  and  those  already  existing”  (25). 229 
Envisioning participation in this way – as fundamental to a popular media system – invoked the counter-
hegemonic mode of community media discourse and suggested, however rudimentarily, the need for a  
Gramscian civil society.230
Such were the types of participatory media projects that emerged from the Venezuelan left in the  
late 1970s. Already in that period, however, and somewhat more frequently in the 1980s, community and  
alternative media projects began to emerge unattached to either an overt political project or the Jesuit  
order, which is to say that they emerged within the mainstream liberal civil society that was legitimated  
by  the  puntofijista framework.  The  first  such  example  is  the  unique  but  precedent  setting  case  of  
Teleboconó, an alternative regional television station in the small town of Boconó (Trujillo) that began  
broadcasting in 1979.
228“[e]l periódico popular debe abandonar su papel de ser unicamente un polo de referencia para convertirse en 
un organizador y promotor de la unidad del pueblo”
229“una verdadera participacion de las masas en el periodico”; “la creación de más periódicos populares en otras 
parroquias y ... una vinculación muy estrecha con ellos y los ya existentes”
230I do not mean to oversell this particular case. La Vega Dice's formulation of participation as a conversion of the 
“masses” from mere “receptors of a particular message” into “individual emitters of a response” remains tethered 
to the transmission model of communication and offers only a simple feedback model of participation. 
Moreover, there is admittedly something of a gap between a fuzzy “relationship” among individual newspapers 
and a systemic model. We might best see these statements as evidence that the shift in terrain which has marked 
the last half century of participatory media praxis is (because still ongoing) tectonic in both scale and pace.; 
“receptores de un mensaje determinado”; “individuos emisores de una respuesta”
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Teleboconó was conceived by Pablo Miliani, an electrical engineer, frigate captain, and airplane  
pilot who went on to serve as Minister of Communications during the Betancourt administration and then  
in the Venezuelan Senate  (Gohla 1995, 3; Capriles et al. 1989, 162). 231 Upon retiring to his home town of  
Boconó (Trujillo), a smallish agricultural center at the northeastern end of the Andes, Miliani “discovered  
a different city. The traditional characteristics of a resident of Boconó, attentive, religious, caring, and  
respectful,  weren't  those  that  stood  out  in  much  of  the  town's  youth”  (161). 232 Miliani  brought  his 
concerns to town leaders, such as Miriam Zambrano, president of the town's cultural center ( Ateneo de  
Boconó), who were likewise concerned about academic apathy and drug use among young people (Goyo  
et al. 1986, 47). They decided to address these issues by establishing a participatory media project. Most  
saw a newspaper or radio station as more feasible, but Miliani believed that young people would be most  
drawn to television and persuaded the others to move forward with the idea. 233
Miliani obtained a three-month experimental television license from the Ministry of Transport  
and  Communications  (Ministerio  de  Transporte  y  Comunicaciones)  and  built  a  rudimentary  studio,  
including a 3 watt transmitter, in his house. Success at this level was convincing and in March of 1978  
Miliani and eight representatives of the commercial and cultural sectors of the city registered the non-
profit Boconesa Cultural Television Foundation (Fundación Televisora Cultural Boconesa) (Capriles et 
al. 163, 167).234 Miliani oversaw the construction of an addition to his own house and donated much of  
231Unless otherwise indicated, all information and quites pertaining to Teleboconó is drawn from Gohla.
232“una ciudad diferente. Aquellas características del boconés, atento, religioso, cariñoso y respetuoso, no eran las 
que sobresalían en muchos jóvenes del pueblo.”
233Miliani recognized that young people “hardly read” (apenas leen) and believed they would not have the attention 
span to take in “an entire speech or talk” (todo un discurso o una charla) via radio (Capriles et al. 161). There is 
reason to believe, however, that the choice had a personal component, as well. In 1933, while still a boy, Miliani 
had constructed a radio transmitter and he considered himself a “communications fanatic” (fanático de las  
comunicaciones) (162). As an electrical engineer, ship captain, and private pilot, he would have had much 
experience with radio transmission, but at one point in the 1950s he had been forced to seek protection from the 
dictatorial regime in the studios of Televisa, Venezuela's first commercial television station. He spent several 
days mingling with the staff and talent, “thus awakening his interest in television” (despertando esto su interés 
por la televisión) (ibid.). Later, upon retiring in Boconó, Miliani agreed to oversee the national public 
broadcaster's local transmission equipment. One can imagine that a desire to experiment with new technologies 
contributed to Miliani's enthusiasm for creating a television station.
234I am following Capriles et al. (1989), who place the establishment of the Foundation in 1978 and the first 
broadcast in 1979. Gohla states that the Foundation itself came into existence in 1979, whereas Castro & Rojas 
(2004, cited in Delgado & Geurrero 2008, 19) place the first broadcast in 1977 and Aponte (2005, 76) gives 1968 
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the  funding  for  state-of-the-art  production  and  broadcasting  equipment.  From  the  beginnings  of  its  
operation,  Teleboconó used computers for data processing and graphic design, with later models being  
used for effects. It was also the first television station in Venezuela to broadcast in color and owned a  
mobile production truck for field recording ( ibid., Goyo et al. 49-50).
Miliani's  primary  focus  was  on  the  experience  of  the  young  people  involved. 235 In  order  to 
participate, they had to maintain good grades. In addition to experiential training in television production  
and administration, Teleboconó offered assistance with school work as well as instruction in computers,  
chess, and folk and orchestral music. The station sponsored a traveling chess team and a local orchestra,  
with some members of the latter going on to play in national orchestras (Capriles et al. 165, Gohla 5). The  
studio space in Miliani's house was open from early in the morning until late at night and the young  
people could “come and go when they like” (3). In the late 80s there were over 100 participants ranging in  
age from six to twenty (Capriles et al. 164). 236 They were not paid for their work, nor did they formally  
belong to the Foundation, although they were kept informed of its decisions (165, 167).
As for programming, the station placed “primordial importance on  the cultural, athletic, and  
social activities of the locality and region”, which were often hosted by partner organizations such as the  
Municipal  Council,  cultural  center,  or  the  Tiscachic  Center  for  Rural  Services  ( Centro  de  Servicios  
Campesinos  Tiscachic),  among  others  (50,  Capriles  et  al.  161). 237 The  production  process  was  not 
rigorously  planned;  “[t]he  production  team  conceives  and  manages  ideas  as  it  goes”  and  “[t]he  
programming block is determined the same day, before going to air... according to the available material  
and/or the criteria of the transmission director on duty”  (Goyo et al. 50-1). 238 By all acounts, Teleboconó 
as the initial year of the project.
235Teleboconó continues to operate today, but its value here is as an example of an early participatory media project 
in the liberal mold. This description of its practices, having been drawn from sources no more recent that 1995, 
does not speak to its current mode of operation.
236In 1995, Gohla reported that over 200 young people, ranging in age from six to sixteen, were “connected to the 
TV station in one way or another” and that “almost 300” had been “formed by the TV station throughout 16 
years” (3-4). 
237“importancia primordial a las actividades culturales, deportivas y sociales de la localidad y e la región”
238“[e]l equipo de producción concibe y maneja ideas sobre la marcha”; “[l]a pauta de programación se elabora el 
mismo día, antes de salir al aire... de acuerdo al material disponible y/o al criterio del director de Transmisión 
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was committed to maximizing the quality of its productions within the limits of its resources, but many  
were transmitted on the same day of  their  recording with no post-production and, in  any case,  “the  
images, in general, present defects. Lack of lighting, framing, little stability, are their frequent problems”  
(Goyo et al. 51).239 Some programs were shot in the studio, including one called  Teleagro, which was 
oriented toward agricultural issues and was produced by a volunteer who worked as an “agricultural  
technician” (técnico agropecuario) (Capriles et al. 166).
During its first decade or so, Teleboconó broadcast on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays from 6 
to 11 pm, with the one kilowatt signal reaching only a local area (Goyo et al. 49-50). The station was  
unable to produce sufficient material to fill this schedule, however, and relied on cultural and educational  
content provided by foreign embassies, universities, and the National Television Station of Venezuela  
(Televisora Nacional de Venezuela / TVN), which was the smaller of the country's two public television  
stations (Capriles et al. 166). The latter of these provided over sixty percent of Teleboconó programming 
during the mid 80s (Goyo et al. 50). Miliani prohibited the transmission of  telenovelas because their 
content was not  “at  the required cultural  level”,  preferring instead to  air  foreign theater  productions  
(ibid.). Nor did the station produce news programs, due to a lack of “sufficient informative material in the  
city”, and Miliani was also intent on avoiding “any manifestation or activity of a political bent”, which  
meant that opinion programs were not allowed (51). 240 Politicians, meanwhile, were “not allowed to talk  
about other politicians in bad terms, and they ha[d] to explain in what way, and how they would carry out  
and realise their programmes” (Gohla 4).
In addition to the resources provided by Miliani himself, Teleboconó received donations from  
private parties, cultural organizations, and government entities. As of the mid-80s, the Boconó Municipal  
[sic] de turno.”
239Capriles et al. are more sanguine, noting that the productions have “a technical quality that can stand up to the 
commercial channels” (una calidad tecnica tal que nada tienen que envidiarle a los canales comerciales)(165).; 
“las imágenes, por lo general, presentan fallas. Falta de iluminación, de encuadre, poca estabilidad, son sus 
problemas frecuentes.”
240“no está al nivel cultural requerido”; “suficiente material informativo en la ciudad”; “cualquier manifestación o 
actividad de corte político”
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Council (Consejo Municipal de Boconó) and the Trujillo Governor's Office (Gobernación del Estado  
Trujillo) were each providing 2,000  bolívares  (Bs) per month (Goyo et al. 48), and by the late 1980s  
CONAC was providing regular funding (Capriles et al 167). 241 Throughout the 1980s, Teleboconó did not 
accept advertising, which Miliani saw as oriented toward consumerism and “against the principals that  
they profess and desire to inculcate in the youth” (ibid.), although it would publicize upcoming events at  
the cultural center and also produced short segments acknowledging donations from businesses (166,  
Goyo et al. 50).242
Beyond  local  community  members  who  volunteer  at  the  station  or  appear  in  its  programs,  
Teleboconó has incorporated the participation of adults  in  several  ways.  They obtained feedback via  
unsolicited telephone calls (which were apparently not aired live) and by conducting periodic surveys  
(Capriles et al. 168). They also collaborated with various Venezuelan universities, who sent researchers  
and/or interns working in the fields of communication, engineering, and education (166).
As for the viewing public, one survey of 295 residents of Boconó conducted in 1986 found that  
three percent  watched the station “often” (a menudo),  26 percent “sometimes” (a veces),  19 percent 
“rarely” (rara vez), and 52 percent “never” (nunca), with those from 12 to 21years old and those over 50  
more likely to view the station. Among those who viewed the channel, the most appreciated element was  
the cultural and educational programming (18 percent), followed by the transmission of local activities  
(12 percent). Other responses included that it belonged to Boconó (4 percent) and that it was participatory  
(2 percent). The implication, therefore, appears to be that  Teleboconó productions were somewhat less 
appreciated than the material brought in from elsewhere (Goyo et al. 53-4).
After a decade of operating very efficiently on an extremely tight budget, Teleboconó entered into 
a partnership that would both ease its budgetary constraints and significantly expand the reach of  its 
signal. At the time Teleboconó obtained its license in 1978, Venezuela had two public and two private 
241Capriles et al. attribute the funding to “Comision de Cultura del Consejo Nacional”, which I understand to mean 
the Comisión Nacional de Cultura (CONAC).
242“contra los principios que profesan y que desean inculcar a la juventud”
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commercial broadcasters, all based in Caracas and transmitting across more or less national networks. The  
private stations, Venevisión and Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV), operated with licenses that had been  
approved in the 1950s,  belonged to two of  the country's  most powerful  conglomerates,  and wielded  
hegemonic  cultural  influence.  The  Venezuelan  government  approved  multiple  regional  licenses  
throughout  the  1980s  but  none  covered  Caracas  until  1988,  when  Televen emerged  as  a  national 
competitor to the two giants. Even after an initial capital outlay of 400 million Bs, some of which went  
toward  a  national  network  of  nineteen  signal  repeaters,  Televen had  significant  catching  up  to  do 
(Hernández 1999, 33-4).  This was the context for the agreement it reached with Teleboconó.
The details are not entirely clear, but  Teleboconó gained four repeaters, transforming it from a  
local to a regional channel that covered “most of the western part of Venezuela”, with the potential to  
reach  “more  than  2.5  million  people”.  At  some  point  following  this  expansion,  the  station  began  
broadcasting every weekday from 4 pm to 10 pm, increasing its weekly transmissions from 18 to 30  
hours, and Televen began using the broadcast network when Teleboconó was not on the air. 243 “In return, 
Televen maintain[ed]  the  technical  equipment,  finance[d]  the  depreciation  of  the  equipment  and  
provide[d] technicians and engineers in urgent cases, free of charge” (Gohla 4).
We have reviewed the structure and operations of  Teleboconó at some length in order to better 
analyze its role in the structure of Venezuelan civil society. Capriles et al. classify Teleboconó as “one of 
the best examples of communicational democracy known until now” (160), but also point out that the  
project fails to establish “massive connection” (168) within its community. 244 In this regard, they note that 
the foundation, which embodied the legally recognized decision-making authority of the station, was  
limited to nine members and that no more were desired “due to the fear that they would want to change  
[the station's] orientation or that it would acquire a political-partisan profile” (168). This recognition can  
help us analyze what is meant by “massive connection”, or articulation, in the context of participatory  
243The six hour broadcasting day was divided into three two hour blocks, with the first catering to children, the 
second to adolescents, and the last to adults (Gohla 3). I do not know if a similar division was employed 
previously, when the broadcasting day was five hours.
244“unos de los mejores ejemplos de democracia comunicacional conocidos hasta ahora”; “vinculación masiva”
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media and civil  society.  In terms of meaning-making, the station serves as a channel of articulation,  
connecting viewers to a proscribed set of cultural activities, as well as educational opportunities around  
certain  themes.  In  terms of  the decision-making process  that  determined the  station's  articulation  of  
meaning-making, however, there was indeed a lack of “massive connection”, or articulation, and this  
resulted from the project's  narrow bounds of participation. The primary participants,  of course,  were  
young people,  and their  authority,  already restrained by limited life experience and the social  mores  
associated with their age, was further restricted to tactical decisions within a set of strategic parameters  
determined  by  others,  primarily  Miliani.  This  is  not  to  diminish  his  extreme  generosity,  nor  the  
considerable  merit  of  the  project.  The  station  has  doubtlessly  benefited  many  young  people  while  
providing valuable television content to its  viewers and we must recognize that these,  especially the  
former, were the original motivations of the project. It was successful on its own terms, but we must  
recognize  those  terms  as  belonging  to  the  development  mode  of  participatory  media  discourse  and  
adhering to a liberal model of civil society.
The foundation's conscientious restriction of decision-making authority was attributed to the fear  
that others would either challenge the station's orientation or bend it toward political ends. It is worth  
examining each of these feared outcomes in turn. The station's orientation can be understood generally as 
its focus on young people, but more specifically as its mission to “inculcate” particular values in those  
young people. These values were reflected in the activities available to the participants as well as the  
content of the station's programming, and the parameters of those fields were pre-determined by Miliani  
and the other directors of the foundation. Of the values allowed by those parameters, we might view some  
as conservative. Examples would include the choices to favor traditional and classical music over salsa  
and  rock,  or  foreign  theater  over  telenovelas.  Others,  however,  might  be  deemed  progressive,  with  
examples including a negative view of advertising and consumerism or the encouragement of computer  
use. Of course, not all would agree with these classifications, but that only speaks to the point at hand. In  
terms of measuring the democratic value of a participatory media initiative, what truly matters is not the  
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values or meaning expressed within the content of the media, nor even the degree to which the project  
connects or articulates a community to allow for the flow of that meaning. Both of these are of extreme  
social importance, but the democratic value of a participatory media initiative is a function of the degree  
to  which  it  articulates  a  community  within  a  decision-making  process  that,  in  turn,  determines  the  
parameters  of  meaning-making.  This  point  is  crucial  to  recognizing  the  difference  between  those  
initiatives, like Teleboconó, that embraced the liberal model of civil society, and those, like TV Caricuao, 
that sought a more democratic civil society.
As we have seen, in actual practice, TV Caricuao fell into the same problematic as Teleboconó. 
As Blanco pointed out, by the 1990s, if not earlier, the decision-making authority within TV Caricuao had  
been reduced to a small group of consistent participants. They continued to produce content that accorded  
with  their  progressive,  perhaps  radical  values,  and  they  continued  to  find  ways  to  articulate  some  
segments of the community around that content, thus stimulating a meaning-making process that might  
not otherwise have existed in that area and among those people. Already lost, however, was the “beauty”  
of  the early  days,  when they  experimented with  a  “horizontal”  structure meant  to  articulate  various  
community  groups  within  a  democratic  decision-making  process  that  would  structure  a  collective  
meaning-making initiative (that, in turn, would help articulate a wider community). In this sense,  TV 
Caricuao in the 90s was, in terms of its structure, part and parcel of liberal civil society, even if its content  
expressed marginal or radical values. Crucially, however, Blanco recognized and was frustrated by that  
situation, which he associated with institutional and financial constraints. Teleboconó, on the other hand, 
sought  to  maintain  and  reinforce  its  structural  position  within  liberal  civil  society.  Perhaps  more  
importantly, it sought to reproduce the liberal social order while denying, at least implicitly, that it was  
attached to any political project whatsoever. At work here is the liberal notion that cultural values are  
somehow separate from the larger political economy.
To make this explicit, we can turn back to the second of the foundation's fears,  which was that  
opening up the decision-making process would allow outsiders to give the station a “political-partisan  
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profile”. Assumedly, given the historical context, the fear was that it would become a vehicle for one of  
the leading parties, either AD or COPEI, or perhaps even a more radical position seeking to destabilize  
the  puntofijista order itself. To prevent this, Miliani and the other directors sought to eliminate overt  
political discourse from the station's activities and programming, for example with the prohibition on  
opinion programs. Unacknowledged, however, is that political values were nonetheless manifested by the  
station's structure,  activities,  and programming, and that those values served to  reproduce the liberal  
puntofijista order. This point might have been addressed in debates over the merits of foreign theater  
productions  vis-a-vis  telenovelas,  or  whether  preparing  young  people  to  “become  engineers,  
communicators, scientists and journalists working in the capital of Venezuela” (Gohla 5) is of benefit to  
the  local  community,  but  those  debates  were  never  held,  in  large  part  because  decisions  about  the  
allocation  of  the  radio  spectrum and the  structuration  of  its  control  were  insufficiently  democratic.  
While  admittedly  speculative,  it  seems more  than  coincidental  that  the  only  local  television  
license to be authorized during the first two decades of puntofijismo was awarded to a former Minister of  
Communications and national Senator. Miliani's clout and connections also seem likely to have enabled  
the deal with Televen – one of whose initial investors, Alberto Federico Ravell, had served as director of  
Venezolana  de  Televisión (VTV),  the  country's  largest  public  television  station,  under  the  same  
administration that granted the  Televen license.245 Miliani's status, in other words, seems quite likely to  
have privileged his personal vision of participatory media relative to those held by other members of  
Venezuelan society and it is unlikely that he would have enjoyed that status if his personal values did not  
generally accord with those held by other privileged members of the puntofijista order. This is not to say 
that those values were identical in all cases. After all, Miliani's anti-consumerist stance on advertising  
must  have  been  sharply  at  odds  with  the  owners  of  Televen,  all  of  whom were  heavily  invested  in 
maximizing advertising profits and one of whom – Ravell again – had founded an advertising agency in  
245Hernández (1999, 34) lists Ravell as a Televen investor.
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1980.246 This difference, however, does not seem to have impeded an agreement that proved mutually  
beneficial  to  both projects.  Nor did it  prevent  Miliani from renting mountaintop land, which offered  
advantageous locations for transmission towers,  to both  Venevisión and VTV (Capriles  et  al.  167).247 
These contradictions are not raised in an attempt to insult or indict Miliani, who seems to have been an  
honorable, capable, and dynamic man with an extremely generous nature and true fondness for young  
people. The point, rather, is to illustrate that his vision for Teleboconó did not preclude his facilitation of 
the liberal,  capitalist  media framework supported by the  puntofijista order.  This  recognition, in  turn,  
serves  to  better  delineate  the  distinction  between liberal  and  Gramscian  notions  of  democratic  civil  
society as they manifest in the history of Venezuelan participatory media. 
Construyamos Juntos (Let's Build Together / CJ) was another important Venezuelan participatory  
media initiative that emerged from within the liberal framework. Whereas Teleboconó formed prior to the  
crisis period of the 1980s and later adopted a closer relationship with a commercial media outlet, CJ was  
founded within a commercial newspaper in 1986, as the economic crisis was accelerating toward its nadir,  
and expanded outward to articulate with a wider network of grassroots  organizations. The sponsoring 
newspaper was the  Diario de los Andes (Andes Daily), located in Valera (Trujillo). Raisa Urribarrí, an  
original member of the project and now a researcher specializing in Venezuelan participatory media,  
writes that: 
[t]he city and the state of Trujillo, in general, were at that time a laboratory of thriving  
community organization that required spaces for social interaction, articulation, projection,  
and recognition. The newspaper decided not to turn its back on that reality and dedicated  
itself to attending to these sectors as an act of corporate social responsibility. (2007, 8) 248
246Ravell's father was a journalist and politician who was twice exiled for opposing Venezuelan dictators. The 
younger Ravell also worked as a journalist before serving as media director for Carlos Andrés Pérez's first 
presidential campaign in 1973. Ravell was then appointed to a post within the first Pérez administration and also 
served as media director for an unsuccessful candidate in the 1977 election. He sold his share of Televen soon 
after it was founded, but returned to television in 1994 as a co-founder and then General Director of Globovisión, 
Venezuela's first 24-hour news channel. Globovisión would become the most ardent anti-Chávez media outlet in 
Venezuela and Ravell himself would become a prominent and controversial opposition figure.
247Due to budgetary constraints, VTV began accepting commercial advertising in the late 1970s. By 1988, public 
funding accounted for only ten percent of VTV's budget (Hernández 1999, 33).
248All quotes from Urribarrí (2007, 2009) are my own translation.; “[l]a ciudad y el estado Trujillo, en general,  
era en ese entonces un laboratorio de pujante organización comunitaria necesitada de espacios de interacción, 
213
The initial plan was to publish four pages of reporting “dedicated to the world of community life” on a bi-
monthly schedule, but the project soon took on a different dimension as those charged with the new  
section decided to move beyond simply “'covering' the community source” and instead facilitate “the  
creation of a newspaper made by community organizations and leaders” (9). 249 Significantly, these staff 
members  had not only “chewed on theories  of  alternative communication,  in  vogue in  the country's  
communication schools in that era” ( ibid.), but were especially motivated by the work of Kaplún who, as  
mentioned above, had ended his Venezuelan exile and published “The Popular Communicator” one year  
earlier.250
Over the course of five years, the CJ model spread throughout the state of Trujillo and was also  
adopted by a commercial newspaper (unaffiliated with Diario de los Andes) in the neighboring state of 
Mérida,  leading  to  a  total  of  22  popular  newspapers  that  operated  within  a  National  Network  of  
Communicators (Red Nacional de Comunicadores / RNC).251 These papers collectively owned a a press 
that was used for their own publication and even to generate a small profit via outside jobs. CJ also  
collaborated with two other groups, El Convite (The Banquet) and Guarura (Bodyguard[?]), to establish 
the “Mario Kaplún” Andean School of Popular Communicators” ( Escuela Andina de Comunicadores  
Populares  “Mario  Kaplún”)  ,  which  received  funding  from the  Venezuelan  Ministry  of  the  Family  
(Ministerio de la Familia) and UNICEF (Urribarrí 2009, 158; personal communication, June 20, 2011).
In conjunction with Teleboconó, CJ and the projects it set in motion clearly signal that throughout  
the 1980s actors and organizations within the privileged sectors of puntofijista civil society (including, in 
this context, the commercial) had become increasingly receptive to the idea of participatory, alternative,  
and  community-oriented  media.  Urribarrí  summarizes  the  interrelated  tendencies  of  this  period  as  
articulación, proyección y reconocimiento social. El periódico [Diario de los Andes] decidió no estar de 
espaldas a esa realidad y se dedicó a atender a estos sectores como un asunto de responsabilidad social 
empresarial.”
249“cuatro páginas dedicadas al mundo de vida comunitario”; “'cubrir' la fuente comunitaria”; “la elaboración de 
un periódico hecho por las organizaciones y líderes comunitarios”
250“masticado las teorías de la comunicación alternativa, en boga en las escuelas de comunicación social del país 
en esa época”
251Assumedly, the papers created the National Network, though that is not explicit in Urribarrí's account.
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follows:
During this stage, which was also marked by the decentralizing impulse that brought the  
election of mayors and governors, the application of participatory community diagnostics  
was promoted as a strategy to capture realities recognized as complex and elusive; critical  
media literacy was stimulated; the need to generate deeper texts, based on research into  
themes proposed for debate, was addressed; the use of fresh language, close to the daily  
life of the audience was advocated, but above all, hard work was put into establishing  
members  of  the  audience,  when  all  was  said  and  done,  as  the  emitters  of  their  own  
messages.  Although  not  in  a  systemic  manner,  some  communication  professionals,  
schools, and research centers engaged alternative media, linking up with its makers, and  
managed to open up a dialogue between activists and academics that, although not exempt  
from difficulties and prejudice, resulted in a mutual enrichment of perspectives. (158-9) 252
These tendencies had two primary catalysts, both of which we have already reviewed. First, prominent  
Venezuelan academics and institutions had played a significant role in the international flourishing of  
participatory communications theory throughout the 70s, thus providing not only the familiarity but also a  
legitimating imprimatur that fueled its acceptance in the 80s. Second, the deteriorating economic and  
political situation of the country had spurred the exploration of new modes of civil society organization  
throughout  society,  not  only  in  relation  to  the  media.  The  convergence  around  participatory  
communications, in other words, was just one manifestation of that greater trend, discussed above, which  
had made the neighborhood movement appear  to  be the inescapable locus of  a  general  convergence  
around community organization.
Recognizing the parallel nature of these processes prompts two important questions. First, we  
should ask if the sense of mounting unity around an alternative media movement was, like the seeming  
unity around the neighborhood movement, covering up very real fault lines that would ultimately lead to a  
sharp divergence. As we will see, this was indeed the case. Before proceeding to that analysis, however,  
252“Durante esta etapa, signada además por el impulso descentralizador que trajo como consecuencia la elección 
de alcaldes y gobernadores, se promovió la realización de diagnósticos comunitarios participativos como 
estrategia para capturar realidades que se reconocían complejas e inasibles; se estimuló la lectura critica de 
medias; se atendió a la necesidad de generar textos más profundos, elaborados con base en la investigación de 
los temas que se proponían para el debate; se abogó por el uso de un lenguaje fresco y cercano a la 
cotidianidad de los destinatarios pero, sobre todo, se trabajó arduamente porque fueran estos, a fin de cuentas,  
los emisores de sus propios mensajes. Aunque no de manera sistematica, algunos profesionales de la 
comunicación, escuelas y centros de investigación se ocuparon de lo alternativo, vinculándose con sus 
hacedores, y se logró entablar un diálogo entre activistas y académicos que, aunque no exento de dificultades y 
prevenciones, redundó en un mutuo enriquecimiento de perspectivas.”
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we should also ask what role the largely middle class neighborhood movement played in the sphere of  
participatory communications. The historical record suggests that it was rather restricted.
Most accounts of Venezuelan participatory media in the  puntofijista period do not mention the 
neighborhood movement at all, suggesting that its real impact was slight. Nonetheless, its leaders were  
quite familiar with the idea of community media. In a document entitled “The Possible Utopia” ( La 
Utopía Posible) and partially reprinted in its “Neighbor's Manual”,  the  Escuela included the following 
among the components of an ideal “community project stemming from neighborhood organization”:
A community with a self-managed artistic and athletic expression... With entertainment  
media that  disseminate  information  and promote critical  awareness  and participation...  
Local theaters, cultural houses,  cineclubes,  poetry readings and groups...  A community 
where the diffusion of information and the exchange of opinions is accessible to those who  
choose to participate: local or interest oriented newspapers and bulletins; community radio  
stations with programming that responds to the needs of the neighbors; bulletin boards,  
murals, walls for free expression, mailboxes, video and film clubs; informational centers  
with  publications  and  computers....  Local  television  with  public  monitors,  cable  or  
conventional  but  produced  and  programmed  by  local  groups  and  cooperatives  of  
communicators, part of a process of community organization... Communication as a real  
process,  without  monopolies  or  manipulations,  with  networks  of  information  between  
organized communities. (Santana 148-50)253
Further  along,  however,  after  reiterating  that  “possibilities  for  local  radio  stations...  cable  television  
service... [and] weekly newspapers or bi-monthly magazines with high print runs and broad diffusion are  
real”, the manual acknowledges that “[t]hey need greater organization and coordination on the part of [the  
national  coordinator]  of  local  neighborhood  associations”  and  are  only  “among  the  plans  of  the  
movement” (168).254 In an enumeration of what had already been accomplished by existing associations,  
253All quotes from Santana are my translation.; “proyecto de comunidad a partir de la organización vecinal”; “Una 
comunidad autogestionada en su expresión artística y deportiva… Con medios al servicio de la distracción que 
difundan información y promuevan la criticidad y la participación.... Teatros locales, casas de la cultura, cine-
clubes, recitales y grupos de poesía… Una comunidad donde la difusión de información y el intercambio de 
opiniones esté al acceso de quienes se lo propongan: periódicos y boletines zonales o por temáticas; radios 
comunitarias con programación adecuada a la exigencia de los vecinos; carteleras, murales, paredes de 
expresión libre, buzones, clubes de video y cine; centros de publicaciones y de información por computador.... 
Una televisión local con monitores públicos, por cable o convencional pero realizada y programada por las 
agrupaciones locales y por empresas cooperativas de comunicadores, parte del proceso de organización 
comunitaria.... Una comunicación como proceso real, sin monopolios ni manipulaciones, con redes de 
información entre las comunidades organizadas.”
254“las posibilidades de radios locales... servicios de televisión por cable... periódicos semanarios o revistas  
quincenales de alto tiraje y difusión son reales”; “[n]ecesitan de mayor organización y coordinación por parte 
de Asovecinos de sectores  vecinos”; “entre los planes del movimiento”
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the manual mentions attempts “to establish a clear and direct relation between the representatives and the  
represented  inside  the  organization,  through  public  board  meetings,  the  publication  of  informative  
bulletins,  and  partial  consultations  for  decision-making”,  as  well  as  “experiences  with  local  media”,  
which are defined as “flyers, posters, bulletins, newspapers, banners, murals, pamphlets, megaphones, or  
events themselves” (139, 168).255 One of the more consolidated associations in Caracas, the Community  
Integration Movement (Movimiento de Integración de la Comunidad / MIC) representing the Chuao and 
Cafetal  urbanizaciones,  sometimes  employed  murals  within  campaigns  around  issues  such  as  the  
preservation  of  green  spaces,  but  “they  were  not  considered  an  important  part  of  the  Movement”  
(Rodríguez et al. 124-5).256
The manual does note that “[t]he neighborhood press is especially developed” (139) and in 1984  
various associations formed the Venezuelan Association of Neighborhood Press ( Asociación Venezolana  
de Prensa Vecinal), which “groups the teams that write and produce community bulletins and newspapers,  
to lower costs, improve quality, reflect on form and content, or train 'neighborhood reporters'” (160). 257 In 
the  same  year,  FACUR  began  publishing  a  magazine  called  “Comunidad”  (Community)  which  
republished some of the content from neighborhood newspapers (Montes de Oca et al. 1989, 98-9). While  
making  no  claim  to  being  comprehensive,  one  review  of  the  press  organs  associated  with  the  
neighborhood movement lists thirteen periodicals (100-1). Of those, all but two were published within the  
Caracas metropolitan area and only three were produced by individual neighborhood associations. 258 Two 
255“establecer una relación clara y directa entre los 'representantes y los representados dentro de la organización, 
por medio de reuniones públicas de la directiva, la edición de boletines informativos y consultas parciales para 
la toma de decisiones”; “experiencias con medios de comunicación local”; “los volantes, afiches, boletines,  
periódicos, telas, pancartas, carteles, murales, folletos, el megáfono o los eventos en sí mismos”
256“no son considerados parte importante dentro del Movimiento”
257The manual also references the 1984 inauguration of an Escuela affiliated Neighborhood Information Center 
(Centro de Información Vecinal) (161), and Urribarrí (2009) notes the existence of a “Good News Agency” 
(Agencia de Buenas Noticias), which was national in scope and also attached to the Escuela (158).; “[e]special 
desarrollo tiene la prensa vecinal”; “agrupa a los equipos que elaboran y producen boletines y periodicos 
comunitarios, para abaratar costos, mejorar la calidad reflexionar sobre forma y contenido o formar 
'periodistas vecinales'”
258These were: “La Voz del Vecino” (The Neighbor's Voice), published by ASOCHUAO, a neighborhood 
association in Chuao; Alternativa” (Alternative), published by MIC; and “Asopaula”, published by the 
Association of Residents of Santa Paula (Asociación de Residentes de Santa Paula). Of the latter, and without 
offering further details, the authors write that “[i]t has the support of its residents and is actually sectorial, of 
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other  of  the  listed  publications  also  served  particular  neighborhoods  but  were  not  published  by  
neighborhood associations.259 Two of the three neighborhood association papers charged a nominal cover  
price of two bolívares (Bs) in the mid 80s, and one was said to have “a great quantity of advertising”. 260
Though  not  published  by  a  single  neighborhood  association,  we  might  nonetheless  take  El 
Pastoreño as representative of the type of paper that the neighborhood movement aspired to produce. The  
paper emerged in the historic La Pastora parish of Caracas in 1978, during an era when accelerated  
urbanization was converting the zone into what would be termed a barrio. Its subheading defined it as “a 
Newspaper in the Service of the Conservation of La Pastora”, it played a prominent role in the creation of  
the Committee for the Rescue of the Cultural Heritage of La Pastora ( Comité de Rescate del Acervo  
Cultural de La Pastora), and it served as a “mouthpiece” (vocero) of the neighborhood associations of the 
sector  (Villa  et  al.  1989,  132-3). 261 Its  sixteen  to  twenty  pages  of  content  included  coverage  of  the  
neighborhood associations, community news and events, interviews, opinion pieces and editorials. The  
paper played an important role in campaigns to preserve the parish's colonial architecture, to repair streets  
and build a park, and to have a cinema donated for use as a cultural center. It maintained an office for its  
staff  of  twelve  and  had  an  additional  eight  “permanent  collaborators”  ( colaboradores  fijos).  It  was 
published  twice  monthly  with  a  print  run  of  two  thousand  copies  that  were  distributed  in  kiosks,  
bookstores, and community organizations, and the cover price was three bolívares (Bs). Two of the staff 
members were dedicated to managing advertising, but the paper also relied on “community support”  
(apoyo comunal). Due to a lack of funds, El Pastoreño ceased publishing from August of 1985 until May 
of  1987 (134),  when support  from individuals  and  organizations  enabled  it  to  resume,  but  renewed  
elites. It could not be considered 'popular'” (Montes de Oca et al. 100).; “Cuenta con el apoyo de sus residentes y  
es más bien sectorial, de élites. No podría considerarse 'popular'.”
259These were: “El Pastoreño” and “El Hatillano” (see Villa et al. 1989). Where specified, the other periodicals 
listed were published by administrative organizations of the neighborhood movement (FACUR, the Escuela, and 
[apparently] a collective of associations from Maracaibo), university students, or professionals (ostensibly as 
commercial enterprises).
260 Given the steady devaluation of the bolívar during this period, it is worth noting that the issues consulted by the 
researchers were printed in October of 1984 and June of 1986.; “una gran cantidad de publicidad”
261“un Periódico al Servicio de la Conservación de la Pastora”
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financial difficulties forced it to shut down roughly one year later (Montes de Oca et al. 101).
Outside of their ideological orientations, El Pastoreño and La Vega Dice have much in common, 
and their comparison can help us to see why the interests and tactics of popular community organizations  
and neighborhood movement appeared to converge in the 1980s. Crucially, however,  El Pastoreño saw 
itself as representing a community that was threatened from without, and was therefore focused on a  
defensive conservation of traditional values. La Vega Dice, on the other hand, saw itself as representing a  
community that existed on the margins and sought to move closer to the decision-making structures of  
society. The specifics of these projects manifested the general tendencies of two very different social  
projects. As the crisis of the 1980s developed, both of those projects moved on similar terrain and each  
saw community media as a vehicle, but their ultimate goals lay in different directions.
Returning to the question of community media within the neighborhood movement, we should  
note that, as with the movement's activities more generally, there was very little discussion of financing.  
The newspapers mentioned above combined private contributions, sales, and advertising, suggesting a  
privately subsidized commercial  model that  seems inadequate to the movement's  utopian vision. The  
mention  of  “cooperatives”  in  relation  to  television  suggests  both  a  recognition  of  the  greater  costs  
associated with that medium and the potential for its commercial operation, but the reference is vague  
indeed.  In  sum,  there  seems  to  have  been  no  serious  consideration  of  the  political  economy  of  a  
community media system from a movement who saw itself “[i]n a constant war against consumerism”  
(150).262
In 2003, Santana reflected that in the 1970s and 80s “apart from some regional or municipal  
governments, State entities that sponsored media with a community profile did not exist” (Urribarrí 2007,  
2).  Nonetheless,  neighborhood  association  community  newspapers  apparently  received  some  state  
funding  between  1989  and  1992  (Yi  Ng  74),  the  Mario  Kaplún  Andean  School  of  Popular  
Communicators was able to obtain funding from the Ministry of the Family, and CONAC was directing  
262“[e]n guerra constante contra el consumismo”
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some support to cineclubes and TV Caricuao. Given its considerable clout, the neighborhood movement  
might have sought to build on these meager beginnings by advocating for state support of participatory  
and community media among its national level policy proposals, perhaps in partnership with FEVEC, the  
Jesuit organizations, or other groups. Further research is warranted, but the lack of such efforts suggests  
that the movement's liberal conception of a wholly autonomous civil society prevented its leaders from  
envisioning a mode of participatory media production supported by public funds. It might also  simply 
indicate  that  community media was not highly prioritized.  In  either  case,  the movement's  vision  for  
community media was hardly counter-hegemonic.
In  fact,  the  manual's  discussion  of  media  production  is  matched,  if  not  outweighed,  by  
suggestions for working with existing media outlets, thus implying a ready acceptance of Venezuela's  
existent  media system, marked as  it  was by a  feeble  public  and a  hegemonic commercial  sector.  In  
addition  to  the  media  noted  above,  the  movement's  conception  of  “neighborhood  communication”  
includes  “constant  visits  to  private  and government  media”  (153). 263 Even if  this  is  understood as  a 
pragmatic or tactical approach for short-term growth as opposed to an endorsement of a marketized media  
system, the associated suggestions demonstrate an acritical faith in professionalized journalism and a deep  
ignorance  of  privilege  that,  taken  together,  reveal  once  again  the  class-based  assumptions  of  the  
neighborhood movement's model of civil society. The manual explains, for example, that:
if  our action and solicitudes are really  representative of the community sentiment,  we  
should  think  about  diffusion  through the  big  media outlets.  For  that  we also  have  to  
organize, writing up a brief document with 'the news', in other words the objective and the  
causes  of  our  campaign and plans  to  visit  the  information  directors  of  radio  stations,  
newspapers,  and  television  stations.  We  should  facilitate  them  with  all  the  necessary  
support material (photos, maps, legal documents) and make possible their direct visit to  
our community and respect the journalists as professionals, providing all the information  
and the greatest possible collaboration, thanking them for their commentaries or reports...  
[The national institutions of  the neighborhood movement] have discovered part  of the  
dynamic  of  these  information  business  organizations.  Courses  and  consulting  to  train  
neighbors in the creation of “press offices” to develop a policy of disclosure with the  
sending  of  press  releases,  regular,  documentary,  and  photographic  information,  and  
maintaining regular telephone relations with press, radio, and television communicators.  
263“comunicación vecinal”; “constantes visitas a los medios de comunicación privados y gubernamentales”
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(167-8)
Assumed in these suggestions is  that  community  members  would  have  sufficient  education,  cultural  
capital, and resources to gather and create legal documents, photos, and maps; to draft standard press  
releases; to make regular phone calls; and to travel to the offices of media outlets. Also assumed is that  
professional journalists and their managers would not only accept visits and phone calls, but also engage  
in mutually respectful relationships that lead to community visits  and journalism worthy of gratitude. 
These  assumptions  fail  to  account  for  the  lack  of  educational  opportunities  and  public  services,  the  
crushing poverty, and/or the remote location of many barrios and rural villages. They also fail to account  
for the very real possibility of class, race, gender, ethnic, and other prejudices that many professionals  
would bring to their interactions with marginalized communities. The manual underlines this point when,  
in a list describing successful practices, it notes that some associations: “[d]evelop a relationship with  
communications professionals  and the owners and directors of  the media organizations ,  who end up 
being neighbors somewhere and thus more accessible” (139, my emphasis). Suffice it to say, few of the  
owners and directors of commercial media outlets were likely to be neighbors with residents of barrios 
and rural areas.
Also worth noting in this regard is the representation of the neighborhood movement, and civil  
society more generally, within the commercial media. As mentioned above, despite disapproval from  
FACUR leaders, Escuela publicity efforts extended to the production of radio and television shows that  
aired on commercial  media outlets  and were sponsored by business  interests.  At  the same time, the  
commercial media sought to mold and appropriate the conception of civil society that was associated with  
the  neighborhood  movement.  In  1987,  Marcel  Granier,  the  president  of  Radio  Caracas,  which  was 
Venezuela's  oldest  and most  prestigious media conglomerate,  oversaw the publication of a document  
entitled  “More  and  Better  Democracy”  (Más y  Mejor  Democracia),  which  equated  democracy  with 
decentralization and economic liberalization (Ellner 2010, 83-4) and hailed the neighborhood movement  
as “the most important phenomenon to take place in Venezuelan democracy during recent years” (Granier  
221
& Gil Yepes, 1987, 142; cited in Yi Ng 1993, 14). 264 Then, throughout the acute political crisis of the 90s,  
the powerful commercial media favored a more strictly autonomous, neoliberal conception of civil society  
by “establishing a  Manichean opposition between the state  (characterized as  corrupt,  inefficient,  and  
clientelist) and a mythical civil society (which included the media), understood as a synthesis of all virtue:  
creativity, initiative, efficacy, honesty and participation” (Lander 2007, 24). Specifically, in 1992, when a  
package of proposed constitutional reforms raised:
the  possibility  of  some  public  regulations  on  the  media,  a  systematic  campaign  was  
launched by all the entrepreneurial associations of radio, television and newspapers... This  
amazingly aggressive terror campaign made the timid reforms proposed (the right to reply,  
restriction of the monopoly on property and control of the media), appear as a threat to the  
very  existence  of  democracy.  Given  the  premises  on  civil  society  and  democracy  
embedded in the new common sense of the Venezuelan political system, the owners of the  
media identified property rights (private ownership of the media) with individual rights  
(the right of citizens to information), so that any attempt to regulate the media seemed to  
jeopardize the right to information. (Lander 1995, 54-5) 265
While this was not necessarily the attitude of the neighborhood movement or even the  Escuela, such 
rhetoric might have been less readily available and less effective had the neighborhood movement used its  
power to more thoroughly and publicly articulate a vision of civil society that included community media  
as a viable counter-hegemonic alternative.
The  1980s  saw several  participatory  media  initiatives  emerge  within  sectors  of  the  Catholic  
church outside the Jesuit order. The most ambitious of these were two regional television stations, though  
neither  incorporated  a  high  degree  of  community  participation.  Amavisión was  founded  in  1984 by 
264“el fenómeno más importante ocurrido en los últimos años de la democracia venezolana”
265As is well known, Granier would go on to place his media holdings in the service of the coup attempted against 
Chávez in 2002. Throughout the Chávez administration, but especially in the period around the government's 
May 2007 decision to not renew the broadcast license of Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV), the media outlets 
belonging to Radio Caracas and other private companies renewed the rhetoric of the 1992 campaign, though with 
even greater vigor.; “la posibilidad de algun nivel de regulación pública sobre estos medios, se desató una 
campana sistemática coordinada entre todas las asociaciones empresariales de la radio, la televisión y la 
prensa escrita... Con insólita agresividad, se produjo una campana de terror que hacia aparecer las tímidas 
reformas sobre el derecho a la replica y las limitaciones al monopolio de la propiedad y control de los medios de 
comunicación, como una amenaza que ponía en peligro la existencia misma del regimen democrático. Dadas las 
premisas en trno a la sociedad civil y a la democracia que forman parte del nuevo sentido común en el sistema 
político venezolano, los dueños de los medios lograron identificar los derechos de propiedad (la propiedad 
privada de los medios), con los derechos personales (el derecho al acceso a la información por parte de los 
ciudadanos), haciendo aparecer cualquier regulación sobre los medios como un atentado en contra del derecho 
a la información” (Lander 1995, 173).
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Salesian  priests  of  the  Apostolic  Vicariate  of  Puerto  Ayacucho  (Amazonas)  to  provide  educational  
material to indigenous communities.  Niños Cantores TV (Singing Children TV / NCTV), meanwhile, 
grew out of the Singing Children of Zulia Institute ( Instituto Niños Cantores Del Zulia), which had been 
established in 1976 by the Archdiocese of Maracaibo with considerable financial support from the state.  
The institute operated from a campus in Maracaibo that included a music education program for children,  
a teaching farm, an athletic complex, and a university. NCTV was created as a commercial enterprise with  
the Archdiocese of Maracaibo owning a majority share. The television facilities were constructed in 1985  
and the station began broadcasting in 1987 following a contentious licensing process that revealed efforts  
on the part of the main  puntofijista parties to exert control over the station (Valbuena 1986). 266 While 
these projects applied certain elements of participatory praxis, in the final analysis they amounted to  
Church  sponsored  alternative  television  stations,  with  Amavisión adopting  an  advertising-free, 
educationally  oriented  public  service  model  and  NCTV  embracing  a  commercial  model  based  on  
advertising (Alcalá et al. 1989, Pérez et al. 1989, Hernández 1999).
Of  much  greater  import  to  the  development  of  participatory  media  in  Venezuela  was  the  
Experimental Television and Video System (Sistema Experimental de Televisión y Video  / SET-Video), 
which was facilitated by Maryknoll missionaries working in three barrios in the city of Barinas (Barinas).  
The idea for the project took form in 1983 when the missionaries, influenced by the tenets of liberation  
theology and committed “to listening to our communities regarding their necessities, worries, and vision  
of the future”,  responded to “their  petition to  utilize  popular  video as  a constant tool of vindicating  
struggle,  valued popular  culture,  and the collective rediscovery of  their  own common and collective  
history” (Ramírez et al. 1989, 149). 267 Having acquired Betamax cameras and editing equipment, the SET-
266Valbuena persuasively suggests that the executive's reluctance to issue the NCTV license was related, on one 
hand, to a power struggle between Jaime Lusinchi and Carlos Andrés Pérez, and, on the other, to a failed attempt 
by AD and allied business executives to gain a controlling share in the television station. COPEI politicians, 
meanwhile, appeared to have taken advantage of the situation to defend the Church, thus scoring points against 
the administration in power and gaining influence over the station.
267“escuchar a nuestras comunidades respect a sus necesidades, inquietudes y su visión del futuro”; “su petitción 
de utilizar el video popular como una herramienta constante de lucha reivindicativa, cultura popular 
valorizada, y reencuentro colectivo de su propia historia común y colectiva”
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Video team (the missionaries and their local partners) offered a video workshop in March 1985.
The first concrete project to take form was “History of a Process” ( Historia de un Proceso). The 
project emerged in a barrio that had formed when families began building makeshift houses on municipal  
land after they had been displaced from a nearby area. More families soon arrived and what came to be  
known as Las Colinas (The Hills) arose in an area that measured roughly one and a half miles by one-
eighth  of  a  mile  and  had  no  basic  services  beyond  electricity.  At  that  point  the  residents  went  to  
government officials who agreed to provide water service once they legalized and documented their claim  
to the land. The residents followed through but the government did not, so the residents began recording  
their meetings with government representatives who continually promised to provide water. They edited  
these into a chronological compilation and invited the Governor to watch it at a community  videoforo. 
The water system was installed in December of 1986.
Other uses of video that came out of the  SET-Video project included  videoforos  that featured 
documentaries presenting issues related to marginalized peoples across the globe, thus enabling  barrio 
residents to contextualize their own experiences; the use of video in groups known as “Feminine Circles”  
(Circulos Femininos), which created space for women to collectively reflect and act on their experiences  
(see Chirinos et al. 1989); and the creation of a Popular Video Library ( Videoteca Popular) with work 
from other popular communication organizations.  The most ambitious initiative, however,  was called  
“Barrios Also Make News” (Los Barrios También Hacen Noticias) and involved training six teams that  
produced  and  distributed  fifteen  to  twenty  minute  videos  throughout  the  three  barrios.  Each  team 
included a “popular reporter” (reportero popular), a “camera operator” (camarógrafo), and a “diffuser” 
(difusor). The first of these was conceived as not only a reporter, but also a producer, who would keep up  
to date with the events of the  barrio and consult with the “general coordinator of the news program”  
(coordinador general del noticiero) about which stories to cover, as well as the principal editor of the  
segment. The camera operator was responsible for the recording equipment and other work “intimately  
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linked to the popular reporter” at all stages of the process. 268 The diffuser, meanwhile, was in charge of  
copying and distributing the finished piece (151).
Particular emphasis was placed on establishing an alternative distribution circuit that the  SET-
Video team referred to as Channel Zero. This involved the use of cassette players that circulated with the  
diffusers, thus allowing for the videos to be passed around and shown wherever there was a television.  
The diffuser would then moderate the “small forum and interchange of ideas” that followed the screening  
(ibid.).269 The diffusor was also responsible for facilitating further distribution, such as in barrios beyond 
those involved in the project or on regional television stations (152).
Not  all  of  the  barrio residents,  of  course,  were  involved  in  the  production  and  distribution  
processes,  but one survey of residents conducted during the early years of the project found that all  
respondents  were  familiar  with  SET-Video and  believed  that  its  productions  were  beneficial  to  the 
community (154). Significantly, the project was not self-sustaining nor fully self-managed, as it depended  
on financing from the Maryknoll organization, whose local office also served as the project's headquarters  
and post-production facility. Nonetheless,  SET-Video established a workable model for  continuous and 
highly  participatory  audiovisual  production  and  distribution  that  would  influence  later  Venezuelan 
initiatives.
As for the Jesuit institutions, in 1986 CESAP initiated a multi-dimensional project called Catia 
Primero  (Catia  First)  that  was based in  a cultural  center  located in  a  sector  of  Catia  known as  Los  
Magallanes. The center served as a space for classes, workshops, meetings, and other activities, and the  
initiative placed particular emphasis on participatory communication (Hernández 2005, 75). One of the  
results was a community newspaper, also called Catia Primero (Castro y Rojas 2004; cited in Leal 56).  
While there are few published details of this project, further below we will touch on the importance that  
both it and SET-Video played in the growing community and alternative media movement.
268“intimamente ligado al reportero popular”
269“pequeño foro e intercambio de ideas”
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In 1983, IRFA began producing a program called “Popular Saturday” ( Sábado Popular), which 
aired  from  8  am  to  noon  on  Saturdays  and  implemented  a  magazine  format  featuring  news  and  
entertainment that was influenced by “Barrio People”, the earlier IRFA program that had grown out of  
CESAP's literacy initiative in La Vega, and specifically modeled on “From Everyone for Everyone” ( De 
Todos para Todos), a program produced by Radio Occidente. The editorial line of “From Everyone for  
Everyone” was oriented toward individual empowerment and community organization, with segments  
focusing on popular organizations, the church, latin american music, and issues deemed to be of particular  
interest  to  women.  Some  of  the  content,  meanwhile,  emanated  from  the  listeners,  thus  facilitating  
channels  of  popular  interaction,  although access  to  production  and decision-making appears  to  have  
remained restricted.
In 1984, IRFA undertook a significant revision of its literacy and primary education programs in  
1984. Among the more immediate changes was a decision to record some of the educational programs in  
the same communities where they aired, “which permitted a socialization of the work and a verification of  
the people's learning, through following up with the participants and facilitators” (Soto 11). 270 Ultimately, 
however,  this  restructuring process  led IRFA to change its  methodology entirely.  In  1986 it  adapted  
Abrebrecha (Breakthrough),  an  existing  workbook  curriculum  that  used  Freire's  “psychosocial  
methodology” (metodología psicosocial), for use in radio education. This meant that the literacy program  
would now be oriented toward political and social conscientization, and that – in a reverse of IRFA's  
previous process – the students would now begin working with facilitators before listening to any of the 
radio content, which would play a more complimentary role. New facilitators were trained in workshops  
conducted across the country by a small team, several of whose members had benefited from the literacy  
campaign that CESAP had carried out in La Vega in the 1970s (11-12). Meanwhile, the programming  
produced for Abrebrecha focused less on literacy and more on “stimulating dialogue” and “revaluing the  
270“lo que permitía una socialización del trabajo y una verificación de los aprendizajes de la gente, a través de 
haciendo seguimiento a los participantes y facilitadores”
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life knowledge constructed by persons without formal education” (13). 271
IRFA's implementation of  Abrebrecha was not wholly successful. For instance, the newfound  
emphasis on conscientization led to increases in the duration of the facilitator training programs and the  
courses themselves, which may have contributed to an increase in drop-out rates. Significantly, however,  
many within IRFA had not been prepared for, nor disposed to accept, “such a radical methodological  
change” (Rodríguez 1991, 173; cited in Soto 13). This may have been related to two outside reactions.  
One of the businesses that sponsored IRFA “showed its discontent with the name selected, and even with  
some of the readings that appeared in the curriculum”. 272 Meanwhile, the Latin American Association of  
Radiophonic  Education  (Asociación  Latinoamericana  de  Educación  Radiofónica /  ALER),  of  which 
IRFA was an affiliate, “maintained a critical  stance, questioning the possibility of conducting formal  
popular education over the radio” (Soto 13). 273 In the face of these problems, the Abrebrecha methodology 
was abandoned in 1988.
Taken together, these diverse initiatives can help us gain a sense of where the Catholic church  
stood in relation to  participatory media and civil  society in  the 1980s.  Unsurprisingly,  there  was no  
unified stance, but a range of positions manifested in the activities of different sectors of the church. At  
one end was NCTV, which was imbricated in the corporatist  structure of the  puntofijista system and 
willing to merge its public service mission with the capitalist commercial order. Amavisión, meanwhile, 
remained close to the traditional liberal model of public service initiatives that afforded little space for  
public participation in the production process and less still in the decision-making process.  SET-Video, 
Catia Primero, and Abrebrecha, on the other hand, demonstrated that some sectors of the Catholic church  
continued  to  employ  participatory  media  as  a  means  of  facilitating  individual  empowerment  and  
271“estimular el diálogo”; “revalorizando los saberes de vida construidos por las personas no escolarizadas”
272Soto does not elaborate on the reasons why the name inspired this discontent. My presumption is that its 
bellicose connotation (of opening gaps in an enemy line) suggested a militant or revolutionary leftist ideology.; 
“mostró su descontento por el nombre seleccionado, e incluso por algunas de las oraciones que aparecían en la 
cartilla”
273“mantenía una posición crítica, cuestionando la posibilidad de realizar educación popular formal a través de la  
radio”
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community self-management in line with a progressive Christian ethos. The short lifespan of Abrebrecha, 
however, suggests that the institutions facilitating these progressive initiatives were doubly constrained:  
first, by their reliance on support from entities operating within and supportive of the existing political-
economic order; and second, by internal differences and/or misgivings over the extent to which political-
economic power should be invested in civil society organizations controlled at the local level.
It  seems  likely  that  grassroots  participatory  media  initiatives  arose  at  an  accelerated  pace  
throughout the 1980s, though many would have been short lived and undocumented. Of those in the  
historical record, some continued to draw on leftist ideologies, though this influence was unattached to  
explicit political projects and had grown to encompass concerns, such as environmentalism, that were also  
preoccupations  of  more  mainstream  organizations  like  the  neighborhood  associations.  Grassroots  
participatory media projects also continued to emerge from the cineclub movement, which continued to 
provide the most stable framework for Venezuela's nascent community and alternative media sector.
Projects of a militant leftist orientation included the Teatro para Obreros (Theater for Workers / 
T-POS), which emerged in 1984 from within La Vega's Utopia Active Community Group ( Grupo Activo  
y Comunitario Utopía) to present works written, directed, and produced by community members and  
focused on social and cultural issues (Hernández 2005, 76). 274 Also of note is  La Piedrita (The Little 
Stone), a community newspaper that appeared in the late 1980s and continued publishing for eight years.  
La Piedrita was attached to the La Piedrita Working Group ( Grupo de Trabajo La Piedrita), a community 
organization that formed late in 1986 in a barrio called 23 de Enero (January 23 rd) which bears a long and 
proud  history  of  militant  leftist  organization  and  armed  struggle.  In  addition  to  the  newspaper,  the  
Working Group organized an Ernesto Guevara de la Serna brigade, which used cultural activities in its  
social work with young people and was especially dedicated to painting murals in the highest and most  
274Hernández (2005) mentions two other theater groups: a “political and ideological group” (grupo político e  
ideológico) called Metamorfosis-teatro (Metamorphosis-theater) that operated in the 1970s, and Triángulo 
(Triangle), which maintained a site in La Pastora for its “direct and pedagogic-social theater” (teatro directo y 
pedagógico-social) (77). Though vague, his references suggest that these groups worked in a Brechtian mode but 
were not participatory in the sense understood by community media. 
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remote areas of the La Vega barrio (Fernandes 2010, 61-2).
 One popular  organization  that  expanded outwards  from the  cineclub model  was  the  Grupo 
Ombligo de Arte y Cultura Popular (Navel Art and Popular Culture Group), which formed in La Pastora  
in 1981 and operated according to “the principle that art and expression should be in the function of  
neighborhood,  cultural,  and  cooperative  organization  of  the  community”. 275 Its  projects  included  a 
cineclub dedicated  to  Super-eight  and  sixteen  millimeter  films,  a  Super-eight  production  workshop,  
“street  workshops  articulated  in  circuits”,  and  the  “Navel  News  Program of  the  Barrio”  (Noticiero 
Ombligo  del  Barrio),  about  which  the  historical  record  appears,  unfortunately,  to  offer  no  further  
details.276 The  Grupo Ombligo apparently  influenced the formation,  also  in  1981,  of  a  group in  the  
neighboring district of Catia that called itself the  Precooperativa Mixta Taller Escuela Integral Arte y  
Expresión  Comitei  [sic]  (Mixed  Workshop  School  Integral  Art  and  Expression  Precooperative  
Committee).277 In  addition  to  its  cineclub,  the  Precooperativa operated  a  “cinema  cooperative” 
(cooperativa de cine) and a “cooperative news programs” (noticiero cooperativo) (Hernández 2005; 74, 
91).
These two groups influenced participatory media projects in La Puerta (Trujillo), and the latter  
also generated some activity in Las Minas de Baruta (Miranda), but they are of particular interest due to  
their innovations regarding the use of legally recognized organizational structures. The Grupo Ombligo 
promoted  the use  of  the  “cultural  foundation,  which  many years  later  was  the  legal  model  partially  
adopted  by  community  media  organizations”  under  regulations  passed  during  the  Chávez  
275“el principio de que el arte y la cultura deben estar en función de la organización vecinal, cultural y 
cooperativa de la comunidad”
276Hernández does note, tantalizingly, that the Grupo Ombligo “[h]ad as a philosophical reference many concepts 
systematized with Venezuelan freemasonry, which served as a constructing guide for the communication and 
community articulation project as the initiating phase of a universal knowledge of reconciliation with the high 
and sacred” (74). This seems to explain the provenance of the group's name.; “[t]uvo como referencia filosófica 
muchos conceptos sistematizados con la francomasonería venezolana, la cual se sirvió de guía constructora del 
proyecto de comunicación y articulación comunitaria como fase de inicación de un conocimiento universal de 
reconciliación con lo alto y sagrado”; “talleres callejeros articulados en circuítos”
277Hernández does not explicitly state that the Precooperativa was the organization in question; this is my 
interpretation of his account.
229
administration.278 The Precooperativa, meanwhile, experimented with the idea of “cultural cooperatives”,  
a modification of the state sanctioned cooperative model which apparently involved establishing physical  
spaces that would serve as “centers of information and documentation” for more or less loosely affiliated  
teams of artists and facilitators, thus providing an archival and organizational nucleus for autonomous  
initiatives (ibid.).
The Cine Móvil Huayra collective united participatory communication with ecological concerns  
and played something of an articulating role in the 1980s and early 90s. 279 It originated in the late 1970s 
when a student hiking group (grupo excursionista) from the Camurí Grande (Vargas) campus of Simon  
Bolívar University (Universidad Simon Bolívar / USB) began producing radio content and constructing  
radio transmitters (Mujica 2013, 11). In 1980, the group formed a cineclub, called the Cineforo Huayra, 
that sought to combine screenings with audiovisual production (Hernández 2005, 66). This group began  
collaborating with  cineclubes in the state of Lara on ecologically oriented audiovisual production. In  
relation to that project, in 1982 it participated in an unlicensed television broadcast using UHF channel 14  
in  Barquisimeto (100).  In  1986,  some of the participants  separated from the USB hiking group and  
established the Cineclub Móvil Huayra (Huayra Mobile Cineclub) as an “itinerant brigade of community  
production”.280 Cine  Móvil  Huayra (as  it  came  to  be  known)  began  working  with  the  “ecological  
movement that was very strong in Tharma [sic; most likely Tarma (Vargas)]” (Mujica 2013, 11)  and  
“initiated a series of productions on the biogeographic memory of the state of Lara” (Hernández 2005,  
278“fundación cultural, el cual muchos anos despues fue el modelo jurídico adoptado parcialmente por los medios 
comunitarios”
279 Information related to Cine Móvil Huayra is primarily culled from Juan Manuel Hernández's historical account 
of Venezuelan community media (Hernández 2005). The text is poorly organized and lacking in relevant detail to 
the point of being difficult at times to interpret. It nonetheless offers a wealth of information that is unavailable 
elsewhere in print. I have cited it where I find it to be most trustworthy and have noted where I have not been 
entirely certain of my interpretation. The text is especially problematic in relation to Cine Móvil Huayra, 
however, because Hernández was a principal member of that collective. Between the difficulty of the text and the 
potential for Hernández's bias or self interest, it is difficult to judge the validity of his presentation of Cine Móvil  
Huayra as a node within the nascent community and alternative media movement of the 1980s and early 90s. I 
have attempted to present only factual claims and to suggest only the possibility of linkages, even where 
Hernández depicts them in bolder terms. Needless to say, further research is merited.
280“brigada itinerante de producción comunitaria”
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104). It also established a presence in the Los Magallanes barrio of Catia in Caracas. During this period  
the collective made contact with TV Caricuao and the Precooperativa (75). By the late 1980s the group 
had taken on the role of educators in participatory communication (Mujica 2013, 11).
Participatory Media After the Caracazo
In 1988, an observer of the Venezuelan participatory media sector, noting a decade of growth and  
an increasing tendency toward interconnection, might have projected increasing consolidation and the  
birth of a cohesive and self-defined movement. They would not have been entirely wrong, as a movement  
was indeed in the making, but it would not include many of the more prominent and seemingly most  
promising entities then in existence. For, as we have seen, the economic crisis of the 1980s tended to  
accelerate existent tendencies toward civil society organization, especially at the local level, but Pérez's  
reelection and embrace of neoliberalism forced proponents to go one step further and contextualize their  
endorsement of civil society within a more robust vision for a workable political economy, and there were  
three general tendencies. Some saw new forms of civil society as the key to a reorganized corporatist  
structure. Others saw civil society as tethered to the commercial sector within a neoliberal order. Still  
others saw civil society as the mechanism for a more participatory mode of self-governance.
Proponents of participatory media faced this same choice, though they did not necessarily make it  
knowingly. Organizations operating within neighborhood associations shared the fate of the neighborhood  
movement itself, and we have seen that the movement fell into decline following a sharp split in its  
leadership over the issue outlined above. We have also seen how both Teleboconó and Niños Cantores TV, 
each in its different way, accommodated themselves to a position of alterity vis-a-vis the increasingly  
commercialized  media  sector  of  the  neoliberal  order. 281 Of  particular  interest  in  this  regard  is  the  
explanation that Urribarrí (2009) offers for the decline of not only  Construyamos Juntos and  related 
initiatives, but of the entire Venezuelan participatory media sector in the 1990s:
281For reviews of the commercialization of radio in the late 1980s and television in the 80s and 90s, see Bisbal 
(1991) and Hernández (1999), respectively.
231
During the decade of  the eighties,  under  the impact  produced by the so-called “black  
friday”  [when  the  currency  was  drastically  devalued  in  1983],  this  ample  movement  
germinated  and was  fecund,  but  when the  macroeconomic  adjustment  measures  made  
themselves felt  with force in the nineties,  among other factors,  these initiatives began  
losing vigor. As in other countries of the region, the community organizations and NGOs  
that  gave  them  sustenance  and  amplification  began  to  execute  some  social  programs  
convened by the State with multilateral entities, which involved carrying out demanding  
activities of an administrative character. As a consequence of this situation, a great part of  
the time and energies  of the organizations were thrown into this type of work, to the  
detriment of the promotion of programs that had emerged from within them. (159) 282
Her reasoning,  in  other  words,  is  that  the vital  energies  of  a  nascent movement  were sapped by its  
incorporation into a globalizing neoliberal order. We should note here the degree to which her statement  
overlaps with Blanco's comments about the negative effects on TV Caricuao that resulted from its reliance 
on state funding. Taken together, the histories of these various organizations do not seem to suggest that  
participatory media projects are stymied by a particularly neoliberal bureaucracy, as Urribarrí would have 
it, but that it is actually their dependent incorporation into a liberal order (of whichever type) that places 
decision-making authority not in the hands of the communities they are meant to serve, but within a  
system accountable to a political economy controlled by elites (whether they be corporate entities, as in  
puntofijismo, or corporations and those serving their interests, as in neoliberalism).
Supporting this interpretation is the fact that Urribarrí overextends her analysis to the entirety of  
the participatory media sector. While the more prominent liberal participatory media initiatives faded  
away during the 1990s, that decade actually saw the consolidation of a true community and alternative  
media movement. This movement was not entirely devoid of influence from liberal actors, but its most  
vigorous  members  would  prove  to  be  grassroots  organizations  that  had  avoided  forming  dependent  
relationships with any larger institutions. Some of these, especially in Caracas, advanced an explicitly  
282“Durante la decada de los ochenta, bajo el impacto que produjo el llamado “viernes negro”, este amplio 
movimiento germinó y fue fecundo, pero cuando las medidas de ajuste macroeconómico se hicieron sentir con 
fuerza al inicio de los años noventa, entre otros factores, estas iniciativas fueron perdiendo vigor. Como en otros 
paises de la región, las organizaciones comunitarias y ONG que les daban sustento y proyección comenzaron a 
ejecutar algunos programas sociales convenidos por el Estado con los entes multilaterales, lo cual implicó la 
realización de exigentes actividades de carácter administrativo. Como consecuencia de esta situación, gran 
parte del tiempo y de las energías de las organizaciones se volcaron hacia este tipo de trabajo, en desmedro de 
la promoción de programas surgidos de su propio seno.”
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counter-hegemonic, leftist ideology from the outset. Others, however, only formed a political economic  
critique  as  a  result  of  their  participation  within  the  community  and  alternative  media  movement.  
Significantly, these positions were not immediately reconciled within the consolidating movement and led  
to deep fissures that would shape the movement's evolution, as well as related policies and practices of  
the Chávez administration. We can better understand these later developments by first discussing some  
general  tendencies  of  the  sector  during  the  1990s  and  then  examining  the  case  histories  of  several  
important participatory media initiatives.
As Venezuela's economic crisis evolved into a full fledged political crisis during the early 1990s,  
participatory media, especially in Caracas, tended to revert to its earlier association with the political left.  
In fact, despite the aura of legitimation that the neighborhood movement and initiatives like Teleboconó 
had cast on participatory media throughout the 1980s, it  had never fully shaken this association. For  
instance, a 1989 review of communications proposals in electoral platforms found that MAS was the only  
one of the three major political parties to mention community media (Catalá 1989, 51-5). Meanwhile,  
Blanco, of TV Caricuao, recalled “a debate during the end of the 80s in the El Nacional newspaper, where  
they  sought  to  question  and  satanize  community  television[,]  relating  it  with  guerrilla  movements”  
(Mujica 2,  n1).283 This  lingering perception  was exacerbated,  however,  by the heightened climate  of  
protest  and rebellion in the period that included the Caracazo of February 1989 and the failed coup  
attempts  of  1992,  which  generally  energized  and  radicalized  the  Venezuelan  left  and  specifically  
emboldened groups that saw community media as a tool for resistance, community organization, and  
progressive political change. 
The Caracazo itself reinforced the need for alternative media outlets to provide a popular voice.  
As Blanco recounts:
...very few community media outlets existed at  that  time, [so] it  was up to us  [at  TV 
Caricuao] to grab the camera and take the street and record what we could of what was  
283“un debate a finales de los años 80 en el diario Nacional, donde buscaban cuestionar y satanizar a la televisión 
comunitaria[,] relacionándola con movimientos guerrilleros”
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happening... and apart from that[,] employees of some private television channels, that  
knew what we did, clandestinely passed us material that the commercial channels were  
going to disappear. (Mujica 8-9)284
At  the  same  time,  Liliane  Blazer,  a  filmmaker  working  with  a  longstanding  alternative  cinema  
organization called  Cotraincine,  produced a documentary of the events,  called “February 27” ( 27 de  
febrero), that  “was quite a milestone for popular alternative media outlets” (Hernández 2005, 87) and  
would circulate in cineforos and other popular circuits for years to come. 285
The climate of crisis also impelled a sense of urgency that led to the creation of important new  
groups. For example, the  Cineclub Carreteros (Highway Riders Cineclub) formed in 1989 to link the  
communities that lay along a highway from Caracas to the coastal city of La Guaira. On of its early  
projects was the “Yulimar Reyes creativity workshop” ( taller de creatividad Yulimar Reyes), so named in 
honor of the first victim of the Caracazo (83). In 1990 the Venezuelan Evangelical Center for Justice  
(Centro Evangélico Venezolano por la Justicia  / CEVEJ) was established in the Cuartel sector of Catia  
“to promote the participation of evangelical Christians in the face of the national situation”. 286 CEVEJ 
facilitated  an  alternative  press  initiative  as  well  as  a  cineclub,  which  linked  it  to  other  popular 
communication groups in the area (78).
Some of the most militant activists to emerge during this period worked with community radio, a  
medium which has so far appeared in our historical review only in relation to IRFA. Gonzalez, writing in  
2001, notes that community radio “initiatives and projects have been around for decades, although few  
have had a significant influence beyond the sphere of their respective communities” (221). 287 This began 
284“...muy pocas comunitarias existían en el momento, [así que] nos tocó [a TV Caricuao] agarrar la cámara y 
tomar la calle y grabar todo lo que podíamos de lo que estaba pasando…y aparte que empleados de algunos 
canales de televisión privados, que sabían lo que nosotros hacíamos, nos hicieron llegar algunos materiales 
clandestinamente que los canales comerciales iban a desaparecer.”
285“fue todo un hito para los medios alternativos populares”
286“por promover la participacion de los cristianos evangelicos frente al acontecer nacional”
287Hernández (2005) references two stations, Radio de Sanare and Radio Libre in Tocuyo, which operated in Lara 
during the 1980s, but it is unclear if the stations themselves or only certain programs were participatory (100). 
Leal identifies the first community radio station in Zulia as Miranda 91.7 FM, which broadcast in the La Limpia 
sector of Maracaibo from 1985 until 2000, when it ceased broadcasting due to a lack of funds (57).; “desde hace 
decadas se han sucedido las iniciativas y proyectos, si bien pocos han tenido una influenda significativa mas 
alla del ambito de las respectivas comunidades”
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to  change  in  the  early  1990s,  however,  when  a  group  in  Catia  employed  a  mobile  speaker  system  
(radioparlante) to broadcast to the local community. As a result of the deepening crisis, especially the  
attempted coups of 1991, facilitators of this experience joined other activists to form “a loose collection  
of radio producers known as [Citizens Band]”, which held workshops in Catia, Caricuao, and La Vega,  
with the latter two leading to the formation of Radio Perola and Radio Activa La Vega in those sectors 
(Fernandes 2010; 165, 239). Among those involved in Radio Perola were members of the Cineclub Cara 
en Contra,  who saw community radio as a platform for their “old dream” ( viejo sueño) of producing a 
community news program (Hernández 2005, 87).  Both  Radio Perola and  Radio Activa La Vega also 
began  using  mobile  speaker  systems,  but  in  the  mid  to  late  90s  these  and  other  stations  began  
broadcasting on the FM band using unlicensed 13 volt transmitters (Fernandes 210, 165). One longtime  
community media activist estimated that there were 30 such clandestine radio stations in Caracas in the  
1990s (Sosa 2011).
Little detail, it seems, has so far been recorded regarding those early years of community radio in  
Caracas, but what is  clear is  that  current members of the  chavista community and alternative media 
movement have memorialized it as an era of clandestine resistance and violent state repression. Often  
repeated, for example, is that practitioners would carry their small transmitter through the streets on a  
bicycle so that authorities would not be able to track down the source of the signal.  Radio Perola was 
twice shut down during Caldera's administration (Fernandes 2010, 165), but the stakes of being caught  
were apparently much higher.  Although not directly  involved in  radio,  one resident of  Caracas who  
became a community media activist  toward the end of  that  era  articulates  the collective memory as  
follows:
When you had a radio here, and what interested you was community organization, the  
organization of your community to achieve vindicating objectives... that was a crime....  
They took the equipment from you, they put you in prison, and those that were... more  
leaders, they disappeared them..... Before '98, you put up a community radio station, and  
believe me, that when they dragged you out, [when] they grabbed you, they put you in  
prison. I'm going to tell you colloquially, a [?] fell on you, we said they gave you  una 
diabla [lit. “a female devil”, a severe beating purposefully carried out to approach but  
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avoid permanent injury or death]... an ass kicking.... They took your equipment, and they  
disappeared many comrades, they killed them.... For that. Just for that. (Méndez 2011) 288
Certainly further investigation is in order, but this perception testifies to the polarizing political climate of  
the era and the increasing use of community media by an emboldened and increasingly radical left. For  
example, one early radio station,  Radio Catia Libre (Radio Free Catia), grew out of a collective called  
Onda  Libre (Free  Wave),  whose  “many  years  working  in  popular  telecommunications”  included  
collaboration with the Committee of Anarchist Relations ( Comité de Relaciones Anarquistas / CRA).289 
El  Liberatario (The  Libertarian),  a  CRA periodical  that  promoted  “self-management  as  a  form  of  
production and … a society free of the State and the market”, appeared on newstands in 1995 (Hernández  
2005, 84; Raydan 2007).290
One of the most important initiatives to emerge in the immediate wake of the Caracazo was the  
Casa de la Cultura Simón Rodríguez (Simón Rodríguez Culture House), which would ultimately give rise  
to Venezuela's most famous community media outlet, Catia TVe. The Casa de la Cultura was established 
in the Las Barracas Simón Rodríguez  barrio of the Manicomio sector of La Pastora. We have already  
reviewed two groups, the El Pastoreño community newspaper and the Grupo Ombligo art collective, that 
were also based in the parish of La Pastora. A brief comparison with the former, which published as late  
as  1988,  will  help contextualize the emergence  of  the  Cultural  House and further  delineate  the  two  
tendencies of participatory media that we have so far identified.
As mentioned above,  El Pastoreño was founded in 1978 with the self proclaimed mission of  
conserving  and rescuing  the  cultural  heritage  of  La  Pastora,  which  was  incorporated  as  a  parish  of  
288“Cuando tu tenías aquí una radio, que a tí lo que te interesaba era la organización comunitaria, la organización  
de tu comunidad para lograr los objetivos reivindicativos… eso era un delito…. Te quitaban los equipos, te  
metían preso, y los que eran … más lideres, los desaparecían.... Antes de '98, tu montas una radio comunitaria, 
y creeme, que cuando te rastreaban, [cuando] te agaraban, te metían preso. Te lo voy a decir coloquialmente, te 
caía una [?], nosotros decíamos, te daban una diabla… una coñaza.... Te quitaban los equipos, y a muchos 
camaradas los desaperecían, los mataban…. Por eso. Solo por eso.”
289It seems likely that Radio Catia Libre is the station referenced by Fernandes that began using the mobile speaker 
system in 1992 or 93, but I am unable to confirm the link.
290El Libertario continues to exist as an online magazine that is highly critical of  the Bolivarian government.; 
“bastantes años trabajando en telecomunicación popular”; “la autogestión como forma de producción y ... una 
sociedad libre del Estado y el mercado”
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Caracas in 1889 and whose central sector features architecture form the colonial era. The origins of the  
Las Barracas Simón Rodríguez barrio in the Manicomio sector of the same parish came much later. In the  
1950s, 150 families that had migrated from rural states were evicted by the local government from where  
they  had  originally  settled  and  given  temporary  barracks  ( barracas)  next  to  a  psychiatric  hospital  
(manicomio),  with  the  promise of  permanent  homes  in  a  soon-to-be constructed  apartment  building.  
Those apartments were given to other migrants in 1961, leaving the residents of the barracas to construct 
a  barrio around their  “provisional”  metal  cabins  (Schiller  77-8).  In  all  likelihood,  the  adapted  rural  
traditions of these migrants and their improvised architecture were not elements of the cultural heritage  
that El Pastoreño set out to rescue in 1978. Rather, considering that by the 1980s the Manicomio sector  
had become “wracked by violence and drug trafficking” ( ibid.), the children and grandchildren of the  
migrants were probably a principal part of the perceived threat. 291
In  any  case,  in  1989  a  group  of  young  residents  of  the  Barracas  barrio decided  that  a 
Corpomercadeo building which had been looted during the Caracazo and then abandoned would make a  
good “practice space for their newly formed gaita band”, so they set about cleaning it up and furnishing it  
(79, Márquez 2005).292 In so doing, they had “to confront other youths from the  barrio that were into 
drugs and those things” who were also  intent  on using the  abandoned space. 293 They soon decided, 
however, that rather than confronting these youths, they should try to motivate them to become involved  
in cultural activities. Ricardo Márquez, one of the founding members, recounts that:
...we held an assembly and the community decided that we would function in this space  
and  so  we  founded  the  Simón  Rodríguez  Cultural  House....  This  space  was  rapidly  
converted as a small mayor's office for the barrio, the community met there once a week  
religiously to talk about everything. Planning activities, social work, talking about politics,  
etc., in sum, everything that interested the community. We organized many cultural and  
291As Schiller notes, in that period Manicomio “became known locally as 'the little Hong Kong,' a reference to the 
intense violence portrayed in Hong Kong action films that were broadcast on Venezuelan commercial television” 
(78).
292The Agricultural Marketing Corporation (Corporación de Mercadeo Agrícola / Corpomercadeo), was a state 
owned entity whose purpose was to make subsidized foodstuffs available to impoverished sectors. It was reputed 
to be highly corrupt (see Comenárez 2010).
Gaita is a genre of Venezuelan folk music.
293“para enfrentar a otros jóvenes del barrio que andaban en la droga y esas cosas”
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social activities, people from other sectors and nearby  barrios even participated, all this 
always framed by our political perspective which was never absent. ( ibid.).294
The group members had begun to form their political perspective while attending the Luís Espelozón high  
school, located in the neighboring district of Catia, which had a long tradition of student activism. As  
Marquéz explains, “[o]ur group had a political militancy close to the PRV and other left movements and  
we began to do political work in the barrio” (Márquez).295
This alignment led the group to reject linking their project to the patronage networks of AD and  
COPEI, which left them vulnerable in relation to their use of the abandoned building. They began to face  
resistance from various official bodies, including the “civil authorities, parish council, [and] state security  
agencies” (Catia TVe 2006).296 Toward the middle of 1989:
...the  repression  started,  they  raided  us,  some  members  were  detained,  they  began  to  
intimidate,  it  was tough[.]  [A]t that  time the mayor was Claudio Fermín and Antonio  
Ledezma [was]  Governor  of  the Federal  District,  both  members  of  AD, Ledezma the  
worst[.] [T]hey persecuted us, because during the Fourth Republic all forms of community  
organization were seen in a bad light by the authorities. (Márquez) 297
In this regard, Márquez offers an anecdote that reveals the pervasive extent of the puntofijista corporatist 
power structure. The Ministry of the Family had agreed to provide the Cultural House with funding to  
operate a summer camp for 150 children living in the  barrio. Once the group had finished planning, 
however, the Ministry backed out, forcing the community to call an emergency assembly and come up  
with sufficient funding to carry the project forward. Márquez recalled that “[m]uch later we found out that  
an AD member from the barrio had gone to the ministry and sabotaged the initiative” ( ibid.).298
294“hicimos una asamblea y la comunidad decidió que nosotros funcionáramos en este espacio y así fundamos la 
Casa Cultural Simón Rodríguez... Este espacio se convirtió rápidamente como una pequeña alcaldía del barrio,  
la comunidad se reunía una vez a la semana religiosamente para hablar de todo. Planificando actividades, 
trabajo social, hablar de política, etcétera, en fin, todo lo que le interesaba a la comunidad. Organizamos 
muchas actividades culturales y sociales, inclusive participaba gente de otros sectores y barrios aledaños, todo 
esto siempre enmarcado en nuestra perspectiva política que nunca estuvo ausente.”
295“[n]uestro grupo tuvo una militancia política cercana al PRV y otros movimientos de izquierda y empezamos a 
hacer trabajo político en el barrio”
296“jefatura civil, junta parroquial, [y] cuerpos de seguridad del estado”
297“...comenzó la represión, nos allanaron, algunos compañeros fueron detenidos, nos empezaron a intimidar, fue  
duro[.] [E]n aquel momento el alcalde era Claudio Fermín y Antonio Ledezma [era] Gobernador del Distrito 
Federal, ambos adecos, Ledezma el peor[.] [N]os perseguían, porque durante la IV República toda forma de 
organización comunitaria era vista con malos ojos por las autoridades.”
298“[m]ucho después nos enteramos que un adeco del barrio había ido al ministerio y saboteó la iniciativa”
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The members of the Cultural House decided to multiply their activities in the community, in order  
to increase their support but also to give them “another front of struggle” from which to continue their  
work if  they  were evicted  from their  physical  space (Catia  TVe 2006). 299 One of  the activities  they 
pursued was the formation of a  cineclub.  One of the members had “forged connections with militant  
leftist students at [UCV], some of whom were active in a Marxist-Leninist political party” called Red  
Flag (Bandera Roja) (Schiller 79). These students encouraged the Cultural House to contact FEVEC, who  
subsidized the purchase of a 16mm projector and connected the Cultural House with CONAC and its  
Nucleus  of  Cinematographic  Support,  which  provided  16mm films. 300  Thus,  in  1991  the  Cineclub 
Manicomio was born.301
The Manicomio district happened to have “one of the few covered athletic courts that exist in the  
Caracas' popular barrios” and this is where the  Cineclub Manicomio decided to hold its screenings on 
Friday and Saturday nights.302 They hung an approximately twelve meter wide sheet from the roof of the  
complex, which also protected the audience from rain as it sat on the outdoor bleachers (Márquez). The  
content of those screenings was limited to what CONAC made available on 16mm and therefore featured  
“mostly products of the New Latin American film movements of the 1960s” and other “material marked  
by a concern with Latin American experiences of poverty and dispossession” (Schiller 80). Despite these  
limits, the cineclub soon became a primary focus of the Cultural House. As a result of its steady activity,  
in 1993 the cineclub was invited to host a premier screening of a new Venezuelan film called “Shoot to  
Kill”  (Disparen  para  matar)  whose  plot  focused  on  violence  in  the  barrios of  Caracas.  The  film's 
promotors provided the projection equipment for the screening, which proved to be the first time that the  
members of the Cineclub Manicomio had seen a video projector (Márquez).
Serendipitously, this exposure to a new technology coincided with a drastic shift in the political  
299“otro frente de lucha”
300Márquez (2005) refers to CONAC's “Cinema Board” (Dirección de Cine), whereas Hernández (2005) refers to 
the Nucleus of Cinematographic Support (86).
301The word manicomio can be translated as “psychiatric hospital”, but can also take on the connotations of 
“madhouse”.
302“una de las pocas canchas deportivas techadas que existen en los barrios populares de Caracas”
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context of the group's activity. As Márquez recalled:
...we  had  participated  in  the  [failed]  coup  [attempt  led  by  Chávez]  of  the  fourth  of  
February of 1992 in the barrio and they were going around looking for us. We were almost  
in a situation of clandestinity, but when there were the elections for mayor that Aristóbulo  
Istúriz won, the neighbors asked us if  we would be table monitors and we went there  
without knowing much about what it involved. But when the divvying up of votes between  
[AD] and [COPEI] started, we started making a scene that ended in a brawl, and this was  
happening in other electoral centers in the city's other popular zones.... [O]ur attitude was  
known to the people of Causa R, [and] days after those elections a recently elected council  
member from Causa R called us and invited us to work with them in the cultural part of  
the mayor's office of Caracas. (Márquez)303
Thus, when Istúriz took office in 1993, the members of the Cultural House became part of the “cultural  
commission of the Office of the Mayor” (comisión de cultura de la Alcaldía), having gone from hunted 
pariahs to trusted advisors in less than a year. Based on their experience with “Shoot to Kill”, the group's  
first suggestion was for the municipal government to purchase video projectors and lend them out to  
cineclubes in the  barrios. The government did just that and the  Cineclub Manicomio acquired a video 
projector.
One important consequence of this technological shift, from film to video, was the capacity to  
show a much wider range of material. The cineclub could, for instance, screen contemporary Venezuelan  
productions,  such  as  “February  27”  (Blazer's  documentary  on  the  Caracazo),  though  these  drew  
significantly smaller crowds than pirated copies of Hollywood films. In the eyes of  the  organizers,  
however, the value of the latter was undercut by their dubious ideological messaging. To compensate,  
they employed the videoforo model in an attempt to generate critical analysis (Eekhout and Fuentes 2001,  
169; cited in Schiller 80).
An even more important consequence of the shift from film to video was the ability for the  
303...habíamos participado en el golpe del 4 de febrero del 1992 en el barrio y nos andaban buscando. Estábamos 
casi en una situación de clandestinidad, pero cuando hubo las elecciones para alcalde que ganó Aristóbulo 
Istúriz, los vecinos nos pidieron que fueramos testigos de mesa y allí fuimos sin saber mucho como era la cosa. 
Pero cuando empezó la repartidera de los votos entre Acción Democrática y Copey, nosotros armamos un 
escándalo que terminó en una trifulca, y esto estaba pasando en otros centros electorales en otras zonas 
populares de la ciudad.... [N]uestra actitud fue conocida por la gente de la Causa R, [y] días después de esas 
elecciones nos llamó un concejal de la Causa R recién electo y nos invitó a trabajar con ellos en la parte 
cultural de la alcaldía de Caracas.
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cineclub to project material that it had shot within the community. In 1992 Ricardo had borrowed a VHS  
camera from a friend and over the next several years the cineclub “documented local religious, sports, and 
musical events” in the barrio (Schiller 80). The group eventually obtained funds from either CONAC or  
the city's Cultural Commission to purchase a hi8 camera of their own. 304 In mid-1995 the group decided to 
project  their  recording  of  a  community  religious  procession  ( La  Paradura  del  Niño)  that  had  been 
organized by the Cultural House. They publicized the screening but were shocked when, instead of the 80  
or  100  people  that  regularly  attended  their  events,  over  1,000  people  arrived  to  view  the  unedited  
material.  The  cineclub organizers  later  recalled  that  “[t]his  really  impressed  us,  since  the  people  
demonstrated that day that they did want to be the protagonist of their history but it had never been  
permitted to them. This day was born the dream of organizing a TV channel so that the people could see  
themselves” (Catia TVe 2006).305
The Cineclub Manicomio not only began screening more of the material they recorded, but they  
also expanded the scope of their recordings and their methods of presentation. As Márquez recalled:
We began to interview the people  of  the  barrio  with  a  little  camera,  we began to  do  
exposés about problems in the community, we did reports, and when Fridays arrived we  
transmitted the baseball games on a big screen as well as the videos that we made and  
many people came to see the games on the big screen and filled the bleachers. When the  
intervals with propaganda came we cut and transmitted the videos that we were making.  
(Márquez)306
The cineclub began putting more and more energy into video production and less emphasis on screening  
material produced outside the community. Meanwhile, Istúriz had agreed to provide 25 million bolívares 
(Bs) in order to construct a new building for the Cultural House, but the project stalled after the old  
304Schiller attributes the funding for the group's first camera (without identifying the format) to the Cultural 
Commission (81). Márquez (historia de Catia TVe 2006) and Mujica (12) (who identify the format) attribute the 
funding to CONAC. 
305“[e]sto nos impresionó muchísimo, pues la gente demostró ese día que si quería ser protagonista de su historia  
pero jamás se lo habían permitido. Este día nació el sueño de organizar un canal de TV para que la gente 
pudiera verse”
306“Comenzamos a entrevistar a la gente del barrio con una camarita, comenzamos a hacer denuncias sobre 
problemas de la comunidad, hacíamos reportajes y cuando llegaba el viernes transmitíamos los partidos de  
baseball en pantalla grande también los videos que nosotros hacíamos y venía mucha gente a ver los juegos en 
pantalla grande se llenaban las gradas. Cuando venían los intervalos con propaganda cortábamos y  
transmitíamos los videos que nosotros hacíamos.”
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building was demolished (historia de Catia TVe 2006, Márquez). Then Ledezma, the group's old nemesis,  
replaced Istúriz as municipal mayor in early 1996 and, according to Marquéz, “said that he wasn't going  
to construct any culture house for some guerrillas”. 307 The group was thus left without a physical space of  
their  own,  though  they  refused  to  return  the  video  projector  that  technically  belonged  to  the  local  
government and which Ledezma was demanding (ibid.).308
One manifestation of the group's wholesale shift to video was the creation, in 1996, of the Magic  
Lantern  Center  for  Cinematographic  Culture  (Centro  de  Cultura  Cinematográfica  Linterna Mágica), 
whose goal was “to make audiovisual works, but with children” (Catia TVe 2006; Márquez). 309 Around 
this same time the group began thinking seriously about  how they might  create  a  television station.  
Márquez became enthusiastic about creating a single channel cable network:
...I thought of a closed circuit, passing conduit through all the streets of the barrio and  
connecting all the houses by cable and in my mom's house making a studio so that there  
some members of the community would give classes or talks, etc. They told me that was  
crazy, that that was very difficult. ( ibid.)310
Before discussing how the television project actually came into being, we should add some context to the  
history that we have just reviewed.
We have seen that one important outcome of the link between the founders of the Cultural House  
and the group of militant UCV students was the latter's suggestion to approach FEVEC for assistance with  
launching a cineclub in 1991. A second important outcome, however, was the arrival, in 1992, of Blanca  
Eekhout, a Red Flag activist who had come from a middle class family in the small city of Acarigua  
(Portuguesa) to study in Caracas. Eekhout became active in the  cineclub and within a few months had 
307“dijo que él no iba a construir ninguna casa de la cultura a unos guerrilleros”
308The group continued to organize around the completion of the new space; it held a public assembly on the issue 
on January 15, 1998 (historia de Catia TVe 2006).
309The text authored by CatiaTVe gives 1996 as the founding year, whereas Marquéz states that the civil association 
(asociación civil) was founded in 1998. It may be that the project began in 1996 but the legal organization was 
not created until 1998, or one of the dates may simply have been given in error. I have used 1996 under the 
assumption that it is more likely accurate, but verification is warranted.
310“...pensé en un circuito cerrado, pasando una tubería por todas las calles del barrio y cableando todas las casas 
y en la casa de mi mamá hacer un estudio para que allí algunos miembros de la comunidad impartieran clases o 
dieran charlas etcétera. Me dijeron que estaba loco, que eso era muy difícil.”
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moved to  Manicomio,  where  she  lived  for  the  next  ten  years  (Schiller  81).  Originally  a  student  of  
economics, Eekhout eventually graduated with an arts degree and a concentration in cinema (Marquéz  
2005). The 600 page thesis that she co-authored with another UCV student was entitled “Cine de Barrio:  
The audiovisual discourse produced by the Manicomio Film Club between 1992-1999”. 311 In addition to 
providing  a  history  and  analysis  of  the  Cineclub  Manicomio,  the  thesis  “reviews  global  efforts  to  
democratize communication... and theorizes the emergence of alternative communication in Venezuela”  
(Schiller 81).
Eekhout  brought  a  valuable  theoretical  framework  to  the  group's  activities.  As  Márquez  
explained:  “With  the  incorporation  of  Blanca  into  our  group,  we  began  to  reflect  much  more  on  
communication. We had the practical things down, but Blanca understood the theory. She was really  
thinking  about  how  the  media  worked…”  (Schiller  82).  Eekhout's  theoretical  and  historical  
contextualization of the Cineclub Manicomio is evident in her summary of the group's evolution:
A leftist, Aristobulo Isturis [sic], won elections to become mayor of Caracas in 1993. He is  
black. He was a teacher by profession. He was in the Congress, and he used that platform  
to defend the people involved in the uprising. His presence in the municipal office gave the  
CineClubs and other popular movements a great deal of support. Before 1993 we were  
working with a 16mm projector, and there were not a lot of films available. We’d show the  
same films over and over. It was fine, it was still collective, it was still a break with the  
atomization of people watching TV in their homes, but under Isturis [sic] we got a video  
projector and that gave us a chance to show so much more material. But more important  
than the video projector was that we got a camera. People started making videos with no  
training.  Attendance  at  our  events  exploded.  People  were  now  seeing  themselves  on  
television. The first videos were just registries. People would tape the street corner, the  
dog on the corner, the people hanging out on the corner, the local shop, the local graffiti.  
The next step was films about local sporting events, or assemblies, or parties. My college  
thesis was on ‘barrio cinema’, the internal discourses and how barrio events are weaved  
through the cinema. The next step in the process was decisive: the activists in the struggle  
for water, in the ‘asamblea popular del agua’ [popular water assembly], began to use film  
as a tool for their struggle. The camera became a weapon: we would tape officials coming  
to the community and making promises, and use the film to hold them accountable. This  
film movement started to become the cables of a network to connect the community. A  
network of  barrio news was created, based on creating and passing these films." (Podur  
2004)
311In Latin America, it is common practice for the equivalent of a US undergraduate degree to require five years of 
study and a substantial thesis paper, although 600 pages is an extraordinary length. Eekhout's co-author, Hectora 
Fuentes, would later play a role in the launch of Telesur, a satellite television channel spearheaded by Venezuela's 
Bolivarian government and co-sponsored by various other Latin American governments (Schiller 82).
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Eekhout's summary suggests several connections that are worth expanding here and investigating further.  
First,  as  discussed  above,  Istúriz's  most  significant  civil  society  innovation  during  his  mayoral  
administration was the introduction  of “water advisory councils” as a conduit for citizens to inform the  
government's provision of services. When she references the “popular water assembly”, Eekhout is likely  
referring to these councils, which manifested a Gramscian tendency toward a civil state and served as a  
prototype for Bolivarian policy initiatives under Chávez. We can see, then, that already in the mid-1990s  
Eekhout and others in the Cineclub Manicomio were envisioning community media as one component of  
a  larger  civil  society  apparatus  that  would  facilitate  popular  participation  in  the  decision-making  
processes of the state.
Perhaps less evident are the historical linkages suggested by Eekhout's encapsulation, but the use  
of video to hold officials to their promises regarding municipal water service, as well the idea of “a  
network of barrio news” established by “passing” copies of videos, seem to have been drawn directly  
from SET-Video. There is reason to believe that this was not merely coincidental. Lying evident but so far  
latent in our history of Venezuelan participatory media is the fact that the relatively small parish of La  
Pastora and the larger neighboring parish of Catia have been the site of a disproportionate number of the  
initiatives  so  far  reviewed.312 In  the  early  1990s  groups  like  CEVEJ,  Onda  Libre,  the  Cineclub 
312The El Pastoreño newspaper (1978), the Grupo Ombligo (1981), and the Cineclub Manicomio (1991) were all 
based in La Pastora. The Precooperativa (1983) and Radio Catia Libre (1992?) were both based in Catia, and 
Cinemobíl Huayra established a presence in the Los Magallanes sector of Catia (early 1980s). We have also seen 
that Catia was home to a high school with a long history of student activism; that Causa R chose Catia as the site 
for its organizational efforts (1970s) and established a community organization called Pro Catia (which operated 
until 1983); that Catia Primero, a community organization sponsored by CESAP that published a community 
newspaper of the same name, was established in the Los Magallanes sector of Catia (1986); and that CEVEJ and 
its communicational projects were based in Catia (1990).
In an attempt to add some explanatory context, we might note that La Pastora and Catia belong to Libertador, the 
largest and historically most impoverished of the municipalities that make up the city of Caracas proper, but one 
that includes or is proximate to important sites of political power and cultural expression. Compared to residents 
of the arguably more impoverished and precarious barrios on the steep hillsides surrounding the city, or to areas 
like Caricuao, which was previously a separate town lying at some distance from the city center and which has 
only relatively recently been incorporated into the expanding metropolis as something like a “bedroom 
community”, residents of Libertador enjoy easier access to certain of the city's resources and administrative 
organs. Of course, the wealthier municipalities of Caracas, such as Chacao, have exponentially more resources 
and privileged access to authorities, but also a less critical need for community organization. The suggestion, in 
other words, is that Catia and La Pastora occupy something of a “sweet spot” where the urgency of community 
organization has been matched by its feasibility. This notion requires further scrutiny, especially when we 
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Manicomio,  the  CRA,  and  Cinemóbil  Huayra,  among  others,  were  all  interacting  within  the  same  
geographic area (Hernández 2005, 78).  In  the 1980s,  the facilitators of  SET-Video  had offered video 
courses  in  Barquisimeto  and  Caracas,  where  Maryknoll  missionaries  were  also  active.  The  project  
continued to operate in Barinas until the mid-1990s, suggesting that its presence in these other urban  
centers may also have continued  (80; Ramírez et al. 145, 151). More importantly, however, in the early to  
mid-90s  the  SET-Video project  was  “revitalized  in  Catia”  by  Cinemóbil  Huayra,  which  was 
simultaneously working in both Catia and rural areas in Lara to promote the concept of the  “ barrio news 
program” (noticierio del barrio) that had been developed in Catia and La Pastora during the early 80s by  
the  Grupo Ombligo and the  Precooperativa (Hernández 2005; 81-2, 101). The point requires further  
investigation, but it seems likely that techniques which had been developed in the 1980s, especially those  
which had proved successful by  SET-Video in Barinas, were transferred to  Cineclub Manicomio by the 
efforts of  Cinemóbil Huayra, if not other groups, and perhaps in conjunction with Eekhout's research  
project.
Catia in the early 1990s appears to have been a vital nucleus of participatory media production in  
what would become a national community and alternative media movement. To get a sense of how this  
national movement ultimately came together, we will turn our attention back outside of Caracas. From  
this point forward, we will focus even more exclusively on video and television than we have so far. In  
part, this is a pragmatic choice, as a thorough history of Venezuela's proliferating participatory media  
initiatives during the 1990s would be daunting. Happily, such a history is not necessary for our purposes,  
since  our  more  limited  emphasis  on  audiovisual  initiatives  will  more  than  sufficiently  illustrate  the  
consolidation of the national movement and the evolution of its collective vision of civil society. In fact,  
since  video  production  and  television  broadcasting  are  more  resource  intensive  relative  to  other  
participatory  media  platforms,  these  activities  are  more  visibly  dependent  on  the  broader  political  
consider that the centrality of these areas may not explain a greater abundance of community organization so 
much as a greater probability of it being included in the historical record.
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economy and thus bring into greater relief those issues that most concern us, namely the organization of  
civil society and its relation to the state and the economy.
The history  of  Teletambores,  a  community  television station  in  the central,  industrial  city  of  
Maracay (Aragua), begins in the 1980s. Toward the end of that decade two teenagers named Leo Briceño  
and Moises “Chicho” Flores began participating in the  Cineclub Yaracuy, which was based in the Rio 
Blanco barrio on the outskirts of the city. The  cineclub screened what Briceño referred to as “critical  
cinema... of a cultural, educational, community, and political character” (Briceño 2011). 313 Flores recalled 
projecting  Venezuelan documentaries  provided by CONAC as well  as  “movies  from the Venezuelan  
cinema that weren't transmitted on television, that weren't commercial but  were good cinema”, but the 
cineclub also  “really  accompanied  the  international  solidarity  with  Central  American  countries”  by  
showing documentaries on their political situation and US imperial intervention (Flores 2011). 314 Until it 
fell dormant at some point in the early 1990s, the Cineclub Yaracuy facilitated cine and videoforos not 
only in Maracay, but throughout the state.
Meanwhile, some residents of Maracay had travelled to Nicaragua in the 1980s to support the  
Sandinista revolution. Many returned to Venezuela following the Sandinistas' electoral loss in 1990 and  
some of them told friends from Nicaragua about the increasingly dynamic political climate in their home  
country.  This  attracted  a  Belgian  named  Thierry  Deronne  who  had  graduated  with  a  degree  in  
communications in 1985 and spent the next three years in Nicaragua facilitating workshops in popular  
video production (ibid., Deronne 2009, 39). Deronne arrived in Venezuela in 1993 or 94 and, along with a  
group of Venezuelans that included Briceño and Flores, set up the Escuela Popular de Cine de Maracay 
(Popular Cinema School of Maracay). The content produced in Escuela Popular workshops was primarily 
shown in  cineclubes,  but the organizers grew frustrated with such a restricted audience. Just like the  
organizers of the Cineclub Manicomio, they became increasingly focused on “the dream of how to arrive  
313“cine crítico... de carácter cultural, educativo, comunitario, y político”
314"peliculas del cine venezolano que no se transmitía por la televisora, que no era comercial pero sí era buen 
cine”; “acompañó mucho la solidaridad internacional con los países centroamericanos”
246
massively in the communities through a community media outlet” (Briceño 2011). 315
With its  deep  connection to  Sandinistan experiences of  popular  communication,  the  Escuela 
Popular was even more predisposed than the nucleus of participatory media initiatives in Caracas to a  
counter-hegemonic mode of community media. Thus, unlike the national movement that seemed to be  
developing just several years earlier and which was anchored to liberal notions of civil society by the  
neighborhood associations and the National Network of Communicators that grew out of Construyamos 
Juntos, the framework for a new movement was catalyzed by popular resistance to neoliberal reform and  
oriented  toward  a  Gramscian  notion  of  civil  society.  As  mentioned  above,  however,  not  all  of  the  
important organizations that would make up this new movement were similarly rooted. To illustrate the  
point  we  will  look  at  another  region  that  would  prove  to  be  of  considerable  importance  for  the  
consolidating national movement.
 The mountainous southwestern states of Mérida and Táchira that lie along the Colombian border 
saw a modest burst of community television initiatives in the 1990s. With one important exception, these  
initiatives emerged in isolation from each other and none were attached to an overt macro-level political  
project  or  vision.  The  common  denominator  seems  to  have  been  increased  access  to  television  
technologies in a region where they had not yet become widespread, thus leaving opportunities for their  
exploitation open to innovative individuals and groups. Initiated as they were outside of political projects,  
these community television stations all implicitly adopted the familiar model of liberal civil society (or, in  
one case, commercial enterprise). What makes the story of these television stations particularly interesting  
for our review, however, is that all of them would later be incorporated into the Bolivarian community  
media framework, with two in particular assuming leading roles in a national community and alternative  
media movement that would go on to repudiate the liberal model of civil society. Three of these stations 
will be introduced in this chapter, while the remaining two will be discussed in the following.
In 1993, the small mountain town of Bailadores (Mérida) had perhaps 2,000 residents. Due to its  
315“el sueño de como llegar masivamente a las comunidades a través de un medio comunitario”
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elevation and the surrounding mountains, television reception in Bailadores was particularly bad. One of  
the residents, Dr. Carlos Andrés Pérez (not the former President), was particularly interested in video and  
computer technologies, so he convened a series of meetings with townspeople to gauge their interest in  
constructing a cable system “with much social sense and not with a commercial sense”. Ninety families  
agreed to contribute to a fund that ended up with roughly 70,000 Bs and Pérez, with assistance from  
several other residents, installed a cable system whose 15 channels included VTV, the three national  
commercial broadcasters, and channels dedicated to sports, cartoons, movies, and news (Padrón 2006, 96-
7).
Early on, Peréz realized that he could connect a camera to the system and transmit the signal. As  
families continued to contribute and the system grew, Pérez continued to entertain the idea of using one of  
the channels for local content. In 1996, while VTV was transmitting a test signal, Pérez took advantage of  
the break to perform a test of his own by transmitting programming from a VCR. Soon after, during a  
town fair, he decided to transmit his first live broadcast: “...it occurred to me to send out the signal and we  
went on air, with all the technical errors because one knew absolutely nothing, not camera operation, not  
signal operation, not operation of anything” (97). 316 Pérez's parents had moved out of the town, so Pérez  
was able to use their vacated house as the headquarters for the new cable channel and he used the funds  
generated by the cable system to purchase necessary equipment.
Soon the Televisora Cultural Comunitaria de Bailadores (Cultural Community Television Station 
of Bailadores) was transmitting from 6:30 am to 9pm, although it seems that not all of the material was  
produced by the community. Some shows, however, were moderated by community members and there  
were live broadcasts “from the stadium, the town square, the church, part of the farm, and the hotel, since  
they had cable outlets in those places that allowed the immediacy of events that were being generated”  
(ibid.).317 By 1999, however, key participants had either retired or left town. The cable system degraded  
316“...se me ocurrió sacar la señal y salimos al aire, con todos los errores técnicos porque uno no sabía 
absolutamente nada, ni manejo de cámera, ni manejo de aire, ni manejo de nada.”
317“desde el estadium, la plaza Bolívar, la iglesia, parte de la granja y el hotel, ya que tenían puntos de cable en 
estos lugares que permitían la inmediatez de los eventos que se estuviesen generando”
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and the channel ceased operating for several years.
In 1993, the same year that Bailadores began putting together its cable system, Ivan Ramírez, a  
photographer living in the small town of Michelena (Táchira), mentioned to a friend, Eduardo Betancourt,  
that  he  was  particularly  interested  in  television.  Betancourt,  an  electrical  engineer  who  “had  been  
familiarized with a television station” in his home country of Colombia, suggested that it wouldn't be so  
difficult to build a transmitter (Padrón 83). 318 Rámirez went to San Cristobal, the state capital, to buy the  
necessary parts and on September 23, 1993 the Cultural Television Station of Michelena ( Televisora 
Cultural de Michelena), commonly known as TV Michelena, began broadcasting on VHF channel 4, thus 
becoming the first regular community television broadcaster in Venezuela ( ibid., Mujica 14).319
TV Michelena established a four person board of directors in February of 1994. In that same year  
engineers  from  the  regional  office  of  the  Ministry  of  Transport  and  Communications  visited  TV 
Michelena “with the purpose of regularizing the legal situation of the television station before this body”  
and  the  National  Telecommunications  Commission  (Comisión  Nacional  de  Telecomunicaciones / 
CONATEL), which had been established as an autonomous regulator in 1991, during the privatization and  
liberalization of the telecommunications sector. 320 While the terms of the station's official authorization  
require further research, Padrón indicates that  broadcasting permission was granted to the Michelena  
Cultural Foundation (Fundación Cultural Michelena), which was presumably established as a non-profit  
organization in June of 1994 for just that purpose (Padrón 83). 321
318Castro & Meleán (2007, cited in Mujica 14) link the motivations of both TV Michelena and TV Rubio (discussed 
below) to “the local population's desire to reconquer for Venezuela radioelectric spectrum conquered by 
Colombia in the Venezuelan Andes of the border region” (deseo de las poblaciones locales de reconquistar para 
Venezuela espectros radioeléctricos conquistados por Colombia en los Andes venezolanos fronterizos), although 
they offer no source for the claim. The issue of spectrum sovereignty and interference along the Colombian 
border has definitely been of concern to the community and alternative media movement, but other sources, as 
well as my interviews with José Angel Manrique, one of the founders of TV Rubio, indicate that these two early 
community television broadcasters were not acting on such motivations.; “había estado familiarizado con una 
estación de televisión”
319As mentioned above, both TV Caricuao and Cinemóbil Huayra had facilitated short broadcasts.
320“con la finalidad de regularizar la situación legal de la televisora ante este organismo”
321José Angel Manrique, one of the founders of TV Rubio who interacted with the founders of TV Michelena in 
1995 (see below), told me that TV Michelena did not have a license until community media broadcasting was 
legalized under the Chávez administration. The legal status of TV Michelena during the 1990s requires 
confirmation.
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In its earliest days,  TV Michelena broadcast rented movies and programming obtained from a  
satellite uplink (Padrón 83), but soon after “they were recording cultural and social activities... and editing  
them”  (Manrique  2011).322 As  for  funding,  Ramírez  covered  the  “majority”  of  the  costs,  with  
contributions  also  coming  from Betancourt.  The  station  also  enjoyed  significant  support  from local  
authorities. The municipal mayor, Luís Enrique Piñeda, sat on the original board of directors and the  
mayor's office provided “economic, institutional, and political” support. Moreover, the municipal council  
“provided resources for the operation of the television station” and included the Cultural Foundation in  
the 1995 municipal budget.323 Official support also came from the state legislature, which granted funds  
for the purchase of a character generator (which enables the addition of titles and credits to content edited  
in an analog system) (Padrón 83-4).
Not far from Michelena, in the small city of Rubio (Táchira), Rafael Rincón and José Angel  
Manrique  heard  about  TV  Michelena sometime  in  1995.324 At  the  time,  Rincón  was  a  student  in  
communications at the University of the Andes (Universidad de los Andes / ULA) and Director of the 
Joseph Kamratowski Rubian Cultural Foundation (Fundación Cultural Rubiense Joseph Kamratowski), 
where Manrique, who was studying electrical  engineering, worked as  the Student Director ( Director  
Estudiantil) (Leal 1999, Padrón 78). The foundation, which was named for a Polish choral director who  
had lived in Rubio around the turn of the 20 th century, focused primarily on musical activities, including a  
student orchestra and choirs for both children and adults. Rincón and Manrique were intrigued by the idea  
of broadcasting the foundation's activities and so traveled to Michelena to learn more about the cultural  
television station. As a result of this meeting, Rincón contracted Betancourt to construct a transmitter for  
the Kamratowski Foundation. Betancourt never fulfilled his end of the deal, however, so Manrique and  
The members of the TV Michelena Board of Directors established in 1994 were Ramírez, Betancourt, Luís 
Enrique Piñeda and Henry Colmenares. The Cultural Foundation had nine official positions, with Ramírez and 
Betancourt serving as President and Vice President, respectively, and Piñeda serving as one of the board 
members (vocales) (Padrón 85).
322“grababan actividades sociales y culturales... y las montaban”
323Padrón suggests these were two separate avenues of support; it is not clear if the Cultural Foundation sponsored 
any activities beyond the television station.; “aportó recursos para la operación de la televisora”
324Unless otherwise noted, all material related to TV Rubio is drawn from my interviews with Manrique (2011).
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Rincón's father, who was a physics teacher, researched the technology and constructed a 20 watt unit that  
transmitted on VHF channel 13.325
The Televisora Cultural de Rubio (Cultural Television Station of Rubio), commonly known as TV 
Rubio, began broadcasting in October of 1996. In addition to the transmitter itself, the elder Rincón and  
Manrique had constructed a system of eight antennas, with the principal tower located on a nearby hill,  
that  allowed  their  tiny  transmitter  to  reach  70  percent  of  the  city  (Padrón  78).  Manrique  had  also  
constructed rudimentary audio and video consoles for the studio space they created in the building where  
the Kamratowski Foundation was located (Leal 1999). Rafael Rincón, meanwhile, had connections in the  
nearby Liberator Experimental Pedagogic University (Universidad Pedagógica Experimental Libertador / 
UPEL) and was able to secure the loan of three very old VHS cameras. 326 Editing was performed by a 
laborious analog tape-to-tape process (Padrón 121).
In the beginning, the station did little more than record and transmit the performances and other  
activities of the Kamratowski Foundation. By late 1999, however, the station had attracted 20 regular  
volunteers, all high school students (Leal 1999, Hernández 1999b). The station's slogan at the time was  
“the channel of youth without limits” ( el canal de la juventud sin límites ). The students produced regular 
“programs that included “Open Committee: The Voice of the Neighbors” ( Cabildo Abierto: La Voz de los  
Vecinos) and “Alternative Page” (Página Alternativa), both described as “opinion spaces” (espacios de  
opinión);  “Chitchat”  (La  Cháchara),  a  “neighborhood  discussion  circle”  (conversatorio  vecinal); 
“Today's  Interview”  (La  entrevista  de  hoy);  “The  Doctor  and  the  Community”  (El  Médico  y  la  
Comunidad); TVCR Sports (Deportivas TVCR); and “The Home Magazine” (El magazín del hogar), a 
program “for the housewives” (para las amas de casa) (Leal 1999).
In its early years,  TV Rubio appears to have been firmly rooted in the liberal tradition of civil  
society and to have manifested no trace of counter-hegemonic ideology. Evidence for this conclusion can  
325According to Manrique, some time later Rincón gave an interview in which he mentioned Betancourt's failure to 
deliver the transmitter. Soon after, Betancourt visited Rincón and returned the money he had been paid.
326UPEL's name references Simón Bolívar, who is commonly known as “The Liberator” (El Libertador) in 
Venezuela.
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be  found  in  the  titles  and  descriptions  of  the  programs.  The  references  to  “neighbors”  and  the  
“neighborhood” link to the dominant vision of civil society that had been provided by the neighborhood  
movement, and the assignation of a domestic show to an audience of not only women, but “housewives”,  
signals a conservative approach to gender roles. We can also see, however, in the strong association of the  
station with young people, a vision of community media as inherently alternative, amateur, and merely a  
form  of  practice  for  professionally  produced  media.  Indeed,  in  September  of  1999  one  newspaper  
columnist describes TV Rubio as “following the model of the pioneer Teleboconó” (Hernández 1999b).327 
Finally, it is telling that both TV Michelena and TV Rubio referred to themselves as “cultural television  
stations”,  signaling  a  self-identification  with  a  circumscribed  sphere  of  aesthetic  activity  that  
compliments, is dependent on, and leaves largely unquestioned the existing liberal political-economy. TV 
Rubio, having grown out of a foundation dedicated to music in the classical tradition, would have been  
especially rooted in this conception.
We have seen that  TV Michelena found favor  in  the state  assembly and apparently also the  
national regulator. In the absence of further investigation, we might tentatively recognize this as resulting  
from the  leveraging  of  official  support  at  the local  level,  and  perhaps also  as  a  judgement  that  TV 
Michelena was an isolated, modest, and benign initiative that posed no threat whatsoever to existing  
power structures. In any case, TV Rubio initially appeared to be on a similar path. An article appearing in  
the  major  state  newspaper  in  September  of  1996,  the  month  before  the  station  began  broadcasting,  
included the following quote from Asdrúbal Aguiar, the Minister of the Secretary of the President:
A team of young people that demonstrate that excellent community work can be carried  
out with effort, dedication, and quality, which not only surprises me but obliges me to  
express to them my most sincere congratulations; with such an act I have to recognize that  
you are  in  the  hopes of  a  country,  which  requires  the participation  and above all  the  
creativity of its new generations. (cited in Padrón 78) 328
327The columnist includes a paragraph based on an email, apparently a press release of some sort, from Rincón. 
Regarding the comparison to Teleboconó, it is not clear whether the columnist is drawing from the email or 
making the association himself.
328“Un equipo de jóvenes que demuestran que una excelente labor comunitaria se puede llevar a cabo con 
esfuerzo, dedicación y calidad, la cual no sólo me sorprende sino me obliga a expresarles mis más sinceras 
felicitaciones; por tal hecho tengo que reconocer que ustedes están en las expectativas de un país, que requiere 
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In this light, the confusion caused by CONATEL's visit  to the station in 1997 is understandable.  As  
Manrique recalled, “...they came to verify what it was that we were doing because they had heard about a  
television station... And so they took photos and we were happy because we supposed they came to help  
us. [pause] No, they didn't come to help us.” 329
CONATEL opened  a  case  against  TV Rubio for  transmitting  without  a  license  and  officials  
returned to the offices to confiscate equipment, although they inexplicably took items like cameras and  
monitors, but neither the transmitter nor the antenna system. Nonetheless, TV Rubio ceased operating  
while Rincón traveled numerous times to Caracas seeking official authorization. 330 At one point, Rincón 
even managed to plead his case directly to President Caldera, who “shook his head” ( se movió la cabeza) 
but  said  nothing,  which the  TV Rubio organizers  could  only interpret  as  a  denial,  since  they  never  
received  authorization.  One  newspaper  account  noted  that  CONATEL  had  opened  administrative  
procedures against 13 radio stations, in addition to TV Rubio. Manrique recalled that at least some of  
these stations were indeed shut down, which opens the possibility that the action against TV Rubio may  
have been taken in conjunction with those taken against the community radio broadcasters in Caracas. 331
TV Rubio itself was never officially closed. Manrique did not have a definitive explanation for  
this result; he suggested that perhaps CONATEL was not able to gather the necessary proof, but later told 
me that TV Rubio had escaped due to a loophole, since the applicable law in that period was the Law of  
Telecommunications written in 1940, early enough that television was not specifically mentioned. Both of  
these suggestions seem somewhat unlikely considering, on the one hand, how conspicuously  TV Rubio 
was broadcasting and, on the other, that updated regulations governing the licensing of television had later  
been attached to the 1940 law and in any case previous administrations had set a strong precedent of  
la participación y sobre todo creatividad de sus nuevas generaciones.”
329“...ellos vinieron a averiguar que lo que estabamos haciendo porque habían escuchado de una televisora... Y 
bueno tomaron fotos y nosotros felices porque suponiamos que vinieron a ayudarnos. [pausa] No, no vinieron a 
ayudarnos.”
330When I was in Venezuela in 2011, the trip from Rubio to Caracas by bus took something like 18 hours, 
depending on conditions.
331Manrique read me excerpts from the article. I did not ascertain the names or locations of the stations, nor 
whether they were operating as community or commercial broadcasters.
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jealously restricting entrance into broadcast television (see Valbuena 1986, Hernández 1999a). Here, too,  
further investigation is required, but it seems possible that TV Rubio was given a tacit pass, considering 
that it was, similar to  TV Michelena, operating far from the center of political power, firmly within the  
liberal tradition of civil society, and with a clearly non-threatening ideological orientation.
In 1998,  TV Rubio resumed its operations and it was in this period that the station's volunteers  
created the programs mentioned above. In a display of the arbitrary nature of state policy in relation to  
community media during that period, CONAC provided TV Rubio with funding. Nonetheless, in the eyes  
of the  TV Rubio organizers,  the Caldera administration had positioned itself  as  a  threat. 332 Manrique 
recalled, for example, that “in that time, freedom of expression was questioned [and] it was impossible to  
think  that  the  state,  the  government  was  going  to  approve  permits  for  cultural  community  media  
outlets”.333 TV Rubio organizers now considered that they were operating illegally. This perception of an  
intolerant state colored the context within which  TV Rubio joined the growing national movement of 
community and alternative media.
Exactly how this movement finally came together in the late 1990s deserves further research. We  
have seen that one important popular nucleus had developed in Catia during the early 1990s and was  
beginning to serve as a center of gravity for initiatives in less central areas like Caricuao, where both TV 
Caricuao and Radio Perola operated. One important marker of the growth of a national movement came  
in the form of FEVEC's Ninth National Congress, held in October of 1996 in the New People Center of  
Popular Formation (Centro de Formación Popular Nuevo Pueblo) in Barquisimeto (Lara), at which “the  
transition of the  cineclub to new models of alternative communication such as  videoclubes,  free and 
alternative radio stations, and regional television stations was officially proclaimed” (Hérnandez 2005,  
332Significantly, the newspaper article covering the action against TV Rubio (as read to me by Manrique) stated that 
CONATEL was acting “on the instructions of the Ministry of Transport and Communications” (por 
instrucciones del Ministerio de Transporte y Comunicaciones), even though CONATEL had been created as an 
autonomous institution under Pérez's neoliberal reforms. The opposition to the Bolivarian revolution would later 
cite CONATEL's lack of autonomy as a primary component in the state's alleged campaign against free speech.
333“en ese tiempo, la libertad de expresión era cuestionada [y] era imposible pensar que el estado, el gobierno iba 
a aprobar los permisos a las comunitarias culturales”
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103).334 As  if  to  reinforce  the  point,  one  month  later  the  World  Association  of  Community  Radio  
Broadcasters (AMARC) hosted a seminar called “Democratizing the Radio Spectrum” ( Democratizar el  
espectro radioelectrico) in Caracas (González 2001, 223).335 Meanwhile, certain intellectuals continued to  
advocate  for  community  media.  For  example,  Pasquali's  unrealized  1995  proposal  for  a  Radio  and  
Television Law incorporated “the notion of community media” (Pasquali  2006,  cited in  Ávila  2008,  
51).336 Support from academic circles may have contributed to events like the AMARC seminar. 337
For community television in particular, a watershed moment came when Manrique met various  
members of the fledgling community and alternative media movement in Caracas. There are somewhat  
conflicting versions of their initial encounter; Manrique has stated that he was in Caracas “approximately  
in  1997...  looking  for  funding”  ([a]proximadamente  en  1997...  buscando  recursos)  (Mujica  2013), 
whereas Schiller writes that the meeting occurred at “a conference on grassroots media” in 1998 (84). 338 
In any case, as Manrique tells the story, Márquez and others from the  Cineclub Manicomio / Linterna  
334Hernández (2005) goes on to say that in 1997 FEVEC “is paralyzed, to later be dismantled since its original 
activity[,] characterized by a state mediation that was changing, gave no response” (103). Though frustratingly 
vague, the statement suggests that perhaps the Caldera administration was reducing CONAC's funding to the 
cineclubes. This is only a speculative interpretation, but it would add more evidence to the argument that the 
state's aggressive opposition to grassroots participatory media only served to radicalize and cohere a national 
movement. “se paraliza, para luego desmantelarse ya que su actividad original[,] caracterizada por una 
mediatización estatal que estaba cambiando, no dio respuesta”; “se proclamaba oficialmente la transición del 
cineclub a nuevos modelos de comunicación alternativa tales como viedeoclubes, radios libres y alternativas, y 
televisoras regionales”
335AMARC formed in Montreal in 1983 and is universally known by the acronym formed by the French version of 
its name: Association Mondiale des Radiodiffusuers Communautaires.
336“la noción de medios comunitarios”
337On the other hand, one review (Molina 2008) of all of the articles relating to popular, alternative, and community 
media that appeared in the journal Comunicación from 1985 through 2006 (inclusive) suggests that Venezuelan 
intellectuals turned away from community media during this period. 25 articles appeared from 1985 through 
1995 (11 years), an  average of 2.27 articles per year, whereas only seven articles appeared from 1996 through 
2006 (11 years), an average of 0.88 articles per year. (It is unclear if Molina included the year 2007 in his review. 
If so, then no articles were published that year and the average would drop to 0.58.) Perhaps even more telling is 
that in the period from 1996 to 2001 (inclusive) only two articles appeared, both in 1999. These were precisely 
the years in which Venezuela's national movement consolidated. To this we can add that Marcelino Bisbal, one 
of Venezuela's foremost communication scholars, an administrator of the Centro Pellín, and a longtime 
contributor to Comunicación, has come out decidedly against the Bolivarian community and alternative media 
movement (see Bisbal 2004, 2006).
338Ostensibly, Manrique could have been at the conference looking for funding. In my interview, he specified 
neither the date nor the context of the initial meeting. Eekhout, meanwhile, also places the initial encounter in 
1998, at “a meeting” (un encuentro) that included community media activists “from 23 de enero, Manicomio, 
from Barquisimeto, everywhere” (todos lados) (historia de Catia TVe 2006).
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Mágica were  shocked to  discover  that  TV Rubio had not  only already accomplished  their  dream of  
operating a television station, but had done so with a technology far more efficient than their use of cable.  
Manrique explained that TV Rubio was operating illegally and that CONATEL had opened a case against  
it, but that it would cost them about 1,000 Bs if they wanted to construct a transmitter of their own. It  
wasn't until 1999 or 2000, however, when Manrique got a call from Márquez saying, “Hey, we robbed a  
bank, we've got the cash now.”339
As we will see, Manrique then shared his knowledge with the group in Maracay, which led to the  
creation of  Teletambores, and the network would continue to branch out. These  connections, however, 
were being made in the rapidly shifting, post- puntofijista political context of the Chávez administration  
and we must address that context before continuing with the particulars of the community and alternative  
media movement. In order to close this chapter and set up that discussion, we will end our review of  
puntofijista participatory media by looking briefly at  how TV Rubio began to change in  1999. This  
discussion will help us better define some of the issues related to community media and civil society that  
we have touched on throughout this chapter and that will occupy our attention more directly from here on  
out. 
The  knowledge  transfer  between  TV  Rubio and  the  Cineclub  Manicomio  was  hardly 
unidirectional. As Eekhout put it, “They were very sympathetic to our cause, but they didn’t have any  
connections to the movements. So we were close to the people but not the technology, they were close to  
the technology but not the people. We put our experiences together and started broadcasting” (Podur). As  
a result of this exchange, TV Rubio, primarily in the person of Manrique, would come to play a major role  
in the continued consolidation and mobilization of the national movement, but the popular ideology of the  
groups in Caracas seems to have also affected the production model in use at  TV Rubio. For instance, 
although the station had identified itself with young people, in statements to the press during the second  
half of 1999, Rincón emphasized that “anybody can come here and have their space, and that contributes  
339“Mira, robamos un banco, ya tenemos la plata.”
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to deepening democracy.... [W]e want them to talk, to participate, to take hold of democracy actively and  
without vices.”340 He also underlined the goal of “fertilizing the path of demystifying television, with the  
intention of bringing it closer to the people” (Leal 1999). 341
More importantly, TV Rubio was set to debut a community news program, called “Informe 13”,  
on December 1, 1999. The show would run for 45 minutes every night at 7:30pm and air reports from “70  
community reporters, one for each neighborhood association, which would be the carriers of the specific  
needs and potentials of each sector”.342 Here is Rincón's description from September of that year:
The news show is our flagship project, as it's a pilot project of citizen participation in the  
elaboration and diffusion of informative messages for a television station. Our channel will  
only facilitate the cameras and microphones to diffuse what the community reporters say  
of their own neighborhoods or sectors. We will respect in their integrity the voice of the  
reporters and their sources. In a short time each community will bring more news than that  
which we are in capacity to transmit, this will make the social, political, and economic life  
of the municipality more dynamic, to a great degree. Many people don't go so far as to  
imagine how important it is that each barrio has its own community reporter, who has been  
selected by their community, by their neighbors. We have only suggested to them that they  
be people that know the problematic and potentialities of the barrio, and that additionally  
they  be  recognized  and  backed  by  a  letter  of  postulation  from  the  Neighborhood  
Association,  plus  50  signatures  of  neighbors  from  the  sector.  We've  requested  the  
collaboration of some professors and students from the ULA School of Communication in  
order to help us offer the basic tools to these community communicators. (Leal 1999) 343
One is tempted to see here a further evolution of the “ barrio news program” that emerged in various  
forms in the 1980s with the Grupo Ombligo, the Precooperativa, and SET-Video, and that seems to have 
340“…cualquier persona puede venir aquí y tener su espacio, y eso contribuye a profundizar la democracia…. 
[Q]ueremos que hablen, que participen, que asuman la democracia en forma áctiva y sin vicios.”
341“abonar el camino en la desmitificación de la televisión, en la intención de acercarla a la gente”
342“70 reporteros comunitarios, uno por cada asociación de vecinos, los cuales serán los portadores de las 
necesidades y potencialidades de cada sector en específico”
343“El noticiero es nuestro proyecto bandera, pues se trata de una experiencia pilóto de participación ciudadana 
en la elaboración y difusión de los mensajes informativos para un medio televisivo. Nuestro canal sólo facilitará 
las cámaras y los micrófonos para difundir lo que los reporteros comunitarios digan de sus propios barrios o  
sectores. Respetaramos en su integridad la voz de los reporteros y sus fuentes. En poco tiempo cada comunidad 
aportará más noticias de los que estaremos en capacidad de transmitir, esto dinamizaré, en sumo grado, la vida 
social, política, y económica del municipio. Muchas personas no alcanzan a imaginar lo importante que es el 
hecho de que cada barrio tenga su propio reportero comunitario, el cual ha sido selecionado por su comunidad, 
por sus vecinos. Nosotros sólo los hemos sugerido que sean personas conocedoras de la problemática y 
potencialidades del barrio, y que además sean reconocidos y respaldados por una carta de postulación de la 
Asove, más 50 firmas de vecinos del sector. La hemos pedido la colaboración a algunos docentes y estudiantes 
de la Escuela de Comunicación de la ULA para que nos ayuden a brindar las herramientas básicas a estos 
comunicadores comunitarios.”
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been carried by Cinemóbil Huayra to the Cineclub Manicomio, who would have then transferred the idea  
to TV Rubio. These links are so far tenuous, though, and we must recognize that it would be easy enough  
for the facilitators of any popular video project to take the relatively small step of envisioning a news  
program, especially  if  they have had the opportunity to study the history of  alternative participatory 
media, as Rincón did.
Whether directly related or not, Informe 13 is of especial interest here because it expands on the  
general  model that  we saw with  SET-Video,  in  which a central  unit  facilitates equipment to  satellite  
producers. One major difference, of course, is the distribution method, which in the Channel Zero model  
of  SET-Video involved  copying  tapes  and  holding  mini  videoforos,  but  in  Informe  13 uses  mass 
broadcasting. Another significant difference, though, is that Informe 13 was designed to make use of the 
already existing civil society structure of the neighborhood association, as a means for both determining  
geographical areas of coverage for each reporter and establishing a degree of democratic control over the  
selection and performance of the reporters via the letters of postulation. This ingenious maneuver, in  
conjunction  with  the  extensive  history  that  we  have  reviewed  above,  lead  to  a  series  of  crucial  
observations.
To begin, we might recognize that with Informe 13, TV Rubio was attempting to carry the orderly  
and existent liberal structure of civil society forward into a more progressive and participatory mode. This  
suggests that Informe 13 is as much a continuation of the “barrio news program”, which we have marked 
as Gramscian, as of the Escuela vision for neighborhood association community media or the National  
Network of Communicators, two projects that we have marked as liberal. This point is crucial because it  
demonstrates the significant degree of overlap between these two modes of civil society in relation to  
community  media.  Both  can  be  interested  in  the  autonomous  production of  media  content  within  a 
framework  that  allows  for  inclusive  access to  a  participatory  system.  Hopefully,  however,  we  have 
indicated that within the Gramscian model, this is always the goal. To be clear, we could not say as much  
about a general  socialist model of civil society, since we would have to acknowledge (as discussed at  
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length in chapter 2) that some socialist visions – those we have identified as Scientific or vanguardist –  
severely limit autonomy, access, and participation. These are precisely the limits that, when imposed by a 
state and/or party, have been decried by liberals (among others) as dictatorial and unfree. Indeed, this has  
been the most widely reported point of contention around Bolivarian media, both public and community,  
and  much  of  the  next  two  chapters  will  be  devoted  to  teasing  out  the  degree  to  which  Bolivarian  
community media tends toward the vanguardist model and the degree to which it hews to the Critical or  
Gramscian model of civil society – and what exactly accounts for these different tendencies.
Within the liberal  model of  civil  society participatory media,  the maximization of autonomy,  
access, and participation does not have to be the goal. Hopefully we demonstrated as much in the case of  
Teleboconó, where the focus on youth functioned as a restriction on participation, and where Miliani's  
dictates regarding content (albeit well intentioned) limited autonomy. Or in the case of  La Pastoreña, 
where the professionalized model restricted both access and participation to a select group whose ideas on  
cultural preservation did not represent the entire community. But what we need to emphasize at this point  
is  that  the  liberal  model  can seek  to  maximize  autonomy,  access,  and  participation,  as  with  the  
Neighborhood Movement's idealistic vision of community media. The problem with the liberal model,  
however,  is  that  the  presupposition  of  a  political  economy based  on  capitalist  markets  ensures  that  
autonomy,  access,  and  participation  are  never  actually maximized.  This  is  precisely  what  we  have  
attempted to demonstrate by revealing how the neighborhood movement's funding model, based as it was  
on member contributions,  resulted in  a  restriction of  access  based on class  (among other vectors  of  
inequality).
The inadequacies of the liberal model do not end with the issue of funding. We can demonstrate  
this by returning to the plan for  Informe 13,  where the letters of postulation from the neighborhood  
associations are meant to democratize the selection of the community reporters. This would undoubtedly 
contribute to the autonomy of each geographic sector  and augment the potential for that sector's residents  
to enjoy access and participation. Nonetheless, it vests decision-making authority (regarding the choice of  
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the reporter) in the neighborhood association, a private civil society organization that in and of itself may  
not  maximize  access  and  participation.  For  example,  a  small  clique  may  maintain  most  of  the  
association's power (and account for a majority of the fifty required signatures). Whereas the liberal  
model  of  civil  society  tends  to  ignore  these  issues,  or  at  least  argue  that  they  are  intractable,  the  
Gramscian model seeks to integrate civil society with formal governance, and thus the larger political  
economy, in the form of a civil state.
The  complexities  of  these  issues  can  be  daunting  and  they  have  tormented  the  subfield  of  
community  media  studies  for  decades.  What  has  been  absent,  however,  is  a  framework  that  
conscientiously situates participatory media within a discussion of civil society and its relation to the  
broader political economy. This is the framework that we have attempted to develop by highlighting two  
tendencies of Venezuelan participatory media during the puntofijista era. One accepts the liberal tradition  
of  civil  society  and  positions  participatory  media  as  inherently  adjunct  to  the  commercial  media  
apparatus. The other hews to the Gramscian model of civil society and positions participatory media as a  
replacement for the commercial media apparatus.
Within a liberal context, these two tendencies overlap because both generally focus on questions  
of access and participation within the existing order. The result is something of a false convergence, as we  
have suggested occurred in Venezuela during the 1980s, when it appeared that leftist activists and the  
middle-class  neighborhood association  movement  shared  a  single  vision  of  community  media.  Even  
where project facilitators do maintain a more-or-less explicit focus on constructing an alternative civil  
society and/or political-economy, they are forced to  operate within the context of a liberal civil society  
and  capitalist  economy.  This  means  that  initiatives  tending  toward  the  Gramscian  model  can  be  
nonetheless shaped in the liberal mold by the exigencies of survival. TV Caricuao is a good example of 
this, since it found stable funding but lost its dynamic organizational model as a result. Once again, the  
result is a false convergence.
We have attempted  to  show that  the Gramscian  tendency in  Venezuelan  participatory  media  
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emerged during the 1960s, grew modestly during the 1970s and 80s, and then more rapidly during the  
1990s in response to the deepening political crisis. At no point, however, was this tendency able to fully  
distinguish itself from the liberal tendency, partially because of the constraints of the puntofijista system 
and partially because there was no preexisting alternative model to emulate. With Hugo Chávez in office,  
however, the puntofijista framework would begin to fall away, thus opening up space for the evolution of  
a new model for participatory media production within a new framework of civil society. As we will see  
in the following chapters, this process would be complicated by the lingering inertia of the liberal model  
and the continuous imposition of vanguardist tendencies.
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Chapter 4: Community Media and the Bolivarian Revolution
If we can consider the history of Venezuelan participatory media during the puntofijista era as the 
first phase of a longer history, then the goal of this chapter is to introduce a second phase of that history.  
There are no exact markers for these phases, but it is relatively easy to correlate the commencement of  
what we are calling a second phase with the inauguration of Chávez in early 1999 and the adoption of the  
new Bolivarian constitution later that year. These events, in a dialectical relationship with the already  
emerging national movement of community and alternative media, led to the further consolidation of the  
grassroots national movement, the construction of a legal framework for broadcast community media, a  
significant expansion of state financing and support, and the rapid proliferation of community media  
outlets. An additional and highly influential  factor in that growth was increasing political  and social  
polarization, and especially the failed attempt to oust Chávez in a civic-military coup in April of 2002.  
The second phase also saw a fragmentation of the national movement into two tendencies, each with  
representational national organizations and each supportive of Chávez, but with distinct strategies and  
tactics. Any attempt to make sense of this history must contextualize it within the broader history of the  
Chávez  administration's  policies  as  they  relate  to  its  evolving  conception  of  civil  society.  We  will,  
therefore, begin our review there. Once that general framework is in place, we will turn our attention to  
the particulars of the community media sector.
Policy and Civil Society in the Chávez Administration: 1998 - 2005
In the 1998 presidential election that brought Hugo Chávez to power, socio-economic position  
became a greater predictor for voting behavior than in previous elections. Chávez “captured the vote of  
the poor and lower-middle sectors of the country by a wide margin, [while] his opponents attracted those  
sectors with the greatest resources” (López Maya 2003, 84). We can link this result to Chávez's rhetorical  
strategy during the campaign, in which he  began referring to his (desired) constituency as “the people” (el  
pueblo), thus offering a unifying identity that draws on and reinforces the positive role played by popular,  
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non-elite  actors  throughout  Venezuelan  history  ( ibid.).344 This  construction  of  the Venezuelan  people 
provided a broadly inclusive counter to the dominant identification of civil society with middle- and  
upper-class  organizations  and  movements,  which  had  been  tacitly  advanced  by  the  neighborhood  
movement and reinforced by the discourse of the commercial media.
From this point on, the term “civil society” would be employed primarily and self-referentially by  
organizations and movements acting in opposition to Chávez and his supporters. Their appropriation of  
that title rests on the liberal conception of civil society as wholly autonomous from the state and invokes  
comparisons to civil society movements that emerged to oppose communist totalitarian rule in Eastern  
Europe  in  the  1980s.  From this  perspective,  community-based  and  other  popular  organizations  that  
support Chávez are not properly civil society but, instead, are either: a) clients of the Bolivarian state /  
party apparatus (much like barrio neighborhood associations were held to be co-opted by AD during the  
1980s and 90s) or b) hierarchically directed appendages of the state / party apparatus (much like the mass  
organizations of revolutionary Cuba). In the former scenario, Chávez managed to dismantle puntofijismo 
only by establishing in its place a new system of corporatist and clientelistic rule. In the latter, Chávez is a  
dictatorial autocrat. The vital point, in any case, is that since the elections of 1998, the term “civil society” 
has generally been associated with opponents of Chávez's Bolivarian movement within Venezuelan public  
discourse.
Supporters of Chávez, on the other hand, have happily forsaken the mantle of civil society and  
instead  refer  to  themselves  as  the  organized  people  ( pueblo  organizado)  or  organized  community 
(comunidad organizada). The question of autonomy from this perspective is more complex. On one hand,  
chavistas recognize the legitimacy of the notion of autonomy that informs the liberal conception of civil  
society.  Towards  this  end,  they  insist  that  the  pro-Chávez  parties,  as  well  as  community-based  
organizations and other social movements, maintain a necessary degree of separation and independence  
344For an extensive and sympathetic analysis of the relationship between Chávez's rhetoric and the history of 
popular participation in Venezuela, see Vargas 2007.
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form the Bolivarian state.  On the other hand,  chavistas point out that  –  as  was made evident under  
puntofijismo – the liberal definition of civil society emphasizes autonomy from political parties and the  
state without recognizing (or at least objecting to) dependence on private capital and an economic system  
predicated on exploitation. Given this reality, they insist that the Venezuelan state, the pro-Chávez parties,  
and community-based and other social movement organizations must work together for the construction  
of a non-exploitative system. Further,  the people,  by necessity,  must have resources sufficient to the  
execution of this liberatory project and, since those resources have been systematically denied to them  
throughout history, they must – at least for the time being – be channeled through the state. From this  
perspective,  it  is  only logical  that  there  would  be coordination,  cooperation,  and resource allocation  
among the state, the parties, community organizations, and social movements.
Bolivarian civil society therefore finds itself in the awkward position of simultaneously insisting  
upon its autonomy and willfully ceding a significant degree of that autonomy (or at least appearing to do  
so).  For  observers  committed  to  the  liberal  perspective,  this  ambivalence  is  cast  as  hypocrisy.  For 
participants, however, the internal coherence of their logic is predicated on a nuanced notion of autonomy  
that seeks to balance short-term necessities with long-term goals. They are, in other words, willing to  
accept a certain degree of dependence on the state so long as that dependence is temporary and ultimately  
leads to increased autonomy. In so doing, they attempt to stake out a cooperative but critical orientation  
toward the state and parties. The subtlety of this position has been especially hard to articulate to the  
degree that the Bolivarian Revolution has remained vague in relation to its long term goals. Over the  
course of its existence, however, the Bolivarian movement has brought its goals into sharper focus. With  
increasing clarity and precision, chavistas have outlined a plan for a political economic system that seeks  
to maximize participatory democracy while guaranteeing social and economic justice.
In  many  respects,  as  will  be  further  discussed  below,  the  Bolivarian  vision  embraces  the  
Gramscian concept of a civil state in which the role of the state is  to facilitate decision-making and  
administration by citizens organized as a civil society (e.g. the “organized community”). There is, of  
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course, significant room for debate regarding the implementation of that vision. Oppositional critics insist  
that, either by design or as the result of unintended consequences, the Bolivarian vision will result (or, for  
some, has already resulted) in an institutionalized concentration of power within the state, especially the  
executive  branch.  Debate  among the  chavistas,  meanwhile,  concerns  the  mix  of  policy  choices  and  
organizational structures that will best address urgent issues while still advancing toward long-term goals.
Debates within the Bolivarian movement have turned on at two principal axes of argumentation  
(Ellner 2010, 139-74). The first concerns the pace and depth of revolutionary change. The “soft line”  
position  in  this  debate  “considers  government  advances  and  successes  as  ends  in  themselves”  and  
emphasizes the “consolidation of gains rather than further radicalization” (141). The “hard line” position,  
on the other hand, advocates a continuous advance that focuses on “the creation of parallel structures and  
the purging of old ones” (143). To be sure, both soft and hard liners expect the revolutionary process to  
take  decades,  but  the  hard  liners,  out  of  a  desire  to  more  quickly  surpass  the  existing  institutional  
framework, have shown a greater willingness to accept risk and confrontation. The soft liners, meanwhile,  
have shown a greater willingness to form political alliances, as well as a greater tolerance for the co-
existence of new and old structures. Over the years, Chávez himself implemented a mix of soft and hard  
line policies, although many soft liners have broken away as the movement has radicalized (see 139-74).
A second axis of debate, which is of principal interest to the present discussion, concerns the  
degree to which the revolution should be guided by the state and the parties (i.e. from above) or by social  
movements  and  unorganized  sectors  of  the  population  (i.e.  from  below)  (175).  This  is,  of  course,  
essentially the same debate that (as discussed in chapter two) has been playing out within Latin American  
socialism  for  over  half  a  century,  with  the  tendency  shifting  away  from a  top-down and  toward  a  
grassroots approach. The Bolivarian Revolution, in line with the broader tendency, has largely embraced a  
Gramscian  position  and  defined  itself,  at  least  rhetorically,  in  terms  of  grassroots  participation.  
Nonetheless, the Bolivarian movement has often relied on the efficiency and discipline of hierarchical  
organization  and  decision-making,  thus  exposing  itself  to  charges  of  clientelism,  paternalism,  and  
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authoritarianism.345 As will be discussed in relation to Bolivarian social programs, top-down models have  
been employed in order to address urgent social needs and shore up the movement's political base in the  
face of concerted opposition. Additionally, institutional inertia and the absence of a well articulated model  
for  the  structuration  of  a  civil  state  have  led  well-intentioned  leaders  to  implement  hierarchical  
organizational models even where these do not serve their own stated goals. Some chavistas, meanwhile, 
simply do not have confidence in the efficacy of radically participatory structures and are either pursuing  
a hierarchical vision of socialism or are merely endeavoring to consolidate their own power for personal  
benefit. All of these rationalizations favor top-down models at the expense of grassroots participation.  
There are also cases, however, where the Bolivarian government has implemented top-down structuration  
and centralized decision-making with the justification that these are necessary for creating and fostering  
participatory  organizational  structures.  In  such  cases  the  argument  is  that  the  state  must  take  less  
participatory measures in the short term in order to maximize participation in the long term.
For  all  of  these  reasons,  the  Bolivarian  Revolution  has  vacillated  between  centralized,  
hierarchical, and even authoritarian decision-making, on the one hand, and progression toward the types  
of radically participatory decision-making structures that would characterize a civil state, on the other.  
The general contours of that vacillation during the first Chávez administration will be sketched in the  
remainder  of  this  section  and  provide  the  backdrop  for  our  subsequent  examination  of  Venezuela's  
community media sector within the emerging Bolivarian framework.
The primary concern of the administration during its first years in power was to follow through  
on the MBR-200's call for a refounding of the republic. The convocation of a constituent assembly was  
approved via a national referendum in April of 1999 and elections for representatives to the assembly  
were held in July, with Patriotic Pole candidates capturing 125 of the 131 seats. A new constitution was  
drafted in the space of three months and approved by 72 percent of voters in December. Less than one  
345As will be argued in the conclusion, hierarchy is not entirely incompatible with participatory organizational 
models, as is suggested by this dichotomous presentation. Nonetheless, framing the debate in this manner 
facilitates a presentation of the tensions that have shaped the Bolivarian Revolution and the role of community 
media therein.
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year after Chávez's inauguration, Venezuela had formally moved from the fourth to the fifth republic.  
Actually  transforming  the  existing  institutional  framework  and  overcoming  the  traditional  modes  of  
government, however, would be a different story altogether.
The  new  constitution  changed  the  country's  name  to  the  Bolivarian  Republic  of  Venezuela  
(República Bolivariana de Venezuela), implemented significant structural changes, and opened up space  
for greater popular participation in governance. 346 Under the new framework, the “Public Power” (Poder 
Público)  of  the  state  is  “distributed”  between  three  levels  of  governance,  the  National,  State,  and  
Municipal. The National Public Power is divided into five coequal branches, including the Executive,  
Legislative,  and  Judicial  Powers  that  had  existed  under  the  1961  constitution.  As  for  the  two  new  
branches, the Electoral Power (Poder Electoral) was tasked with overseeing elections and the Citizen  
Power (Poder Ciudadano) with fiscal and ethical oversight of the other branches, as well as protection of  
citizen  rights.  Other  significant  changes  to  the  previous  system included  abandoning  the  bicameral  
Congress in favor of a unicameral National Assembly and prohibiting public financing of political parties.  
These changes, some of which had been mentioned years before in MBR-200 documents (López Maya  
2003, 85), manifested a commitment to overcoming the corruption of  puntofijismo.347 The Bolivarian 
constitution also amplified commitments to human rights, including explicit guarantees to indigenous  
peoples, and it specified the responsibilities of the state in relation to environmental stewardship. 
Critics of the constitution, including leaders of AD, COPEI, and FEDECAMERAS, objected to  
the recognition of a right to housing, along with guarantees of publicly funded hospital services and  
education at all levels, as excessive state intervention. They also criticized the new system for rolling back  
previous efforts at decentralization and especially objected to the concentration of power in the executive,  
pointing to articles that allowed the National Assembly to pass “enabling laws” which would allow the  
346Although the assembly had elected to discard the name change, it was included “at the last minute” upon the 
insistence of Chávez, who considered it a “point of honor” (López Maya 2003, 85).
347Some critics argued, however, that prohibiting public financing of parties placed less privileged sectors of the 
population at a disadvantage relative to those with greater resources (López Maya 2003, 86).
267
President, during a limited period, to unilaterally issue legislation relating to specific issues (85-6). 348 
These arguments, of course, only reprised the themes of the debate that had raged throughout the previous  
decade.
The new Bolivarian magna carta pointed the country away from the neoliberal path, but it still  
leaned  heavily  on  a  liberal  conception  of  representative  democracy.  Mechanisms  for  participatory  
governance were mentioned, but only in general terms. For example, Article 62 recognizes the "obligation  
of  the  State  and  the  duty  of  society  to  facilitate  the  generation  of  optimum  conditions”  for  the  
“participation of the people in forming, carrying out and controlling the management of public affairs” in  
order “to ensure their complete development, both individual and collective”. 349 Article 70, meanwhile, 
lists “channels of participation and active involvement” ( medios de participación y protagonismo) for 
both the “political” and the “social and economic” spheres. Included among the options for the former are  
“the town meeting  and citizens assembly whose  decisions  will  be  binding”. 350 Options for  the  latter 
include “self-management, co-management, cooperatives in all their forms including financial, … [and]  
community  businesses  and  other  associative  forms  guided  by  values  of  mutual  cooperation  and  
solidarity”.351 The same article,  however,  specifies  that  the “conditions for  the effective functioning”  
(condiciones para el efectivo funcionamiento) of those channels is to be established by law, which meant  
that the practical extent of the new government's commitment to popular participation remained to be  
determined.352
348Article 74 of the constitution allows for all laws to be submitted to a popular referendum upon the initiative of 
10 percent of registered voters. For laws issued under the enabling clause, however, the threshold is only 5 
percent of registered voters. The National Assembly may also modify or rescind the laws through normal 
legislative procedures. Previous Venezuelan Presidents had been granted similar power to rule by decree (Crisp 
1998).
349“obligación del Estado y deber de la sociedad facilitar la generación de las condiciones más favorables”; “su 
completo desarrollo, tanto individual como colectivo”
350“el cabildo abierto y la asamblea de ciudadanos y ciudadanas cuyas decisiones serán de carácter vinculante”
351“la autogestión, la cogestión, las cooperativas en todas sus formas incluyendo las de carácter financiero, … [y] 
la empresa comunitaria y demás formas asociativas guiadas por los valores de la mutua cooperación y la 
solidaridad”
352In addition to Articles 62 and 70, Article 166 mandates representation of the “organized communities” 
(comunidades organizadas) on  state-level Planning and Public Policy Coordination Councils (Consejos de  
Planificación y Coordinación de Políticas Públicas) and Article 182 mandates representation of “neighborhood 
organizations” (organizaciones vecinales), and “organized society” (sociedad organizada) on Local Public 
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Perhaps  surprisingly,  as  the constitutional  process  played out,  Chávez  largely maintained  the  
economic policy of his predecessor (Ellner 2010, 111). The idea seems to have been to refrain from  
making  significant  changes  to  macroeconomic  policy  until  the  new  political  framework  had  been  
emplaced.  Nonetheless,  in  February  of  1999  –  on  the  tenth  anniversary  of  the  Caracazo  –  Chávez  
announced a program called Plan Bolívar 2000, in which 40,000 soldiers would provide social assistance,  
including  housing,  health  care,  and  education,  to  those sectors  of  the population  where it  was most  
urgently needed. The plan was in keeping with the MBR-200 vision of a civic-military alliance,  but  
critics, including those from within the MVR, objected to its model of centralized service provision and  
lack of opportunities for community participation and self-sustenance. Chávez himself defended the plan,  
suggesting that it was more participatory than many understood (Chávez & Harnecker 2003), but the  
debate illustrated the wide range of meanings attached to the notion of participation and the Bolivarian  
movement's lack of a framework for instituting civil society governance.
For those advocating more robust forms of grassroots participation, there had been at least one  
encouraging development in 1999, as activists had managed to convince the government to adopt as  
national policy the water advisory councils that had been implemented by Istúriz when he had served as  
mayor of Libertador (López Maya & Lander 2011, 67-8). Specific legal implementations of the new  
constitutional framework, however, were slow to arrive. This was due, in part, to the fact that ratification  
of the new constitution required new elections for state officials and these were not held until late July of  
2000, when Chávez was reelected with a 60 percent majority and the MVR won 91 of 165 seats in the  
new National Assembly. In the meantime, chavista activists attempted to implement change from below.  
Towards this end they proposed holding the citizens assemblies mentioned in Article 70 and called for  
structural transformation in the labor movement, universities, and oil industry via constituent assemblies,  
as per the national example, but these initiatives produced few results (Ellner 2010, 178).
The  pace  of  change  began  to  accelerate  in  2001.  In  September  the  government  released  its  
Planning Councils (Consejos Locales de Planificación Pública).
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“Guidelines of the National Social and Economic Development Plan 2001 – 2007” ( Lineas Generales del  
Plan de Desarrollo Económica y Social de la Nación 2001 – 2007 ). This document, which outlines a 
model  of  development  whose  “character  and  rhythm” emerge  from the  specifics  of  the  Venezuelan  
situation, recognized that the “process of democratic control of the instruments of power” was still in  
construction  and  thus  defined  the  period  in  question  as  one  “of  transition  toward  the  Bolivarian  
revolution”.353 This transition was presented primarily in terms of economic policy that called for “a  
diversified and competitive productive system that is  open to international markets, based on private  
initiative,  and  with  the  presence  of  the  State  in  strategic  industries,  but  with  openings  for  private  
investment”.354 At the same time, however, the Guidelines recognized the constitution's “protection and  
fomentation of the social economy, as a strategy for the democratization of the market and of capital”,  
where the social economy included “family businesses, cooperatives, and community labor associations”  
(13).355
In its presentation of “social equilibrium” the Guidelines recognized that the government's work  
to overcome inequality can not be conceived as a form of welfare “to cure the wounds of those excluded  
from the market” but instead encompasses the creation of “conditions to achieve citizenship” based on  
political, economic, and social rights (18). 356 Even in this section, however, much of the emphasis is  
placed on economistic concerns, chiefly the reduction of poverty, and plans for the “democratization of  
community life” (19) are overshadowed by those for the democratization of the market. 357 Still, the four 
“orienting principles” for achieving social equilibrium are “universality,  equity,  participation, and co-
353“un carácter y un ritmo”; “proceso de control democrático de los instrumentos del poder”; “de transición hacia 
la revolución bolivariana”; All translations from the Guidelines are my own.
354“un sector productivo diversificado, competitivo, abierto hacia los mercados internacionales, basado en la 
iniciativa privada y con presencia del Estado en industrias estratégicas, pero con apertura a la inversión 
privada”
355“la protección y fomento de la economía social, como una estrategia para la democratización del mercado y del 
capital”; “empresas familiares, cooperativas, asociaciones comunitarios para el trabajo”
356“equilibrio social”; “para curar las heridas de los excluidos del mercado”; “condiciones para alcanzar la 
ciudadanía”
357“la democratización de la vida comunitaria”; The Guidelines are divided into four main sections: economic 
equilibrium, social equilibrium, political equilibrium, and territorial equilibrium.
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responsibility” (91).358 Significantly, the strongest statement regarding participation reads as follows:
The public, reconstituted as a space guaranteeing the collective interest is thus converted  
into an instrument of civic power, not understood as power transferred or ceded, but as the  
creation  of  a  new  power  capable  of  legitimately  valuing  the  participation  of  society,  
communities  and  families  in  the  formulation,  execution,  and  evaluation  of  public  
decisions, and in accountability and public oversight. (92) 359
There is, in this passage, an indication that the Bolivarian vision of a civil state – at least in its appearance  
during this transitional phase – is not as utopian as Gramsci's vision has sometimes been interpreted, in  
the sense that civil society will overtake all forms of state governance and the state will cease to exist. The  
Bolivarian vision, rather, was for civil society to emerge as a new “instrument of civic power” that does  
not demand that the state “cede” its power, but that stands alongside the state in a democratic dialectic of  
governance.360 López Maya & Lander (2011) have put the matter quite succinctly:
As  a  strategy  to  reach  social  equilibrium,  the  Guidelines  considers  the  work  of  two  
fundamental actors to be decisive: first,  the state in all of its administrative levels and  
branches,  as the creator of conditions that make possible the empowerment of citizens ; 
second, citizens, who through their participation in families, communities, and organized  
groups are transforming themselves into political subjects with values such as solidarity,  
respect for democratic procedures, and co-responsibility. (64, my emphasis)
Of course, this leaves open the question of which responsibilities belong properly to the state and which  
to civil society, but the Guidelines can be taken as a marker of the Bolivarian understanding of a civil  
state.
As with the constitution, it remained to be seen how the Chávez administration would implement  
the Guidelines. The first major indication came in November, when Chávez made use of decree authority  
granted by the National Assembly to issue a package of 49 laws, many of which were designed “to  
reverse the neoliberal trends of the 1990s” (Ellner 2010, 112). These included laws mandating that the  
358“principios orientadores”; “la universalidad, la equidad, la participación y la corresponsabilidad”
359“Lo público, reconstituido en espacio de garantía del interés colectivo se convierte así en instrumento de poder 
ciudadano, no entendido como poder transferido o cedido, si no como la creación de un nuevo poder capaz de 
hacer valer legítimamente la participación de la sociedad, las comunidades y familias en la formulación, 
ejecución y evaluación de decisiones públicas, y en la rendición de cuentas y contraloría pública.”
360This conception is in line with Moulian's (2000) presentation of the state within 21st Century Socialism: “The 
'new socialism' conserves that anti-statist vocation and proposes to actively attempt to convert the State into a 
semi-State, without however believing that it can be extinguished” (120, my translation). [“El 'nuevo socialismo' 
conserva esa vocación anti-estatista y se propone buscar activamente que el Estado devenga semi-Estado, sin 
creer sin embargo que éste pueda extinguirse.”]
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government control the majority stake in mixed enterprises in the oil sector, making idle land subject to  
expropriation and redistribution, and ensuring state control of the social security system.
Outside observers have characterized these reforms as “democracy for rather than by the people” 
(Hellinger 2011, 33; original emphasis), as did many chavistas. Following the caracazo in 1989, popular 
organizations in Caracas had come together in an “Assembly of Barrios” that remained active until 1994. 
Many of the same organizations that had formed part of the Assembly reemerged in 2001 to proclaim that  
none of the 49 laws, which were supposed to make good on the framework of the constitution, recognized  
their aspirations regarding the “regularization of urban land tenancy” (López Maya & Lander 2011, 66-7).  
Their activism led Chávez to issue another decree, in February of 2002, that established a system of  
Urban Land Committees  (Comités de Tierra Urbana /  CTUs),  comprised of 100 to 200 families,  to  
coordinate with the government on the issuance of property titles. The CTUs, which followed the pattern 
set by the water advisory councils, served as an organizing locus for  barrio  residents, maintained their 
independence, became “famous for their flexibility and organizational versatility” ( ibid.), and went on to 
address collective issues beyond land ownership (Wilpert 2003; see also Antillano 2005). The CTUs thus  
provide  an  important  example  of  how  progressive  forms  of  civil  society  organization  during  the  
puntofijista era shaped policies in the Chávez administration and also how new manifestations of popular  
civil society that emerged as a result of Bolivarian policies could maintain their autonomy and continue to  
evolve. The CTUs, in fact, were an important precursor of the communal council ( consejo comunal), 
which (as discussed in the following chapter) would become the fundamental organizational component  
of the more evolved framework for a Bolivarian civil state that emerged several years later.
Political  opponents  of  the  Chávez  administration  were  also  critical  of  the  49  decreed  laws,  
claiming that they had not been properly submitted for public debate, as called for in the constitution. In  
December, FEDECAMERAS filed a legal action in an effort to block them (Attorney General’s Office  
admits... Jul 22, 2004).361 Whether it was the procedural aspects of their passage or the actual content of  
361FEDECAMERAS pointed to Articles 206 and 211 of the constitution.
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the laws that inspired such outrage,  they served to  unify and reignite  opposition to  Chávez and the  
following  months  saw  a  series  of  large  demonstrations  and  counter-demonstrations  throughout  the  
country. As has been well documented and copiously discussed, these demonstrations became violent on  
April 11, 2002, thus providing a pretext for leaders from FEDECAMERAS, the CTV, AD, COPEI, and  
the Venezuelan military  to  attempt  a  coup.  The imposed government  fell  apart  only two days later,  
however, when massive popular mobilizations and resistance from within the military restored Chávez to  
office.
In the aftermath of the coup attempt, the Chávez administration set a conciliatory tone by creating  
a  Presidential  Commission  for  National  Dialogue,  implementing  decentralizing  provisions  of  the 
constitution that created opportunities for oppositional state governors, and appointing more moderate  
figures to important posts, including the head of the state oil company (Ellner 2010, 118). Nonetheless, in  
December  of  that  year  FEDECAMERAS,  CTV,  and  top  oil  executives  attempted  to  destabilize  the  
country by calling a general strike that focused especially on the petroleum sector. Although extremely  
damaging to the economy, the maneuver failed and the strike fizzled out after eight weeks. The opposition  
then collected enough signatures to submit Chávez to a national recall referendum in August of 2004, but  
that attempt failed when 59 percent of voters endorsed his presidency. In 2005, opposition parties chose to  
boycott elections for the National Assembly, claiming that the electoral system was fraudulent. This plan  
backfired, as they failed to delegitimize the government and ended up ceding full control of the National  
Assembly to the chavistas. The cumulative effect of the opposition's efforts was to galvanize and further  
radicalize the Bolivarian movement. Opposition intransigence to the administration's conciliatory efforts  
following the coup attempt had discredited the soft liners' counsel to form alliances and lent credence to  
the mistrust of hard liners. Additionally, rising oil prices vastly increased Venezuela's foreign exchange  
reserves and provided the administration with much more room to maneuver.
Throughout  the period of  increasing  polarization,  the government  implemented  multiple  new  
policies and programs designed to increase popular participation in governance and economic production.  
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The results of these attempts were mixed. Of particular importance was the relaunch of the Bolivarian  
Circles during the second half of 2001.362 Leaders of the Bolivarian movement had recognized that the  
MVR suffered from excessive bureaucracy and that social programs up until that point had leaned heavily  
on the armed forces and lacked organization at the grassroots level (Ellner 2010, 181; Arenas & Gómez  
2005, 181). They thus urged a return to the organizational strategy that had been used with success by the  
MBR-200, although it was now modified to integrate with the state apparatus under a newly created  
National Coordination of Bolivarian Circles (Coordinación Nacional de los Círculos Bolivarianos). The 
goal was to create a specifically Bolivarian form of civil society that would channel the desires of the  
community and the programs of the state; at least one chavista politician specifically stated that the goal  
was to replace the neighborhood associations with Bolivarian Circles as the fundamental organizational  
unit within the framework of the puntofijista Fundamental Law of Municipal Governance (181-2). While  
they continued to play a role in disseminating and discussing Bolivarian ideology, the most common  
functions of the renewed Bolivarian Circles seem to have been enabling citizens to access government  
services and fomenting support for Chávez prior to the 2004 referendum.
According to the official strategy, each Circle was to have between 7 and 11 members, although  
some grew much larger (Hawkins & Hansen 2006, 106). In 2003 the government claimed a total of 2.2  
million members, although truly active members have been estimated at only 700,000 (107). Members of  
the  circles  tended  to  be  relatively  well  educated  and  have  significant  experience  in  political  and  
community-level activism. There is also some indication that members were somewhat wealthier than  
“rank and file”  chavistas and one survey found that 55 percent of the Circles' funding came from their  
members (110-11). These demographic findings can help explain two larger trends in the history of the  
Bolivarian Circles. The first is that they maintained a great deal of autonomy. Their members tended to be  
relatively radical and committed to participatory democracy. They mistrusted political parties, including  
362Arenas & Gómez (2005) state that the renewed emphasis on Bolivarian Circles began in June of 2001 (168). 
Ellner (2010) points to a speech given by Chávez in April of that year (181). Hawkins & Hansen (2006) state 
that Chávez called for the formation of new Bolivarian Circles in 2000, but suggest that the process had little 
momentum until after Chávez led an official swearing in ceremony in December of 2001 (102-3).
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the MVR, and resisted the hierarchical organization of the state. Many of the Circles, while maintaining  
allegiance to Chávez, organized into parallel  associations at local, regional, state,  and national levels  
(106-7) and very little of their funding – 10 percent or less – seems to have come from the state. 363
The  second  trend,  however,  is  that  the  Circles  were  less  a  mechanism  for  participation  in  
governance, at least in terms of decision-making around policy, than an auxiliary to the state apparatus.  
They were generally composed of the most committed and capable chavistas who served to direct other 
community members to government services. Many of the members were simultaneously active in those  
programs, especially in remedial education and health care provision (108). Moreover, members tended to  
identify more strongly with Chávez and the Bolivarian movement at large than with a specific set of  
policies or with their particular Bolivarian Circle as an independent organization. In other words, they  
exhibited a “charismatic mode of linkage” that not only “created an internal contradiction or tension  
between  the  [Circles']  stated  goals  of  autonomy/internal  democracy  and  serving  Chávez”,  but  also  
“undermined  their  efforts  at  institutionalization”  (119). 364 Additionally,  the  Circles  “unwittingly  (and 
sometimes wittingly) served as new clientelistic brokers, ensuring the provision of [state] programs in  
neighborhoods [or to individuals] that supported Chávez” (118, original emphasis).
The model of the Bolivarian Circle had emerged within the MBR-200 as a tool for elaborating a  
national political movement. For the purposes of constructing an organized civil society apparatus as a  
component of the Bolivarian civil state, however, the model proved to be overly rudimentary. The Circles  
strove for internal democracy but had no replicable institutionalized structure. Nor did they have any real  
power over social resources, which restricted them to facilitating access to state programs and invited the  
formation of clientelistic patterns. Participation in the Bolivarian Circles dropped off sharply around 2005  
363The Circles studied by Valencia (2007) “received no funding from the state” (127). Hawkins & Hansen found 
that 10 percent of funding, generally in the form of in-kind contributions, came from the state (109).
364Hawkins & Hansen usefully distinguish between the “charismatic mode of linkage”, which centers on a political 
personality and is thus closely related to populism, and the “programmatic mode of linkage”, in which political 
action is committed to a specific set of policies or principles (119). These are not, of course, mutually exclusive, 
but to the extent that the charismatic mode invites a top-down movement it can operate at cross-purposes with 
the principle of participatory democratic decision-making.
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as the government shifted it's emphasis to new forms of Bolivarian civil society and (as would befit a  
charismatically linked movement) many members of the Circles followed suit (124). 365
In early 2003, as Venezuelan society remained deeply polarized and oil prices were relatively  
high, the Chávez administration began implementing a series of extensive social programs referred to as  
“missions” (misiones). Conceptually, the missions were basically an expansion of the Plan Bólivar 2000 
program,  although managed and staffed  by  civilians instead  of  soldiers.  The most  prominent  of  the  
missions, which provide no-cost health care, multi-level adult education, and food staples at subsidized  
prices, were created in 2003. New missions, addressing issues such as housing, land reform, the social  
economy,  female  heads  of  households,  and  the  environment,  among  other  issues,  were  created  in  
subsequent years. Billions of dollars of state oil revenues have been directed to the missions, which are  
among the Bolivarian movement's most important attempts to create parallel structures meant to surpass  
the institutions inherited from the puntofijista and neoliberal periods.366 The missions have been attacked 
for their fiscal irresponsibility and their lack of results, while supporters have celebrated their role in  
drastically reducing poverty levels and improving important indicators of societal well-being. The debate  
that concerns us here, however, is the degree to which the missions have contributed to the formation of a  
civil state.
As their goals included safeguarding the rights guaranteed by the constitution and advancing the  
goals laid out in the Guidelines, the missions were designed to create the general conditions within which  
an autonomous “civic power” could emerge to assume its role in a system of shared governance and their  
design reflected efforts to increase popular participation (see Alayón 2005). At a minimum, they created  
new volunteer opportunities for community members. Indeed, many members of the Bolivarian Circles  
365The Bolivarian Circles were never disbanded or entirely abandoned. In July of 2011 they were “relaunched” and 
the various parallel national associations joined together in a “Unitary Council” (Zárraga 2011). Their role, 
however, is less focused on community organization and they are far from being cast as the primary unit of 
Bolivarian civil society. They have, rather, returned to their original role as cells of ideological discussion and 
agitation within a more explicitly political sphere.
366For example, in 2007, the state petroleum company directed $1.36 billion to the primary medical mission and 
$546 million to the primary housing mission (Gómez 2009).
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volunteered within the mission structure and the government's shift of emphasis toward the missions  
contributed to  the decline of  the Circles.  Critics,  however,  have painted the  missions as  attempts  to 
establish patronage networks and other forms of clientelism in order to consolidate Bolivarian control.  
More sympathetic observers, while not discounting the possibility and existence of clientelistic relations  
within the mission system, have suggested that,  as with the Bolivarian Circles,  the  correct frame to 
employ is that of a “charismatic-populist” linkage which lacks “overt conditionality” and “intentional  
efforts at exclusion”. Rather, the “ideological, partisan atmosphere” is “a natural outcome of a movement  
that relies heavily on the figure of Chávez and sees him and the movement as the embodiment of the  
popular will” (Hawkins et al. 2011, 211). Be that as it may, they note that, although the missions “make  
some noteworthy, largely indirect contributions to Venezuelan civil society", their organizational logic is  
clearly hierarchical,  with funding and decision-making dependent  on national  leaders  (197).  In  sum,  
whether or not the missions have been of substantial benefit to the well-being of Venezuelan society, they  
seem to be much more in the line of traditional social benefit programs, with their concomitant risks for  
clientelism and other forms of abuse, than they are a vehicle for generating a new framework of civil  
society and consolidating community self-governance.
Victory in the August 2004 referendum firmly established majority support for Chávez and placed  
the Bolivarian government on a firmer footing than it had enjoyed at any point in the previous three years.  
Oil prices and revenue had continued to climb and the economy had surged away from the 2002 / 2003  
recession,  ultimately  posting  18.3  percent  GDP growth  in  2004 (Weisbrot  et  al.  2009,  8).  With  the  
missions (understood to be) addressing the most urgent needs of the population and consolidating the  
movement's political base, the administration found itself with greater freedom to extend opportunities for  
democratic participation in both the economy and the state.
In February of 2005 the government created the Ministry for the Popular Economy to improve  
upon  previous  attempts  to  facilitate  the  widespread  establishment  of  worker  cooperatives.  The  new  
ministry began working closely with previously established state banks to provide credit, often in the  
277
form of microcredits, and with one of the missions that had been tasked with training and other forms of  
assistance  for  new  cooperatives.  By  October  of  2006  the  government  claimed  141,000  registered  
cooperatives (Ellner 2010, 122-3). By law the cooperatives are required to provide volunteer services to  
the communities in which they are located, meaning that they are meant to contribute to both civil society  
and the social economy. Many of the cooperatives, however, never got off the ground, and many more  
failed. The government never expected all of the new cooperatives to succeed, of course, but only hoped  
that the strongest  would serve as  models for future efforts.  Nonetheless,  the cooperatives have been  
heavily  dependent  on  the  state,  especially  in  their  early  years,  and  there  has  been  significant  
misappropriation of funds. One of the most sensitive problems with the cooperatives has been how to  
ensure that they comply with their legal obligations, since the government has been reluctant to wield a  
heavy  hand  against  its  most  ardent  supporters  (130-1).  In  any  case,  the   economistic  focus  of  the  
cooperatives did not prove to be a vehicle for popular participation in civil governance:
The initial idea that cooperatives would automatically produce for the satisfaction of social  
needs and that their internal solidarity based on collective property would extend to their  
local communities, proved to be an error. Most cooperatives still followed the logic of  
capital;  concentrating  on  the  maximization  of  net  revenue  without  supporting  the  
surrounding communities, many failed to integrate new members. (Azzellini 2013)
The cooperatives illustrated one of the persistent shortcomings of Bolivarian attempts to establish robust  
mechanism of participatory governance, although the problem was in no way limited to the cooperative  
sector.
As of 2005, the “organized communities” still lacked sufficient investment in and control over  
public resources to encourage widespread interest in what the 2001 Guidelines had referred to as “social  
oversight” (contraloría social) and defined as:
...a strategy for which the organized communities are converted into effective guards of  
public administration in its various levels, to guarantee the suitability of the state's action  
in  the  development  of  programs  and  projects  directed  toward  the  improvement  of  
community  standards  of  living,  through  the  development  of  community  units  for  the  
monitoring and administrative control of the planned public agenda. (106) 367
367“...una estrategia para que las comunidades organizadas se conviertan en vigilantes efectivas de la gestión 
pública en sus distintos niveles, para garantizar la idoneidad de la acción del estado en el desarrollo de los 
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Social oversight clearly lies at the heart of the project of shared governance established in the Guidelines  
and it had not been sufficiently accomplished by the charismatic linkages that motivated the Bolivarian  
Circles and the hierarchical organization that structured the missions. These programs had gone further  
toward the creation of an innovative and progressive welfare state than they had toward the construction  
of a civil state.
Chávez and the Bolivarian government appear to have been keenly aware of this problem and  
their vision extended far beyond a renewed emphasis on the cooperative business model. In November of  
2004, Chávez publicly “encouraged citizens to form units of Contraloría Social in their neighborhoods in 
order to exercise some degree of vigilance and control over state-sponsored social programs” (Fernandes  
2010, 236). During that same month, he led a workshop for MVR leaders and outlined ten key objective  
of the Bolivarian movement's “New Strategic Map” ( Nuevo Mapa Estratégico) (Chávez 2005). Whereas 
the 2001 Guidelines had evidenced an economistic approach, only two of the ten objectives of the “new  
map” were primarily economic, and the first three on the list emphasized civil society structuration:
1) Advance in the constitution of a new social structure (social revolution, power to the  
poor),  2)  Articulate  and  optimize  the  new  communicational  strategy  (shared  
responsibility), 3) Rapidly advance in the construction of a new democratic model (popular  
participation) (Garrido 2004)368
The most important marker of this sustained shift toward a new framework for popular power was the  
emergence of an organizational entity called the communal council as the basic structuring component of  
the Bolivarian civil state.
The communal council first appeared as a relatively minor component of the 2002 Law of Local  
Councils of Public Planning (Ley de los Consejos Locales de Planificación Pública / LCLPP) which, in 
response to article 182 of the constitution, called for municipal mayors to preside over Local Councils of  
Public Planning (CLPPs) that would also include municipal council members, parish board presidents,  
programas y proyectos dirigidos al mejoramiento de los niveles de vida de las comunidades, mediante el 
desarrollo de unidades comunitarias para el monitoreo y control de gestión de la agenda pública plaificada.”
368“1) Avanzar en la constitución de una nueva estructura social (revolución social, poder a los pobres), 2) 
Articular y optimizar la nueva estrategia comunicacional (responsabilidad compartida), 3) Avanzar 
aceleradamente en la construcción del nuevo modelo democrático (participación popular)”
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and representatives of neighborhood and other social organizations. Under the 2002 law, CLPPs were  
tasked with promoting “the Network [sic] of parish and communal councils in each of the spaces of civil  
society that, in general, respond to the typical nature of the municipality” and the members of those  
councils “will be able to carry out oversight, control, and evaluation” of the projects approved by the  
CLPPs.369 The law thus conceived the communal councils as subcomponents of the parish councils, both  
of which were secondary to the CLPPs, which were to become the primary component of participatory  
governance at the local level (López & Añez 2005, 123 – 127). 370 The law did not, however, specify how 
the communal councils were to be organized.
Communal and parish councils  were again mentioned in the Fundamental  Law of Municipal  
Public Power (Ley Orgánica del Poder Público Municipal /  LOPPM) that was enacted in June of 2005 
and which finally replaced the puntofijista Law of Municipal Governance that had legally established the  
neighborhood associations.371 The LOPPM reiterated the framework created by the 2002 LCLPP and the  
role of the communal and parish councils within it. 372 The law also stipulated, in article 114, that “[t]he  
ordinances of the [CLPP] must regulate all aspects of the integration, organization, and functioning of the  
parish and communal councils”,373 but this only further cemented the authority of the CLPPs over the  
communal  councils  and  undercut  the  ability  for  the  councils  to  serve  as  effective  conduits  of  civil  
governance. In other words, a certain circularity was built into the role of the communal councils, whose  
existence depended on the CLPPs, and thus elected (and party supported) members of the municipal  
369“la Red de consejos parroquiales y comunales en cada uno de los espacios de la sociedad civil que, en general, 
respondan a la naturaleza propia del municipio”; “podrán realizar el seguimiento, control y evaluación”
370As Ellner (2009) points out, the CLPPs “ended up largely under the control of mayors who packed them with 
their own followers”.
371Article 7 of the LOPPM establishes “[t]he municipality and other local entities” as “primary spaces for civic 
participation in the planning, design, execution, control and evaluation of public administration”.; “[e]l 
Municipio y las demás entidades locales”; “espacios primarios para la participación ciudadana en la  
planificación, diseño, ejecución, control y evaluación de la gestión pública.”
372Interestingly, the LOPPM refers to the “transfer” (transferencia) of municipal public services to “organized 
communities and neighborhood groups” (comunidades y grupos vecinales organizados) (Article 260). This is in 
seeming contradiction to the passage from the 2001 Guidelines, cited above, which denied that “civic power” 
should be “transferred or ceded”.
373“La ordenanza del Consejo Local de Planificación Pública deberá regular todo lo relativo a la integración,  
organización y funcionamiento de los consejos parroquiales y comunales.”
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government, even though the councils were tasked with the social oversight of municipal government  
projects.
CLPPs  were  not  created  in  all  municipalities  and  very  few,  if  any,  networks  of  parish  and  
communal councils were created. Resistance to the CLPP framework resulted to some extent from a lack  
of political will on the part of municipal authorities, either due to mere institutional inertia or a willful  
aversion  to  ceding  authority  and power.  This  was  only  augmented  by  the  highly  polarized  political  
climate,  in  which  those  opposed  to  the  Bolivarian  movement,  including  municipal  officials  and  
oppositional  civil  society  organizations,  actively  resisted  any proposals  whatsoever  coming from the  
Chávez administration (133). These various modes of obstruction were at least partially enabled by the  
dependency of the council structure, as the mechanism of social oversight, on the municipal structure,  
which  maintained  the liberal  representative  model  of  democracy  and its  susceptibility  to  capture  by  
powerful interests.374
 The  CLPP framework  did  not  create  a  viable  basis  for  a  civil  state  but,  by  establishing  a  
rudimentary notion of the communal council, it did presage the more robust framework that would be  
elaborated through a series of policy statements and laws, beginning with the Law of Communal Councils  
(Ley de Consejos  Comunales)  in  2006. This  framework will  be discussed at  length in  the following  
chapter. What we have so far reviewed in this chapter is the evolution of Bolivarian civil society during 
the first seven years of the Chávez administration. We have seen that political exigency,  economistic 
preoccupation, institutional inertia, and the lack of a coherent vision all hampered the structuration of a  
participatory civil society with a determinative role on governance. Nonetheless, there is evidence for a  
374In 2004, the Torres municipality in the state of Lara elected a progressive mayor, Julio Chávez, from outside 
(and arguably to the left of) the MVR. Significantly, Chávez oversaw an innovative and radical overhaul of the 
structure of municipal governance, with the goal of maximizing public participation, but did not apply the 
structure called for in the 2002 LCLPP. Instead, he applied the model of the constituent assembly, which had 
been employed at the national level in 1999. This choice did not reflect opposition to the national Bolivarian 
movement, which he supported. In fact, the municipality was one of the first to adopt the communal council 
system following passage of the 2006 Law of Communal Councils (Harnecker 2008). The failure to create a 
LCLPP in Torres is indicative of the degree to which that framework was not viewed as a way forward even by 
local leaders most committed to participatory governance.
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consistent focus on and movement toward this goal. Early initiatives took the form of innovative and  
massive  welfare  projects  that  allowed  for  only  minimal  participation.  More  robust  channels  of  
participation in governance, like the water advisory councils and the CTUs, were isolated, restricted in  
scope, and not scalable. Nonetheless, these various efforts, in conjunction with a continual focus on the  
maximization  of  social  oversight,  contributed  to  the  design  of  the  more  systematic  approach of  the  
communal councils.
The broad outline of this history bears some similarity to that of the community media sector. As  
we will see, once broadcast community media was given a legal basis, the Bolivarian government sought  
to expand the sector via the contribution of considerable resources, but these flowed from centralized  
institutions outward, thus generating clientelistic tensions along the lines of the missions or Bolivarian  
Circles. This situation was exacerbated by the lack of a social governance structure, in other words a civil  
state, within which community media could be anchored. As a result, community media outlets had a hard  
time fulfilling their goal of making significant contributions to the process of social oversight. At the  
same time, there was no stable mechanism for communities to exercise strong social oversight over the  
media outlets. Nonetheless, important lessons were learned as the movement progressed and the need for  
a systematic overhaul became more pressing. Keeping the similarities of these trajectories in mind as we  
review the history of community media during the early years of the Chávez administration will enable us  
to better appreciate later attempts to integrate that sector with the communal council structure.
The Consolidation of the Community and Alternative Media Movement in the Early Years of the  
Bolivarian Republic
As might be expected, many members of the burgeoning Venezuelan community and alternative  
media movement were ardent supporters of Chávez and the Bolivarian revolution throughout the 1998  
elections. With the adoption of the new constitution in December of 1999, that support began to bear fruit.  
As Eekhout later recalled:
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The  Constitution  provided  a  legal  framework  for  community  media.  Until  then,  
community  media  were  essentially  illegal.  But  the  media  activists  participated  in  the  
constitutional process and got communication established as a human right. So community  
media were not only supposed to be legal, but protected and developed as a human right  
like health care or education. (Podur 2004a)
This arguably overstates the case; it seems more apt to say that the constitution provided a legal basis  
rather than a framework, as community media is not mentioned per se. In fact, article 108, which most  
specifically  addresses  the  media,  references  only  state  support  for  public  media  and  suggests  a  
progressive liberal model (see Velasco 2001, 143):
Communications media, public and private, shall contribute to civil education. The State  
will guarantee public radio and television services, and library and computer networks, in  
order to permit universal access to information. Educational centers will incorporate the  
knowledge and application of new technologies, and resulting innovations, in accordance  
with such requirements as may be established by law. 375
This does not, of course, preclude state support for a private system of civil society media, but when  
Bolivarian  community  media  advocates  point  to  a  constitutional  basis  for  state  support,  they  most  
commonly refer to articles 57 and 58. The latter of these, however, offers nothing that necessarily exceeds  
a liberal system:
Communication is free and plural, and involves the duties and responsibilities indicated by  
law.  Every person has the right  to  timely,  truthful,  and  impartial  information,  without  
censorship, in accordance with the principles of this Constitution, as well as the right to  
reply  and  corrections  when  they  are  directly  affected  by  inaccurate  or  offensive  
information. Children and adolescents have the right to receive information suitable to  
their overall development.376
There is, of course, room to argue that communication can be neither truly free nor inclusively plural, and  
that mediated information can not be truthful and impartial, outside of a radically participatory system,  
but the point here is that the formulation of this article adopts language common to many liberal states.
375“Los medios de comunicación social, públicos y privados, deben contribuir a la formación ciudadana. El 
Estado garantizará servicios públicos de radio, televisión y redes de bibliotecas y de informática, con el fin de 
permitir el acceso universal a la información. Los centros educativos deben incorporar el conocimiento y 
aplicación de las nuevas tecnologías, de sus innovaciones, según los requisitos que establezca la ley.”
376“La comunicación es libre y plural y comporta los deberes y responsabilidades que indique la ley. Toda persona 
tiene derecho a la información oportuna, veraz e imparcial, sin censura, de acuerdo con los principios de esta 
Constitución, así como a la réplica y rectificación cuando se vea afectada directamente por informaciones 
inexactas o agraviantes. Los niños, niñas y adolescentes tienen derecho a recibir información adecuada para su 
desarrollo integral.”
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The  potentially  transcendental  clause  of  the  Bolivarian  constitution  upon  which  which  state  
support for a system of participatory media can be founded is tucked into article 57:
Every person has the right to express freely his or her thoughts, ideas or opinions orally, in  
writing,  or  by  any  other  form  of  expression,  and  to  make  use  of  any  means  of  
communication and diffusion for such purpose ,  and no censorship shall be established. 
Anyone making use of  this  right  assumes full  responsibility  for everything expressed.  
Anonymity,  war  propaganda,  discriminatory  messages  or  those  promoting  religious  
intolerance are not permitted. Censorship restricting the ability of public officials to report  
on matters for which they are responsible is prohibited. (my emphasis) 377
Here,  too,  there  is  room for  interpretation.  To  say  that  a  citizen  has  the  right  “to  make  use  of”  a  
communications medium does not guarantee that they have  access to that medium. This would be the 
interpretation  that  has  predominated  in  the  liberal  tradition  and  which  understands  the  freedom  of  
expression in a negative sense, in that a citizen's expression can not be restricted by the state. In context, 
however, the clause seems to exceed that interpretation. The right to expression in any form is already  
guaranteed in the preceding clause, and the prohibition against censorship is established in the succeeding  
clause as well as the succeeding article. The only additional meaning that could therefore have been  
intended by the clause in question is a positive right to access that places a burden on the state to facilitate 
that access.
We can further contextualize this interpretation by looking at articles 99, 100 and 101:
Cultural  values  are  the  irrenounceable  property  of  the  Venezuelan  people  and  a 
fundamental right to be encouraged and guaranteed by the State, which will provide the  
necessary conditions, legal instruments, means and funding . The autonomy of the public 
administration of culture is recognized on such terms as may be established by law. The  
State  will  guarantee  the  protection  and  preservation,  enrichment,  conservation,  and  
restoration of the cultural heritage, tangible and intangible, and the historic memory of the  
Nation. The assets constituting the cultural heritage of the Nation are inalienable and not  
subject to embargo nor statute of limitations. Penalties and sanctions for damage caused to  
these assets shall be provided for by law.378
377“Toda persona tiene derecho a expresar libremente sus pensamientos, sus ideas u opiniones de viva voz, por 
escrito o mediante cualquier otra forma de expresión y de hacer uso para ello de cualquier medio de 
comunicación y difusión, sin que pueda establecerse censura. Quien haga uso de este derecho asume plena 
responsabilidad por todo lo expresado. No se permite el anonimato, ni la propaganda de guerra, ni los mensajes 
discriminatorios, ni los que promuevan la intolerancia religiosa. Se prohíbe la censura a los funcionarios  
públicos o funcionarias públicas para dar cuenta de los asuntos bajo sus responsabilidades.”
378“Los valores de la cultura constituyen un bien irrenunciable del pueblo venezolano y un derecho fundamental 
que el Estado fomentará y garantizará, procurando las condiciones, instrumentos legales, medios y 
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Popular culture constituting the national identity of Venezuela enjoys special attention,  
with recognition of and respect for intercultural relations under the principle of equality of  
cultures.  Incentives and inducements will be established by law for persons, institutions  
and communities that promote, support, develop, or finance cultural plans, programs and  
activities  within  the  country,  as  well  as  Venezuelan  culture  abroad.  The  State  will  
guarantee cultural workers inclusion in the social security system to provide them with a  
dignified  life,  recognizing  the  particularities  of  cultural  work,  in  accordance  with  the  
law.379
The State will guarantee the issuance, reception, and circulation of cultural information . 
Communications media have the duty of contributing to the dissemination of the values of  
popular tradition and the work of  artists,  writers,  composers,  motion picture directors,  
scientists,  and  other  cultural  creators  of  the  country.  Television  media  shall  include  
subtitles and translation into sign language for persons with hearing problems. The terms  
and modalities of these obligations will be established by law. (emphasis mine) 380
Here  we  can  also  find  support  for  both  liberal  and  more  progressive  interpretations  of  the  state's  
relationship to the media. Much depends on the interpretation of “culture” and “popular culture”.
The  mention  of  “cultural  heritage”  and  “historic  memory”  in  article  99  suggests  a  narrow  
interpretation  in  which  culture  is  understood from a  modern-  and paternalistic  liberal  conception  as  
something static that can be cordoned off and protected. Likewise, the mention of “values of popular  
tradition”  suggests  a  narrow  interpretation  in  which  popular  culture  is  associated  with  forms  of  
expression,  such  as  dance  and  artisanal  craftwork,  that  reflect  the  colonial  era  or  pre-colombian  
indigenous practices.381 This interpretation is reinforced by article 309, which reads: “Artisanship and  
presupuestos necesarios. Se reconoce la autonomía de la administración cultural pública en los términos que 
establezca la ley. El Estado garantizará la protección y preservación, enriquecimiento, conservación y 
restauración del patrimonio cultural, tangible e intangible, y la memoria histórica de la Nación. Los bienes que 
constituyen el patrimonio cultural de la Nación son inalienables, imprescriptibles e inembargables. La ley 
establecerá las penas y sanciones para los daños causados a estos bienes.”
379“Las culturas populares constitutivas de la venezolanidad gozan de atención especial, reconociéndose y 
respetándose la interculturalidad bajo el principio de igualdad de las culturas. La ley establecerá incentivos y  
estímulos para las personas, instituciones y comunidades que promuevan, apoyen, desarrollen o financien 
planes, programas y actividades culturales en el país, así como la cultura venezolana en el exterior. El Estado 
garantizará a los trabajadores y trabajadoras culturales su incorporación al sistema de seguridad social que les  
permita una vida digna, reconociendo las particularidades del quehacer cultural, de conformidad con la ley.”
380“El Estado garantizará la emisión, recepción y circulación de la información cultural. Los medios de  
comunicación tienen el deber de coadyuvar a la difusión de los valores de la tradición popular y la obra de los o 
las artistas, escritores, escritoras, compositores, compositoras, cineastas, científicos, científicas y demás 
creadores y creadoras culturales del país. Los medios televisivos deberán incorporar subtítulos y traducción a 
la lengua de señas, para las personas con problemas auditivos. La ley establecerá los términos y modalidades 
de estas obligaciones.”
381This is corroborated by the official English version of the Constitution, which translates “popular” as “folk”, 
thus rendering the phrases “folk cultures” and “values of folk traditions”.
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typical popular industries of the Nation will enjoy the special protection of the State, in order to preserve  
their authenticity, and they will receive credit facilities to promote production and commercialization.” 382 
We  need  only  recognize  the  difficult  baggage  carried  by  the  word  “authenticity”  to  see  that  the  
constitution's  emphasis  on “popular  culture”  is  linked to  essentialist  liberal  assumptions  of  progress,  
development, and modernity. In this sense, these articles reproduce an irony common to Latin America  
since the 1960s, in which progressive impulses can lead to a reactionary and rather conservative defense  
against “cultural imperialism”.
On the other hand, if culture and popular culture are interpreted broadly, to include evolving  
modes of creative production that engage with contemporary issues, genres, and styles, then these articles  
suggest a different range of outcomes. This broader and more progressive interpretation is supported by  
the reference to “cultural information” and the specific inclusion of motion picture directors and scientists  
within the category of “cultural creators”. It is also endorsed by language in article 98, which states that  
the  freedom of  cultural  creation  includes  “the  right  to  invest  in,  produce  and  disseminate  creative,  
scientific,  technical  and  humanistic  work”. 383 Under  this  wider  umbrella  there  is  room  to  envision  
guarantees for “the issuance, reception, and circulation of”, as well as “incentives and inducements” for,  
non-essentialized forms of Venezuelan media, such as investigative reporting, hip hop music, or comedic  
films, and some might argue that only a national system of participatory media could adequately respond.
In sum, the Bolivarian constitution is open-ended and somewhat ambiguous in relation to media  
and  culture.  It  undoubtedly  exhibits  a  progressive  intent,  and  there  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  it  
establishes a framework for participatory media that transcends the liberal order, but this remains open to  
interpretation. As such, its practical significance would ultimately depend on consequent state policy. Its  
immediate effect, however, was to encourage the cohering community and alternative media movement,  
382“La artesanía e industrias populares típicas de la Nación gozarán de protección especial del Estado, con el fin  
de preservar su autenticidad, y obtendrán facilidades crediticias para promover su producción y 
comercialización.”
383“el derecho a la inversión, producción y divulgación de la obra creativa, científica, tecnológica y humanística”
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which viewed the new constitution, optimistically, as providing considerable opportunity for advance. 384
Another important catalyst for the consolidation of the national movement was a palpable, though  
gradual,  shift  in CONATEL's attitude toward community media.  Soon after Chávez's inauguration, a  
representative from CONATEL visited TV Rubio with an invitation to a meeting in the state capital. As  
Manrique recalled, he and others from TV Rubio went, but not without a lingering mistrust that had been  
developed during the Caldera administration:
We went, because he said that he came on behalf of the government and wanted to hear the  
experiences of [community and alternative] radio and television.... That day we went with  
concern. And when we arrived... there were military police, there were buses, and we all  
said, 'That's it. They're going to put us all in the buses and they're going to take us to  
prison.' But I don't know why the buses were there, but they weren't for us.... And we  
remained in the meeting and the guy launched into a big speech, that the government was  
interested in hearing about the experiences and so on and so forth. And that CONATEL  
wanted to listen. (Manrique 2011)385
CONATEL's  newfound  willingness  to  listen  inspired  trust  and  optimism  among  community  media  
practitioners  who  were  invited  to  this  meeting.  Ayan  Vergara,  one  of  the  first  community  radio  
broadcasters in the state of Zulia, later recalled that:
[w]hen Chávez took office, we had already been transmitting for awhile and we thought  
that  they were going to  shut  us  down because a  government  was coming to install  a  
dictatorship.  But  the  exact  opposite  occurred,  I  have  to  recognize  and  I've  always  
reaffirmed,  that  President  Chávez's  CONATEL  was  more  receptive  than  in  other  
governments, they invited us to learn about our work with community radio stations, we  
met with them in Táchira when that had never occurred. (Ávila 2008, 44) 386
384On the other hand, many defenders of the status quo of Venezuela's commercially dominated media system 
argued that the constitution would lead to increased censorship and state control, due to the express mention of 
the educative and civic responsibilities of media providers (Velasco 2001).  Those opposed to the Bolivarian 
government have since wielded similar arguments in relation to other laws and policies, especially the Social 
Responsibility in Radio and Television Law (Ley de Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión / RESORTE) 
which was proposed in 2003 and adopted in 2004 (see below).
385“Nosotros fuimos, porque decía que venía de parte del gobierno y quería escuchar las experiencias de radio y 
televisión [comunitaria y alternativa]…. Ese día nosotros ibamos con temor. Y cuando llegamos… habían 
policía militar, habían autobuses, y todos dijimos, "Nada. Nos van a meter todos a los buses y nos van a llevar  
todos preso. Pero no sé porque estaban los autobuses allí, pero no eran para nosotros…. Y nosotros quedamos 
en la reunión y el tipo se lanzó en todo un discurso, dijo que el gobierno tenía interés en conocer a las 
experiencias y tal y cuestión. Y que CONATEL quería escuchar.”
386“Cuando Chávez asumió la presidencia, ya teníamos rato transmitiendo y pensábamos que nos iban acabar 
porque venía un gobierno a implantar una dictadura. Pero sucedió todo lo contrario, tengo que reconocer y 
siempre lo he reafirmado, que el Conatel del presidente Chávez fue más receptivo que en otros gobiernos, ellos 
nos invitaron para conocer nuestro trabajo con las emisoras comunitarias, nos reunimos con ellos en Táchira 
cuando nunca había ocurrido.”
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The  shift  in  attitude  was  neither  absolute  nor  immediate,  however,  and  the  assembled  practitioners  
remained cautious. As Manrique noted, “everyone talked, said … what they had to say. Or what they  
supposed could be said.  Because not everything was said.  Or it  wasn't  advisable  to  say everything”  
(Manrique 2011).387
The most important outcome of that meeting in Táchira, however, was not directly related to  
CONATEL. Although Manrique was already familiar with TV Michelena and the network of community 
media practitioners in Caracas, he only became aware of the extent to which community media had been  
growing in the western states when he saw them assembled that day. He described the connections forged  
at that meeting as the “genesis” of the Venezuelan Network of Community Media ( Red Venezolana de  
Medios  Comunitarios /  RVMC),  which  formed  in  “the  beginning  of”  (comienzos  de)  1999  (ibid., 
González 222).388 Manrique would be the driving force and president of the RVMC for the next eight  
years, during which time it would play a crucial role in the organization of Venezuela's community media  
sector.
By September of 1999, TV Rubio was being described as “part of a pilot program, developed by  
the  new  authorities  of  CONATEL,  for  the  development  of  alternative,  community,  and  educational  
communications” (Hernández 1999).389 This  designation does not seem to have brought any material  
support, but clearly there was real interest in the sector on the part of the new government. The first major  
test of the Chávez administration's commitment to community media, however, came in early 2000, as it  
set out to update the antiquated 1940 Law of Telecommunications (LOT). The formulation of the new law  
was indicative of the somewhat incoherent nature of Bolivarian policy in that period more generally. Once  
the new constitution was passed in December of 1999, the previously elected bicameral congress was  
dismissed,  but  the  new national  assembly  was  not  to  be  elected  until  July  of  2000.  In  the interim,  
387“todo el mundo habló, dijo ... lo que tenía que decir. O lo que supuso que podía decir. Porque todo no se dijo. O 
todo no convenía decirlo.”
388Both Castro & Rojas (2004, cited in Delgado & Guerrero 2008, 20) and Fuentes-Bautista & Gil-Egui (2011, 
258)  mistakenly place the formation of the RVMC in 1996.
389“parte de un programa piloto, desarrollado por las nuevas autoridades de Conatel, para el desarrollo de las  
comunicaciones alternativas, comunitarias y educativas”
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legislative duties were carried out by an appointed National Legislative Commission ( Comisión Nacional  
Legislativa), popularly known as the “little congress” (congresillo). The new LOT was one of the very 
few pieces of legislation passed by this body.
The  initial  formulation  of  the  new  LOT  was  heavily  influenced  by  the  Chamber  of  
Telecommunications Services  Businesses  (Cámara de Empresas de Servicios  de Telecomunicaciones , 
CASETEL), which sought to consolidate the privatized and deregulated order that had been put in place  
with Pérez's neoliberal reforms in 1991. CONATEL, which had been created as a result of those reforms,  
saw itself as an autonomous regulator whose goal was to ensure universal service but otherwise maintain  
a commercial marketplace for telecommunications service that would be open to foreign investment. As  
such, CONATEL also supported the initial, neoliberal proposal for the new LOT (González 222). 
Once this proposal was made public, however, members of the community and alternative media  
movement began to organize to change it. On March 10 th and 11th of 2000, “groups and collectives” from 
Caracas, Maracay, and the state of Lara met in Barquisimeto at “The Free Communication Meeting” ( El 
Encuentro  de  la  Libre  Comunicación).  One  of  the  principal  groups,  LibreCommunicación 
(FreeCommunication), described itself as “a front of various groups that work in alternative, free, popular,  
and/or countercultural communication”390. The nucleus of this group was a collective called Onda Libre 
(Free Wave) that had established Radio Catia Libre in the early 1990s (Manrique 2011; Hernández 2005,  
85).391 The RVMC, led by Manrique, was the second principal group, and these two were joined by  
“diverse  popular  organizations  that  work  in  popular,  community,  and  alternative  communication”  
(LibreComunicación 2000).392 These groups collectively drafted a “Manifesto of Free Communication”  
390“un frente de varios grupos que trabajan en comunicación alternativa, libre, popular y/o contracultural”
391Manrique referred to this collective as Onda Nueva (New Wave) in our interview, but it seems that he misspoke. 
González (2001), for example, seems to have an insider's knowledge of the organization around the LOT and is 
identified as “an activist and human rights researcher” (activista e investigador en DD. HH.) as well as a 
“member of the Free Wave collective” (miembro del colectivo Onda Libre).
392“diversas organizaciones populares que trabajan en comunicación popular, comunitaria o alternativa”; Alvin 
Lezama, who served as a consultant for CONATEL during the formulation of the LOT and would go on to 
become that institution's Director General in 2003, would later recall that “the community initiatives that had 
been working for some time in Venezuela from the Andes, from Catia TV [sic], and Vargas, among others, put 
together an assembly and carried a proposal to be included in the LOT” (Morales 2004, 39).; “las iniciativas  
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that  would serve as  the centerpiece in a campaign “around the right to  free communication and the  
freedom of access to the media on the part of communities”. 393. The Manifesto was presented on May 3,  
which is the UN's World Press Freedom Day, at a conference in Caracas on public services that had been  
organized by CASETEL, the Andean Commission of Legal Scholars ( Comisión Andina de Juristas), and 
the federal office of the Public Advocate (Defensoría del Pueblo). It was also made available online,  
allowing an opportunity for other groups to add their name to the list of supporters (LibreCommunicación  
2000).
The Manifesto ends with a list of six demands that are worth citing in full:
1) Official  recognition  of  the  community  media  sector  as  an  essential  component  of  
public service broadcasting and a vital contribution to pluralism in the media and the  
validity and enjoyment of the freedom of expression and information.
2) The creation on the part of the State of a public space for debate and consultation in  
which representatives of civil society and the organized communities (and not only  
private enterprise) participate in the design and instrumentation of communication and  
telecommunication policies, laws, and regulations.
3) A guarantee in the new Law and the new Regulations of Telecommunications that the  
assignation of  broadcasting frequencies, the technical criteria, and the priorities of  
development promote and incentivize the creation of media outlets on the part of non-
governmental organizations and organized communities, without establishing political,  
economic, administrative, technical, or any other type of barriers to the exercise of the  
right to inform and express oneself freely, beyond those imposed by the use of the  
limited resources of the broadcasting spectrum.
4) That  the  State  earmark  a  significant  amount  of  fiscal  revenues  from the  taxes  of  
telecommunication  businesses  in  order  to  institute  plans  for  the  development  and  
formation of cultural, community, and civic structures of communications.
5) That the so-called National Telecommunications Plan advanced by the State take into  
account  and  favor  the  existence  and  development  of  absolutely  autonomous  
community radio and television broadcasters with no type of official interference in  
the programming and emission of content.
6) The designation of a significant part of the broadcasting spectrum for use by micro-
broadcasters and community media outlets.394
comunitarias que tenían tiempo trabajando en Venezuela desde Los Andes, de Catia TV y Vargas, entre otras, 
hicieron una asamblea y llevaron una propuesta para incluirlo en la LOT"
393“en torno al derecho a la libre comunicación y la libertad de acceso a los medios por parte de las comunidades”
3941) El reconocimiento oficial del sector de los medios comunitarios como un componente esencial de la 
radiodifusión de servicio público y como contribución vital al pluralismo en los medios y a la vigencia y disfrute 
de la libertad de expresión e información. 2) La creación por parte del Estado de un espacio público para el 
debate y la consulta en el cual los representantes de la sociedad civil y las comunidades organizadas (y no solo 
la empresa privada) participen en el diseño e instrumentación de las políticas, leyes y normativas de 
comunicación y telecomunicaciones. 3) La garantía en la nueva Ley y el nuevo Reglamento de 
Telecomunicaciones de que la asignación de las frecuencias del espectro radioeléctrico, los criterios técnicos y 
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This list marks the first time that Venezuela's community and alternative media movement publicized a  
univocal set of concrete policy demands. It is also the last time that the movement would do so in such a  
concise and definitive form.
The  movement's  inability  to  return  to  such  cohesion  and  unity  has  been  due  in  part  to  the  
explosive growth experienced by the sector during the first half of the Chávez administration. This growth  
made it much harder, from a logistical point of view, to organize internal debate and produce unanimously  
or even widely endorsed documents. Beyond practical difficulties, however, the movement would also see  
a significant expansion in the scope of social and political-economic considerations that drove its attempts  
to influence state policy. As we will see, this expansion of scope would not only prevent concision but  
would lead to  significant  fragmentation within the  movement.  We will  review these  transformations  
below; they are noted here in order to introduce the notion that the community and alternative media  
movement, as of 2000, enjoyed a (seemingly) great degree of internal consistency precisely because it  
generally accepted the liberal framework of state governance. The Manifesto of Free Communication, in  
other words, is a progressive but still liberal policy document.
We can view this point from a slightly different angle by noting that the Manifesto's demands are  
restricted to the broadcasting sector. This limitation makes sense in the context of activism around a  
proposed  telecommunications  law,  but  it  is  also  suggestive  of  the  amicable  but  significant  division  
between  broadcasting  and  print-based  community  media  organizations  that  has  persisted  within  the  
movement to this day.  This division is, of course, primarily due to differences in the resources required  
las prioridades de desarrollo promuevan e incentiven la creación de medios por parte de las organizaciones no 
gubernamentales y las comunidades organizadas, sin que se establezca ningún tipo de barreras políticas, 
económicas, administrativas, técnicas o de cualquier otra índole para el ejercicio del derecho a informar y a 
expresarse libremente, más allá de las que impone el uso de los recursos limitados del espectro radioeléctrico. 
4) Que el Estado destine una significativa cuota de los ingresos fiscales provenientes de la carga contributiva de 
las empresas de telecomunicaciones para implantar planes de desarrollo y de formación de las estructuras 
culturales, comunitarias y cívicas de las comunicaciones. 5) Que el llamado Plan Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones que adelanta el Estado tome en cuenta y favorezca la existencia y desarrollo de emisoras de 
radio y televisión comunitarias absolutamente autónomas y sin ningún tipo de injerencia oficial en la 
programación y emisión de contenidos. 6) La atribución de una parte significativa del espectro radioeléctrico 
para el uso por parte de micro-difusores y medios comunitarios.
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and the policy considerations at play in relation to each medium, and it makes sense that community  
broadcasters would continue to have distinct concerns in relation to community newspaper journalists or,  
for  that  matter,  muralists,  theater  producers,  web  producers,  and  others.  What  was  absent  in  2000,  
however, and what would remain absent for at least another eight years, was an overarching conception of  
the role of community media in the construction of a socialist media system and a socialist state. In the  
absence of such a conception, the community media movement found itself pushing for policies and  
resources on a situational basis in an attempt to expand the bounds of the liberal framework. The most  
salient efforts occurred in relation to broadcasting because the liberal regulatory structure was especially  
dense  and  constrictive  in  that  sector.  While  this  somewhat  fragmented  approach  garnered  real  and  
significant  victories,  it  also  led  to  inconsistencies  and  inefficiencies  that,  although  they  continue  to  
hamper the sector, have spurred efforts to reorganize community media policy on a broad scale and in  
accordance with the emerging structure of the Bolivarian socialist state.
The community and alternative media movement's progression from a restricted set of concerns  
within a liberal framework toward an overarching structural model within a socialist framework is the  
primary  focus  of  this  chapter.  The  Manifesto  of  Free  Communication  can  serve  as  a  baseline  for  
measuring this shift, since it is a progressive liberal document in terms of its policy goals and rhetoric.  
For  example,  the  Manifesto  cites  the  historical  marginalization  of  popular  sectors  with  respect  to  
communication  and  a  tradition  of  “official  support  of  the  monopoly  of  broadcast  media  and  press  
promoted  by  sectors  of  economic  power”395,  and  it  argues  that  the  Bolivarian  government  was  
perpetuating  this  tradition  by  advancing  proposals  for  a  new  LOT  that  were  nothing  more  than  
“agreements negotiated between the State and private enterprise, that conceive of telecommunications as  
exclusively  economic  activities  and  have  been  especially  designed  to  take  advantage  of  the  fiscal  
opportunity offered by the opening of the telecommunications sector beginning in the year 2000” (which  
395“apoyo oficial al monopolio de los medios radioeléctricos y de prensa promovidos por los sectores de poder 
económico”
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had been determined by the liberalization schedule implemented by Pérez in 1991) . 396 The document 
goes on to declare “free and community practices of communication … essential for the creation of  
spaces that support the participation of citizens in a democratic process” and thus implicitly calls out the  
hypocrisy of a government “that bases its legitimacy on the deepening of democracy through the people's  
greater prominence and participation in social processes”. 397 All of this showcases the progressive ethos of 
a movement that was deeply skeptical of the liberal state apparatus.
Nonetheless, the rhetoric of the Manifesto remains decidedly liberal. For example, we have seen  
that it calls for the participation of “representatives of civil society and the organized communities” in  
policy debates. As mentioned above, the escalating polarization of Venezuelan politics in late 2001 would  
cement the division of these two rhetorical terms, with “civil society” applying almost exclusively to  
those opposed to the Bolivarian government.  In early 2000, however, the community and alternative  
media  movement  still  saw  itself  as  triangulated  between  an  unethical  commercial  sector  and  an  
untrustworthy state apparatus, and thus an important component of a progressive civil society acting in  
conjunction  with  popular  sectors  in  defense  of  the  democratic  ideals  of  the  liberal  tradition.  The  
movement's lingering distrust of the state also induced the Manifesto's authors to anchor their demands in  
the pronouncements of classic international liberal institutions, including the UN's declaration of freedom  
of  information  as  a  fundamental  human  right,  the  Organization  of  American  States'  Convention  on  
Human  Rights,  and  “the  principals  and  postulates”  ( los  principios  y  postulados)  of  AMARC.  The 
Manifesto does point to  articles 57, 58, 101, and 108 of the Bolivarian constitution, but there is  no  
reference to the ideals of the Bolivarian revolution or the person of Chávez, much less to the ideology of 
socialism, as would be common in the documents produced from within the movement in years to come.  
396“acuerdos negociados entre el Estado y la empresa privada, que conciben las telecomunicaciones como 
actividades exclusivamente económicas y han sido diseñados especialmente para aprovechar la oportunidad 
fiscal que ofrece la apertura del sector de las telecomunicaciones a partir del año 2000”
397“las prácticas de comunicación libres y comunitarias … esencial para la creación de espacios que apoyen la 
participación de los ciudadanos en un proceso democrático”; “que fundamenta su legitimidad en la  
profundización de la democracia a través de un mayor protagonismo y participación del pueblo en los procesos 
sociales”
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Moreover, in the highly polarized political battles that would play out over the next decade, both the  
Convention on Human Rights and an important declarations from AMARC would be wielded by those  
opposed to the Bolivarian government and its  allies,  including the community and alternative media  
movement.
As for the specific goals of the Manifesto, the most decidedly liberal is the call for community  
media to be recognized as “an essential component of public service broadcasting”, which is to say a  
subset  of  the  existing  liberal  media  system,  as  opposed  to  a  basis  for  a  radically  democratic  and  
transformatively hegemonic media system, as in the socialist model. The remaining demands tend to  
reinforce  this  conception  of  community  media  as  inherently  alternative,  as  opposed  to  potentially  
hegemonic.  This  distinction,  as  discussed  in  chapter  one,  is  crucial.  We  will  see  that  later  on  the  
opposition to the Bolivarian revolution would adopt this same rhetoric in order to argue that it supports  
community  media,  but  that  the  model  of  community  media  sought  by  the  Bolivarian  movement  is  
corrupted precisely because it seeks to become hegemonic. Arguments around this point can become  
quite tangled, but they come down to the nature of the relationship between the state and community  
media practitioners. The key idea here is autonomy, which is central to both liberal and socialist notions  
of a free media system.
In the previous chapter we saw that the neighborhood movement ultimately fragmented around  
differing conceptions of autonomy in relation to civil society, and that its notion of autonomy in relation  
to community media revolved around the idea of self-sustenance, principally through contributions by  
members. We examined how this conception was designed to preserve the community media sector's  
autonomy from the state and political parties, but that it nonetheless placed it in an implicitly dependent  
relationship on the status quo of the capitalist political economy. This notion of autonomy is thus in line  
with a neoliberal conception of the liberal order.
The Manifesto, meanwhile, calls for “the existence and development of  absolutely autonomous 
community radio and television broadcasters with no type of official interference in the programming and  
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emission of content” (emphasis added), but it  places itself  in a different relationship to the political-
economic order than that assumed by the Neighborhood Movement. It does this by coupling its call for  
autonomy with a call for the state to “earmark a significant amount of fiscal revenues from the taxes of  
telecommunication businesses in order to institute plans for the development and formation of cultural,  
community, and civic structures of communications”. As such, it socializes the sector's dependence on the  
capitalist order in order to offer a progressive liberal framework for the sustenance of community media.  
It does not even attempt to explain, however, how the state's allocation of these funds would be conducted  
in a manner that does not impinge upon the community media sector's autonomy. This is a key issue for  
this chapter, precisely because it becomes ever more important as the community and alternative media  
movement begins to align itself with the Bolivarian revolution and integrate with the burgeoning socialist  
state. In other words, Bolivarian efforts to construct a counter-hegemonic community media system return  
us to the overarching question of chapter two, in which we reviewed the generally failed attempts of Latin  
American socialist states to foster and  support an autonomous participatory media system anchored in  
civil  society.  The Manifesto's  attempt to  support  “absolute” autonomy via  state  distribution of  fiscal  
revenue is a progressive liberal solution, but it anticipates the question of autonomy in a socialist state  
because it relies on the state to manage resource allocation in the community media sector.
The Movement for Free Communication opens up another crucial question for this chapter, since  
we will be tracking the dialectical relationship between civil society and the state as the driving force  
behind the evolution toward a Gramscian civil state. To be sure, in 2000 the community and alternative  
media movement was merely focused on carving out space for community media within the liberal order,  
but in order to do so they enlisted the support of the aforementioned federal office of the Public Advocate, 
which  had  been  established  by  the  Bolivarian  constitution  to  aid  citizens  in  such  advocacy  efforts  
(González 2001). Thus, a tool created by the constitutional Constituent Assembly enabled the community  
and alternative media movement to advocate for official recognition. This recognition helped grow the  
movement, which then contributed to other state initiatives. In recognition of these contributions, the state  
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has attempted to further integrate the community media sector into the emerging socialist framework by  
providing additional resources and restructuring the legal framework, and the movement has responded  
by continuing to support the state. Though oversimplified in the above summary, the existence of this  
dialectic is unquestionable. The nature of the dialectic, however, has been the subject of considerable  
debate. Bolivarians would argue that the state and the organized communities (civil society) are working  
together, with a shared ethics and vision, to create 21 st Century Socialism, which we understand here to be 
a civil state. Opponents of the Bolivarian revolution, on the other hand, would argue that the state, in a  
manner similar to 20 th century socialist governments, is merely appropriating civil society to reinforce its  
authoritarian,  if not dictatorial, control over society. As suggested above, and as we will endeavor to  
illustrate below, there is evidence for both tendencies. Neither, however, were fully developed during the  
debates over the LOT, when the movement's advocacy and the state's concessions operated within the  
inherited liberal framework.
Returning  to  our  historical  account,  the  pressure  generated  by  the  Movement  for  Free  
Communication persuaded CONATEL and the Little Congress to create space for contributions from the  
community media sector, with the result that the final version of the new LOT made Venezuela one of the  
first  Latin  American  nations  to  officially  recognize  community  broadcasters.  The  LOT  mentions  
community broadcasters in several articles, but the crucial language is in article 200, which reads:
The state will promote the existence of non-profit, public service community radio and  
television broadcasting stations as media for the plural and transparent communication and  
action  of  the  organized  communities  in  their  respective  area.  Their  rules,  planning,  
characteristics, requirements, and limitations will be determined by means of a regulation,  
in  accordance  with  the  National  Telecommunications  Plan  and  the  National  Table  of  
Frequency Band Assignments.398
The  LOT,  being  a  fundamental  law,  did  not  spell  out  the  details  of  the  newly  legitimated  sector's  
operation. Those would have to wait for the authorization of a specific set of regulations. Beyond the  
398“El Estado promoverá la existencia de estaciones de radiodifusión sonora y televisión abierta comunitarias de 
servicio público, sin fines de lucro, como medios para la comunicación y actuación, plural y transparente, de las 
comunidades organizadas en su ámbito respectivo. Su régimen, ordenación, características, requisitos y 
limitaciones se determinarán mediante reglamento, en concordancia con el Plan Nacional de 
Telecomunicaciones y el Cuadro Nacional de Atribución de Bandas de Frecuencia (CUNABAF).”
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official recognition and basic intent articulated in the above article, the only specific information provided  
in relation to community broadcasters was found in article 158, which enabled the president to totally or  
partially exonerate community broadcasters from special telecommunications taxes.
The inclusion of  community broadcasters  imparted a  significantly  progressive element to  the  
LOT, which also called for one percent of the gross revenue of commercial telecommunications providers  
to finance a Universal Service Fund (articles 54 - 62, 151) as one component of the state's compliance  
with the law's guarantee of universal service (article 49). The LOT also outlined the rights of citizens in  
relation to  telecommunications and called for  the state  to  promote the creation  of  non-governmental  
organizations that were meant to defend those rights in conjunction with the Public Advocate (article  
201). While CONATEL has made innovative use of the Universal Service Fund, the user associations  
have never reached fruition (see Corporación Andina de Fomento 2004, 6-7). 399 On the whole, subsequent 
observers have viewed the LOT, which endorsed “free” market competition and “minimized the idea of  
government as representative of the public interest” (Fernandes 2010, 196), as an extension of Pérez's  
neoliberal  reforms.  Certainly  this  is  the  sentiment  of  those  within  the  Bolivarian  revolution.  Alvin  
Lezama, who served as a consultant to CONATEL during the formulation of the LOT and rose to become  
that institution's General Director in 2003, recalled that:
[w]e followed the guidelines of neoliberalism: we made a number of rules more flexible to  
favor the companies, thinking that way service would arrive to more regions of the country  
and to  a  vaster  sector  of  the  population....  we  fell  into  the  trap  of  neoliberalism,  the  
precepts of the World Trade Association (Lezama 2006). 400
In a 2009 speech before the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, who served as General Director of  
CONATEL during the formulation of the LOT, called it as a “neoliberal Law” and, in what he referred to  
as “self-criticism”, stated that “perhaps the only good thing in that Law, truly, is that it gives space to the  
communities to organize themselves” (Cabello 2009). 401 
399CONATEL's annual reports on the Universal Service Fund can be accessed online at: http://www.conatel.gob.ve/
400“[s]eguimos las líneas del neoliberalismo: flexibilizamos unas cuantas reglas para favorecer a las compañías  
pensando que así le llegaría el servicio a más zonas del país y a un sector más vasto de la población.... caímos 
en la trampa del neoliberalismo, los preceptos de la Organización Mundial del Comercio” 
401“Ley neoliberal”; “autocrítica”; “quizás lo único bueno que tiene esa Ley, verdaderamente, es que se le da 
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Whether  properly  neoliberal  or  not,  the  leaders  of  Venezuela's  largest  telecommunications  
enterprises certainly lauded the LOT at the moment of its adoption  (ANMCLA [Mar 25] 2008). As  
Manrique (2011) recalled, “We scored a goal... because the private sector didn't realize the move made by  
the  [community media] sector.... [who it saw as] the little poor people, the fools, the popular classes”. 402 
Whether the private sector didn't notice or, as seems more likely, it was simply unconcerned about the  
inclusion of a community media sector that seemed infinitesimally marginal, the state of affairs made the  
official signing ceremony a rather unique event, at least in retrospect. On hand to observe were Diego  
Cisneros  and  Marcel  Granier,  the  presidents  of  Venevisión  and  RCTV,  respectively,  as  well  as  
representatives from the Movement for Free Communication, including Manrique and Eekhout. 403 Within 
just two years, following the attempted coup of April 2002, these sectorial leaders would be, ideologically  
if not personally, the bitterest of foes. In July of 2000, however, they could all find something to praise in  
the  LOT,  which  is  emblematic  of  Bolivarian  policy  during  the  first  several  years  of  the  Chávez  
administration.404 As discussed above, while there was clear evidence of a commitment to progressive and  
even participatory initiatives, there was still no overarching policy framework and considerable space was  
provided for the continuance of inherited economic policies.
Between  the  LOT  and  the  Attempted  Coup:  Further  Consolidation  and  Growth,  Early  
Fragmentation within the Movement, and the Liberal Framework of the Regulations
The LOT was a significant and concrete step in the ongoing dialectic between the Bolivarian  
government and the community and alternative media movement, and it contributed to the growth of the 
sector in at least three interrelated ways. First, it inspired greater commitment to community media on the  
espacio a las comunidades para que se organicen”
402"Nosotros metimos un gol… porque el sector privado no se dió cuenta de la jugada del sector. Los pobresitos,  
los bobitos, los populares.”
403Manrique did not recall with exactitude which members of the movement were on hand, but he noted those he 
could recall by their first names. Besides himself and Blanca [Eekhout], there were Ricardo [Márquez] and 
Wilfredo [Vasquez] (from Catia TVe), Gorka (from LibreComunicación), and Andy (affiliation unknown).
404The LOT was published in the Official Gazette (Gaceta Oficial) of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela on 
June 12, 2000, but the signing ceremony did not take place until July.
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part of groups and individuals who had been at the margins of the movement. We will discuss a founding  
member of TV Petare as an example. Second, it brought the community and alternative media sector to  
the attention of Hugo Chávez, who recognized its potential and personally advocated on its behalf in key  
moments over the next several years. In this section, we will discuss Chávez's personal involvement in  
relation to Catia Tve, and we will also look at some early forms of assistance provided by municipal and  
national institutions. Third, while the LOT officially recognized community broadcasters, the parameters  
and  procedures  for  their  licensing  and  operation  were  to  be  spelled  out  in  a  corresponding  set  of  
regulations. The process of organizing around the formulation and adoption of these regulations provided  
a vital opportunity for the further consolidation of the movement and its continued engagement with the  
Bolivarian  government.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  necessity  of  formulating  legal  criteria  for  
community broadcasting opened up a significant rift in the burgeoning movement. We will discuss these  
vectors of evolution in relation to the RVMC. 
Petare  is  a  parish  and  the  capital  of  the  eastern  Sucre  Municipality  of  Caracas.  Once  an  
independent  town,  Petare  was  incorporated  into the metropolitan  area  in  the second half  of  the 20 th 
century as Caracas expanded. Like so many other sectors of the city, immigrants established informal  
neighborhoods on the steep slopes surrounding Petare, which grew into the largest and most populous  
conglomeration of barrios in Caracas. Charles Méndez grew up in Petare, where his family had always  
supported  leftist  political  ideas.  In  the  1990s,  Méndez  was  active  in  the  “grassroots  movement”  
(movimiento de base) that supported Chávez's call for a constituent assembly. Following the adoption of  
the Bolivarian constitution, he joined with six friends and fellow  chavistas who were inspired by the 
media activists of that decade to explore the idea of working in community media. As Méndez recalled:
in that period the Network [RVMC] didn't exist, ANMCLA didn't exist, nothing existed.  
There was simply a movement that identified us... There was a vanguardist movement  
from here in Caracas, in Catia. I remember that they would invite me, the crew: 'Come on,  
come on, a clandestine community radio!', that [type of] stuff. (Méndez 2011) 405
405The National Association of Community, Free, and Alternative Media (Asociación Nacional de Medios 
Comunitarios, Libres, y Alternativas / ANMCLA) will be discussed in detail below.
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Some members of the group had studied sociology or economics but had little practical experience with  
media, but one had been involved in the cineclub movement, another had earned an undergraduate degree  
in filmmaking in Cuba, and Méndez had worked for over a decade as a technician at RCTV. Méndez and  
his  colleagues  were  thus  inclined  more  toward  television  than  radio,  but  even  with  their  mix  of  
enthusiasm and diverse knowledge the group struggled to find a path forward until the approval of the  
LOT:
We had been around for two years, but the idea was very vague... not even the structure of  
the state,  nobody was prepared to establish community radio and television stations....  
With articles 57 and 58 of the constitution, you were guaranteed truthful [and] timely  
communication, freedom of expression, all that stuff... [but] we had only the constitution.  
It was – for us, it was... ephemeral, the reality of having a television station, but there was  
the experience  of  Colombia,  the  experience of  all  of  Latin  America,  the international  
experiences of community radio and television stations. Therefore we had the dream that,  
well, if we had achieved in the constitution that they approved those articles, we had the  
hope that with the Telecommunications Law articles would be introduced that would give  
legal  cover  for  our  alternative  media.  And  that  was  achieved.  When  the  LOT  was  
approved, we saw that it was possible... a path opened, but there was still much ground to  
cover. And we started to work.406
As it turned out, establishing  TV Petare would require many years of work. By the time  the 
station finally went on the air in 2008, Méndez would be the only remaining member of the original  
group. We will discuss the difficulties he encountered further below, but here we should underline two  
related points.  First,  that  the legal  recognition delivered by the LOT was instrumental  in  converting  
sympathetic but reserved activists into the founders of a television outlet with its own identity and history.  
Unless otherwise noted, all information pertaining to TV Petare and all quotes from Méndez are drawn from my 
interviews with him.; “en esa epoca no existía la Red [RVMC], no existía ANMCLA, no existía nada. 
Simplemente había un movimiento que nos identificaba…. Había un movimiento vanguardista desde aquí en 
Caracas, en Catia. Yo me acuerdo que a mí me invitan, los panas, 'Vengan, vengan - Una radio clandestina 
comunitaria, es[e tipo de] vaina.”
406“Teníamos dos años, pero la idea era muy vaga… ni siquiera la estructura del estado, nadie estaba preparado 
para conformar radios y televisoras comunitarias..... Con los artículos 57 y 58 de la constitución, te garantiza la  
comunicación veraz [y] oportuna, la libertad de expresión, todo esa vaina… [pero] teníamos nada más la 
constitución. Era muy - para nosotros, era… efemero, el hecho de tener una televisora, pero venía la 
experiencia de colombia, la experiencia de todo latinoamérica, las experiencias internacionales con radios y 
televisoras comunitarias. Entonces tuvimos el sueño de que, bueno, si habíamos logrado en la constitución que 
aprobaban estos artículos, teníamos la esperanza que con la Ley de Telecomunicaciones se introdujeran los 
artículos que nos dieran cabida legal a los medios alternativos. Y eso se logró. Cuando se aprueba la LOTEL,  
nosotros vimos que era posible … se abrió un camino, pero todavía había mucho camino por recorrer. Y 
empezamos a trabajar.”
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In other words, the legitimation provided by the Bolivarian government created space for less daring  
and/or more constrained activists to participate in the community media sector. Second, these activists  
were not entirely new to the sector, but had been drawn to it partly as a result of the decades of efforts  
discussed  in  chapter  three.  As  mentioned,  one  early  member  of  TV Petare was  active  in  both  the 
Bolivarian  and  the  cineclub movements.  Méndez's  personal  history,  however,  provides  an  important  
example of the intertwined nature of community-based media and political activism.
Fe y Alegría maintained a cultural and athletic center in the neighborhood where Méndez grew  
up, and the priests that ran the center used a mobile sound system to broadcast the afternoon prayer and  
announce social services. Méndez recounted that “from the community organizations, there were people  
that asked for space to put on cultural programs on that mobile sound system. That was the experience of  
the sector where I lived.”407 In fact, during the 1970s his father had used the sound system on Sundays at  
7am to host a program featuring contemporary Venezuelan music. Méndez reflected that, “[i]n my case,  
that  experience  meant  a  lot  to  me....  I  understood  what  could  be  achieved  with  a  communication  
medium... Hell, if a mobile sound system worked to organize an entire community... what couldn't you do  
with a television station?”408
Méndez's desire to work specifically with television did not develop until the 1980s, however. He  
had studied electrical engineering at a technical high school and, during school vacations, he worked at a  
shoe store owned by a Spanish immigrant. Méndez was unable to afford university studies  after high 
school, but he remained friends with the sons of the shoe store's owner, one of whom earned a degree in  
engineering, became head of RCTV's videotape division, and offered Méndez a job. Méndez worked at  
RCTV from 1983 until 1996 and he managed to earn a university degree during this time. Nonetheless, he  
felt stifled at RCTV due to his class and race. For example, RCTV sent many of its workers to train in  
407“desde la organización comunitaria, hubo gente que pidió espacio para montar programas culturales en esa 
radio parlante. Esa fue la experiencia del sector donde yo vivía.”
408“[e]n mi caso, me sirvió mucho esa experiencia.... Entendí lo que se puede lograr con un medio de 
comunicación… Coño, si una radio parlante servía para organizar a toda la comunidad… con una televisora,  
qué no se puede hacer?”
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Cuba,  but  Méndez  was  never  offered  that  opportunity  “because  I  was  black,  a  poor  man  from the  
barrio.....  I  experienced  discrimination,  racism,  everything.”  Méndez,  who  was  especially  skilled  in  
special effects, found himself passed over for promotions by people with much less experience but better  
connections to the decision makers. Méndez's dissatisfaction with RCTV also extended to the content it  
produced:
I  was  always  critical  of  the  generation  of  content  that  was  done  in  [commercial]  
televisión.... Really, no space was given for [popular] venezuelan culture.... When a black  
person like myself appeared on television it was to be ridiculed, to be stigmatized. The  
roles performed by black people in the dramas that were produced here were the thug, the  
delinquent, the thief, the drug trafficker. That was the characterization of the black man on  
television.... And the [black] women were the prostitute, the salsa dancer, the schemer... It  
was all the negatives.409
Méndez's inclination toward community media was a product of his family, professional, and political  
histories, but it may have gone undeveloped had he not become involved with a movement of likeminded  
activists that successfully lobbied for legal recognition of their activities. The legitimation provided by the  
LOT inspired  them to  continue  moving forward  and  ultimately  led  to  the creation  of  TV Petare as 
Caracas' third community television broadcaster, alongside TV Caricuao and Catia TVe.
While TV Caricuao has the longer history,  CatiaTVe is by far the most well known community  
television channel  in  Caracas.  This  status  is  due primarily  to  the central  role  it  has  occupied in  the  
community and alternative media movement, as well as the rather conspicuous support it has offered to  
the Bolivarian revolution. Both of these, in turn, were to a great degree enabled by the station's relatively 
central physical location within the country's most important city. Another vital factor in the renown of  
Catia TVe, however, was its early association with President Chávez himself, and that relationship was  
catalyzed by the community and alternative media movement's organization around the LOT.
The first moment of personal contact between Chávez and Catia TVe has been enshrined in the 
409“Siempre fui crítico de la generación del contenido que se hacía en [la] televisión [commercial]…. Realmente, 
no se le daba cabida a la cultura [popular] venezolana… cuando saliá un negro, así como yo, en televisión era 
para ser ridiculizado, para ser estigmatizado. Los papeles que ejercían los negros en los dramáticos que se 
producían aquí eran el malandro, el delincuente, el ladrón, el traficante de droga. Eso era la caracterización del 
negro en la televisión…. Y las mujeres [negras] era la prostituta, la salsista, la intrigante… Era todos los  
negativos."
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lore of the station's history and is often recounted to the groups of international tourists that visit its  
premises.  The encounter is sometimes couched as a moment of discovery, when Chávez both learned of  
and immediately recognized the potential of community media. Eekhout, for example, has offered this  
summary:
At the beginning of 2000, President Chavez was in Catia for a public event. Some of our  
people  went  to  interview  him,  identifying  themselves  first  as  being  from  "CatiaTV,  
community television." He said: "What do you mean, community television?" When he  
heard what we were doing,  he realized how important  it  was to  support  it.  But  other  
members of the government didn’t realize. (Podur 2004b)
If there has been a mild tendency to mythify the moment, Catia TVe is also nonetheless responsible for  
revealing the more nuanced historical truth by including footage of the meeting in a video documentary of  
the station's history.
The event actually occurred in July of 2000, weeks after the LOT had been officially approved  
and on the eve of the official signing ceremony. At this time, the members of the Cineclub Manicomio / 
Linterna  Magica  were  in  the  process  of  constructing  a  40  watt  UHF transmitter,  based  on  the  one  
Manrique had constructed for TV Rubio, and establishing a broadcasting station in space they had rented  
within the Jesus Yerena General Hospital in Lidice, which is near Manicomio (Manrique 2011; Eekhout  
and Fuentes 2001, 479, cited in Schiller 2009, 88). 410 They were not yet on the air, nor were they using the  
name Catia TVe; on the night before Chávez's visit to Catia, several members of the group had created a  
mic flag (the box below the head of the microphone that identifies a news outlet) which read “Community  
Television of the West” (Televisora Comunitaria del Oeste) (Historia de Catia TVe 2006).411
The Catia TVe crew approached Chávez on the street, amidst a scrum of reporters, onlookers, and  
members of his entourage. In the footage of the interview, Eekhout can be heard asking, “Mr. President,  
what do you think of  the creation of community radio and television stations which is  what we are  
410In the Catia TVe documentary, Eekhout can be heard explaining to Chávez that they were already broadcasting 
via radio (presumably an allied community station) and that they were a month away from broadcasting their 
video signal. Later the transmitter is described as being “barely 30 watts” (Historia de Catia TVe 2006).
411In the documentary, Márquez identifies Monica Gil, Leafar Guevara, Wilfredo Vásquez, and Blanca Eekhout as 
the members who created the mic flag.
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developing? The social property of the communication media?” 412 To which Chávez replies:
Well, that is marvelous. I have to congratulate you because... you have advanced – you are  
like the vanguard  of  a  struggle that  is  now going to  be  done with much more force,  
because, as you know, tomorrow I am going to put into effect, in the afternoon, the new  
Law of Telecommunications and it appears noted, precisely, in a very extensive and very  
precise  set  of  articles,  that  the  communities  have  the  right  to  establish  and  manage  
community  communication  media.  Continue  forward  and  leave  that  example.  I  
congratulate you.413
Moments later, engaged in a more direct conversation with Eekhout, Chávez adds:
...look, the idea is that even the Bolivarian schools, little by little we are advancing in that,  
also  function...  and  the  children  even  make  programs  and  record  things  themselves,  
interviews, they participate, that is marvelous. That is the democracy that we want, the  
democracy of the people.414
Finally, Chávez calls over Vice Minister Alejandro Andrade and explains:
I want to help them.... I want you to go see where they are and in what things we can help,  
ok? And, in addition, to see the model, to explain it to people in the whole country, in  
Guasdalito, in San Fernando, in Delta Amacuro, so the people learn how beautiful it is to  
participate... (ibid.)415
Chávez's words are significant on several levels. First, they demonstrate his style of charismatic  
politics and his knack for positioning himself as a populist leader. Second, they reveal that Chávez was  
already familiar with the concept of community broadcasting and the provisions made for it in the new  
telecommunications law. Third, they indicate the importance that the Bolivarian movement placed on the 
concept of participation, and that Chávez recognized community media as a significant manifestation  
thereof. At the same time, however, we see that he alludes to two different visions of community media.  
In  his  association  of  community  media  with  media  production  by  school  children,  he  invokes  the  
412“Señor Presidente, qué piensas de la creación de emisoras y televisors comunitarias que es lo que estamos 
desarrollando nosotros? La propiedad social de los medios de comunicación?”
413“Bueno, eso es maravilloso. Tengo que felicitarlos porque… se han adelantado, son como la vanguardia de una 
lucha que ahora se va a hacer con mucho más empuje, porque, como tu sabes, yo mañana voy a poner de 
ejecutarse, en la tarde, a la nueva ley de telecomunicaciones y aparece señalado, precisamente, en un articulado 
muy extenso y muy preciso, que las comunidades tienen derecho, el derecho a gestionar y manejar medios de 
comunicación comunitarias. Sigan adelante y dejen ese ejemplo. Los felicito.”
414“...mira, la idea es que incluso las escuelas Bolivarianas, poco a poco vamos avanzando en eso, funcionen 
también… y los niños inclusos hagan programas y graban ellos mismos las cosas, entrevistas, participen, eso es 
maravilloso. Eso es la democracia que queremos, la democracia de la gente.”
415“Yo quiero ayudarlos a ellos…. Queiro que vayas a ver donde estan ellos y en que cosas podemos ayudar, ok? Y 
además ver el modelo para explicarselo a gente en todo el país, a Guasdalito, en San Fernando, en Delta 
Amacuro, que la gente vaya aprendiendo lo bello que es participar, no te parece?”
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alternative discourse of community media, in which it is inherently marginal, non-professional, and not  
competitive with commercial or state media. Nonetheless, his identification of Catia TVe as a vanguard, 
and his instruction to spread the model across the nation, invokes the counter-hegemonic discourse, in  
which community media can displace the institutional apparatuses of commercial and state media. In his  
future pronouncements, Chávez would abandon entirely the alternative discourse, associated as it is with  
the  liberal  understanding  of  civil  society,  and  cast  community  media  as  a  vital  component  of  the  
Bolivarian counter-hegemonic media apparatus.
As it turned out, Andrade never followed through and  Catia TVe did not gain any  immediate 
assistance from the encounter. Márquez recalled going to CONATEL to follow up, but “they didn't hear  
me in  that  moment,  or  they  didn't  take  me into  account”  ( ibid.).  Later  that  year,  however,  Eekhout 
attended a cultural awards ceremony where she was able to deliver to Chávez an invitation to the official  
inauguration of Catia TVe on the 15th of December. Chávez responded saying that he was engaged on the  
date they had selected but that he would be available on the 20 th of that month. When officials from 
CONATEL heard about the planned inauguration, however, they objected strenuously, arguing that, since  
the regulations corresponding to the LOT had not been finalized, the station could not operate legally.  
According to Eekhout, “[t]he President replied that it was legal according to the constitution, and the  
regulations would have to catch up. Finally, some changes were made to the regulations, and CatiaTV  
[sic] became official” (Podur). In actuality, the regulations would not be finalized for another year, but  
Chávez  did  apparently  intervene  in  some  manner.  CatiaTVe  was  given  provisional  authorization  to  
broadcast and the official inauguration ceremony was finally held on March 31, 2001.
Chávez's  comments  during  the  inauguration  ceremony  indicate  the  degree  to  which  he  had  
sharpened his views on community media as a component of the Bolivarian revolution. As he entered the  
room, a man called out, “Hugo, here you are going to hear the good things that are happening in our  
country!” To which Chávez replied, “Of course, and the bad too... Neither good nor bad, let's say that  
we're  going to  leave aside classifications.  The opinion of the people....  And the alternatives  and the  
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projects of the people. And what's more, we're going to go to battle against lies.” 416 During his official 
statement, Chávez added: “So now it won't be Chávez alone on the networks, no now we also have  
TeleCatia [sic], in the hands of the people, because it's the people that [make] battle. A television station  
that isn't managed by economic interests, that is marvelous. That is indeed freedom” (Historia de Catia  
TVe  2006).417 Here  Chávez  has  already  abandoned  any  hint  of  classifying  community  television  as  
marginal, casting it instead as a viable counter-hegemonic alternative to the commercial media that will  
spread the truth of popular social movements.
Chávez used this discourse and his aura to raise the stature of community media in general and  
Catia TVe especially, and the effect was tangible. For example, student activists from the UCV, who were  
part  of  a  movement  against  the  privatization  of  the  university,  saw  the  Catia  TVe inauguration  on 
television and, recognizing a potential ally, went to the studios. One of the activists, Gabriel Gil, later  
recalled that “Catia [TVe] was the first that went to cover with other eyes the protests that we were  
doing.”418 Gil himself became an active member of the Catia TVe staff and went on to serve as Director in  
2008 and 2009, before becoming Vice Minister of Communications and Information and then taking a  
managerial position at a state owned television channel (Gil 2011). 419 Behind the scenes, meanwhile, 
Chávez's  support  seems to  have  been  key  in  helping  Catia  TVe get  off  the  ground.  Not  only  were 
arrangements  made  to  get  around  CONATEL's  objections  regarding  the  regulations,  but  Catia  TVe 
enjoyed a “small grant” from a state ministry, as well as funding from the state oil company ( Petroleos de  
Venezuela, S.A. / PDVSA).420 When hospital officials complained about the heavy traffic in and out of the  
416“Hugo, aquí vas a oír de las cosas buenas que están pasando en nuestro país!"; “Claro, y la mala también… Ni  
buena ni mala, digamos que vamos a dejar de clasificaciones. La opinión del pueblo…. Y las alternativas y los 
proyectos del pueblo. Y además, vamos a armar una batalla contra la mentira.”
417“Entonces ya no estará Chávez solo en las cadenas, no ahora también tenemos a TeleCatia [sic], en las manos 
del pueblo, porque es el pueblo que [da] la batalla. Una estación de televisión que no esté manejada por 
intereses economicos, este es maravilloso. Eso así es libertad.”
418“Catia fue la primera que fue a cubrir con otros ojos las protestas que nosotros [hacían].”
419Gil was Vice Minister of of Strategy in the Ministry of Communications and Information (Ministerio para la  
Comunicación y la Información / MINCI) from April of 2009 to April of 2010 while Blanca Eekhout served as 
Minister. He then became Programming Coordinator (Coordinador de Programación) at Visión Venezuela 
(ViVe), the community-oriented state broadcaster discussed further below.
420Schiller states that the grant came from MINCI but no ministry was established under that specific name until 
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space, the ministry stepped in again to help Catia TVe rent space in the Venezuelan National Library for  
recording and editing (while the transmission equipment remained on the hospital premises) (Schiller 88).  
With this assistance from the state, Catia TVe, was able to broadcast two hours daily to a potential  
audience of one to three million people. 421 In actual practice, however, “the signal [was] often unreliable  
due to weather and the uneven terrain of the Caracas valley.” Nonetheless, by late 2001, the station's  
“focus shifted from local concerns specific to Manicomio to a broader effort to use media as an activist  
tool throughout poor neighborhoods of west Caracas” ( ibid). Under the aura of Chávez,  CatiaTVe had 
surged forth to become the country's most recognized community television station, but it was only the  
most salient new addition to a growing community television sector.
In 2000, the Escuela Popular in Maracay used a small UHF transmitter constructed by Manrique  
(from  TV Rubio) to establish their own community television station. According to Flores (2011), the  
members of the Escuela Popular decided to name their new station Teletambores (Teledrums) “because 
the drum here in this zone or at the Latin American level ... informs(,) ... brings together(,) ... as a result of  
the  drum  the  people  communicate  and  come  together.” 422 For  their  early  broadcasts,  members  of  
Teletambores housed their equipment in the house of friends living in the Camburito neighborhood of the  
Francisco Linares Alcántara municipality on the outskirts of Maracay, but within a year strong winds had  
blown down the antenna and Teletambores began operating out of the house of Maria Santini, one of the  
founding members. Whereas  Catia TVe, like  TV Rubio,  could make use of mountainsides to transmit  
across entire valleys, Teletambores operated on flat land and, according to Briceño (2011), could only  
transmit 500 to 750 meters in any direction. The station operated on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays  
from 6 to 9 PM, thus becoming Venezuela's fourth open-air community television broadcaster. 423 The 
2002. If the grant did not come directly from CONATEL, it is possible that it came from the Ministry of 
Infrastructure, to which CONATEL was attached in 2001.
421Eekhout and Fuentes (2001, 479; cited in Schiller 88) give a figure of one million, whereas Manrique (2011) 
estimated three million.
422“porque el tambor aquí en esta zona o al nivel latinoamericano… comunica... reune… a raíz del tambor la gente 
se comunica y se aglutina”
423Community television was not the only medium to expand outside of Caracas and the direct support of 
government institutions. In Zulia, for example, at least four community radio stations were established in 2001 
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members of Teletambores, especially Thierry Deronne, would become important figures in the alternative  
and community media movement at the national level.
Chávez's engagement with Catia TVe was only the most salient aspect of an expanding interest in  
community media on the part of government institutions in the years following the passage of the LOT.  
For  example,  the  Foundation  for  Culture  and  the  Arts  ( Fundación  para  la  Cultura  y  las  Artes  / 
FUNDARTE) attached to the office of the mayor, expanded on its program to develop  cineclubes (see 
chapter 3) by establishing an Alternative Communication Unit ( Unidad de Comunicación Alternativa) 
that facilitated the establishment of four  cineclubes, four community newspapers, and four community  
radio stations around Caracas (Benítez 2008, 74). 424 At the national level, alternative and community  
media were mentioned in the “Guidelines of the National Social and Economic Development Plan 2001 –  
2007” as a component of the “sub-objective” to “[g]uarantee the enjoyment of universal and equal social  
rights”, as well as a subcomponent of the strategic goal of “[a]rticulating the process of decentralization  
with participation in social policies”. 425 The language in the Guidelines tends to cast community media  
within the alternative discourse familiar to liberalism, noting that they “can be utilized as icons in the  
intervention  of  demands  and  necessities  in  the  areas  of  education,  health,  the  environment,  citizen  
participation, food, and co-responsibility in free access to information and transparency” (102-3) and that  
they:
support the process of the democratization of communication, with the development of  
instruments and alternative communication media necessary for social dialogue, cultural  
resistance, self-education, diffusion of typical interests and organizing experiences, and of  
exercising active and participatory democracy. (116) 426
(Delgado & Guerrero 2008, 23; Iguaran et al. 2008, section 4.3.10).
424The cineclubes were created in the parishes of 23 de Enero, Caricuao, La Vega, and El Valle. The newspapers 
were El
Clarín de San Juan (San Juan), El Torrense (La Vega), 23 en Positivo (23 de Enero), Epa Parroquia (El Recreo). 
The radio stations were Radio Alí Primera, Radio Macarao and Radio Senderos de Antímano.
425“[g]arantizar el disfrute de los derechos sociales de forma universal y equitativa”; “[a]rticular el proceso de 
descentralización con participación en las políticas sociales”
426“pueden ser utilizadas como inconos en la intervención de las demandas y necesidades en las áreas de 
educación, salud, ambiente, participación ciudadana, alimentación y corresponsabilidad en el libre acceso a la 
información y la transaprencia”; “apoyan el proceso de democratización de la comunicación, con el desarrollo 
de instrumentos y medios de comunicación alernativos necesarios para el diálogo social, la resistencia cultural, 
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In late 2001, CONATEL joined with CONAC and other organizations to establish a National Center of  
Production  for  Community  Radio  and  Television  (Centro  Nacional  de  Producción  para  Radio  y  
Televisión Comuitaria)  that,  “[i]n addition to  functioning as  a  database that stores  different  types of  
programs, also should provide training and refresher courses, as well as courses in the management of  
maintenance for the conservation of equipment” (Velandia 2002). 427 It is unclear, however, whether the  
National Center ever operated and there is no evidence to suggest that it played a significant role in the  
subsequent development of the community media sector.
Despite the official recognition of community broadcasters established by the LOT, in 2001 no  
community  broadcaster  was  operating  legally  except  Catia  TVe,  which  had  secured  provisional 
authorization through Chávez's intervention. For the community and alternative media movement, the  
next task was to push CONATEL to pass the regulations that would detail the parameters and procedures  
for the licensing and operation of community broadcasters. Members of the movement met at the regional  
level throughout the first half of 2001 to draft proposals (González 2001, 223). These then became the  
basis for discussions at the first National Meeting of Community Media ( Encuentro Nacional de Medios  
Comunitarios) which was held in Rubio and promoted by the RVMC, led by Manrique from TV Rubio  
(Manrique 2011).428
Rather than producing a unified proposal,  however, the meeting in Rubio resulted in a sharp  
division within the community and alternative media movement that would persist for at least another five  
or so years. As Manrique put it, “Nothing came out of that first meeting.... In fact, there were almost  
la autoformación, la difusión de los propios intereses y de las experiencias organizativas y de ejercicio de la 
democracia participativa y protagónica.”
427“[a]demás de funcionar como un banco de datos que almacene distintos tipos de programas, también debe 
proporcionar cursos de formación y actualización, así como de gerencia de mantenimiento para la conservación 
de los equipos.”
428González (2001) offers a somewhat different account than that given by Manrique, calling a meeting in Caricuao 
“the most significant” of the regional meetings, “from which came a proposal for the regulations, that was later 
enriched with contributions from other regions at a national meeting in Rubio” (223).; “el mas significativo... de 
donde salio una propuesta de reglamento, que fue luego enriquecida con aportes de otras regiones en un 
encuentro nacional en Rubio.”
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fistfights.”429 On one side of the divide was the RVMC, which was primarily composed of groups from  
Táchira, Barquisimeto, Lara, Ciudad Bolivar, and other states outside of Caracas. The other side of the  
fissure was dominated by voices from Caracas. We will therefore adopt Manrique's shorthand and refer to  
those opposed to the RVMC as the “centralists” ( centralistas), though this must be understood in terms of  
geography, not ideological orientation. The differences between these two factions can be described, on  
one hand, in terms of their general attitude and, on the other, in relation to their specific policy goals. The  
centralists are generally considered to have been more radical on both counts.
The  RVMC was  primarily  interested  in  consolidating  the legal  recognition  of  the  sector  and  
establishing  a  framework  that  would  permit  the  continued  operation  and  growth  of  the  sector.  As  
Manrique explained, “for us it was a point of honor to have the permits.... If we had already operated  
without permits, with permits we could do lots of good things. We could look for financing.” 430 Here we 
must  recognize  community  media  cast  in  a  classically  liberal  notion  of  civil  society  in  which  state  
recognition allows for resources to be obtained from the private sector. This conception rests on a notion  
of autonomy similar to that expressed by the Neighborhood Movement, especially the  Escuela, in the 
1980s.
The centralists, on the other hand, believed that resources for the community media sector should  
come from the state, not – or at least in addition to – the private sector. In Manrique's recollection, the  
centralists'  goal during the meeting in Rubio was to create a new organization, in substitution of the  
RVMC, that would take on the task of administering the state funds. Manrique and those in the RVMC  
considered this as a power grab. Whether or not the intention was to wrest power from the RVMC, we can  
recognize the proposal as  a  quite  progressive manifestation of  liberalism or  even as  a  move toward  
socialism. We should note,  however,  the emphasis  on establishing administrative control within civil  
society, not the state, which also reinforces the widely held view that the centralists operated from a loose  
429“De ese primer encuentro no salió nada.... Inclusive, casi hubo peleas.”
430“para nosotros era un punto de honor tener los permisos.... Si ya habíamos operado sin permisos, teniendo 
permisos podíamos hacer muchas cosas buenas. Podíamos buscar financiamiento.”
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core  of  anarchist  ideals  which  demanded  that  power  be  vested  almost  entirely  in  the  organized  
communities. There was thus a tendency toward what we have been describing as a Gramscian civil state,  
but in the absence of any thorough and explicit proposals describing a broader vision for the functioning  
of community media in relation to the state and other instances of civil society, we should go no further  
than to note this as one of a mixed set of tendencies emanating from the centralists, not a platform or  
doctrine.
As a result of the repression of community broadcasting experienced during the puntofijista era 
(by 2001 known as the Fourth Republic), both sides of the fissure exhibited a deep distrust of the state  
apparatus. Méndez, of  TV Petare, noted a slogan that was in use by many within the community and  
alternative media movement at the time: “The government is a friend and the state is an enemy.” 431 In 
other words, trust was high in Chávez himself, and in certain officials within his administration, but on  
the whole the state apparatus was still largely populated by officials and bureaucrats who maintained a  
Fourth Republic mindset and were reluctant or altogether unwilling to act in favor of the ideals expressed  
in the Bolivarian constitution that founded the Fifth Republic. Mistrust of the state did not prevent the  
RVMC, however, from seeking dialogue and negotiated solutions. The centralists, however, were more  
radical on this point as well. They adopted a much more confrontational approach, often choosing public  
protest, sometimes violent, over partnered dialogue. Though grounded in fact, this tendency may have  
loomed larger in reputation than in actual practice. As we will see, in 2002 the centralists created a formal  
organization of their own which has entered into several important  agreements with state institutions. 
The division between these two factions of the community and alternative media movement can  
be seen as the product of the two overlapping but distinct vectors of activism that we identified in chapter  
three.  We  saw  that  in  the  highly  urban  context  of  Caracas  several  factors,  including  more  salient  
conditions of dire poverty, a higher concentration of politically charged activism, a greater proximity to  
powerful institutions, and a more heated application of state repression, created a climate in which many  
431“Tenemos un gobierno amigo, y un estado enemigo.”
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community media practitioners viewed themselves as activists aligned with leftist ideals and movements.  
In the provinces, however, a different rhythm of daily life, a tradition of civil society more focused on  
culture, a lesser proximity to powerful institutions, a less intensive political climate, and a less repressive  
pattern  of  state  repression  created  a  climate  in  which  community  media  practitioners  understood  
themselves primarily in terms of cultural facilitators. Manrique's reflections reinforce this understanding:
[The centralists] were more chavista than Chávez, to put it that way, and [the RVMC] was  
a bit more conservative.... [The centralists] have been a little more radical and those that  
were in the provinces were less radical, they came from a distinct process.... Many of those  
that are in Caracas come from the militancy of the Left.... [T]he people that were here [in  
the  provinces],  the  popular  movements  that  were  here,  [were]  less  left  [and]  more  
cultural.432
To be sure, the geographic division was not absolute. For example, the members of Catia Tve were among 
the more leftist practitioners of community media during the 1990s and therefore maintained friendly  
relations  with  the  centralists,  but  they  also  played  a  principal  role  in  the  RVMC  both  during  the  
formulation of the regulations and afterwards (Eekhout 2011). At the same time, because some rural areas 
and smaller cities had more militant traditions of political activism, or merely due to the predilections of  
particular collectives, the centralists attracted allies from outside Caracas. Nonetheless, though further  
research is certainly in order, distinct social contexts seem to have contributed significantly to two general  
patterns of development that eventually produced a debilitating tension between two tendencies within the  
community and alternative media movement.
According  to  Manrique  the  immediate  result  of  the  fissure  that  opened  during  the  national  
meeting in Rubio was that the RVMC took it upon itself to “unilaterally” approach CONATEL in an effort  
to  propel  the  formulation  and   adoption  of  the  regulations.  During  the  negotiations  over  the  LOT,  
Manrique and the other representatives from the community media sector had developed a close rapport  
with Jesse Chacón, the Director of CONATEL. As Manrique recalled, “We had a magnificent relation  
432“[Los centralistas] era[n] más Chavista que Chávez, para decirlo así, y [la RVMC] era un poco más 
conservador…. [Los centralistas] han sido un poco más radicales y los compañeros que estaban en la provincia 
eran menos radicales, venían de otro proceso distinto.... Muchos de los campañeros que están en Caracas 
vienen de la militancia de la izquierda…. [L]a gente que estuvo aquí [en la provincia], los movimientos 
populares que habían acá, [fueron] menos izquierda [y] más cultural.”
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with Jesse. Going to CONATEL was like going to our house.” 433 It was not difficult, therefore, for the  
RVMC to arrange for a series of meetings to negotiate the text of the regulations. In the first of these,  
perhaps a dozen members were present; Manrique recalled representatives from TV Rubio, TV Michelena, 
Catia TVe,  Teletambores, “some radio stations from Lara, [and] some people from Ciudad Bolivar”, as  
well as members of the collective that would later form a television station called  Canal Z (discussed 
below).434 “We all created the proposal together and we defended it together [before] the technocrats.” 435 
Manrique's terminology is significant because, although they felt comfortable with Chacón, things were  
often more tense with the employees of CONATEL who sat across the table from the RVMC. These  
functionaries would generally have had engineering backgrounds and been used to the neoliberal model  
of commercial telecommunications (Lobo 2011). Few, if any, would have identified with the Bolivarian  
movement. Nonetheless, the RVMC was committed to dialogue and, as Manrique put it, “for us it was  
very easy to negotiate with CONATEL.... We could agree, we could advance.... We fought with them and  
would come out of that.”436 The result was that in mid-2001, after what Manrique estimated as eight to ten  
sessions, both sides agreed to a draft proposal.
CONATEL  attempted  to  invite  outside  participation  in  the  negotiation  process  by  posting  
successive versions of the proposal to the Internet and soliciting public input. As González pointed out,  
however, this was only a feeble solution, since: 
...the  process  of  participation  has  seen  itself  affected  by  …  the  lack  of  facilities  to  
participate in the design of the regulations. Following the same pattern that was settled on  
in the process of the design of the [LOT], the regulatory authorities of the sector facilitated  
the successive versions of the regulations, but they haven't sufficiently favored the opening  
of the doors for dialogue. Additionally, CONATEL has a tendency little in keeping with  
the national reality of favoring participation through the internet, a medium that is still  
today of minority access in the country. (223) 437
433“Nosotros tuvimos una magnifica relación con Jesse... nosotros llegamos a CONATEL como a casa.”
434“una radios de Lara, [y] una gente de Ciudad Bolívar”
435“La propuesta la hicimos entre todos y la defendimos entre todos [ante] los tecnócratas.”
436“Para nosotros fue muy facil negociar con CONATEL.... Pudimos acordar, pudimos avanzar, pudimos 
articular…. Pelearon con ellos y que saliera de eso.”
437“...el proceso de participacion se ha visto afectado por ... la falta de facilidades para participar en el proceso de 
diseno del reglamento. Siguiendo la misma pauta que se concretó en el proceso del diseno de la [LOT], las 
autoridades reguladoras del sector facilitaron las sucesivas versiones del reglamento, pero no han propiciado lo 
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Nonetheless,  CONATEL  received  30  responses.  Many  of  them  came  from  the  same  groups  that  
participated in  the negotiating sessions,  but both AMARC and Radio Fe y Alegría  contributed their  
observations. Although CONATEL had closed the official response period in May, representatives of the  
centralist faction went to CONATEL in September of 2001 and demanded to be heard. Manrique believes  
that “[t]hey didn't much manage to have an impact on the proposal that we had presented... because...  
[they] went to insist, to fight, to say that everything was bad.” 438 CONATEL, however, agreed to hold four 
additional sessions to accommodate the centralists and “they proceeded together to modify those articles  
where they reached agreement. This collective [the centralists]  claimed to be satisfied with some 80  
percent of the regulations” (CONATEL 2003).439
The regulations were approved by the Council of Ministers ( Consejo de Ministros) on November 
3, 2001 and went into effect on January 8, 2002, when they were published in the Official Gazette as  
Presidential  Decree  number  1521.440 Despite  CONATEL's  attempts  to  foster  public  dialogue,  the  
regulations  were primarily  marked by  the  vision  of  the RVMC and the technocratic  expectations of  
CONATEL.441 The result was a document cast in the liberal mold and this outcome would have significant  
repercussions for the community media sector over the decade to come. Here we will attempt to identify  
the  most  important  aspects  of  the  regulation  so  that  we  can  trace  their  effects  on  the  practice  of  
community media and subsequent attempts to reorganize community media policy. First, we will discuss  
the technocratic requirements imposed by CONATEL and the difficulties they created for community  
suficientemente la apertura de las puertas para el dialogo. Adicionalmente, CONATEL tiene una tendencia poco 
acorde con la realidad nacional de propiciar la participacion a tra· ves de internet, medio que es alin hoy en dia 
de acceso minoritario en el pais.”
438“[e]llos no lograron mucho incidir en la propuesta que nosotros habíamos presentado... porque… [fueron] a  
exigir, a pelear, a decir que todo estaba malo.”
439“se procedió en conjunto a modificar aquellos artículos donde se llegaron a acuerdo. Este colectivo [los 
centralistas] manifestó estar satisfecho con un 80 por ciento del reglamento”
440Manrique believes that the regulations took several months to be approved due to resistance among high officials 
in the Chávez regime and that they would not have been approved at all if it were not for the personal 
intervention of Jesse Chacón.
Presidential Decree number 1552, published on the same date, exonerates licensed community 
broadcasters from paying the taxes established in the LOT. This decree corresponds to article 158 of the LOT.
441Without providing specifics, Morales (2004, 40) notes that AMARC also contributed to the process.
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media broadcasters. Second, we will examine the notion of autonomy as it is manifest in the regulations  
in relation to both political and economic control. Third, we will analyze the framework established for  
the interaction of community broadcasters with their communities and civil society more generally.
As noted above, in 2001 many CONATEL officials continued to operate with the technocratic  
mindset pertinent to the liberal framework within which the agency had been created. They were not  
necessarily averse to incorporating community media into the broadcasting regime, but they insisted on  
attaching stipulations modeled on their experience with commercial broadcasters. These were established  
in article 5 of the regulations, which enumerates the required elements of an application for a community 
broadcasting license, including justification of the “technical viability” ( viabilidad técnica) of the project, 
its “economic viability and sustainability” ( viabilidad económica y sostenibilidad), and the articulation of 
a valid “social profile” (perfil social), which is to say that applicants were required to demonstrate how  
the broadcaster would achieve the social goals mentioned in the regulations (and discussed below).
For applicants from the popular sector whose educational and/or professional backgrounds did  
not  include  the  formulation  of  such  studies,  the  vague  requirements  of  the  regulations  could  seem  
daunting and the representatives from the RVMC feared they would created unnecessary hurdles that  
would limit popular participation. As Manrique explained, “[t]he community sector wasn't prepared to do  
it. Why have an economic project where you prove that sustainability and economic viability exists for  
five years? How was that going to be explained if the popular sector has never had money?” 442 At the 
same time, he understood why CONATEL felt that these studies were necessary. CONATEL wanted to be  
“armored” (blindado) against any accusations that a community broadcasting license had been awarded  
capriciously and the studies would provide evidence that it had carried out due diligence. Recognizing  
that CONATEL would not back down on these demands, Manrique and his team accepted their inclusion,  
but only within a pre-conceived framework for minimizing their impact on future applicants.
442“[e]l sector comunitario no estaba preparado para hacerlo. Porque tener un proyecto económico donde tu 
pruebes que existe la sostenabilidad y la viabilidad económica de aquí a cinco años? Cómo se iba a exponer si 
nunca el sector popular ha tenido plata?”
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As  for  the  technical  study,  they  were  able  to  convince  CONATEL  that  issues  related  to  
broadcasting power, antenna placement, and spectrum allocation were almost always going to be beyond  
the  ken  of  future applicants.  As  such,  the  regulations  included a  “transitory  provision” ( disposición  
transitoria) which stated that during the first year after the regulations went into effect CONATEL “will  
offer technical support to Community Foundations with the aim of promoting them.” 443 In actual practice, 
CONATEL performed the technical studies itself and, though rarely in a timely fashion, they seem to have  
continued to do so well beyond the indicated first year. While this ensures the orderly use of the radio  
spectrum,  it  also  created  an  opportunity  for  at  least  the  perception  that  CONATEL  favored  the  
broadcasting  applicants  for  whom  it  provided  this  service,  thus  ironically  undercutting  an  initial  
motivation for the studies, which was to protect CONATEL from charges of favoritism.
In order  to  further  simplify  the process,  in  May of  2002 CONATEL created  models  for  the  
economic and social studies (CONATEL 2003). The RVMC, however, had already decided to take the  
matter into its own hands. Its members joined forces to create the economic and social studies for the first  
five applicants to come from its ranks. This allowed for the formulation of a standardized model that,  
once  the  initial  studies  had  been authorized  by  CONATEL,  could  then  be  replicated  and used  with  
minimal  modification  by  future  applicants.  As  Manrique  summed it  up,  “...after  the  first  five  were  
achieved... the rest are going to be... very easy for everyone else. Take the model, assemble the model,  
this is like this, make the move, bim boom bap, present [it] and that's all.” 444 This system of employing 
models has allowed CONATEL to have the “armor” it desired without placing a major obstacle in the way  
of aspiring broadcasters, but it has also reduced the studies themselves to formulaic fodder. In the end, the  
various  studies  can  be  seen  as  components  of  a  technocratic  liberal  bulwark  that  largely  failed  to  
contribute  to  the  goals  of  sustainability  and  social  integration  while  also  negatively  impacting  the  
autonomy of community media broadcasters. The potential loss of autonomy resulting from CONATEL's  
443“ofrecerá apoyo técnico a las Fundaciones Comunitarias con el objeto de promoverlas”
444“...despues de que se lograron los cinco primeros… los demás van a ser… muy facil para todos los demás. 
Tomense el modelo, armen el modelo, esto es así, echen la jugada, bim boom bap, presenten y eso es todo.”
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assumption of the technical studies is especially ironic given the regulations' adhesion to a traditionally  
liberal notion of autonomy in which civil society is sharply separated from the state. This framing of  
autonomy can be seen within the regulations in relation to the structure of community broadcasters, their  
content, and their source of revenue.
In formulating the regulations, CONATEL and the representatives of the community broadcasting  
sector had a difficult time deciding what kind of organization would be permitted to obtain a community  
broadcasting license. No existing model seemed to embody the necessary characteristics, so they were  
forced to adapt the existing model of a foundation, as specified in Venezuela's civil code, into a legal  
personality that the regulations identify as a “community foundation” whose model would be determined  
by CONATEL (Méndez 2011). Article 21 of the regulations provides the key distinction of a community  
(as  opposed  to  a  traditional)  foundation:  “...they  must  foresee  democratic,  participatory  and  plural  
mechanisms, for both the election and the exercise of the function of the authorities or organs of direction,  
administration, and control.”445 The same article goes on to specify that the administrative authority of the  
community foundation can be comprised of no more than nine members who can occupy their position  
for no more than three years and must reside in the geographic area served by the broadcaster.
In  order  to  assure  the  autonomy of  community  foundations,  article  22  specifically  prohibits  
certain categories of persons from serving as board members. Included in these prohibitions are: “public  
civil servants occupying high level posts”, “active members of the military”, “leaders in any level of  
political parties or electoral groups”, and “leaders or representatives of unions or chambers [i.e. business  
associations]”.446 Also excluded were “operators of services of radio and television broadcasting”, those  
who  occupied  administrative  positions  in  such  broadcasters,  board  members  of  other  community  
broadcasters, and persons linked or related to them. 447 Finally, only one board member could come from  
445“deberán prever mecanismos democráticos, participativos y plurales, tanto para la elección como para el 
ejercicio de las funciones de las autoridades u órganos de dirección, administración y control.”
446“funcionarios públicos que ostenten cargos de alto nivel”; “militares activos”; “dirigentes en cualquier nivel de 
partidos políticos o grupos de electores”; “dirigentes o representantes de gremios o cámaras”
447“operadores de servicios de radiodifusión sonora y televisión abierta”
317
any  particular  church.  Clearly  visible  in  these  prohibitions  is  an  attempt  to  protect  community  
broadcasters from co-optation by the most powerful blocks of the corporatist puntofijista system of civil 
society. Along these same lines, but in terms of content, article 26 absolutely prohibits the transmission of  
“partisan or proselytizing messages of any nature”, thus specifically decoupling community broadcasters  
from party politics and religious persuasion. 448 
Economic autonomy for  community broadcasters  was another  goal  of  the regulations,  which  
provided for multiple sources of revenue from the private sector. Article 19 states that “[t]he assets of the  
community  foundations,  made  up  of  contributions,  donations,  or  grants,  will  be  able  to  come from  
members of the community where the service is provided … or from other people but never from radio or  
television broadcasting operators.”449 Further, the provision of these assets can not imply “subjection to  
conditions different from those established in the present Regulations.” 450 Article 20, meanwhile, specifies 
that “income obtained through the offering of community radio and television broadcasting services”  
must be reinvested in the operations of the community foundation. 451 While those services are not limited  
by the regulations, they are only specified in relation to advertising and program sponsorship. Article 30  
allows for five minutes of advertising per hour from “natural persons”, “small and mid-size businesses”  
located in the community, and “large industries” and “natural persons” from other communities, so long  
as these two latter categories do not comprise more than fifty percent of the total. 452 Finally, article 31 
allows for the sponsorship of programming by “natural or legal persons, domiciled or not within the  
area”, who would be entitled to place a message of no longer than five seconds, up to four times per hour,  
that includes “auditory or visual messages of the name or logo of such businesses or public entities”. 453 
448“mensajes partidistas o proselitistas de cualquier naturaleza”
449“[e]l patrimonio de las fundaciones comunitarias, constituido por aportes, donaciones, o subvenciones, podrá 
provenir de miembros de la comunidad donde se preste el servicio ... o de otras personas pero nunca de 
operadores de radiodifusión sonora o televisión abierta.”
450“sujeción a condiciones diferentes a las establecidas en el presente Reglamento”
451“ingresos obtenidos por la prestación de los servicios de radiodifusión sonora comunitaria y televisión abierta  
comunitaria”
452“personas naturales”; “pequeñas y medianas industrias”; “grandes indstrias”
453“personas naturales o jurídicas, domiciliadas o no dentro de la localidad”; “mensajes auditivos o visuales del 
nombre o logo de tales empresas o entes públicos”
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The only instance in which the government is specifically mentioned as a source of revenue is thus in  
relation to sponsorship, but the regulations clearly foreground the private sector as the primary source of  
financial sustainability.
In this regard the regulations accord with the desire of Manrique and the RVMC to establish a  
legal  basis  upon  which  community  broadcasters  would  be  able  to  achieve  their  own  financial  
independence. To do so, they would operate as non-profit entities but compete to some degree in the  
commercial marketplace for publicity. We can locate this model firmly within the liberal tradition of civil 
society and, given the leeway provided for advertising, even place it toward the neoliberal end of that  
spectrum. In this regard, the impulse was once again very close to that of the Neighborhood Movement,  
especially as articulated by the  Escuela. Of course, just as donations and grants were to be explicitly  
detached from any influence on the operations of the broadcasters, the limitations on advertising were  
also  meant  to  protect  the  community  foundations  from  being  controlled  by  their  advertisers.  An  
unintended effect of these limitations, however, was to narrow the opportunities for funding. In retrospect,  
Eekhout (2011) noted this as one of the primary “weaknesses” (debilidades) of the regulations:
There's nothing [similar to these limitations] that regulates the media in general, private or  
public,  but  the  restrictions  on  community  media  are  much  more  firm.  Why  is  that?  
Because this was being done from the perspective of understanding community media as  
an instrument in the hands of the people, as an instrument of the people, as a non-profit. 454
Eekhout's lament, in other words, is that any attempt to ensure autonomy within the liberal framework of  
civil society seems to result in a mitigation of opportunities. By reducing the scope of advertising for  
community broadcasters, the regulations worked to handicap and thus marginalize their operations, just as  
has occurred for decades within liberal orders that adopt the alternative discourse of community media.
As noted above, the centralist faction of the community media movement anticipated this turn of  
events and thus had argued for state funding that would be distributed by an association of community  
454“No hay nada [similar a estos limitaciones] que regule los medios en general, privados o públicos, pero las  
restricciones a los comunitarios son mucho más firmes. Eso porqué? Porque este se estaba haciendo desde el 
perspectivo de entender lo comunitario como un instrumento en manos de la gente, como un instrumento del 
pueblo, no con fines del lucro.”
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media broadcasters. As we will see, this idea would form the kernel of the funding model that would later  
be debated by the Bolivarian community media sector, once it became apparent that the liberal model  
imposed  by  the  regulations  was  not  sufficient  to  guarantee  sustainability.  In  2001,  however,  both  
CONATEL and the RVMC continued to adhere to the liberal model. In their defense, we might note that  
the mere act of legalizing community media was in and of itself a major step, placing Venezuela out  
ahead of most other Latin American states. As such, state funding may have been considered infeasible, at  
least as a core element of the law.
At the same time, neither CONATEL nor the RVMC were necessarily opposed to the state playing  
a role in the sustainability of the emerging community media sector, as evidenced by the inclusion of  
“public entities” as potential sponsors. Additionally, article 27 states that “community operators will be  
able to be beneficiaries of agreements in relation to training that CONATEL signs with national and  
international, public and private organizations”. 455 Perhaps most telling is the role that state financing  
ended up playing in the model for the study of “economic viability and sustainability” that the RVMC  
developed for the use of applicants. As Manrique explained, they had trouble conceiving of a manner in  
which an applicant would be able to acquire the funding necessary to establish itself, so they decided to  
turn to the state:
Then we were figuring out... what was the economic solution? It was that they put... the  
supposed [resources] that the community and alternative media outlets were going to have  
from the state.... That was the way out... as the [LOT] says, 'The state will promote the  
existence of community media outlets.' So, how is a state going to promote the existence if  
its not going to finance them? … The discussion was that the state should give a seed  
contribution, an initial contribution. An initial working capital. 456
The RVMC thus saw this as a compromise solution, believing that once the broadcaster was established  
455“los operadores comunitarios podrán ser beneficiarios de los convenios que en materia de capacitación 
suscriba la Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones con organismos públicos y privados, nacionales e 
internacionales”
456“Despues se fue solucionando… cual fue la solución económica? Era que se ponía… los supuestos [recursos] 
que los medios comunitarios y alternativos iban a tener del estado.... Eso era la salida…. como dice la [LOT],  
'el estado promoverá la existencia de los medios comunitarios.' Entonces, cómo un estado va a promover la 
existencia si no lo va a financiar? …  La discusión fue que el estado debe dar un aporte semilla, un aporte 
inicial. Un capital de trabajo inicial."
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with the help of the state (via a generous interpretation of the text of the LOT), it  would be able to  
maintain  itself  within  the  liberal  framework  established  by  the  regulations.  As  we  will  see  below,  
however, this would not prove to be the case.
The final aspect of the regulations that we will address here is the framework they established for  
the interaction of community broadcasters with their communities and with civil society more generally.  
As with CONATEL's  technocratic requirements and the notions of political  and economic autonomy  
outlined above, the relationship between community and civil society embedded in the regulations hews  
to the liberal model. Article two provides the following definition of a community:
[a]  group  of  people  that  reside  or  find  themselves  domiciled  in  a  locality  and  that  
[CONATEL]  determines  to  find  themselves  closely  linked  due  to  their  common  
problematic and their historical, geographic, cultural, and traditional characteristics 457
The regulations are thus primarily based on the notion of a community of place, but they add to that  
notion the stipulation that residents must be bound by shared characteristics and concerns (i.e. “their  
common problematic”). This addition is laudable, as it suggests that true communities, even when defined  
geographically, are not merely communities of place, but also of affinity, in the sense that the residents of  
a community are bound together by their relation to a shared set of outcomes that are, at least partially,  
determined by their shared geography. For example, residents of a hillside  barrio belong to the same 
community not only because they live nearby but also because they face common difficulties, such as  
water provision and trash disposal.
In  article  six,  however,  this  nuanced notion  of  a  geographic  community  is  mitigated  by  the  
limitations placed on the service area of community broadcasters, the determination of which is made by  
CONATEL. These service areas can be no smaller than the parish but no larger than the municipality in  
which the broadcaster is located and they cannot include the fractional part of a parish. As a result of  
these stipulations, the possible formulations of a community are, as a practical matter, limited by the pre-
457“[un] conjunto de personas que residen o se encuentran domiciliadas en una localidad y que la Comisión 
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones determina que se encuentran estrechamente vinculadas en razón de su 
problemática común y de sus características históricas, geográficas, culturales y tradicionales”
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existing boundaries of the areas of local governance determined by previous administrative regimes. As  
will be discussed further in the following chapter, those boundaries were sometimes determined by power  
relations (such as hereditary land ownership) that have little to do with the majority of the locality's  
current residents. Additionally, even where original boundaries did encompass cohesive communities,  
subsequent demographic shifts, especially increases in population density, have often fragmented and/or  
reformed the patterns of community. The adherence of the regulations to that model therefore diminishes  
the ability of CONATEL to place community broadcasters in the service of a well integrated community.
There is a further limitation to the geographic schema established in the regulations. By assigning  
community broadcasters to a fixed area, the regulations assume that communities are discrete, do not  
overlap, and do not scale. This assumption corresponds to an un-nuanced notion of community of place.  
As an example, we might conceive of three parishes, one above the other on the same mountainside. The  
lowest  parish  may  have  adequate  water  provision  and  trash  disposal.  The  middle  parish  may  have  
adequate trash disposal but no water provision, and the upper parish may enjoy neither. Meanwhile, all  
three are concerned with the high potential for mudslides during heavy rains. Here we can see that if we  
define community in terms of shared outcomes in relation to particular issues, as opposed to the mere  
imposition of geographic boundaries, the scope of community can change in relation to the particular  
issue under consideration. The regulations leave little flexibility for this scalability. We will return to this  
issue below.
Another issue to note is the degree to which the regulations manifest the development discourse  
of community media.  This  can be seen in  article  17, which defines  the objective of the community  
foundations as “assuring the free and plural communication of the members of the communities … as  
well as  contributing to the solution of the community's problems ” (my emphasis).458 This tendency is 
reinforced by article 26, which states that operators must “[g]uarantee the transmission of programs with  
458“asegurar la comunicación libre y plural de los miembros de las comunidades ... así como coadyuvar a la 
solución de la problemática de la comunidad”
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educational, cultural and informative content that benefits the development of the community, as well as  
contribute to the solution of the community's problems” and “[g]uarantee the transmission of messages  
directed toward public service that procure the solution of the community's problems”. 459 This emphasis 
on the correction of problems evidences a somewhat paternalistic tendency that has long manifested in the  
literature on development and, in development communications, can be seen as something of a holdover  
from the dominant paradigm of the 1950s and 60s. Perhaps more importantly, however, the emphasis on  
public service, educational, cultural, and informative content suggests once again that community media  
is  marginal  and  merely  supplemental  to  mainstream  media.  One  could  perhaps  interpret  “cultural”  
programming to include all forms of entertainment, but given its relation to educational and informative  
programming,  not  to  mention  the  identification  of  early  community  television  broadcasters  like  TV 
Michelena and  TV Rubio as  “cultural”  foundations,  this  connotation  seems  unlikely.  Arguably,  the  
regulations therefore suggest that community media are meant to respond to the weightier and more  
serious aspects of community building, whereas entertainment should be left to the commercial system. In  
sum, the regulation's discursive framing of community media is much more in line with participatory  
development and alternative discourses, associated as they are with a liberal framework of civil society,  
than with a counter-hegemonic discourse in which community media bears the potential to displace the  
dominant commercial apparatus.
In addition to their discursive approach, the regulations also set up a concrete framework for  
interaction between broadcasters and the communities they serve. This relationship hinges on the role of  
the “community producer”, which is defined in article two as:
[a] natural or legal person that produces audio or audiovisual content, that has been trained  
and accredited as a community producer by an operator of community radio or television  
broadcasting  services  and  that  is  not  linked  with  any  operator  of  radio  or  television  
broadcasting460
459“[g]arantizar la transmisión de programas de contenido educativo, cultural e informativo que beneficien el  
desarrollo de la comunidad, así como coadyuvar en la solución de la problemática de la comunidad”; 
“[g]arantizar la transmisión de mensajes dirigidos al servicio del público que procuren la solución de la  
problemática de la comunidad”
460“persona natural o jurídica que produce contenidos sonoros o audiovisuales, que ha sido formada y acreditada 
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Community producers are explicitly distinguished, in the same article, from independent producers, with  
the sole difference being the accreditation provided by the community broadcaster. Meanwhile, articles 37  
(for radio) and 41 (for television) allow community operators to broadcast up to 24 hours per day but  
require that they broadcast no less than six hours per day. Various requirements are then placed on the  
makeup of the broadcasting day. Article 28 states that community broadcasters “will be media for the  
transmission of independent production and community production, so much their own as that generated  
in other communities” and it goes on to require that 70 percent of any given day's transmissions be  
comprised of community production.461 The broadcasting operator may contribute to that amount, but  
article 29 makes clear that the operator may produce no more than 15 percent of the content transmitted in  
a single day. At least 55 percent of each day's transmission, in other words, must be content produced by  
community producers. The same article limits the portion of each day's transmission produced by a single  
producer, whether community or independent, to 20 percent, meaning that, at a minimum, at least three  
community producers must contribute to each day's transmission.
The  intent  of  these  requirements  seems  clear.  They  are  meant  to  ensure  that  community  
broadcasters promote the participation of community members in the production process, that community  
broadcasters do not devolve into conduits for commercial or public content, and that content remains  
focused on the community itself. In practical terms, however, the effect of these requirements is that, for a  
six hour broadcast day with five minutes of publicity per hour, over 180 minutes of content must be  
created by at least three different community producers. Even a minimum familiarity with the production  
process for radio and, especially, television allows one to comprehend that producing that amount of  
quality content is extremely resource intensive.
To be sure, broadcasters are free to utilize content created by community producers from outside  
of their own community. A networked exchange of content between broadcasters might therefore lessen  
como productor comunitario por un operador de servicios de radiodifusión sonora comunitaria o televisión 
abierta comunitaria y que no está vinculada con ningún operador de radiodifusión sonora y televisión abierta”
461“serán medios de transmisión de la producción independiente y la producción comunitaria, tanto propia como 
aquella generada en otras comunidades”
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the burden of constant local production so long as there is  sufficient content from other  community  
producers that is applicable to the localities served by other broadcasters, but there is obviously a tension  
between focusing on a particular community (especially in terms of responding to its specific “problems”)  
and producing content that has a wider appeal. There have been some attempts to share content among  
community broadcasters, but the steady stream of local production implied by the requirements of the  
regulations  has  proven  difficult  in  conjunction  with  the  limited  resources  made  available  by  their  
proposed funding mechanisms. We will return to this issue below.
Finally,  we should  note  that  the  regulations  position  community  broadcasters  as  a  relatively  
isolated instance of civil society in which the only prescribed interactions with the community occur  
around  content  production.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  vision  for  the  integration  of  community  
broadcasters with other instantiations of civil society, much less local government. It would be possible,  
of course, for representatives of other civil society organizations to participate in content production, to  
vote as members of the community foundations, or even serve on the administrative board, but there is no  
formal framework for such interrelationships (and, due to the imposition of a liberal notion of autonomy,  
they are in fact limited by the prohibitions on who is eligible to serve on that board). The relative isolation  
of community broadcasters is a further manifestation of the liberal framework of civil society that is  
modeled on the notion of an atomistic competitive market made up of private enterprises. This should be  
especially clear in comparison to our working notion of a Gramscian civil state in which an integrated  
civil  society takes on a maximal  level of decision-making in  public  governance. For  now it  will  be  
sufficient to recognize the imposition of this isolated or atomistic vision of civil society; we will trace its  
implications further below.
In  sum,  we  have  seen  that  in  relation  to  the  LOT and  its  regulations  the  community  and  
alternative media movement operated within the liberal tradition of civil society, as a pressure group  
interacting with a liberal state apparatus. Although some within both the movement (e.g. the centralists)  
and the state (e.g. Chávez) had begun to articulate a counter-hegemonic vision for community media,  
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these were tentative and incomplete. The RVMC and CONATEL, who played the primary roles in the  
shaping  of  the  regulations,  were  significantly  impelled  by  the  inertia  of  the  fourth  republic  and  
implemented only a progressive liberal model of community media. In the following sections we will  
review how this model shaped the explosive growth of the sector in the wake of the events of April 2002.
The Attempted Coup and its Aftermath: The Politicization and Explosive Growth of Community  
Media
As noted above, the Venezuelan political sphere became increasingly polarized throughout 2001  
and the early months of 2002, with the result that on April 11 oppositional leaders took advantage of  
massive  and  competing  street  demonstrations  to  launch  a  coup.  Pedro  Carmona,  President  of  
FEDECAMERAS, held power illegitimately for two days before Chávez was restored by loyal units of  
the military supported by massive popular protests in Caracas and throughout the country. As has been  
widely documenter, the role of the media was extremely pivotal in these events (cf. Beasley-Murray 2002;  
Giordano 2002a, 2002b; Hernández 2002; Klein 2003; Britto 2004; Wilpert 2007; Quezada nd.). We have  
seen that the presidents of Venevisión and RCTV, the nation's dominant television networks, had stood  
alongside community media activists during the signing of the LOT. Now, along with the two other major  
Venezuelan television networks, they were principal players in the scheme to replace Chávez. As Klein  
summarizes:
...in the days leading up to the April coup, Venevisión, RCTV, Globovisión and Televen  
replaced regular programming with relentless anti-Chávez speeches, interrupted only for  
commercials calling on viewers to take to the streets: "Not one step backward. Out! Leave  
now!" The ads were sponsored by the oil industry, but the stations carried them free, as  
"public service announcements." They went further: On the night of the coup, Cisneros's  
station [Venevisión] played host to meetings among the plotters, including Carmona. The  
president of Venezuela's broadcasting chamber co-signed the decree dissolving the elected  
National  Assembly.  And  while  the  stations  openly  rejoiced  at  news  of  Chávez's  
"resignation," when pro-Chávez forces mobilized for his return a total news blackout was  
imposed.... When Chávez finally returned to the Miraflores Palace, the stations gave up on  
covering the news entirely. On one of the most important days in Venezuela's history, they  
aired Pretty Woman and Tom & Jerry cartoons.
The most significant act of collusion between the commercial media and the coup plotters, however, was  
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the intentional manipulation of footage to make it appear as if  chavistas  were responsible for shooting 
unarmed opposition protesters.462 This footage was aired by commercial news outlets on the day of the  
coup and throughout the following weeks in an attempt to justify the actions taken against the Chávez  
administration (Wilpert 2009).
The government, meanwhile, also made use of the media resources available to it. In the days  
leading up to the protests, the Chávez administration repeatedly made use of a legal provision, known as a  
cadena (chain),  that  allows  the  state  to  require  all  broadcast  media  to  simultaneously  transmit  a  
government announcement. These were generally ten minute addresses from then Vice President (and  
formerly Director of CONATEL) Diosdado Cabello that presented the administration's point of view on  
the developing crisis. On the day of the protests, the state television channel, VTV, aired interviews with  
government officials and supporters. At 3:45pm, as the now violent demonstrations were being broadcast  
by the commercial networks, Chávez himself made use of the cadena to address the nation. Roughly a 
half hour later, after the networks split the screen to air the demonstrations alongside Chávez, he ordered  
that they be taken off the air, leaving no live broadcast footage of the street scenes and only VTV to air  
his address. The commercial channels managed to continue transmitting via cable and satellite, however, 
and  at  about  10pm,  once  the  opposition  had  gained  the  upper  hand,  VTV went  off  the  air  and  the  
commercial broadcasters returned (Wilpert 2007). The following evening, however, VTV returned to the  
air under the control of Chávez supporters and begin transmitting a counter-narrative of the events of the  
previous day (Beasley-Murray 18-9).
The struggle over television broadcasting and other forms of mainstream mass media during the 
three days of the crisis heightened the importance of other forms of communication, especially among  
chavistas who realized that the commercial networks were airing a distorted version of events. This was 
462Although the question of who killed the protesters remains highly controversial, abundant evidence that they 
were not killed in the manner described by the manipulated footage is provided by two documentaries: The 
Revolution Will Not Be Televised (2003) and The Llaguno Bridge: Keys to A Massacre (Puente Llaguno: 
Claves de una Masacre / 2004). For an account and analysis of the discursive value of the former within the 
Bolivarian movement, especially in relation to community media practitioners, see Schiller 2009.
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especially evident in Caracas, where alternative news and interpretations, including the fact that Chávez  
had not willfully resigned, began circulating among informal networks. As news spread, more and more  
chavistas descended from the  barrios surrounding the city to the Presidential residency in downtown  
Caracas, which became the epicenter of the popular movement to restore Chávez to power. The informal  
communication  networks  that  drove  these  demonstrations  included  the  “grapevine”  (known in  Latin  
America as “radio bemba” [lip radio]), taxi drivers, motorcycle messengers, cellular text messaging, and  
the internet, as well as alternative and community media.
Fernandes (2010) reports that “...it was mainly the alternative print media that was able to get the  
message out”, with activists making use of the Caracas Municipal Press to produce 100,000 copies of an  
informative bulletin (167). Meanwhile, Nicolás Rivera covered the competing demonstrations of April  
11th for  Radio Perola,  one of the community radio stations that had been shut down by the Caldera  
administration in the 1990s. The following day, with the opposition in control of the government, the  
police raided Radio Perola and arrested Rivera, beating him, taking him to his home where his wife was  
also beaten, forcing him to sign a false statement, and then taking him to jail. Rivera was released on the  
14th, after Chávez had regained the presidency (Giordano 2002b).  Radio Catia Libre and  TV Caricuao 
were  also  raided,  and  Catia  TVe workers  dismantled  their  own  antenna  in  an  effort  to  avoid  its  
confiscation (ibid., Historia de Catia TVe 2006b, Blanco 2011). 463 The workers of Catia TVe also played 
an  instrumental  role  in  bringing  VTV  back  on  the  air,  even  though  their  unfamiliarity  with  the  
professional equipment resulted in significant technical  difficulties  (Giordano 2002b, Beasley-Murray  
18).
Just how important alternative and community media were in facilitating the massive support for  
the restoration of  Chávez is  not clear.  For  example,  two alternative film collectives,  COTRAIN and  
Panafilms, recorded invaluable footage that was used in two different documentaries to demonstrate that  
463Giordano reports that Catia Tve was also raided, but that station's own historical documentary gives the version 
of events included here.
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the commercial media's account of the shootings during the demonstrations was false, but this footage  
was not broadcast during the crisis itself (Forrest 2003). 464 A videographer from Catia Tve, meanwhile, 
recorded soldiers on the roof of the presidential residence calling for the support from the assembled  
crowd. That footage was shown at various sites in Caracas, but it was not broadcast because Catia TVe 
had gone off the air. While  Radio Perola and other stations offered coverage of the events, their low  
power transmitters could only be heard within limited areas. In fact, it was the powerful network of Radio 
Fe y Alegría, along with courageous reporting by its staff in the face of threats and demands from the  
opposition controlled police,  that  did more than any other alternative or community outlet  to spread  
accurate information not only throughout Caracas, but across the country (Barrios & Urdaneta 2002,  
Giordano 2002a, López 2006).
Except for perhaps the reporting of Radio Fe y Alegría and the role of Catia TVe in putting VTV 
back on the air, it seems unlikely that alternative and community media played a determinative role in the  
outcome of the attempted coup. Nonetheless, the sector's already rising profile was thrust much further  
into the public sphere as a result of the work carried out by community media practitioners. As Chávez  
had  already  recognized,  community  media  provided  a  strong  example  of  the  Bolivarian  ideal  of  
participation within “organized communities”; now it could be held up by the government as one of the  
people's tools for combating the treachery and deceit of those opposed to Bolivarian revolution, thus  
giving it  additional appeal.  Meanwhile,  chavistas outside of the government who were outraged and 
energized by the coup now recognized community media as an accessible opportunity for working to  
defend and advance Bolivarian ideals. In the years since the coup attempt, community media (much more  
than  Radio Fe y Alegría) have been hailed by the Bolivarian movement for their role in thwarting the  
attempted coup. For example,  on the fifth  anniversary of  the coup attempt,  “[s]tate  media turned to  
community activists and particularly to community media producers to remember and reflect on their  
experience of the coup” (Schiller 2009, 261). More pointedly, one of the founding members of Radio Ali  
464 See note 463.
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Primera explained that “alternative media, in a sense, were baptized in the street, with blood... during the  
coup d'etat” (Varenzuela 2011).465 This commonly invoked rhetorical link between the birth of Bolivarian  
community media and the coup attempt is not altogether false, since the events of April 2002 led to  
explosive growth in and drastically increased government support  for the sector.  Nonetheless,  it  also  
serves  to  obscure  the  deeper  roots  of  Venezuelan  community  media  across  decades  of  popular  
organization that stretch back to the 1960s.
Without  a  doubt,  however,  the  attempted  coup  revealed  the  vulnerability  of  the  Bolivarian  
revolution in  the face of a  hegemonic commercial  media system. For Chávez and other government  
officials,  this  pointed  to  an  urgent  need  to  establish  a  Bolivarian  “media  hegemony”  ( hegemonía 
mediática). Their attempts to do so have involved three interrelated vectors of action: tighter regulation of  
private media, expansion of the public media apparatus, and increased support for the community media  
sector. While community media has never garnered the headlines given to the government's battles with  
commercial broadcasters and organizations defending freedom of the press, it certainly became a  widely  
recognized and contentious axis of debate and action.
Growth in the sector was almost immediate, since already existing groups were inspired to push  
forward faster and with greater energy. For example, the Popular Revolutionary Assembly ( Asamblea 
Popular Revolucionaria), a group that went into  barrios to distribute fliers urging residents to join the  
protests against the coup, went on to create a website called aporrea.org that continues to serve as a  
clearing  house  for  news and opinions  from within  the  community  and alternative  media  movement  
(Wilpert 2007). Meanwhile, all throughout the country previously inactive  chavistas were inspired to 
form new print, radio, and television collectives (see Fernandes 2010, 167).
One example that illustrates both these tendencies is a collective from Maracaibo (Zulia) that had  
been publishing a leftist magazine called Letra Zurda (Left-handed Writing) since the late 1990s. In 2002, 
this group attended an alternative and community media conference in Lara where they met workers from  
465“los medios alternativos, de una forma, se bautizó en la calle, con sangre… cuando el golpe de estado”
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Catia TVe and Teletambores and decided to apply for a television broadcasting license of their own. Soon  
after,  however,  the  initial  group  “divided  internally  due  to  personal  problems”  (Useche  2009). 466 
Nonetheless, it had already attracted new members as a result of the attempted coup and a group of these  
newcomers took the reins of the television project, Canal Z (Channel Z). One of the members of this new  
group later recalled:
that the coup d'etat had … made very clear to us what, and for what, the [commercial]  
media were.... That made us ... wake up..., in that we also said, 'Well, now we can't stay  
here,  watching  another  coup,  watching  another  way  to  break  up  even  the  [political]  
project, we're going to be disarmed.' From that point we took control of the thing and we  
haven't let it go.... (ibid.)467
Though  bureaucratic  delays  and  a  dependence  on  the  state  for  resources  prevented  Canal  Z from 
broadcasting until 2007, in the meantime the station's workers applied the cineforo model that they had 
learned  from  Catia  TVe.  Once  they  acquired  video  cameras,  they  would  assist  residents  in  creating  
documentaries about the history of their communities and screen these in outdoor locations on Sunday  
afternoons. Canal Z workers quickly established themselves as among the most influential member of the  
national  alternative  and  community  media  movement,  in  large  part  due  to  their  status  as  the  only  
community television broadcaster in Venezuela's second largest city.
 The growth of the community media sector was also enabled by a sharp increase in government  
recognition  and  support.  The  coup  attempt  spurred  CONATEL to  accelerate  the  process  of  issuing  
licenses to community broadcasters (Manrique 2011).  Catia TVe and  Teletambores received licenses in 
May, and by the end of 2002 licenses had been issued to eight community radio and six community  
television  stations,  including  TV Caricuao,  TV Michelena,  and  TV Rubio.468 (As  we  will  see  later, 
however, this is not to say that all of these stations began broadcasting in 2002.)  In June, Catia TVe and 
Radio Perola shared a Special Mention Prize (Galardón en Mención Especial) from the government's 
466“se dividen internamente por problemas personales”
467“que el golpe del estado … nos dejó muy claro que era, y para que estaban los medios [comerciales]. Eso nos 
hizo ... despertarnos..., en el que nosotros también dimos, 'Bueno ya nosotros no podemos quedarnos aquí, 
viendo otro golpe, viendo otra manera de romper con el proyecto [político] incluso, nosotros nos vamos a estar 
desarmado.' De allí asumimos la cosa y no lo hemos soltado...”
468Catia TVe had received only a provisional license in March 2001.
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National Journalism Awards (Premios Nacionales de Periodismo) for the work they had done during the  
coup attempt – although  Radio Perola did not yet have a broadcasting license. In a related move, that  
same month Catia TVe was the location for a live filming of Chávez's very popular Sunday television and  
radio  program,  “Alo  Presidente!”.  In  August,  CONATEL hosted  the  First  International  Forum  and  
National Meeting of Community Media (Primer Foro Internacional y Encuentro Nacional de Medios  
Comunitarios), which included community media practitioners from Spain, France, Uruguay, and Brazil,  
as well as representatives from AMARC. In October, CONATEL and AMARC jointly hosted a workshop  
on the management of community media outlets (CONATEL 2003).
In the same month, the Chávez administration established the Ministry of Communications and  
Information (Ministerio de Comunicación e Información  / MINCI). Representatives from MINCI, as well  
as those from VTV and the state-owned Venezuelan News Agency (Agencia Venezolana de Noticias /  
AVN),  met  with  community  media  practitioners  at  the  First  National  Meeting  of  Alternative  Media  
(Primer Encuentro Nacional de Medios Alternativos) in April of 2003. In June, Nora Uribe, then Minister  
of Communication and Information, met with representatives from the sector “in order to reinforce the  
mechanisms of information exchange, while also strengthening the links between the Ministry and said  
media outlets, as an expression of the communications policy of the Venezuelan State”. 469 MINCI then 
began organizing “different training activities, workshops in the area of communication, and working  
groups  with  social  organizations  in  order  to  consolidate  the  development  of  media  outlets  in  
communities” (Morales 2004, 46).470 In August, MINCI created the General Office of Alternative and  
Community Media (Dirección General de Medios Alternativos y Comunitarios / DGMAC) which took  
over these and other responsibilities. 471 During this period, CONATEL continued to actively support the  
community media sector. It arranged, for example, a series of meetings in March of 2003 that sought to  
469“a fin de reforzar los mecanismos de intercambio de información, aprovechando a la vez para estrechar los 
vínculos entre el Ministerio y dichos medios, como expresión de la política comunicacional del Estado 
Venezolano”
470“diferentes actividades de capacitación, talleres en áreas de la comunicación y mesas de trabajo con las 
organizaciones sociales a los fines de consolidar el desarrollo de los medios en las comunidades”
471DGMAC was formally instituted on April 14, 2005, with Ministerial Resolution number 20 (Milano 2008a).
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direct state financing from various public entities toward community media (CONATEL 2003). As we  
will see, however, the effectiveness of DGMAC initiatives, as well as the relationship between MINCI,  
CONATEL, and the alternative and community media movement, has varied over the years.
The creation of MINCI was just one of the manifestations of the government's drive to rein in the  
commercial media and establish a media hegemony within the extremely polarized political and social  
climate of the post-coup period. One of the most divisive government initiatives during that time was the  
Law  of  Social  Responsibility  in  Radio  and  Television  (Ley  de  Responsabilidad  Social  en  Radio  y  
Televisión / RESORTE Law), which was presented in the National Assembly in January of 2003 but not  
approved  until  December  of  2004.  The  main  objective  of  the  RESORTE  Law  was  to  establish  a  
framework for regulating broadcast content in accordance with social and family values. The opposition  
charged that  it  was merely an attempt  to  censor  the media and referred to  it  as  the Gag Law  (Ley 
Mordaza).  Media  coverage  over  the  RESORTE  Law  brought  public  debates  about  Venezuelan  
commercial media to a fever pitch, but the law contained at least two provisions that were of potential  
import for the community media sector.
The first of these provisions, found in article 11, states that multichannel subscription service  
providers (like cable and satellite television companies) must distribute free of charge the signals of VHF  
and UHF broadcasters in their area, including community television stations, with the condition that such  
channels  may  not  occupy  more  than  fifteen  percent  of  the  service  provider's  total  offerings.  This  
obviously offers community television broadcasters an opportunity to significantly increase their reach,  
not only because houses receiving cable or satellite television would otherwise be unlikely to tune in to  
their  broadcast  signal,  but  also because  multichannel  service providers  reach  households beyond the  
limited range of community television transmitters. Within the framework of the regulations, increased  
viewership might translate into additional revenues,  whether  through advertising or donations,  and it  
might also attract more participants, thus increasing the quantity and perhaps the quality of community  
produced content. The actual significance of the provision, however, depends on CONATEL's ability and  
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willingness to enforce it, and in actual practice very few community television broadcasters have been  
included in the offerings of multichannel providers. Canal Z, for example, has written several letters to  
the  cable  company  in  its  area  requesting  to  be  included.  They  have  received  no  response  nor  has  
CONATEL sought to enforce the provision (Manuel Hernández 2011).472
The second provision  in  the  RESORTE Law that  bore  potential  implications  for  community  
media, found in article 14, mandates that all radio and television broadcasters must carry five and a half  
hours of content produced by “independent national producers”. Article 13, which defines these producers  
and requires  that  they  be  registered,  exempts  “independent  community   producers”  from the  formal  
registration requirement and suggests that their productions will also count toward fulfilling the mandated  
quota. Nonetheless, some community producers still registered as independent national producers, hoping  
to  increase  their  chances.  The  legal  provision  seemed  to  offer  community  broadcasters  a  golden  
opportunity  to  increase  their  revenue and prestige,  but  in  actual  practice  “[m]ost  community-trained  
producers … had trouble selling their programs to the already existing state or commercial channels.” As  
a  result,  many  community  producers  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  independent  national  
production quotas merely “perpetuated a capitalist model of media production that prioritized the skills  
and financial wellbeing of the professionally trained middle-class who had the skills to produce 'quality'  
television” (Schiller 2009, 350).
472At least two community television broadcasters are carried by local cable providers:
Montaña TV (Mountain TV), in Cordero (Táchira), was originally established as part of a small, family-owned 
local cable service provider called Montaña Visión (Mountain Vision) in 1997. The owners of that company 
operated a community channel in order to increase demand for subscriptions. In 2000, a much larger cable 
service provider called NetUno entered the market. Unable to compete, Montaña Visión sold its subscriber base 
to NetUno but negotiated to keep the community channel on the cable system. It then applied for and received a 
broadcasting license in 2004 as Montaña TV (Chacón 2011).
The RESORTE Law did enable TV Rubio to negotiate a position in the local cable offerings, although in 
something of a roundabout manner. When Intercable, the local cable provider, decided to raise its rates, TV 
Rubio organized a boycott designed to prevent the rate increase and ensure its inclusion on the cable menu. TV 
Rubio managed to organize a march of some 800 people past the offices of Intercable and finally succeeded in 
enlisting the help of CONATEL, which mediated negotiations that resulted in a compromise in which Intercable 
was permitted to raise its rates so long as it included TV Rubio in its offerings. Later, when a second cable service 
provider entered the market, it included TV Rubio without issue (Manrique 2011). While CONATEL played a 
role in this outcome, it seems likely that this was primarily the result of the community organization carried out 
by TV Rubio, which forced Intercable to negotiate, and Manrique's familiarity with CONATEL due to his years 
of activism in the RVMC.
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Both of the above provisions of the RESORTE Law seek to empower community media within a  
capitalist  market and they accord with a progressive liberal  model of civil  society.  In  the first  case,  
community television broadcasters are largely dependent on the state's centralized regulatory body to  
protect their access to a commercial system since they have almost no mechanisms to govern the process  
themselves. In the second case, community broadcasters are marginalized by a system that prioritizes  
“national” programming that accords with the stylistic and technical codes of the hegemonic commercial  
system, and thus its professionalized and hierarchical organizational model, as well as its dependence on  
capital and advanced technology.
Vision  Venezuela  Television  (ViVe  TV),  a  state  television  network  that  was  inaugurated  in  
November of 2003, can be seen as an attempt to bridge community television, as a local instantiation of  
participatory civil society, with the professionalized world of television production at a national level. The  
first president and vice president of ViVe were Blanca Eekhout, of Catia TVe, and Thierry Deronne, of  
Teletambores, respectively, and they imparted the ethos of participatory community television to the new  
network.  Nonetheless,  ViVe  is  a  public  broadcaster  funded  entirely  by  the  government  whose  
organizational structure remains professionalized and hierarchical. As Eekhout explained toward the end  
of ViVe's first year on the air:
There is  no possibility for people’s participation in  the private media.  The only space  
where there was even a possibility is the state media. But there are contradictions. There  
are  definitely two conflicting models.  One is  that  of a  state  TV network, with a  state  
budget. The administration of [Vive TV] is controlled by the state. And the state is still,  
even after all of the changes that have been made, it is still a state that is conceived in the  
framework of neoliberalism, based on the idea of management and ‘efficiency’. Those of  
us from activist backgrounds discovered that in some ways there were fewer headaches  
when we were working without state support! The neoliberal model of the media does not  
put the community and the people at the centre of things. It is about creating spectators  
who watch TV alone in their homes. We don’t want spectators. We want communication.  
We  are  critical  of  the  media.  We  want  to  give  tools  –  cultural,  educational,  social,  
economic tools – to the communities. In the communication sphere we want to create the  
kinds  of  tools  that  exist  in  the  economy,  like  the  Banmujer  [women's  bank]  and  
microcredit initiatives that have helped people empower themselves. (Podur 2004)
ViVe began as a centralized network but has since reorganized itself into six regional broadcasters that are  
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unified as a single network. Even a summary analysis of its strategic goals and various methodologies  
would fall beyond the scope of our historical review of the community media sector. Here we will simply  
flesh out some of the “contradictions” to which Eekhout alludes.
ViVe's principal goal has been “to make visible the diverse initiatives that are born of the people  
and the distinct experiences of popular, rural, worker, and indigenous organization” (Eekhout & Deronne  
2009).473 It has primarily done this by producing its own professionalized content, although ViVe's staff  
has taken pains to incorporate the participation of the communities that have been the subject of its  
productions. For example, at one point ViVe's producers decided to create a fictional series set among the  
afro-venezuelan community. When they presented their proposal to afro-venezuelan social organizations,  
however, the proposal was rejected and the organizations made a counter proposal that resulted in a three  
chapter mini-series that “was produced by a [ViVe] producer, but under the direction and coordination of  
a social movement” (Gil 2011).474 At the same time, however, ViVe is under the direction of MINCI and  
part of the “National System of Public Media”. As such, it's crews are often compelled to cover official  
events and press conferences in a traditional journalistic style and are thus diverted from ViVe's primary  
mission (ibid.).
ViVe has also encountered difficulties in producing content that is appealing to a wide range of  
viewers.  Deronne  (2007)  provided  much  of  the  network's  initial  stylistic  vision  and  oversaw  the  
publication of a manual of sorts, entitled “Theory and Practice of Socialist Television”, which provides  
considerable insight into his intellectual framework. The manual does include some quotes and excerpts  
from Mattelart in relation to popular production during the Allende administration in Chile, as well as a  
brief  section  on  a  “socialist  mode of  television  production”.  The  vast  bulk  of  the  text,  however,  is  
dedicated to a critical analysis of the aesthetics of cinema from a marxist perspective that seems little  
removed  from twentieth  century  vanguardist  frameworks.  In  practice,  Deronne's  preferred  approach  
473“Visibilizar las diversas iniciativas que nacen del pueblo y las distintas experiencias de organización popular,  
campesina, obrera e indígena, entre otras.”
474“fue producido por un productor ... pero bajo la dirección y coordinación de un movimiento social”
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emphasized the use of extended long shots and minimal cutting that are intended to invoke that actual  
lived conditions and rhythms of documentary protagonists (Kunich 2011). Eekhout and Deronne have  
argued that this format:
...of small human teams, deep observation of processes, imperceptible among adversaries,  
capable of discovering and recording proofs and complex processes, has a greater capacity  
than  other  formats  for  audiovisually  describing,  understanding,  and  expressing  the  
problems of popular organizations. (Eekhout & Deronne 206-7) 475
Venezuelan audiences, however, were not appreciative of the resulting fare. As Sergio Arriasis, head of  
ViVe's Office of Strategic Development, put it:
It’s very complicated to change people’s minds. At the beginning, no one understood ViVe.  
In the first year, when we were showing peasants planting seeds, people thought 'what the  
hell  is  this?'  When  we  showed  indigenous  people  speaking  their  own  language  with  
Spanish subtitles, nobody understood, including Chavistas. (Wynter 2010)
ViVe officials, however, have argued that its programs do not require a large audience in order to have a  
significant social effect. In their study of programming produced by ViVe Zulia, for instance, Eekhout and  
Deronne note that “far from being of high ratings, they are programs of low diffusion, but that hasn't  
impeded their high impact in society (Eekhout & Deronne 206). 476 Nonetheless, in recent years some 
producers within ViVe have sought to integrate Bolivarian ideals with more contemporary aesthetic styles  
that will attract larger audiences (Gil 2011). This tendency, however, leans more heavily on professional  
producers and technicians and is thus less conducive to direct community participation.
Beyond its own productions, ViVe has made concerted attempts to foster independent national  
producers since even before the RESORTE Law was passed. As Eekhout explained in 2004:
ViVe, in advance of the law, has already established its quotas – 60% national production,  
and of that, 60% independent production. We are supporting and financing independent  
producers  and  collectives.  TV  has  this  possibility  of  diversity  and  plurality  in  
programming.  There’s  also  the  cultural  programming,  to  make  visible  work  in  
communities. Not just excluded people and movements, but also artists, musicians, who  
475“...de equipos humanos pequeños, observación a profundidad de los procesos, imperceptible entre los 
adversarios, capaz de descubrir y registrar pruebas y procesos complejos, tiene una capacidad de alcance 
mayor que los otros formatos para describir, comprender y expresar audiovisualmente los problemas de las 
organizaciones populares.”
476“...lejos de ser de alta audiencia, son programas de baja difusión en la pantalla, pero ello no ha impedido su  
alta contundencia en la sociedad.”
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had never found spaces in the past. We are trying to create a platform for them. (Podur  
2004)
In their analysis of the first 60 independent productions supported by ViVe, Eekhout and Deronne note  
that 55 percent were “developed … by cooperatives and community producers with a medium amount of  
experience, that are accompanied in a process of mutual training and learning” (Eekhout & Deronne 196).  
This figure comes with some caveats, however. Half of all the independent producers selected came from  
the Caracas metropolitan area, with another third coming from three of Venezuela's most developed states  
(Miranda, Zulia, and Mérida). Eekhout and Deronne recognize that “[t]his reflects the disequilibrium of  
favorable  conditions  of  access  in  the  elaboration  of  audiovisual  discourse  (lack  of  training,  of  
technological access, etc.), which imposes on us the urgent necessity of incrementing our action in the  
interior  of  the  country...”  (196-7). 477 They  note  that  toward  this  end  ViVe  “is  articulated  with  
approximately 27 community television stations from across the country, with which [they] are deepening  
relations of support and solidarity to gain access to the independent producers of their regions” (197). 478 
Nonetheless,  as  Schiller  notes,  “the  few  community  producers  ...  who  secured  contracts  with  [state  
broadcaster]  Vive  TV were  the  most  technologically  savvy  producers.  Nevertheless,  they  constantly  
complained about the quality monitors [from ViVe] who made demands about the image, sound, and  
lighting” (Schiller 2009, 350 n97). As of 2011, community television operators continued to complain  
that the system of national independent productions established by the RESORTE Law had not provided  
significant opportunities for their advancement.
Independent production contracts were not the only method by which ViVe attempted to raise the  
profile of community television production, however. Soon after ViVe went on the air, it dedicated a  
Saturday morning time slot to a program called “Let My People Talk” ( Que Hable Mi Gente) which 
showcased community produced content. This program only lasted a short time, presumably due to the  
477“[e]sto refleja el desequilibrio de las condiciones favorables para el acceso en la elaboración del discurso 
audiovisual (falta de formación, de acceso tecnológico, etc.), lo que nos impone la urgente necesidad de 
incrementar nuestra acción en el interior del país...”
478“se articula a su vez con aproximadamente 27 televisoras comunitarias de todo el país, con las cuales [estan]  
profundizando las relaciones de apoyo y solidaridad para acceder a los productores independientes de sus regiones ”
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difficulty  of  procuring  sufficient  content  on  a  weekly  basis  (Manrique  2011).  Beginning  in  2007,  
however, ViVe began providing support to a Venezuelan initiative called ALBA TV, whose goal was to  
coordinate community media efforts at an international level, especially in Latin America. 479 In October 
of 2010, ViVe began airing half hour presentations of community media programming curated by ALBA  
TV. In 2011 ALBA TV was given a weekly time slot, thus offering a regular opportunity for Venezuelan  
community television producers to air their content. Many community television stations also retransmit  
the program, which counts toward their daily quota of community produced content (Kunich 2011).
ViVe  has  been  an  active  ally  of  the  community  media  sector  in  areas  beyond  independent  
production  contracts  and  content  distribution.  For  example,  ViVe's  Popular  Latin  American  Cinema  
School (Escuela Popular Latinoamericana de Cine /  EPLAC) has offered workshops throughout the 
country that included 421 participants through their first several years (Eekhout & Deronne 191). 480 In at 
least one case, ViVe provided a video camera to a fledgling community television station (Durán 2011).  
Through internships and paid positions, ViVe has also provided opportunities for community television  
practitioners  to  practice  their  craft  in  a  more  resource  rich  context,  although  some  community  
479The ALBA TV project was initially conceived in December of 2006 at the First Congress of Communication 
Toward Socialism (Primer Congreso de Comunicación Hacia el Socialismo) in Caracas. Among the initial 
participants were Pablo Kunich, an Uruguayan who was then employed by ViVe, and workers from Catia TVe. 
Various institutions in the Venezuelan government offered initial verbal commitments and ViVe supplied funding 
for workshops to be held in Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaraua, and Brazil, but the project remained largely stalled until 
2009, when support from ViVe's Popular Latin American Cinema School (Escuela Popular Latinoamericana de 
Cine / EPLAC) allowed for community media practitioners from across Latin America to participate in 
workshops held in Venezuela. These workshops allowed more Venezuelan community television stations to 
become involved and the project began to take more concrete form. The television stations asked Kunich to 
manage the creation of a web site and twelve agreed to provide financing and/or equipment, although not all of 
them followed through. In 2010 ViVe began providing office space and salaries for three ALBA TV workers. 
The Venezuelan government had long promised that ALBA TV would be given priority access to transmission 
channels on its satellites, but as of 2011 that had not materialized (Kunich 2011).
480“EPLAC was born ... in a school occupied by the community, in a barrio in the west of Caracas during the oil 
sector strike of 2002. From its beginnings, the role of this school was to offer free popular workshops in 
revolutionary cinema, in the cinematographic language, camera and sound practice, and editing to the organized 
communities, so that they express themselves in an autonomous manner. Very rapidly, EPLAC was installed in 
ViVe, launching a joint effort.” (Eekhout & Deronne 187)
“La EPLAC nació ... en una escuela ocupada por la comunidad, en un barrio del oeste de Caracas 
durante el paro petrolero del año 2002. Desde su inicio, el papel de esta escuela fue ofrecer gratuitamente 
talleres populares de cine revolucionario, de aprendizaje del lenguaje cinematográfico, práctica de la cámara y 
del sonido y aprendizaje de la edición a las comunidades organizadas, para que ellas se expresen de manera 
autónoma. Muy rápidamente, la EPLAC se instaló en ViVe, emprendiendo una labor en conjunto.”
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broadcasters complain of losing precious talent to ViVe since they can't afford to match its salaries. ViVe  
has also served as an institutional partner in order to enable community television and radio stations to  
participate in international agreements for the provision of resources.
Finally,  we should note  that  ViVe has also played an active role in  fostering and supporting  
popular organization more generally. Towards this end it as created a “citizen assistance office” whose  
role is “to provide rapid and timely information, as well as orient citizens, communities, and social groups  
that present proposals, complaints, plans, and inquiries to the institution” (Eekhout & Deronne 191). 481 
Through this office ViVe has attempted to support community groups by reporting on their activities as  
well as their need for support from other government institutions.
Community television practitioners recognize and appreciate ViVe as an ally, but they are also  
quick  to  insist  that  while  ViVe  produces  television  focused  on  organized  communities  and  social  
movements,it does not produce community television. In this light, we might usefully compare ViVe to  
the  Bolivarian  missions  that  were  discussed  earlier  in  this  chapter.  Like  the  missions,  ViVe  clearly  
contributes to Venezuelan civil society, both in its support for community media and more generally in its  
support  for  popular  organizations  and  social  movements.  Nonetheless,  ViVe  employs  a  hierarchical  
organizational logic that is only partly mitigated by its regionalized structure. It is a state-funded public  
broadcaster that might best be described as an extremely progressive instantiation of the liberal tradition  
which sometimes exhibits the vanguardist current of leftist ideology. It's contributions to the formation of  
a Gramscian civil state are not nil, but its institutional inertia seems to contribute to a much greater degree  
to the perpetuation of a bureaucratic state apparatus.
Another  significant  contribution  by the state  to  the growth  of  Venezuela's  community media  
sector came in October of 2003, during the Second International Forum and First Festival of Community  
Media (II Foro Internacional y I Festival de Medios Comunitarios ) that had been organized by MINCI 
481“unidad de atención al ciudadano”; “brindar información rápida y oportuna, así como orientar a los  
ciudadanos, comunidades y grupos sociales que presentan propuestas, denuncias, planteamientos y solicitudes a 
la institución”
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(Morales 2). At this event, which was held in the center of Caracas and hosted delegations of community  
media practitioners from across Latin America, Chávez gave a speech lauding community media and  
announced that  the  government  would  set  aside  5  billion  bolivares ($2.3  –  3.1  million)  for  a  fund  
supporting community media.482 Chávez specifically noted that the money would go toward “the creation  
of a news agency exclusively dedicated to the sector, and 'the installation of a technological platform for  
satellite distribution available to every community media outlet'” (Rivero 2003). 483 In actuality, the fund 
was not directed toward these goals, but was used to finance individual community media outlets. We will  
take a closer look at the disbursement of these funds in the following section.
With the establishment of MINCI's DGMAC and ViVe, as well as a very public announcement  
from Chávez himself regarding a significant allocation of state funds, the events of 2003 cemented the  
reality that the Bolivarian state stood firmly behind the growing community media sector. This show of  
support coincided with a sharp increase in officially licensed community broadcasters. By the end of  
2002, a total of 14 stations (8 radio, 6 television) had been licensed. In 2003 the total rose to 61 (50 radio,  
11 television) and in 2004 it shot up to 157 (135 radio, 22 television). Growth then slowed, with a total of  
174 (149 radio, 25 television) at the end of 2005 and 196 (168 radio, 28 television) at the end of 2006.  
Another spurt, especially in radio, occurred in 2007, by the end of which 263 stations (227 radio, 36  
television) had been licensed (Urribarrí 2009, 186). Growth then slowed again, with 283 stations (241  
radio, 42 television) licensed at the end of 2008, before stopping altogether. In fact, the official count  
dropped to 280 (244 radio, 36 television) by April of 2011 (Villalobos 2012).
These numbers are indicative of the size of the community media sector, but they must be taken  
with several precautions. First, they refer only to broadcasters, which require an official license from  
CONATEL, and thus leave aside periodicals,  online outlets,  muralist  collectives,  and other forms of  
482Rivero (2003) reports the amount as $3.1 million, whereas Fernandes (2010, 166) gives a figure of $2.3 million. 
There is also some confusion as to the provenance of this money. Rivero identifies the source as the Cooperative 
Development Fund (Fondo Cooperativo de Desarrollo), whereas Morales (2004, 36) points to the 
Intergovernmental Decentralization Fund (Fondo Intergubernamental para la Descentralización / FIDES).
483“la creación de una agencia informativa exclusivamente dedicada al sector, y 'la instalación de una plataforma 
tecnológica de distribución satelital a disposición de cada medio comunitario'”
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community media. Numbers for these other types of media are hard to come by, but one Bolivarian  
politician, in an address to community media practitioners, stated that as of December of 2009 there were  
211  “registered”  community  newspapers  in  the  country,  for  a  total  of  492  officially  recognized  
community media outlets.484 A second limiting factor of the above figures is that they refer only to those  
broadcasters that have been officially licensed. As we will see, the licensing process in CONATEL has  
been subject to extreme bureaucratic delays, meaning that some broadcasters have operated for significant  
periods without a license and the official count may therefore underrepresent the sector. The combination  
of the above factors may account for the figure of 600 community media outlets given by Andres Izarra,  
then serving as Minister of Communications and Information, in late 2008 (Urribarrí 2009, 167).
An exact count of community media is therefore impossible to come by and the counts we do  
have reflect only the state's interpretation of what constitutes a community media outlet, meaning that  
there is also room for political bias. Nonetheless, CONATEL's broadcasting figures should be sufficient to  
demonstrate two important trends. First, the explosive growth exhibited in the sector during the years  
following the attempted coup and second, that the state altogether ceased to license new broadcasters  
beginning in 2009. Although their numbers do not accord with other published accounts of CONATEL's  
official figures, Fuentes-Batista & Gil-Ergui (2011) nonetheless provide support for the latter tendency  
when they write that “according to data published by CONATEL, the number of licensed community-
based broadcasters decreased from 453 to 288 between 2007 and 2010 (almost a 64% reduction) and the  
estimated number of non-licensed stations fell from over 1,000 to about 600 during the same period (a  
decrease of around 40%)” (259).
Our task now is therefore to identify what accounts for these identified trends in the growth and  
subsequent  stagnation  (if  not  contraction)  of  Venezuela's  community  media  sector.  We have  already  
suggested that the boom in growth was the outcome of at least three interrelated factors. First, a long  
484The figure was given by Representative (Diputado) Julio Chávez, then serving as Vice President of the National 
Assembly's Permanent Committee on Popular Power and Communication Media, during his opening address to 
the June 17, 2011 debate in Maracaibo on the proposed Law of Popular Communication. Left unclear was with 
whom, how, or why these newspapers were registered. Assumedly, the number came from MINCI.
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history  of  popular  organizing  around alternative  and community  media  that  enabled  a  robust  social  
movement to cohere in the late 1990s. Second, the intersection of that social movement with the Chávez  
administration's predisposition for supporting popular participation as a solution to social problems, with  
the result being the construction of a legal framework for community media broadcasting and expansive  
state support for community media more generally. Third, a moment of political crisis that highlighted the  
potential  and  significance  of  community  media  (both  rhetorically  and  actually)  for  the  Bolivarian  
movement  as  it  faced  increasing  opposition  from traditional  corporatist  power  blocks,  including  the  
commercial media.
The question before us, therefore, is why this surge in growth should have ground to a halt after  
2008. The hypothesis that we will carry into the following section is that the framework for community  
media established between 2000, with the signing of the LOT, and 2003, with the surge in supportive state  
institutions and funding, was insufficient to support a deeply integrated and influential community media  
sector, much less to maintain the levels of growth seen between 2003 and 2005. As we have seen, this  
framework incorporated highly centralized institutions and funding patterns that rested on a liberal set of  
regulations. If it can be said to have diverged from the liberal tradition, it did so in ways that tended  
toward centralized state control and even vanguardist notions of content production. As the Bolivarian  
state became more explicitly socialist, these tendencies threatened to infuse the system with the type of  
state-centric tensions discussed above in relation to Sandinista community media in Nicaragua, rather  
than toward the sector's inclusion as a vital component within a Gramscian civil state, which has been the  
longstanding goal of many within the alternative and community media movement,  as well  as some  
officials within the Bolivarian state. As evidence for the incapacities of the liberal framework mounted,  
calls for a new framework emerged with greater frequency. In the following chapter we will examine  
some of the most significant problems experienced by the Bolivarian community media sector before  
reviewing the history of attempts to establish that new framework.
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Chapter 5: Toward the Restructuration of Bolivarian Community Media
We have thus far reviewed the transition of Venezuelan community media from its first phase,  
during the puntofijista era, to a second phase, in which it expanded drastically within a progressive liberal  
legal framework under the Bolivarian government of Hugo Chávez. In this chapter we will look at the  
process  within  which  both  practitioners  and government  officials  have  worked to  move Venezuelan  
community media into a third phase. We will begin by examining some of the more serious problems  
faced  by  community  media  outlets  to  understand  why  practitioners  are  eager  for  a  new  regulatory  
framework. These problems are especially salient for the community television broadcasters on whom we  
will  focus due to the resource intensive nature of that  medium. Our exploration of these issues will  
especially seek to highlight how they are connected to the limitations of the progressive liberal framework  
that has shaped the second phase.
Attempts  to  establish  a  third  phase  have  sought  to  integrate  community  media  with  what  
Bolivarian officials have referred to as a “new geometry of power” that employs the communal council as  
a base unit and seeks to invest social governance in a participatory civil society along the lines of a  
Gramscian civil state. We will therefore review the major legal and structural elements of this new system  
before  turning  toward  a  closer  examination  of  how  community  media  might  fit  within  it.  That  
examination will begin by looking at the relationship of community councils and community media under  
the current regulations. We will then discuss attempts to reorganize and fortify the community media  
sector, heeding once again the tension between state and citizen control. In this context, we will conclude  
by discussing the multi-year effort to formulate and pass what came to be known as the Law of Popular  
Power Communication. Although the LCPP ultimately failed to pass, the structural elements envisioned  
during the process of its formulation will provide a basis for the theoretical considerations to be discussed  
in the conclusion.
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Division, Difficulty, and Stagnation: Problems in Venezuela's Community Media Sector
In this section we will review a range of difficulties that emerged within the community media  
sector following the explosive growth of 2003 and 04. These difficulties are reflective of the limitations  
inherent  in  the liberal  legal  framework and the state-centric  model  of  support  that  underpinned that  
growth. We will first examine the continued fragmentation within the community media sector itself.  
Then we will look at several issues related to the relationship between the state and the community media  
sector. We will conclude by addressing issues related to the internal structure of community media outlets  
and their relations with the communities they are meant to serve.
As we have seen, a significant fissure opened up within the alternative and community media  
movement during the process of formulating the regulations that correspond to the LOT and govern  
community media broadcasters. On one side was the RVMC, which we have identified as emerging from  
a more traditional and culturally oriented civil society background, and which proved itself more ready to  
work with a state apparatus that maintained significant institutional inertia from the fourth republic. On  
the other side were the centralists, who we have identified as emerging from a leftist and activist political  
background and having adopted a more radical stance in relation to the state. We saw also that the RVMC  
proved much more influential on the formulation of the regulations.
The centralists had already been meeting regularly throughout 2001, but as community media  
rose  to  prominence  in  the  months  following  the  attempted  coup  they  decided  to  create  a  formal  
organization of their own. In June of 2002, they established the National Association of Community, Free,  
and  Alternative  Media  (Asociación  Nacional  de  Medios  Comunitarios,  Libres,  y  Alternativas  / 
ANMCLA) (Fernandes 2010, 239-40).485 From the outset, ANMCLA was envisioned with a different  
purpose than the RVMC. The latter was created in order to advocate on behalf of its members and thus  
fortify the community media sector itself. ANMCLA, on the other hand, was “established as a forum for  
485Fernandes (2010, 239) traces ANMCLA's roots to the Banda Ciudadana community radio collective discussed 
in chapter three.
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facilitating interaction among [alternative and community media]  projects  and different  actors  of the  
popular movement" (Fuentes-Batista & Gil-Ergui 258).  ANMCLA's vision, in other words, had less to do  
with advocating on behalf of its members in the manner of a sectoral organization than with working to  
place its members in the service of other social movements, all of whom were aligned in their struggle to  
recreate society according to the tenets of radically leftist ideologies. To be sure, there was no formal  
organization  that  united  these  social  movements  and  ANMCLA did  not  articulate  a  specific  policy  
platform, but we can see in its tendency to support the integration of a wide alliance of social movements  
and civil society initiatives a significant commitment to critical socialist and even anarchist ideal of civil  
society governance based on widespread popular participation. This is not to say that the RVMC did not  
ultimately share those ideals, but it began in a much more conservative position and was more willing to  
work with the state and within the existing liberal framework to take small steps toward those goals.  
ANMCLA, on the other hand, focused on working with social movements in order to pressure the state to  
adopt more radical positions more quickly. In this sense, we can therefore view the RVMC and ANMCLA  
as embodying positions analogous to the soft and hard line positions (discussed in chapter 4) regarding  
the pace and depth of revolutionary change more generally within the Bolivarian process.
This difference is illustrated by the stance taken in the years following the enactment of the  
regulations. As discussed above, the RVMC formulated a plan to ensure that its members would be able  
to obtain licenses as efficiently as possible by using a shared model for their applications to CONATEL.  
According to Manrique, the plan worked and some 50 RVMC broadcasters were among the first to be  
licensed. ANMCLA, on the other hand, initially adopted an attitude of rejecting the need for the state to  
authorize a community broadcaster, arguing instead that the only required legitimation must come from  
the people.  In  practice,  however,  the benefits  of  being eligible  for state  resources became clear  and  
ANMCLA broadcasters began seeking licenses according to the regulations (Manrique 2011).
Regardless,  ANMCLA's  pronounced  distrust  of  the  state  apparatus  persisted  and  became  
especially acute in the weeks following Chávez's announcement of the 5 billion bolívares (Bs) fund for 
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community  media  in  October  of  2003.  While  there  are  few  records  of  the  process,  it  seems  that  
CONATEL called a meeting with representatives from the RVMC and ANMCLA on November 14 for the  
purpose of establishing a cooperative to administer the funds to individual stations. ANMCLA reported  
that  it  agreed  with  CONATEL's  proposal  for  74  million  to  be  used  for  the  administration  of  the  
cooperative itself, with another 60 percent of the money was to be used as loans for equipment and the  
rest  to  be disbursed as  grants  for  administrative costs  and training  programs.  CONATEL's  proposal,  
however, which was backed by the RVMC, was based on the idea that only officially licensed stations  
would be eligible to participate in the cooperative. ANMCLA's representatives felt that this was unfair  
and that unlicensed broadcasters should also be given an opportunity to benefit from the funds. As they  
summarized:
...we proposed to designate part of the resources to aid those that still didn't possess an  
Administrative Authorization but that nonetheless their work and social practice [sic] fits  
perfectly in what we have called[,] together with the Compañero President [Chávez] and  
MINCI, the Bolivarian Dream, resources that could help them to finish their project and  
above all fortify the community radio and television sector. (Radio Perola 2003) 486
ANMCLA's representatives additionally argued that alternative web sites be considered as members of  
the cooperative (ibid.). In the end, the conflict resulted in a stalemate that left CONATEL unwilling to  
move forward with the cooperative. Instead, CONATEL took on the responsibility of administering the  
funds itself (Manrique 2011).
There is irony in this outcome. As we saw, during the first  National Meeting of Community  
Media, held in 2001 in preparation for negotiating the regulations, the centralists (who would become  
ANMCLA) had lobbied for the formation of a new organization that would administer state funds for the  
entire sector. The RVMC viewed this as a power grab and in any case did not believe that state funds were  
necessary. Now, some two and a half years later, the RVMC had come around to the idea of state funding,  
at least in terms of “seed capital”, and was actively supporting the creation of a new organization to  
486“...propusimos que se asignara parte de los recursos para ayudar a quienes aún no poseían Habilitación 
Administrativa pero que sin embargo su trabajo y práctica social se inscribe perfectamente en lo que hemos 
llamado[,] junto al Compañero Presidente y el MINCI, el Sueño Bolivariano, recursos que podrían ayudarlos a 
que terminaran sus proyecto y sobre todo fortalecer al sector de radios y televisoras comunitarias.”
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administer those funds. ANMCLA, however, was now opposed to this solution. We can make sense of  
this irony by recognizing that in both cases the RVMC supported the more liberal option, whereas the  
centralists  /  ANMCLA sought  to  invest  greater  responsibility  and  capacity  in  civil  society  while  
simultaneously divesting the state of its control over civil society. This is not to say that the RVMC did  
not seek to empower civil society, as it most assuredly did; the difference comes down to the pace and  
scope of change, especially in relation to the role of the state. The RVMC was willing to move more  
slowly and abide by a more rigid set of norms in exchange for good order. ANMCLA sought more rapid  
change  and  was  willing  to  tolerate  a  higher  amount  of  disorder  in  exchange  for  more  extensive  
opportunities  for  citizen  participation in  governance.  In  a  further  bit  of  irony,  however,  ANMCLA's  
resistance in the case of the 2003 funding resulted in a state institution taking complete control, with civil  
society playing no administrative role whatsoever.
The RVMC / ANMCLA split grew increasingly heated over the next couple of years, inducing  
most community broadcasters to choose one side or the other. TV Petare, for instance, belonged to both 
organizations  but  withdrew  from  ANMCLA  in  2005.  In  providing  his  personal  motivation  for  
withdrawing, Méndez articulates a sentiment common to those who opposed ANMCLA:
Why am I going to be in an association to throw stones at those who are by my side?  
[There are] regulations that I don't like sometimes, but the state has them like that and we  
have to advance to change the regulations... You don't have to [disrespect] the regulations  
[and  say]  I'm  going  to  take  advantage  [of  that]  to  screw  everyone  else.  That  isn't  
revolutionary.  For me revolutionary is  … let's  change the regulations,  let's  change the  
[law], that's revolutionary.... We're all radicals. 487
ANMCLA certainly positioned itself in opposition to the state – as we will discuss below, ANMCLA  
members  famously  occupied  CONATEL's  headquarters  in  2005  –  but  this  was  a  tendency,  not  an  
absolute. For example, one ANMCLA member, David Berrios, was named as Director of DGMAC in  
2005. According to Manrique, this occurred during the last flare up between the RVMC and ANMCLA.  
487“Porqué me voy a estar en un gremio para tirarle piedra a quien está a mi lado? [Hay] normas que a veces no 
me gustan, pero el estado las tiene así, y tenemos que avanzar a cambiar las normas… No hay que [atreverse] 
las normas [y decir] yo voy a aprovechar [de eso] para joder a los demás. Ese no es revolucionario. Para mí 
revolucionario es … vamos a cambiar las normas, vamos a cambiar la [ley], eso es revolucionario…. Todos 
somos radicales.”
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The division was significant enough that CONATEL called a national meeting in May of 2005 in an  
attempt to establish dialogue between the two organizations. Nonetheless, RVMC members believed that  
Berrios had removed TV Rubio from a list of broadcasters who would be receiving equipment from the  
state and therefore sought to have Berrios removed from his position (Manrique 2011). For our purposes,  
the details of these conflicts are of little importance except to illustrate the degree of division and to  
indicate the resulting inefficiencies within the sector.
As the years went on, however, the divide became less significant, partly because both the RVMC  
and the Bolivarian state continued to move away from the liberal model, and partly because ANMCLA  
found itself forced to reorganize due to its own internal divisions. A clear example of the RVMC's shift  
came  in  2007,  as  Chávez  publicly  took  responsibility  for  CONATEL's  decision  to  not  renew  the  
broadcasting license for RCTV, one of the commercial television broadcasters that had participated in the  
2002 coup attempt. That decision reignited the fierce debate over the media that had subsided somewhat  
after the RESORTE Law was passed, and many international observers issued statements opposing the  
move as an authoritarian overreach that would unduly restrict media freedom. One of those was AMARC,  
the long standing and widely respected international association of  community broadcasters that  had  
played a significant role in facilitating the development and legitimation of Venezuela's community media  
sector. In fact, AMARC and the RVMC had been working together since the Second International Forum  
and First Festival of Community Media in 2003, and they had recently entered into an agreement, along  
with Radio Fe y Alegría, for a series of projects. The RVMC, however, issued a statement of support for  
the Bolivarian government and publicly broke with AMARC. Significantly, Radio Fe y Alegría continued  
to maintain a relatively neutral political profile and also continued to work with AMARC ( ibid.). Also of 
significance  was  the  fact  that  AMARC's  statement  against  the  RCTV decision  included  an  explicit  
statement  of  support  for  the  community  media  legal  framework  established  by  the  LOT  and  the  
regulations (Pía Matta 2007). In essence, although the RCTV decision was not explicitly concerned with  
community  media,  AMARC was declaring  that  its  support  for  Venezuelan  policy  would  not  extend  
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beyond the liberal media model, whereas the RVMC was signaling that it was willing to push beyond that  
model in cooperation with the Bolivarian state.
The RVMC continues to exist in name, but since Manrique's departure as the organization's leader  
it  has  taken  on  a  much  diminished  profile.  Meanwhile,  new  associations  of  community  media  
organizations  have  arisen  over  the  years.  For  example,  the  National  Movement  of  Alternative  and  
Community Media (Movimiento Nacional de Medios Alternativos y Comunitarios  / MoMAC) formed in 
March of 2008 with a membership tilted toward print collectives. Many of the community television  
broadcasters, meanwhile, have organized as the National Movement of Community Television Stations  
(Movimiento Nacional de Televisoras Comunitarias) which, as of 2011, seemed to be the conduit for most  
of the lobbying efforts waged by members of Catia TVe, Teletambores, TV Rubio, TV Petare, and Canal  
Z, among others.488
ANMCLA  continues  to  work  at  bridging  the  community  media  sector  with  other  social  
movements in order to push the Bolivarian revolution toward a greater reliance on civil society and a  
diminished role for the state. In recent years,  however,  ANMCLA has undergone significant internal  
reorganization as a result of conflict and mistrust. In March of 2007, 66 community media foundations  
and collectives signed the “Charallave Manifesto” in which they publicly resigned their membership in  
ANMCLA, citing a “mistaken model” (modelo equivocado) in which members from Caracas refused to  
rotate  leadership  posts,  improve  the  flow  of  information,  and  allow  for  sufficient  internal  debate  
(Venezuela: Medios Comunitarios de varias regiones del país renuncian a la ANMCLA 2007).
ANMCLA experienced another tumultuous split as a result, ironically, of agreements it had made  
to  distribute publicity for state institutions,  including the recently re-nationalized National Telephone  
Company of Venezuela (Compañía Anónima Nacional Teléfonos de Venezuela / CANTV) and the newly 
established Ministry for People's Power of Communes ( Ministerio de Poder Popular de las Comunas) 
488Jesús Suarez (2011), President of Catia TVe, stated that 17 of the 37 licensed television broadcasters participated 
actively in the National Movement of Community Television Stations.
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(Prensa  de  Frente  2009).  The  agreement  with  CANTV involved distributing  advertising  among 100  
community media outlets affiliated with ANMCLA throughout one year in return for 3,600,000 BsF. In  
2009, some 2 million BsF had not been distributed and were unaccounted for. Suspicion fell on one of  
ANMCLA's longtime leaders who had been among the most important of the inner circle in Caracas. For  
various reasons the situation was never legally resolved, but the gravity of the situation resulted in the  
departure  of  some  member  collectives  and  a  reorganization  of  ANMCLA's  internal  structure,  with  
traditional  leaders  vacating  official  posts,  increased  representation  from  outside  of  Caracas,  and  a  
renewed dedication to transparency, especially in relation to financial matters (Reyes 2011). As of 2011,  
ANMCLA represented roughly 50 community media collectives in eight states. Most of those collectives  
were  radio  stations,  although  ANMCLA's  membership  included  at  least  three  television  collectives  
(ibid.).489 
Accompanying  the  above  mentioned  intra-organizational  dynamics  in  the  community  media  
sector is a significant diminishment in its internal fragmentation. On one level, this can be attributed to  
the passing of the “old guard” within the RVMC and ANMCLA, and thus the dissolution of personal  
animosities and ideological posturing. More importantly, however, we can see it as symptomatic of a  
broad shift in terms of strategy and state policy. In the early years of the Chávez administration, the inertia  
of  the  liberal  model  remained  strong,  both  within  CONATEL and  the  RVMC.  As  time progressed,  
however, the limitations of that liberal model, expressed primarily in the regulations, became apparent. As  
we will see, this is not to say that either the state or the alternative and community media movement has  
adopted  a  coherent  strategy  for  overcoming  those  limitations,  but  this  has  become  the  goal  of  all  
supporters of the Bolivarian revolution. The debate, in other words, has shifted from the degree to which  
the liberal model should be defended to which model should be put in its place. In a certain sense, at least  
according  to  the  simplified  binary  presented  above,  this  outcome  might  be  seen  as  vindicating  
ANMCLA's “hard line” stance. We would do well to recognize, however, that were it not for the stability  
489Reyes named Lara TV (Lara), Bolivar TV (Yaracuy), and Barrio TV (a mobile audiovisual school in Caracas).
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of the model originally advanced by the RVMC, and especially the various forms of cooperation between  
the state and community media practitioners, the community media sector would not have experienced  
the explosive growth and dynamic vitality that has made the need for a new model so very salient. In this  
regard,  we might  view the  tension  between the  RVMC and ANMCLA as having  had at  least  some  
salutary effect.
In order to see why the need for a new framework of community media regulation became so  
critical, we must now turn our attention to the limitations of the current framework. To begin, we will  
look at three interrelated sets of difficulties that have troubled the relationship between the community  
media sector and the state. First, we will review how the centralized and bureaucratic structure of the state  
resulted in lost opportunities for community media practitioners. Second, we will examine how the lack  
of a coherent policy across, as well as diachronically within, state institutions also created obstacles.  
Finally, we will look at how the complicated notion of autonomy has played out over the years.
We have already seen that the licensing process overseen by CONATEL has been the subject of  
disputes within the community media sector. One basic issue is that the four studies required by the  
regulations are seen as particularly onerous for aspiring community broadcasters. As noted above, many  
members of the RVMC were able to circumvent this obstacle by copying an “approved” format from the  
first stations to receive licenses. ANMCLA applied the same approach, with 20 community radio stations  
copying the application of Radio Negro Primero in Caracas (Fernandes 2010, 168). Nonetheless, aspiring  
broadcasters across the country have continued to find the process intimidating and overwhelming. For  
example, in the first trimester of 2007, Saúl González, then president of the Association of Community  
Radio Stations of the State of Zulia (Asociación de Radios Comunitarios del Estado Zulia  / ARCEZ), 
estimated that only 15 of the 120 stations in Zulia had a license. While some of these stations would not  
qualify  as  community  broadcasters,  given  their  programming  and  organizational  model,  González  
partially attributed the state of affairs to the difficulty of completing the application process:
…  we  acquire  the  equipment  ourselves,  and  we  are  legitimate  but  we've  had  many  
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problems because you have to do a lot of “paperwork”, they have to understand that we're  
from the community. We've had many obstacles due to CONATEL because you have to do  
a social project [study], a technical one, [an] economic one, and a legal one. Many of us  
are people from the community and what we want is to advance the community forward  
and not everyone is a student and they don't know what they have to do. (Ávila 2008,  
56)490
As a result, calls for reform of the current framework often articulate a desire for “the simplification of  
the community projects [studies] that allow for speeding up the permitting and authorization of alternative  
media” (Movimiento Integrador de Medios Alternativos y Comunitario [MIMAC] 2009). 491
In addition to the difficulty of completing the studies, many in the sector found the basis for the  
economic study to have become obsolete. Méndez of TV Petare noted that the economic study:
...was a capitalist study the same as any other [private] national television station.... It had  
to  do  with  the  sale  of  publicity  space  to  any business,  the  contracting  of  specialized  
personnel.... The only reference that we had was the private media. But, notice that with  
the reflection on the coup d'etat in 2002, we realized that that couldn't be the logic.... [W]e  
can't put ourselves under that logic because [then] we're in the hand of any capitalist. 492
While this is primarily a question of the funding model for community media, the fact remained that  
aspiring stations were required to either submit a study that reflected an ideologically untenable model or  
substantiate an entirely new and untested model added a layer of distaste to the application process.
Meanwhile, even when stations did properly complete the required process, they often found  
themselves waiting years for their license to be approved. According to article 13 of the regulations (in  
accordance with article 28 of the LOT), CONATEL has a period of 45 days (extendable one time only for  
a period of 15 days) to respond to a completed application. According to article 31 of the LOT, however,  
the absence of a response during that period is to be interpreted as a negative response, meaning that  
490“...los equipos los adquirimos nosotros mismos, y somos legítimos pero hemos tenido muchos inconvenientes  
porque hay que hacer mucho "papeleo", deben entender que somos de la comunidad. Hemos tenido muchos 
impedimentos por parte de Conatel porque hay que hacer un proyecto social, uno técnico, económico y uno 
legal. Muchos de nosotros somos gente de la comunidad y lo que queremos es impulsar hacia adelante la 
comunidad y no todos son estudiantes y no saben lo que deben hacer.”
491“la simplificación de los proyectos comunitarios que permitan agilizar la permisología y habilitación a los  
medios alternativos”
492“...era un estudio capitalista igual que calquier otra televisora nacional [privada]… Tenía que ver con la venta 
de espacio publicitaria a cualquier empresa, contratación de personal especializado… La única referencia que 
teníamos era los medios privados. Pero, fíjate que con la reflección del golpe del estado en 2002, nosotros nos 
dimos cuenta que eso no podía ser la lógica…. [N]osotros no podemos meternos en esa lógica porque estamos 
en la mano de cualquier capitalista.”
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applicants have no recourse if they do not hear back from CONATEL. In actual practice, these articles  
have been entirely disregarded, as CONATEL has rarely, if ever, responded within the 60 day limit, yet  
many applications have been approved far beyond this window.
Many radio stations, which can more easily acquire the funds and resources necessary to begin  
broadcasting, have simply begun to broadcast “illegally” while waiting for their license to be approved.  
As will be discussed below in relation to autonomy, CONATEL is unlikely to force these broadcasters off  
the air when its own lentitude can justifiably be cited as the cause of illegality. As Villalobos (2012)  
points out, however, “[t]his apparent 'letting slide' makes it possible for the emergence of media outlets  
that  aren't  subject  to  the established regulations and carry out a  [mode of]  communication closer to  
commercial  activity  and  removed  from  community  purposes.” 493 The  proliferation  of  “pseudo-
community” broadcasters then provides ammunition for critics of Bolivarian community media policy  
(see Castro y Rojas 2004, Leal 2007, Ávila 2008).
Some television broadcasters have also begun operating without a license. Canal Z, for example,  
submitted its application in 2002 but did not receive a license until 2006. In the meantime, the collective  
began broadcasting using the very same transmitter that Manrique had built for Catia TVe. Nonetheless,  
without the funding, equipment, and consulting from CONATEL that accompanied a license, Canal Z was  
unable to maintain a presence on the airwaves and it was not until September of 2008 that the collective  
began broadcasting legally. The experience of TV Petare was similar; it submitted an application in 2002,  
did  not  receive  a  license  until  2005,  and  did  not  begin  broadcasting  until  2008.  In  both  cases  the  
collectives continued to conduct workshops and produce videos in their communities during this period,  
but without a license and a broadcasting presence, their opportunities for attracting funding and other  
forms of collaboration, including community participation, were significantly diminished. 494
493“[e]ste aparente “dejar, dejar pasar” hace posible que surjan medios que no están sometidos a las regulaciones 
establecidas y hagan una comunicación más próxima de la actividad mercantil y alejada de los propósitos 
comunitarios.”
494Two participants in Canal Z, including one of the founding members, worked at Radio Fe y Alegría in Zulia. 
Thanks to these connections, Radio Fe y Alegría made its installations available for Canal Z to hold workshops.
354
Beyond  those  lost  opportunities,  however,  the  delay  caused  the  community  television  
practitioners to develop rancor and suspicion toward CONATEL. Kenia Useche (2009), one of the leaders  
of Canal Z, described the process as “our war, almost, against CONATEL”, which she described as “an  
institution that was created in another time, not suitable to our reality”. 495 Like many members of the 
alternative and community media movement, workers at both TV Petare and Canal Z became convinced  
that the delays were not merely the result of the bureaucratic delays that are common to many Venezuelan  
institutions, but that certain officials working in CONATEL were actively opposed to the expansion of the  
community media sector. Keyla González, a lawyer and leading member of Canal Z, remarked that “[w]e  
found out that our experience [application] had been shelved in CONATEL because there was no type of  
interest in liberating the radio spectrum occupied by private companies” (Prieto 2010). 496 Méndez, from 
TV Petare, similarly explained that their application “got lost inside CONATEL” when an official passed  
it to a group “on the right” so that they could use it for an application of their own. 497 By enlisting 
connected friends and showing the receipts of their submissions they were not only able to salvage their  
application, but also to bring about the firing of two CONATEL officials. Canal Z had an especially tough  
time advocating on their own behalf, due to the time (14 – 20 hours) and cost of the bus trip from Zulia to  
Caracas, where CONATEL is located. Useche explained that many trips were required, with the group  
finally having to stay for an entire week in order to push through the application, and that only happened  
after  they  had  launched a  campaign with  letters  from other  community media outlets,  support  from  
MINCI, and even an entire half hour program produced by ViVe (and aired on both ViVe and the principal  
state broadcaster, Venezolana de Televisión [VTV]) dedicated to the difficulties encountered by Canal Z  
in obtaining a license (Prieto; Eekhout & Deronne, 203).
Similar  delays  have  been  common  in  other  state  institutions.  Much  of  the  funding  for  the  
495“nuestra guerra, casi, contra CONATEL”; “una institución que fue creada en otro tiempo, no adecuado a 
nuestra realidad”
496“[n]osotros nos enteramos que nuestro experiencia había sido engavetado en Conatel porque no había ningún 
tipo de interés por liberar el espectro radioeléctrico ocupado por empresas privadas”
497“se perdió dentro de CONATEL”; “de la derecha”
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Bolivarian community media sector has been distributed by MINCI. One of the several conduits of this  
funding has been the “Cuba – Venezuela Integral  Agreement of Cooperation” ( Convenio Integral de  
Cooperación Cuba – Venezuela / CICCV), which has been renewed annually since 2000 and has resulted  
in an interchange between the two countries in areas as diverse as agriculture, energy efficiency, mining,  
sports, education, culture, and – most famously – healthcare. MINCI took advantage of the fifth CICCV,  
signed  in  2004,  to  finance  equipment,  including  transmitters,  antennas,  cameras,  microphones,  and  
computers,  for  128  community  radio  and television  broadcasters.  By the  end of  2007,  however,  58  
broadcasters had not yet received the promised equipment, and 11 of those had still not received it by the  
end of 2008 (Sistema Nacional de Comunicación Popular, Alternativa y Comunitaria 2009). 498 Given the 
rapid pace of  technological change in  the video and computer sectors,  much of this  equipment was  
therefore approaching obsolescence by the time it was installed.  As will  be discussed below, similar  
delays affected equipment procured by MINCI through the tenth CICCV, signed in 2009.
A significant contributing factor to the inefficiencies of the largely centralized mode of resource  
provision for the Bolivarian community media sector has been the lack of a coherent policy both across  
and within state institutions. To a significant extent, this has been caused by the frequent rotation of top  
officials and the degree to which their personal preferences dictate institutional policies. At the inter-
institutional level, one issue has been that MINCI or other organizations have frequently recognized and  
aided broadcasters that were not licensed by CONATEL (Triviño 2011). More broadly, however, different  
institutions have  often  worked toward  the  same goals  but  in  isolation  from each other.  CONATEL,  
498There is some inconsistency in relation to these numbers. The document from which the above figures were 
culled provides contradictory information that can be interpreted to mean that either 11 or 12 broadcasters lacked 
the equipment at the end of 2008: “Program of Technological Endowment, that has benefitted to date 117 
community media outlets of the 128 equipment packages contemplated in the Program of the Cuba-Venezuela 
Agreement.... In 2008 of the 58 media outlets awaiting installation 46 (37 radio and 9 television) have been put 
on air.” Meanwhile, Andrea Salinas (2011), employed in DGMAC in 2011, stated that the 2004 agreement called 
for 100 community radio and 20 community television broadcasters to be equipped. Rigger Triviño (2011), who 
served as Director of DGMAC from August 2009 to June 2010, referred to “a bit more than” (un poco más de) 
100 radio and 20 television packages, but remembered that more than 20 had not been delivered by the time he 
left the post.; “Programa de Dotación Tecnológica, que ha beneficiado hasta la fecha a 117 medios comunitarios 
de los 128 equipos contemplados en el Programa del Convenio Cuba-Venezuela.... En 2008 de los 58 medios por 
instalar se han puesto al aire 46 (37 radios y 9 televisoras).”
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MINCI, and ViVe, for example, have continually launched funding and training programs that are not  
integrated and thus tend to repeat similar efforts with new participants, instead of focusing on building the  
capacity of  and providing steady resources for consistent participants.
Standing  even  further  outside  of  those  efforts,  however,  is  the  work  undertaken  by  the  
government's  Infocenter  Project  (Proyecto  Infocentro),  which  is  run  by  the  Infocenter  Foundation 
(Fundación Infocentro) that is housed not in MINCI, but in the Ministry for People's Power of Science,  
Technology,  and  Intermediate  Industries  (Ministerio  del  Poder  Popular  para  Ciencia,  Tecnología,  e  
Industrias Intermedias / MCTI). An infocenter is a public site that makes information and communication  
technologies (ICTs), primarily internet-connected computer terminals, available to the general population  
at no cost. Infocenters also provide instruction in how to utilize such technologies, and they provide space  
for the community to meet and participate in a range of other activities. The Infocenter Foundation has  
also used the infocenters as bases for the creation for what it  refers to as Communications Brigades  
(Brigadas Comunicacionales), which are community media collectives that work in a variety of media,  
from murals to web pages (but not broadcast) (see ¿Qué son las Brigadas comunicacionales?, nd). While  
Communications Brigades operate across the country, they are rarely articulated with community media  
broadcasters, are not actively supported by DGMAC, and do not participate consistently in the alternative  
and community media movement.
Inside MINCI, the lack of policy coherence has principally been caused by the frequent rotation  
of Ministers and Directors of DGMAC. When Delcy Rodríguez became Minister of Communications and  
Information in August of 2013, she became the tenth person to hold the post since MINCI was established  
in  2002, although since Andrés Izarra served during three non-consecutive periods,  hers  became the  
thirteenth distinct administration in an eleven year period. New ministers bring a new vision and focus to  
MINCI policies and they usually install a new Director of DGMAC that they trust to carry out their plans.  
MINCI's portfolio is quite broad, however, and the role of state media and propaganda campaigns often  
overshadows the  community  media  sector  in  terms of  priorities.  Berriós,  who served as  Director  of  
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DGMAC in 2004 and 05 under Andrés Izarra, reflected after the fact that “our work isn't recognized and  
the government doesn't understand that what we do has a profound political meaning” (Urribarrí 2009,  
181).499 In some administrations, however, community media is given greater prominence and leeway for  
action,  meaning  that  the  relationship  between  the  central  state  institution  and  the  alternative  and  
community media movement can shift dramatically over a short period of time.
Blanca Eekhout, who served from April of 2009 to April of 2010, is widely recognized within the  
movement as the most amicable of all the Ministers of Communications and Information. She is the only  
Minister to have come directly from the community media sector, having worked at Catia TVe for over a  
decade and, as we have seen, she had developed a vision of community media at  the national level  
through her work in establishing ViVe. In MINCI, Eekhout appointed Gabriel Gil, who had entered Catia  
TVe as a student activist and risen to Director in 2008, as her Vice Minister of Strategy, and she appointed  
Rigger Triviño, who had also been a student activist and then spent years working in various community  
media collectives in the state of Carabobo, as Director of DGMAC. Both Gil and Triviño were quite  
young and eager to change MINCI's culture in relation to community media. Even so, the difficulties of  
utilizing DGMAC to benefit the movement are manifest in relation to Eekhout's administration. Asked  
how her personal experiences had shaped her work at MINCI, she replied that “in the period of a year you  
can't make transformations in order to materialize ... everything that is implied by that vision of 'the  
community'” (Eekhout 2011).500
MINCI  has  been  structured  by  two  principal  departments:  Strategy  and  Communications  
Operations (Gestión Comunicacional). Gil explained that prior to Eekhout's administration, DGMAC had  
been assigned to Operations, but that they decided to place it under Strategy, which was the department  
that ran the state's publicity campaigns. As a result, DGMAC was able to channel funds to community  
media outlets in exchange for running public service advertisements and publicity from state institutions.  
499“nuestro trabajo no se reconece y el gobierno no entiende que lo que hacemos tiene un profundo sentido 
político”
500“en un lapso de un año tu no puedes hacer transformaciones como para que se materializen ... todo lo que 
implique esa visión de lo comunitario”
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We will discuss the implications of this and other state policies in relation to the question of autonomy  
further below; for the moment we will focus on publicity as a means of funding. Triviño was certainly  
aware of the possible implications: “...we didn't like the idea of publicity spots … however, the state had  
gone so many years without economically supporting community media, that many media outlets were on  
the floor, economically speaking...”. 501 According to Gil, prior to Eekhout's administration MINCI paid  
for community media outlets to distribute state publicity, but “in a reductionist manner... It was something  
like 2,000 Bsf per year. With that a media outlet can't function. It was a very small vision.” 502 Triviño 
explained that when he entered DGMAC, there were roughly one million BsF available for some 1,000  
recognized (but not necessarily licensed) community media outlets, whereas MINCI had a budget of 24  
million  BsF  for  advertising  on  private  commercial  media.  Since  DGMAC was  now in  the  Strategy  
department, with Gil's support he was able to transfer 30 percent of the money from that budget in order  
to provide substantial financing for over 150 community media outlets during his tenure (Triviño 2011;  
Medios alternativos y comunitarios consolidarán... 2010). 503
When  Eekhout  was  transferred  from  her  post,  however,  DGMAC  was  returned  to  
Communications Operations and the flow of publicity to community media outlets was cut off once again.  
Triviño did not mince words when accounting for this change, declaring that the following two Ministers,  
“Tania [Díaz] and Mauricio [Rodríguez] don't believe in community media as such. There was no solid  
work  with  the  people  of  the  community  media,  there  was  no  financing  or  support  for  community  
media.”504 While many members of the alternative and community media movement openly shared this  
opinion, the Ministers and their staff might have countered that state publicity was not the appropriate  
501“a nosotros no nos gustaba el tema de la pauta publicitario … sin embargo, el estado tenía tantos años sin  
apoyar económicamente a los medios comunitarios, que muchos medios estaban en el piso, ecónomicamente 
hablando…”
502“...de una manera reduccionista… era algo así como 2,000 BsF al año. Con eso un medio no funciona. Era una 
visión muy pequeña.”
503Between September and December of 2009, 3,660,000 BsF were distributed to 96 radio stations, 1,640,000 BsF 
went to 11 television stations, and 992,000 BsF to 48 printed publications (Medios alternativos y comunitarios 
consolidarán... 2010).
504“Tania y Mauricio no creen en los medios comunitarios como tal. No hubo trabajo sólido con gente de los  
medios comunitarios, no hubo financiamiento o apoyo a los medios comunitarios.”
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avenue for financing a supposedly autonomous community media sector. Whatever the reason, the sudden  
shift in policy drastically altered the fortunes of those community media outlets that had enjoyed the  
funding, meaning that they had to cut back on the salaries that they could offer to their workers, as well as  
any planned investments in infrastructure, equipment, or programming.
Another example of the debilitating effects of MINCI's inconsistent policies can be found in the  
fate of the community media financing package included in the tenth CICCV, signed in 2009 during  
Eekhout's administration.505 According to Triviño, this package had three initial components: a training  
program,  equipment  for  35  community  radio  and  12  community  television  stations,  and  funds  to  
“interconnect” community media broadcasters into a single network. At the time that the agreement was  
signed, the 12 television stations were led to understand that mobile recording units were to be included in  
the equipment package. These were meant to alleviate longstanding problems associated with producing  
community television on location inside communities.  Television stations could not afford their  own  
vehicles, much less vehicles suitable to mobile production. Meanwhile, attempts to use taxis or more  
affordable forms of public transport were inherently risky, as it was not uncommon for valuable cameras  
to be stolen.
When control of the project passed to the administration of Andrés Izarra and the new Director of  
DGMAC,  Rukleman  Soto,  the  equipment  for  the  television  stations  was  placed  “under  revision”  
(Salinas).  Officially,  no specific  reason was  given for  this  decision,  but  many community television  
practitioners suspected that Soto did not believe the television stations would make proper use of such  
expensive equipment. Eduardo, who worked at Canal Z, appraised the situation as follows: “They believe  
that the community media outlets can't move forward.... They think that it will be lost money, because  
we're not going to produce. I imagine that those people aren't committed to the project.” 506 Méndez, from 
505The original sponsoring institution for this agreement was ViVe, but at some point control was transferred to 
MINCI (Kunich 2011).
506“Creen que los medios comunitarios no pueden seguir adelante.... Piensan que va a ser plata perdido, porque no 
vamos a producir. Me imagino que esa gente no son comprometido con el proyecto.”
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TV Petare, concluded that Soto “was applying a fourth republican policy.” 507 Manrique, from TV Rubio, 
suggested  that  the  new  administration  viewed  providing  mobility  and  satellite  connections  to  the  
community television sector as a potentially “dangerous” loss of control. While the radio equipment was  
delivered in the second half of 2011, the television equipment was not delivered until a year later and the  
mobile units were not included.
As  discussed  so  far,  the  problems  related  to  state  institutions  can  be  seen  as  inefficiencies  
symptomatic of a highly centralized bureaucracy, but we have also already seen indications that they  
overlap  with  the  particularly  vexing  issue  of  autonomy.  The  question  of  autonomy  in  Venezuela's  
community media sector is worthy of a separate study; here we will attempt only to sketch the outlines of  
the issue so that we may take it  into consideration as we discuss attempts to reorganize the sector's  
political economic framework.508 We will first examine certain facets of CONATEL's application of its  
licensing authority. Then we will look at the question of funding and its effect on the actions and content  
of community media broadcasters. Finally, we will initiate a comparison of the notion of autonomy within  
a liberal and a Gramscian civil society framework.
As the broadcast regulator, CONATEL is responsible for enforcing the provisions of the LOT and  
the community broadcasting regulations.  We have already seen,  however,  that  extreme delays in  the  
licensing (and initial funding) process created a situation in which many community broadcasters (or  
those that claim to be), especially radio stations, operate or have operated without a license under the  
pretense of being unable to procure one. Since the Bolivarian government seeks to foster community  
media, and because delays within CONATEL itself have contributed to the problem, the regulator has  
generally refrained from penalizing or shutting down unlicensed community broadcasters. This has, of  
course, incurred harsh criticism from those opposed to the Bolivarian government. As early as September  
of 2002, during the period of extreme polarization following the attempted coup, El Nacional, one of  
507“estaba aplicando una política cuarta republicana.”
508Schiller (2009, 2011) impressively integrates a discussion of autonomy in relation to liberal and socialist 
frameworks with her analyses of Catia TVe.
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Venezuela's most respected and widely circulated dailies, ran a story on community media that called  
CONATEL into question and included the following quote from Marcelino Bisbal, one of Venezuela's  
most renowned academics in the field of communications:
Under a regime in which the rule of Law is in fashion, the regulatory entity would be  
obligated to systematize the use of the spectrum and to instill order, because otherwise we  
would be in a radio frequency jungle. If a community experience invaded without the  
corresponding  permits,  and  the  governing  organization  did  not  intervene,  one  would  
suspect the existence of dark intentions along the way. (Velandia 2002) 509
Similar  arguments  were  levied  by  the  Venezuelan  Broadcasting  Guild  ( Cámara  Venezolana  de  la  
Industria de la Radiodifusión / CVIR) (Brett 2003, 9). This critique continued to smolder and flared up  
again in 2009, when CONATEL demanded that all broadcasting license holders present their credentials  
and then revoked the licenses of 61 radio and two television stations due to various irregularities (Urbina  
2012,  48).  Critics  of  the  Chávez  administration  countered  that  many  community  broadcasters  were  
operating without licenses and that CONATEL was operating a double standard.
Critics have also long contended that Bolivarian community media are in breach of article 26 of  
the regulations which, as noted above, prohibits “partisan or proselytizing messages of any nature”. For  
example, in the period following the coup attempt, “a major grievance of the CVIR, as well as of the  
political  opposition (with which the CVIR is  closely allied),  is  what they perceive to  be the radical  
political  profile  of  the  stations.  Indeed,  in  press  articles  and  editorials  the  community  stations  are  
frequently portrayed as ideological mouthpieces of the state” (Brett 2003, 9). Meanwhile, a 2005 article in  
the El Universal newspaper, Venezuela's leading business daily and arguably its paper of record, referred  
to community radio stations as “radio-electronic media of the state … employed for propaganda and  
politIcal proselytism” (cited in Fernandes 2010, 186). Such criticism is also evident within the Venezuelan  
academy. Bisbal (2007) has classified alternative and community media outlets, with specific reference to  
members  of  ANMCLA, as  “semi-state”  or  “semi-public  media”  (659).  Urribarrí  (2009),  meanwhile,  
509“Bajo un régimen en el que prive el estado de Derecho, el ente regulador estaría en la obligación de 
sistematizar el uso del espectro y de imponer orden, porque de lo contrario estaríamos en una jungla 
radioeléctrica. Si una experiencia comunitaria irrumpiera sin la permisología correspondiente, y el organismo 
rector no interviniera, se sospecharía de la existencia de intenciones oscuras en el camino.”
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writes  of  a  transition  from community  to  “ govunity”  media  (gobunitarios)  and  notes  a  “pernicious 
symbiosis between [community media] and the government” (171). 510
The argument expressed from this perspective is that government support, whether CONATEL's  
selective enforcement of  the regulations or  funding and resource provision from state institutions,  is  
predicated on obedience and supportive content from the recipients of that support. Bisbal, for example,  
penned a 2004 article in El Nacional that carried the headline “Media Incentivized by the Government  
Are Not Community Media”, and he writes (2007) that:
the interference of the government is visible … by the insertion of publicity spots, by the  
purchase  of  equipment  and  installations,  even  the  contribution  of  resources  for  their  
'fortification'. They are media that directly or indirectly are linked to government policies  
under the political ideology of the current Government. (659) 511
Urribarrí (2007) echoes this argument when she concedes that some broadcasters must “try to maintain  
their autonomy and a critical tone”, but only with a degree of difficulty that is proportionate to their  
dependance “on licensing from CONATEL to operate the spectrum frequency and, in almost all cases,  
also on state financing” (5).512
The relationship between state support and autonomy is a complex and thorny issue that lies at  
the heart of any discussion of governance and sustainability models for community media. Our analysis  
must begin by recognizing that Bisbal, Urribarrí, and the Venezuelan opposition are wielding a strong  
version of the traditional liberal notion of autonomy as completely independent of the state. We have seen  
this argument previously in relation to the neighborhood movement, especially the stance taken by the  
Escuela. We must also recognize that the Bolivarian community media has been to some degree lying in a  
bed of its own making since it was complicit, through the advocacy of the RVMC, in instituting the liberal  
notion of autonomy in the regulations. As we have seen, while organizations such as Radio Fe y Alegría  
510“perniciosa simbiosis entre los [medios comunitarios] y el gobierno”
511“la ingerencia del gobierno es visible por lo que apuntábamos antes, es decir por la inserción de pautas de 
publicidad, por la compra de los equipos e instalaciones, hasta el aporte de recursos para su “fortalecimiento”.  
Son medios que directa o indirectamente están articulados a las políticas gubernamentales bajo el ideario 
político del actual Gobierno.”
512“tratar de mantener su autonomía y un tono crítico”; “de la habilitación de Conatel para operar la frecuencia 
del espectro y, en casi la totalidad de los casos, también del financiamiento estatal”
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and AMARC have continued to endorse that liberal intent, the RVMC has sought a different framework.  
In  2011,  Manrique remarked that “these regulations have already become obsolete.” 513 With specific 
reference to the prohibition on proselytization in article 26 he added that “I, speaking personally, made a  
mistake.”514
It would be an oversimplification to say, however, that community media outlets aligned with the  
Bolivarian revolution merely seek to echo the messages of the government or the ruling political party, as  
Bisbal and Urribarrí suggest. This would correspond to a state- or party-led vanguardism reminiscent of  
the type of minimally participatory communications system instituted in Cuba. Of course, this is precisely  
what many in the opposition believe to be the intent of Bolivarian community media policy. Pasquali,  
long one of Venezuela's most prominent supporters of participatory communications, is now one such  
ardent opponent and has drawn dire implications from the financing provided via the CICCV, noting that  
“the installation of the so-called 'community' broadcasters ('self-managed media with resources from the  
state' or in other words chavistas) runs on an account of the cuban [enterprise] Copexte [sic]” (Pasquali  
2007) and claiming to know “of so-called community broadcasters that even have a political inspector  
overseeing the purity of the doctrine” (cited in Ávila 2008, 51). 515 This unsubstantiated and seemingly 
untrue claim is unique in the literature on Bolivarian community media, but indicates the suspicions and  
intent of those opposed.
The difficulty of discussing autonomy in relation to Bolivarian community media, however, is  
that two distinct but overlapping and interrelated understandings of autonomy are always at play, and they  
are generally not so well defined as Pasquali would have it. First, there is the traditional liberal notion of  
civil society autonomy discussed above. While Manrique may appear somewhat blithe in his disavowal of  
513“este reglamento ya quedó obsoleto”
514"Yo, en lo personal, me equivoqué."
515Copextel is a Cuban state-owned enterprise that offers products and services related to home appliances, 
commercial computer systems, and telecommunications, among other areas.; “la instalación de las emisoras mal 
llamadas 'comunitarias' ('medios autogestionados con recursos del Estado' o sea chavistas) corre por cuenta de 
la cubana Copexte [sic]”; “de mal llamadas emisoras comunitarias que hasta cuentan con un comisario político 
cubano velando por la pureza de la doctrina”
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article  26,  this  notion  of  autonomy continues  to  inform Bolivarian  community  media.  Eekhout,  for  
example, who can also claim a role in the authorship of the regulations, defended article 26 with the  
following logic:
The political is present in everything. Community media could never be at the margin of  
the political. I think that the intention is that it doesn't become a type of fishing line for a  
party, but that  it  truly picks up the political  expression of a people. But not that  it  is  
conditioned, as if in being community it can be the medium of such and such party.... I  
don't know if perhaps that becomes a limitation and the people think that they can't talk  
about politics. Talking about politics is a necessity in community media, it's determinative.  
But being conditioned by a party could be a limitation. 516
What Eekhout elides, however, is that Bolivarian community media outlets are dependent on the state,  
that they have often had a difficult time sustaining integrated community participation, and that they often  
do articulate government and ruling party positions on important issues. We will examine some specific  
cases below, but as a ready example we might recall that Chávez broadcast his Sunday television program  
from Catia TVe while Eekhout was serving as Director of that station in 2002. Such confluence between  
government and community content, in conjunction with an obvious regulatory and financial dependency  
on the state, is what leads critics to claim that Bolivarian community media are almost entirely bereft of  
autonomy.
Community  media practitioners,  however,  sometimes  express  an  alternative  understanding  of  
autonomy that corresponds to what we have referred to as a Gramscian civil state. From this perspective,  
regulatory and financial dependence on the state can be (and, they would argue, is) separated from the  
conditioning of content and administrative decisions so long as decision-making authority rests with the  
community itself. In other words, the state can and should provide necessary  resources (especially to 
historically impoverished sectors) so long as governance remains in the hands of the people.
The  outlines  of  this  debate  can  be  drawn  from  the  work  of  long  time  participatory  
516“La política está presente en todo. Los medios comunitarios jamás podrían estar al margen de la política. Creo  
que la intención es que no se convertiera en una especia de palangre de un partido, sino que de verdad 
recogiera la expresión política de un pueblo. Pero no que estuviera condicionado, como que si es comunitario 
puede ser el medio del partido tal.… No sé si a lo mejor eso más bien se convierte en una limitación y la gente 
cree que no se puede hablar de política. Hablar de política es una necesidad en lo comunitario, es determinante. 
Pero que esté condicionado por un partido puede ser una limitación.”
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communications practitioner and scholar Alfonso Gumucio, whom Urribarrí (2007) invokes to argue that  
Bolivarian community media lack autonomy: 
One could certainly describe as light the evaluation that is made about the performance of  
a  media  outlet  taking  into  account  only  the  source  of  its  resources,  but  as  Alfonso  
Gumucio  (2006)  notes,  official  financing  has  always  been  a  limiting  factor  for  the  
existence  of  really  autonomous  community  media,  since  on  occasion,  when the  State  
provides support, it also conditions the content and applies a veiled or open censorship.  
(5)517
Elsewhere, however, Gumucio (2003) is careful to note that the mere provision of state resources is not an  
insurmountable obstacle to autonomy:
If there existed any coherence in the policies of the State, community radio stations and  
community telecenters would receive the same support that public schools, libraries, or  
national cultural projects receive. This doesn't mean that the State should intervene in the  
political communication project of community media outlets, but it should support their  
development as autonomous, decentralized entities.... This indicates that there are other  
aspects that directly influence institutional sustainability: the property of the media outlet,  
internal organization, labor relations, mechanisms and transparency of management. 518
To this brief list we must add the relationship between the media outlet and the community it is meant to  
serve, especially in terms of governance and resource allocation. Gumucio's more nuanced notion of  
autonomy  is  ignored  by  critics  of  Bolivarian  community  media,  but  it  reflects  the  ideals  of  many  
Bolivarian  community  media  practitioners.  This  vision  has  proven  especially  difficult  for  those  
practitioners to articulate, however, for several reasons.
First, because while the structures of both a liberal and a vanguardist, state-directed socialist civil  
society are well known and thus easy to invoke, most community media practitioners lack a concrete  
vision of, much less a ready vocabulary for, what we have been referring to as a Gramscian civil state.  
517"Ciertamente podría calificarse como ligera la apreciación que se haga acerca del desempeño de un medio 
tomando en cuenta sólo la fuente de sus recursos, pero como apunta Alfonso Gumucio (2006), el financiamiento 
oficial ha sido siempre una limitante para la existencia de medios comunitarios realmente autónomos, pues en 
ocasiones, cuando el Estado proporciona el apoyo, también condiciona los contenidos y ejerce una censura 
velada o abierta."
518“Si existiera alguna coherencia en las políticas de Estado, las radios y los telecentros comunitarios deberían 
recibir el mismo apoyo que reciben las escuelas públicas, las bibliotecas o los proyectos culturales nacionales. 
Esto no significa que el Estado deba intervenir en el proyecto político comunicacional de los medios 
comunitarios, sino apoyar su desarrollo como entidades autónomas, descentralizadas..... Esto indica que hay 
otros aspectos que inciden directamente en la sostenibilidad institucional: la propiedad del medio, la 
organización interna, las relaciones laborales, los mecanismos y la transparencia de la gestión.”
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This is not to say that they are not aware of what they want. Indeed, as we will see below, the alternative  
and community media movement has progressively developed such a vision. Nonetheless, discussions  
continue to fall  back to the familiar binary of liberal  autonomy or state control.  Schiller  (2009) has  
cogently recognized this tendency in her study of Catia TVe: 
Although … Catia TV producers challenge the validity of liberal democracy’s norms, they  
also  deploy  notions of  autonomy and freedom that  have roots  in  a  liberal  democratic  
tradition, in order both to deflect  criticism from their detractors as well  as to struggle  
against the impositions and restraints of state officials. (16)
Indeed, on a superficial level the Gramscian notion of autonomy can appear very similar to the liberal  
notion  of  civil  society  autonomy.  Some liberal  states,  especially  in  Europe,  have  even made public  
funding available to community media outlets under terms meant to preserve autonomy. It is therefore not  
hard to understand why, in the face of accusations that their efforts are dictated by the government,  
Bolivarian community media practitioners are more apt to call on the familiar structures and ideals of a  
liberal state than to point to an ideal of civil society governance that has been instantiated only partially  
and ephemerally, at best, in human history.
This leads us to a second reason for the difficulty of articulating the vision of community media  
as part of a Gramscian civil state. Such a state does not yet exist in Venezuela, meaning that community  
media practitioners are forced into the awkward position of defending an existing system that is not, in  
fact, what they desire. They are caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, their detractors  
defend a liberal system for which there are ready models and within which the autonomy of community  
media is clearly valued (if not actually achieved). On the other hand, they seek a Gramscian system that  
does not exist, that they can not bring into existence on their own, and for the establishment of which they  
must rely on the concerted efforts  of  both popular  social  movements and a  hopefully friendly state.  
Choosing the latter option requires passing through a transitional period that is necessarily replete with  
contradictions and about which there are no guarantees that it will lead to the desired outcome.
Any realistic appraisal of the current state of affairs in the community media sector thus reveals  
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certain vulnerabilities. To begin, there is the fact that community media outlets are, to a great degree,  
dependent on the government. To this must be added evidence which suggests that some government  
officials do not share a Gramscian perspective on civil society and would prefer to employ community  
media as a propaganda appendage of the state communications apparatus. Given this state of affairs,  
community media practitioners are forced to make difficult decisions regarding the manner and degree to  
which they are willing to support the government in exchange for continued access to resources. They are  
locked,  in  other  words,  into  an ongoing and tense negotiation regarding means and ends within  the  
context of multiple social pressures and uncertainties.
The  result  of  this  negotiation  is  that  community  media  outlets  sometimes  do  prioritize  their  
support for the Bolivarian revolution, and sometimes the government that represents that revolution, in  
ways that would not necessarily accord with decisions taken within a more robust system of community  
governance. Factors that contribute to this outcome include dependence on state resources, but also the  
inexistence of and immediate inability to establish an integral system of community governance, as well  
as sincere support for the Bolivarian government in conjunction with vanguardist predilections on the part  
of some community media practitioners. Appreciating the context of debates regarding community media  
autonomy in Venezuela requires that we examine these factors in greater detail.
We have already seen that the financing model foreseen in the regulations was predicated on  
advertising and private contributions. Few, if any, community media outlets have been able to obtain a  
comfortable  level  of  sustainability  from  those  sources,  however.  Among  community  television  
broadcasters,  TV Rubio  has had relatively  greater  success  attracting advertisers.  This  is  perhaps not  
surprising, given its longer history and familiarity with fundraising outside of a context of state support.  
Manrique insisted that TV Rubio would have been able to continue operating outside of any state support.  
The station charged 150 to 300 BsF per month for a 30 second advertisement that  ran twice in  the  
morning, once in the afternoon, and eight times in the evening. 519 The majority of advertisers were small  
519In 2011, Canal Z was seeking 600 BsF per month to run a publicity spot four to six times per day. This was 
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businesses, such as hairdressers, mechanics, and local supermarkets. Manrique acknowledged that some  
placed advertisements as a form of solidarity, but he insisted that others sought only the publicity value.  
He gave a monthly figure of 5,000 to 6,000 BsF as an average advertising revenue.
The purchase of advertising by government institutions, however, drastically altered the financial  
situation. Manrique specifically mentioned advertising from MINCI (during Eekhout's administration)  
and  from  the  National  Electoral  Council  (Consejo  Nacional  Electoral),  which  he  referred  to  as 
“extraordinary income” because it was not steady, but depended on the publicity campaign cycles of the  
institutions. Manrique specified that one such contract provided 40,000 BsF over a period of five or six  
months. “They paid late, but they paid,” he explained, with the money being used for “investment plans  
for the television station”, including the purchase of a computer, a video camera, and end of year bonuses  
for the station's workers.520
Publicity campaigns are only one of the ways that community media outlets receive state funding.  
Also common are various types of grants. We have already seen that the funding announced by Chávez in  
2003 was distributed by CONATEL as “seed capital” in order to finance the preparation of installations  
and  initial  equipment  packages  for  broadcasting.  We  have  also  seen  that  MINCI  has  distributed  
equipment financed via the CICCV. Additionally, community media outlets often obtain financing by  
proposing “projects” to be financed by government entities, whether at the federal, state, or local level.  
Frequently these projects are centered on production and/or media literacy workshops offered to the local  
community, often with one goal being the attraction and initial training of new volunteers or workers.  
These  projects  generally  provide  wages  for  those  running  the  workshops,  but  government  entities  
sometimes provide sufficient enough financing to cover the purchase of new equipment to be used during  
but also long after the workshop itself. Manrique described the process of constantly proposing projects as  
“a systematic job” (un trabajo sistemático)  that  was crucial  to meeting an average annual budget of  
several years after the period to which Manrique referred, so inflation would account for some of the difference, 
as would Canal Z being located in Maracaibo, Venezuela's second largest city.
520“Pagaban tarde, pero pagaban”; “planes de inversión de la televisora”
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150,000 BsF at TV Rubio.
Practitioners evince contradictory attitudes about the effects of their financial dependence on the  
state. Gil, who has experienced the situation from leadership positions within both Catia TVe and MINCI,  
defended the autonomy of community media in relation to MINCI advertising by arguing that: “that was  
under an agreement to transmit some spots in a certain time... that doesn't include any interference in the  
programming of the media outlets, no interference in the work, nothing.” 521 The irony, of course, is that  
this argument is  hardly different than that deployed by commercial journalistic outlets in the type of  
capitalistic liberal system that the Bolivarian revolution is meant to supersede. Other workers at Catia TVe  
have been somewhat less evasive:
Although Catia  TV producers  did  not  openly  acknowledge that  the  station’s  publicity  
contracts with state ministries shaped their editorial decisions, they expressed concern that  
their  financial  reliance  on  the  state  could  perhaps  “someday”  inhibit  their  ability  to  
broadcast denuncias [critical reports]. (Schiller 2009, 200)
The issue goes beyond direct interference or censorship, however. For example, Triviño explained  
that while he served as director of DGMAC, decisions about which outlets would receive contracts for  
MINCI publicity campaign were based on “the work with the community, who participated in the outlet,  
and... on strategy, geopolitically speaking”, with the latter factor favoring the inclusion of community  
media outlets in “border states [and] principal cities”. 522 In late 2011, meanwhile, producers from two well  
established community television stations acknowledged that government officials were talking about  
providing resources, via CONATEL, to some community media outlets, presumably in preparation for the  
2012 elections. When asked about this possibility, Jacson Lobo, Coordinator of the Office of Technical  
Accompaniment (Gerencia de Acompañamiento Técnico) in CONATEL's General Office of Universal 
Service (Gerencia  General  de Servicios  Universales)  denied  that  any  such plans existed,  suggesting  
instead that the community media producers must have been referring to CONATEL's administration of  
521“eso era bajo un acuerdo de transmitir unas cuñas en cierto tiempo… que no incluye ningún intromisión a la 
programación de los medios, ninguna intromisión al trabajo, nada.”
522“el trabajo con la comunidad, quienes integraban el medio y... por la estrategia, geopoliticamente hablando”; 
“los estados fronterizos, las ciudades principales”
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the interconnection project that formed part of the CICCV package. Several weeks later, however, the  
same  producers  confirmed  that  would  be  receiving  equipment  and  funding  for  staff  salaries  from  
CONATEL, and both believed that this decision was directly related to the upcoming elections.
To be clear, not even the community media producers themselves were certain of the reasoning  
behind CONATEL's offer and both were adamant that no quid pro quo was involved. These stations were  
already proudly supportive of the Bolivarian process  and they believed that  the additional  resources  
would only allow them to produce and facilitate more and / or higher quality content of the type that they  
would  have  generated  in  any  case.  Here  we  can  see  the  sometimes  uncomfortable  overlap  and  
contradictions between community media support for the Bolivarian project and support for a Bolivarian 
government that represents that project without always manifesting its deepest ideals, especially when the  
sort term goal of maintaining power through elections is seen as essential to the longer term goal of  
establishing a more robust system of civil society governance. The bottom line, however, is that some  
government officials seem to indeed view community media as a component of the state media apparatus,  
not an autonomous sector of civil society. These officials are invested in community participation only to  
the extent that it bolsters the “media hegemony” of the Bolivarian revolution which, in some cases at  
least, is reduced to the propagandistic line of the government.
Community media practitioners recognize that they are in a dependent position, but they also  
understand that transforming community media into a viable counter-hegemonic media system requires  
state  resources.  Moreover,  they believe that this is  a proper and necessary use of such resources,  as  
Schiller (2009) illustrates:
Reliance  on  state  funding  was  a  problematic  issue  for  many  Catia  TV  staff  and  
volunteers...  Their  financial  dependency  leaves  the  station  vulnerable  to  critics  who  
questioned their objectivity. Additionally, the station’s staff fears that state funding could  
impede their ability to broadcast denuncias (complaints) critical of government figures and  
state institutions.  Catia  TV’s leaders periodically suggested the possibility of trying to  
create  financial  independence  from  state  institutions  by  raising  money  among  their  
neighbors  and viewers.  Ricardo, Catia  TV’s director,  and Hector,  an assistant-director,  
learned about the model of the listener-funded Pacifica Radio network in the U.S. when  
the Berkeley Art Museum in California invited them to exhibit their work in 2006. Many  
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Catia TV producers, however, responded with outrage that the station might try to raise  
money among the poor in the name of autonomy. Not only did the idea strike many staff  
and volunteers as wildly impractical, they also expressed their beliefs that oil revenues are  
the population’s national patrimony and that the government should distribute these state  
resources to community organizations. Many Catia TV producers see the station’s receipt  
of state funds as an integral part of creating a state that serves the popular classes. (153)
Rather than identify a definitive relationship between community media practitioners and the state, we  
must recognize that the latter are in a bind. They are dependent on resources allocated by a state that  
continues to be primarily structured along the lines of a liberal bureaucracy even as it is undergoing a  
transformative process that oscillates between the centralized and hierarchical tendencies of twentieth  
century  socialist  states  and  the  participatory  governance  of  a  Gramscian  civil  state.  Schiller  is  also  
incisive on this point:
How  Catia  TV producers  ...  understand  the  state  as  an  aspect  of  their  everyday  life  
constantly shifts. They exhibit multiple approaches to the state simultaneously. There is no  
definitive embrace  either  of  the state  as  something apart  (not  them) or  themselves as  
something they form part of with the responsibility to fix things and bring about new  
possibilities. (360)
Community  media  outlets  must  simultaneously  do  business  with,  resist,  and  embrace  these  various  
modalities of the Bolivarian state.
Juggling these disparate perspectives can be confusing and result in loss opportunities, as is well  
illustrated by Gil's strategic justification for placing the DGMAC under the control of MINCI's Strategy  
department while he served as Vice Minister in Eekhout's administration. Ironically, although one effect  
was to make more publicity campaign funding available as a means toward the immediate fortification of  
the sector, he expressed a deeper desire to shift the role of community media from a top-down channel for  
propaganda toward a bottom-up channel for popular sentiment:
Community media was on the side of operations. Because the vision that they have – I say  
'that  they  have'  because  they  have  it  again  –  is  that  'I  utilize  community  media  to  
disseminate  messages.'  …  A form  of  disseminating  messages,  like  another  tool,  like  
another megaphone.... A vertical conception of communication. We changed community  
media to Strategy with the intention that it be reversed.... They [community media] are on  
the ground and allow us to have information. We can utilize all that information to teach  
strategy and get potential.... Because communicational strategy – And we didn't resolve  
that either, no? It's a task that was left pending. – has been fundamentally reactive.... If the  
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opposition says something, I respond to it. But it has never been offensive.... Very few  
times has it been offensive. And part of that is because we don't know our potential, our  
people, our movement, the capacities. Therefore, that was the idea of having community  
media on this side of the spectrum, on the side of Strategy. Strategy is the side that picks  
up information and makes a plan, and then they make it operational through the public  
media  [and  other  channels]....  And  besides  we  are  of  the  conception  that  …  
communication goes beyond mediated communication.523
In this statement we can see an educated resistance to the idea of top-down communication but, at least in  
his role as a Vice Minister of Communications and Information, his alternative vision is limited to merely  
flipping the direction of verticality. In this vision, community media are still cast as a tool of the state.  
That state arguably incorporates greater participation, but only in the form of a more robust feedback  
channel.  As  such,  decision-making  concerning  the  state's  communications  strategy  would  remain  
restricted to appointed officials and the framework for governance hardly shifts at all.
In other moments, however, community media practitioners exhibit considerable clarity regarding  
their vision for the future, as illustrated by the following remarks from an Assistant Director of Catia TVe:
One understands that in other countries, or even here before the revolutionary process, to  
be dependent on the state was bad, to be connected to the state was bad. Now at Catia TV  
we talk about taking the state. More than that, we are in the process of taking power and  
destroying the state to construct a popular one.  To be independent of a state that is  a  
revolutionary state is a right wing position; it’s a reactionary position, no? (Schiller 2009,  
136)
We have seen that ANMCLA has been an early and a particularly vociferous proponent of this ethos. As  
the community media sector  expanded and struggled  to  establish itself  under  the regulations  and in  
conjunction  with  the  Chávez  administration,  common  practical  difficulties  pointed  with  greater  
523“Los medios comunitarios estaban al lado de la operatividad, porque la visión que se tiene - digo que se tiene 
porque se tiene otra vez - es que 'Yo utilizo los medios comuntarios para difundir mensajes.' … Una forma de 
difundir mensajes, como una herramienta más, como un megáfono más…. Una concepción de la comunicación 
verticalista. Nosotros cambiamos a estrategia los medios comunitarios con la intención de que fuera al revés…. 
Están en el terreno y nos permita a nosotros tener información. Nosotros podemos utilizar toda esa información 
para enseñar estrategia y conseguir potencial…. Porque la estrategia comunicacional - Y eso tampoco lo 
resolvimos, no? Es una tarea que quedó pendiente. - ha sido fundalmentamente reactiva… Si la oposición dice 
algo, yo le respondo. Pero nunca ha sido ofensiva…. Muy pocas veces ha sido ofensiva. Y parte de eso es porque 
no conocemos tampoco nuestra potencial, nuestra gente, nuestro movimiento, las capacidades. Entonces, ese 
era la idea de tener los medios comunitarios de este lado del espectro, del lado de la estrategia. Estrategia es la 
que recoge información y hace un plan, y despues lo operatizen por los medios públicos [y otros canales]…. Y 
además nosotros somos de la concepción de que… la comunicación va más allá que la comunicación 
mediatizada.”
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consistency toward a more refined and increasingly shared vision of autonomy that does not require  
independence from the state, as the liberal model of civil society would have it, but the conjunction of  
state resources with civil governance, as in a Gramscian civil state. As we will discuss below, this vision  
has motivated calls for a restructuration of the legal and political-economic framework for Bolivarian  
community media.  Before  turning to  that  discussion,  however,  we must  conclude  our  review of  the  
obstacles  faced  by the sector  under  the regulations with  a  look at  difficulties  related  to  the internal  
organization of individual media outlets, as well as their relationships with the communities they serve.
Dependency on government allocated resources is a primary factor in the internal difficulties of  
community  media  organizations,  especially  television  broadcasters.  Not  all  funding  comes  from the  
government, of course. As we saw with TV Rubio,  some outlets have been able to attract significant  
advertising revenue. Some receive private contributions, whether in cash or in-kind, from workers or  
supportive community members; several television stations, for example, operate on land or in buildings  
ceded in this manner. Some partner with outside organizations or governments; just before the RVMC  
split  with AMARC in 2007, for example, it  had entered into an agreement that would have brought  
financing for a series of projects. Nonetheless, for many outlets, the government is the primary source of  
resources. As we have seen, however, funding and equipment tend to arrive in a boom and bust cycle,  
with  the  timing  dependent  on  multiple  factors  including  the  policies  of  the  current  Minister  of  
Communications and Information, the calendar of government publicity campaigns (including elections),  
institutional  funding  cycles  and  interpersonal  relationships  with  government  officials  (especially  in  
relation to one-off “projects”), and membership in regional or national associations (like ANMCLA and  
the RVMC). The result of this inconsistent allocation of resources is that community media outlets are  
unable to maintain a constant rhythm of activity, both in terms of training new producers and producing  
content. Nor are they able to count on a consistent budget for projecting future investments and planning  
for growth.
Teletambores offers a clear example of the irregular rhythm of funding for community television  
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stations. As noted above, the collective found its first homes in borrowed houses, with the second and  
more permanent belonging to a founding member. That location endured until mid-2004, when a storm  
once again toppled the antenna. This setback motivated the collective to find a site of their own. They  
were first able to procure a 750 m 2 piece of land in commodatum (a limited duration loan free of cost)  
from the Housing Institute of Aragua ( Instituto de la Vivienda de Aragua). Funding for the construction of 
the installations was acquired from CONATEL via a project proposal. Construction of an office space, a  
small kitchen, a control room, and a recording studio / activity room began in September of 2005 and was  
completed in March of 2006.
Meanwhile,  in  2004  Deronne  had  acquired  funding  from  the  European  Union  (EU)  for  an  
elaborate project called International Neighborhood News (Noticiero Internacional de Barrios / NIB). 
The EU provided 70 percent of the funds, which covered salaries, video equipment, supplies, and living  
expenses for the production of a series of documentaries. Meanwhile, each participating country was  
required to appoint a partner institution that would cover the remaining 30 percent. 524 CONATEL, as 
Venezuela's partner institution, directed its contribution toward the construction of a main site for NIB  
activities  on the grounds of  Teletambores.  The grant  also  provided additional  production equipment,  
including an editing station, camera, and accessories. Although NIB participants, including Teletambores,  
began producing documentaries as early as 2004 and the EU financing lasted only until November of  
2006, CONATEL did not deliver the equipment until January of 2008 and construction did not commence  
until  that  July.  CONATEL  funding  covered  materials  only,  however,  meaning  that  members  of  
Teletambores and other volunteers provided the labor for the construction of a multi-post editing room, a  
524The NIB was conceived and proposed by Deronne and a Belgian colleague. Participating countries included 
France, Spain (working in Bolivia), Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil. In Venezuela, resources from the project 
were allocated to Teletambores, Catia TVe, and Camunare Rojo TV (a rural broadcaster that has was established 
as the result of a workshop given by Deronne in 2003 and which has been especially focused on agricultural 
issues [Rodner 2008, 37; Durán 2011]). The goal of the project was to create documentaries on single themes, 
such as water or illiteracy. Each participating collective would contribute a short video piece that engaged the 
theme in relation to its community or region. For each theme, the short pieces were then edited into a completed 
work (Flores 2011). At least 18 documentaries were produced through the work of the NIB. (Fundación 
Teletambores, nd)
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meeting room, a dormitory for accommodating overnight guests at workshops and other activities, and an  
outdoor multi-use space (Fundación Teletambores, nd). Construction on the new installations was finally  
completed in 2009 (Flores).
For several years, NIB funding covered the “salaries”, which Flores categorized deprecatingly as  
“an economic contribution” (un aporte económico). of four of the six principal members of Teletambores.  
Another  such salary was acquired through projects funded by CONAC. 525 The sixth member,  Flores 
himself, did not receive a salary from Teletambores, but continued to work at the metropolitan wholesale  
market (mercado mayorista metropolitano). During that period, Deronne coordinated the visit of a mayor  
from  France,  which  helped  Teletambores  establish  a  relationship  with  the  mayor  of  their  own  
municipality,  Francisco  Linares  Alcántara,  that  led  to  financing  for  various  projects,  including  the  
production of short videos on the history of the community. In 2007, however, the mayor's political party,  
Podemos, openly broke with Chávéz and his newly created umbrella party, the United Socialist Party of  
Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela  / PSUV). Teletambores was thus linked to Podemos in  
the public eye and, as Flores explained, “there were also people, … enemies of the television station …  
that have spread the idea that we belong to Podemos.” 526 As a result,  and even though Teletambores 
actively supports the Bolivarian revolution, they were no longer able to procure funding from the local  
government after the PSUV won the mayorship in the 2008 municipal elections.
In the years following the end of EU funding for the NIB project and the loss of support from the  
mayor's office, salaries were only consistently available while Eekhout was Minister of Communications  
and Information and publicity income was steady. Teletambores obtained funding from Venezuela's Grand  
Marshal of Ayacucho Fund (Fundación Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho / Fundayacucho), which supports 
higher education, for a series of workshops for students of the new Bolivarian University of Venezuela  
(Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela / UBV), as well as through  the National Autonomous Center for  
525CONAC was displaced by the creation of the Ministry of Culture in 2005 and formally liquidated in 2008.
526“también ha habido gente, … enemigos de la televisora … que han metido la cizaña de que nosotros somos de 
Podemos”
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Cinematography (Centro Nacional Autónomo de Cinematografía / CENAC) for community audiovisual 
workshops. According to Flores, however:
the projects that are put in [submitted], are put in for training and to buy equipment, here  
there are no ... sustainable projects, for a year, for example. On the part of the government,  
there aren't any, because they don't want [to give the impression that] the television station  
has passed to the state. So, well, for salaries there's nothing. 527
In this quote we find another facet of the shifting and ambiguous understandings of the state held by  
community media practitioners,  as Flores finds himself lamenting government efforts to preserve the  
autonomy of his own collective. When pressed, he admitted that the preservation of autonomy was indeed  
positive,  but  he  concluded  this  admission  by  noting  that  “neither  do  they  give  you  the  propaganda  
[contracts] that can maintain you.”528
Flores was interviewed in mid-2011 and, given the context, was perhaps predisposed to articulate  
this perspective. Since MINCI had shifted to a new administration and ceased providing steady publicity  
contracts, Teletambores had fallen on hard times. The lack of funding had made it extremely difficult to  
maintain an active network of community producers. Meanwhile, the core group of producers that had  
always maintained the station was suffering from infighting and fatigue, even as tension with community  
members was manifesting. As Flores, summarized:
In the television station there's a crisis of participation. Many people have had to assume  
other  commitments.  The  television  station  hasn't  found  itself  to  be  sustainable  …  
independent of the publicity of the state. We have to look for another form of subsisting  
without the help of the state. There are few [people] that are coming... 529
Briceño, for example, had been with the collective since his teenage years but had recently resigned the  
presidency of the foundation, ceased working with the station, and taken a job with the government of the  
527“los proyectos que se meten [se proponen], se meten para formación y para comprar equipos, aquí no hay 
proyectos… sustentables, por un año por ejemplo…. Por parte del gobierno no lo hay, porque ellos no quieren 
[dar la impresión de que] la televisora ha pasado al estado. Entonces, bueno, para salarios no hay.”
528“tampoco te dan [los contratos de] propaganda que te puede mantener”
529“En la televisora hay una crisis de participación. Mucha gente ha tenido que asumir otros compromisos. La 
televisora no se ha encontrado ser sustentable … independiente de la publicidad del estado, los aportes que da 
el estado. Tenemos que buscar otra forma de subsistirse sin la ayuda del estado. Hay pocos que estamos 
viniendo….”
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neighboring municipality where he lived.530
At the beginning of the year, the station's server ceased operating, so they had been limited to  
transmitting material from DVDs. They were not producing new content and, since they were operating  
from a limited library of recorded material, programming was frequently repeated. Since community  
media  outlets  do  not  have  the  funds  to  repair  electronic  equipment,  the state  has  provided licensed  
broadcasters  with  access  to  maintenance  services  via  Transmission  Networks  of  Venezuela  ( Red  de 
Transmisiones de Venezuela, C.A. / Red TV), a state-owned enterprise created in 2005 to service state-
owned media networks. Red TV had taken the server in for repair, but it had come back to Teletambores  
in June “even more damaged”.531
Flores  believed that  the  lack  of  steady resources  had  much  to  do  with  the  problems  facing  
Teletambores, which is why he lamented the loss of the steady publicity contracts from MINCI. At the  
same time, however, he expressed optimism about the station finding other sources of funding, but he felt  
that his colleagues were not enthusiastic about this idea. Once again displaying the shifting perception of  
the state, Flores switched to the opposite side of the question of autonomy when he remarked that “there  
are people that are in the television station that don't believe that we can be autonomous.... There are  
some that believe that we have to depend on the, as they say, on the teat of the state.” This attitude  
manifested “in apathy. When [we say] 'Let's do a project.” [they say] 'No, why? For what?'” 532 Here the 
emphasis is on economic, not political, autonomy. After years of arming one-off projects that have not  
brought  financial  security,  several  of  the  small  core  of  diehard  Teletambores  workers  have  resigned  
themselves to the idea that a whole new system is necessary.
The history of financing at  Teletambores is  unique but exemplary. It  is  unique, and arguably  
530Briceño's rational was only partially related to economic concerns. Tensions within the television station and 
with community members also seemed to play a role.
531Several community television producers complained about delays and quality of service in relation to Red TV, 
whereas other reported relatively timely service and good results.; “más dañado todavía”
532“hay gente que está en la televisora que no cree que nosotros podemos ser autonomos.... Hay algunos que creen 
que tenemos que depender de la, como se dice, de la teta del estado.”; “en la apatía. Cuando [decimos] 'Vamos a 
hacer un proyecto.' [dicen] 'No, porqué? Para qué?”
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privileged,  because  of  the  participation  of  Deronne,  whose  background,  contacts  with  sympathetic  
Europeans, and elevation to a powerful position in ViVe have facilitated funding and resources that would  
have been much more difficult for other television broadcasters to acquire. This privilege, however, only  
serves to reinforce the reality of the general scenario that community television broadcasters have not  
found  financial  sustainability  sufficient  to  maintaining  rigid  autonomy,  as  well  as  planning  for  and  
investing in future operations. On the whole, community television broadcasters have operated day to day  
and hand to mouth.
As with Teletambores, most community television stations are the result of the extraordinary  
dedication and sacrifice of a small group of activists. In some cases this group is to a greater or lesser  
degree held together by family ties.533 Often this core group rotates the official positions of the community  
foundation, although members are usually adamant that these positions are for legal purposes only and  
that decisions are made collectively. With some exceptions, such as Catia TVe, there is an informality to  
organizational structure and decision-making that results from the tight knit bonds and small size of the  
core group.534 Decisions deemed to be of especial significance are often made in larger assemblies that  
include participants and community members outside of the core group. Stations have established rules  
for determining who gets a voice and/or a vote in these assemblies. In Canal Z, for example, participants  
must be active in the station for three years before earning the right to vote in an assembly (Manuel  
Hernández 2011). In Teletambores, “active” members, defined as those who have participated for two  
years, have the right to vote, whereas “associate” members have only the right to speak, but not vote, in  
assemblies (Flores 2011).
533In Teletambores, one core member was Briceño's cousin. The core members of Canal Z included three siblings 
from one family (whose father hosted a regular show), as well as two sisters from another family, one of whom 
was married to another core member. The founders of Camunare Rojo TV are the Durán sisters (Rodner 2008, 
Durán 2011).  Montaña TV is sustained by the resources and labor of the Chacón family (primarily the father, 
mother, and two of the three sons). Perijá TV (Zulia) was located in the residence and depended on the labor of a 
single family. 
534In 2004, when Catia TVe began broadcasting from its new headquarters, “[t]he station was divided into separate 
departments of Production, Transmission, and Community Outreach, Administration, Volunteer Production, 
Equipment, and Security. A second wave of participants, who had became involved in the project over the 
previous few years, was hired to fill these departments” (Schiller 2009, 94).
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The informality  of  organization  and decision-making affects  community  television  groups  in  
ways both positive and negative. On the positive side, the fluidity of such organizations provides the  
flexibility necessary for stations to quickly adapt to changing circumstances or unexpected contingencies.  
It can also enable internal democracy, as the lack of a rigid hierarchy can allow participants to express  
their views within an open process of deliberation. As Fernandes (2010) points out, however:
...at times the lack of a formalized structure can itself lead to the emergence of an informal  
de  facto  leadership.  The  absence  of  explicit  and  formally  structured  work  teams may  
encourage the emergence of informal cliques and concentrate power in a few leaders of the  
organization. (184)
Fernandes (ibid., 279 n17) and Schiller (2009, 252 - 296), looking at Caracas community radio stations  
and Catia TVe, respectively,  found this concentration of power expressed in gender imbalances. This is  
not uniformly the case, as Canal Z has relied on strong female leadership, but decision-making authority  
is frequently invested in the core group based on the longevity of their service, thus creating the potential  
for multiple forms of imbalance.  
When funding for “salaries” is available, it is meager and generally divided according to a shared  
recognition of committed labor among members of the core group. In most cases, there are no contracts  
and core members are aware that there may be no funds available during certain periods. 535 Inarguably, 
core  members  do  not  remain  committed  to  the  stations  for  monetary  gain.  In  this  context,   new  
participants,  even  those  who  commit  wholeheartedly  to  the  project  and  offer  consistent  labor,  will  
generally not receive any type of financial compensation for some time. One volunteer at Canal Z, for  
example,  reported  working  regularly  for  eight  months  before  receiving  what  he  referred  to  as  an  
“incentive”. The result of this informal organization and limited revenue is that paths of entry into the  
core group are not clearly established nor well incentivized beyond ideological commitment.
Attracting and retaining committed participants  becomes difficult,  especially  in  impoverished  
communities.  There  are  two  particularly  common avenues  for  attempting  to  do  so.  The  first  is  by  
535Catia TVe is again an exception. Schiller (2009) reports that “staff members earned minimum wage and receive 
food stamps (cesta tickets) that totaled about $400 monthly. As Director, Ricardo received a higher salary of 
around $500 a month” (94, n36).
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coordinating internships with universities. The second is by offering audiovisual production workshops. A  
common lament among core members is that both interns and workshop participants view their time at the  
community station as a mere stepping stone toward finding paid work in the commercial sector or at state  
broadcasters.536 Estafanía Morao, of Tarmas TV, explained that, “we've trained many compatriots in the  
area of audiovisual production and they almost always end up migrating to institutions or businesses that  
offer them better working conditions” (Milano 2008b). 537 Méndez, of TV Petare, expressed the same idea  
with greater concision: “The voluntary worker has an expiration date.” 538 Catia TVe has gone so far as to  
screen  applicants  for  its  workshops  and  reject  those  “who  they  suspect  want  to  take  the  workshop  
primarily to gain skills that might improve their chance for employment”, although many sincere activists  
from impoverished  areas  are  simultaneously  interested  in  expanding  their  employment  opportunities  
(Schiller 2009, 115). Given the difficulty of retaining new workers, core members are often burdened with  
a greater set of responsibilities than they can accomplish. This creates something of a vicious cycle in  
which core members struggle to maintain the day to day operation of the station even as they recognize  
that they are  not attending to the planning, investment,  and growth (in  terms of revenue, personnel,  
production, and community engagement) that are necessary to overcome the very obstacles that make day  
to day operation so difficult.
As we saw with Teletambores, one of the significant difficulties that comes with a limited staff  
working with limited resources is the ability to continue producing new, quality content. Of course, the  
framework established in the regulations is meant to ensure that content production is primarily carried  
out by community members, not the station staff itself. Further below we will look more closely at how  
that has played out in relation to community television, but for now it is sufficient to reiterate that the  
536This is not unique to Venezuela nor to contemporary media markets. Berrigan (1981) noted that although the 
Audiovisual Production Center for Training (Centro de Producción Audiovisual para la Capacitación / CEPAC) 
had trained 94 persons, “[a]t present, there are thirty extension personnel working full-time with CEPAC on 
production and application. Some of those trained have moved to better job offers, or been absorbed by the 
broadcast industries. Others do not do any audiovisual work” (33).
537“hemos capacitado a muchos compatriotas en el área de producción audiovisual y casi siempre terminan 
emigrando a instituciones o empresas que les ofrecen mejores condiciones laborales”
538“[e]l voluntariado tiene fecha de vencimiento.”
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customary obstacles to  attracting community participation are  only exacerbated by the constraints  of  
limited resources. This is certainly not to say that community producers are nonexistent, but stations seem  
to have proven incapable of covering the percentages specified in  the regulations without frequently  
rebroadcasting programs. One common effect of producing television with limited resources (whether or  
not the producers are station staff or community producers) is that programs tend to mimic commercial  
models for live studio content; usually this involves one or two moderators interacting with one or more  
guests. Rodner (2008), for example, describes her visit to Lara TV as follows:
On the day I arrived at Lara Tve, I got to sit in on their production meeting. There were all  
sorts of people, ranging from youngsters to people their  fifties,  and of different work,  
educational,  economic  and  religious  backgrounds.  They  must  prepare  their  programs  
before coming to the studio: organize props, guest speakers and video footage. All the  
programs I saw had similar formats but very different themes, varying according to the  
interest and background of the producers. The format is “in studio”, the producer is usually  
also the moderator, and sits facing the cameras, talking about the subject matter or event.  
Producers or hosts sometimes have a guest who may or may not be an expert on some  
theme, and they chat to the audience at home. (43-4)
In Canal Z, producers attempted to intercut pre-recorded clips with the live talk. For example, a program  
called “Cayapa Comunicacional”, which was produced and hosted by the station's staff, featured guests  
discussing current topics of interest to the community but also regularly included “man-on-the-street”  
interview  segments  presenting  community  members'  views  on  those  topics. 539 Nonetheless,  a 
programming line-up which relies heavily on a rotation of talk shows with non-professional moderators  
and often hastily scheduled local guests would has a difficult time attracting an audience that has become  
habituated to a diversity of commercial offerings with much higher production values.
Within the studio format, stations make an earnest attempt to present an array of programs that  
address diverse populations within the community. Montaña TV (Tachira) has been especially focused on  
this goal (Chacón 2011). In 2011, the studio programs on its schedule included: “Electrónica para Niños”  
(Electronics for Children), a science-themed Saturday morning show for children; “Entropando”, hosted  
539Cayapa, a word particular to Venezuela, is defined by the Royal Spanish Academy as a “Group of persons that, 
jointly, carry out an unpaid task” (Grupo de personas que, conjuntamente, realizan un trabajo no remunerado). 
A more literal translation of the program's title might be “Communicational Workgroup”. More figuratively, 
“Communicational Barn Raising” might express the idea.
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by  a  group  of  university  students  who  seek  to  “deconstruct”  celebrity  news;  “Opinión  Ciudadana”  
(Citizen Opinion), hosted by a lawyer who offers advice to callers; “Harmonia Vital” (Vital Harmony),  
hosted by a respected doctor who gives advice on using natural medecine; “Cocina Popular – Sazón a  
Pueblo” (Popular Kitchen – the People's Taste), highlighting popular cooking techniques; “Unidos para  
Educar”  (United  to  Educate),  hosted  by  a  teacher  who  addresses  educational  issues;  “Rompiendo  
Barreras” (Breaking Barriers), hosted by two sisters with disabilities who discuss issues pertaining to  
people with disabilities; “Historia Local” (Local History); and “Conversando con Luis” (Chatting with  
Luis), an opinion program on current issues that took live callers.
As of May, however, few of those shows were being produced regularly. “Electrónica para Niños”  
had had a steady run as a live show in 2006-7, but its host had moved on to other pursuits when the local  
government withdrew its sponsorship and now only delivered taped programs irregularly; “Entropando”  
had ceased production when the university semester began and the producers became busy, but they were  
hoping to resume production during the upcoming vacation; “Opinión Ciudadano” was not in production  
as the producers were “reorienting”; “Harmonia Vital” was no longer in production; “Cocina Popular –  
Sazón  a  Pueblo”  required  funding  for  ingredients  and  had  ceased  production  when MINCI stopped  
offering  publicity  contracts;  “Unidos  para  Educar”  aired  only  sporadically,  as  the  host  had  recently  
changed jobs and ceased to arrive regularly; “Rompiendo Barreras” was suspended because the hosts had  
been dealing with sickness due to recent heavy rains. Meanhwile, “Historia Local” and “Conversando con  
Luis” were relatively new programs. The former was hosted by a core member of the station (the mother  
of the central family) and had only produced four episodes, while the latter was co-hosted by a core  
member (the father) and had only been on the air since February. 540
Like other stations, Montaña TV made up for these difficulties by rebroadcasting old programs  
540In addition to these studio programs, Montaña TV also produced “Resumen de Noticiero Comunitario” (Recap 
of Community News), which featured an average of ten news segments per week, all shot in the street and 
“Educación Bicentenaria” (Biscentennial Education), a basic educational program for children shot in a local 
school. These were also suspended. The former had been produced by two core members, one of whom had 
ceased working after entering university and the other of whom had shifted to other duties in the station. The 
latter had been suspended when the station's loanable camera broke.
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and  by  supplementing  its  schedule  with  material  produced  by  state  institutions.  Some  community  
television stations also show documentaries, animation, and films produced abroad. At some stations, the  
lack of programming and demands on the limited staff can also result in an informality regarding the  
broadcast schedule, meaning that programs do not always begin at regular intervals and that the schedule  
may vary from one day to the next.
Additionally, the most regular programs tend to be produced by core members or community  
producers whose consistency is motivated by a commitment to the ideological project of the Bolivarian  
revolution. Thus, while many stations are truly open to and make a sincere effort to present a diversity of  
themes,  much of  the content  is  either  directly  or  indirectly  related to  the Bolivarian revolution and,  
frequently, government initiatives. This, of course, enhances the perception that community television in  
Venezuela is dependent on and thus controlled by the state, as discussed above. Indeed, some programs  
can take on the tint of propaganda. One edition of “Cayapa Comunicacional”, for example, took place  
after heavy rains had left many impoverished families living on the outskirts of Maracaibo homeless. The  
guests  were  officials  from  the  Ministry  of  Housing  ( Ministerio  de  Vivienda)  who  promoted  the 
government's efforts to construct new homes for the displaced families. The program had not actually  
begun, however, so the time was spent discussing promises of how many homes were going to be built,  
why this was so necessary, and what the benefits would be. This was intercut with clips of residents  
expressing how grateful they were to the government. 541
At  the  same  time,  community  television  producers  understand  the  Bolivarian  project  to  
encompass a popular process that goes far beyond the government and they readily recognize (as their  
own experiences with CONATEL and MINCI have demonstrated) that the government does not always  
541Schiller (2009) offers a similar example in relation to Catia TVe: “The program that Jhonny, a volunteer, was 
editing just a few computers down from Evencio was far more representative of the kinds of material Catia TV 
volunteers most often produce. Jhonny’s video production featured the state oil company’s efforts to rebuild a 
woman’s house after a recent heavy rainfall had destroyed it. Jhonny was not from the woman’s neighborhood. 
Instead, the cooperative of engineers employed by PDVSA contacted Jhonny, asked him to “cover the news.” 
His five minute program included an emotional expression of gratitude addressed to Chávez personally from the 
woman whose house was being rebuilt. The woman was positioned as a victim of previous government’s neglect 
and as a passive and thankful beneficiary of the current government’s benevolence.” (127-8)
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act in the best interests of the people. Most core members will recount with pride that they have produced  
segments and programs that have been heavily critical of the government. Canal Z, for example, produced  
a series of news segments documenting environmental destruction and social discord within indigenous  
communities as a result of natural resource extraction carried out by state enterprises despite prohibitions  
from Chávez himself. TV Petare, meanwhile, had been critical enough of the local Bolivarian mayor that  
he had publicly denounced the stations as “esqualidos” (squalid ones), an epithet used by  chavistas to 
refer to members of the opposition (Méndez 2011).
We have seen that limited resources play a significant role in the difficulties of attracting and  
maintaining  community  television  producers.  To  understand  the  relationship  more  clearly,  we  must  
examine the basic model for training and coordinating the work of those producers. This model seems to  
have  originated  at  Catia  TVe,  which  has  promoted  the  use  of  Independent  Audiovisual  Community  
Production Teams (Equipos Comunitarios de Producción Audiovisual Independiente  / ECPAIs). These 
teams are meant to be comprised of four to seven volunteers that “[c]arry out community work of any  
type in their community, either by belonging to some grassroots social group or as a collaborator” (Catia  
TVe, nd B).542 In Catia TVe, prospective members of the ECPAI must go through an interview with a  
member of the Community Office (Dirección Comunitaria) in order to be approved for participation in  
one  of  their  free  workshops.  Successful  completion  of  the  workshop  establishes  the  ECPAI  as  a  
community producer and enables it to borrow recording equipment and use the station's post-production  
facilities. Other community television stations have applied this same model. The group that took over the  
Canal Z project in 2002, for example, began its work with the station as an ECPAI (even before it was on  
the air).
On one level, ECPAIs were meant to respond to the regulations' requirement that community  
producers account for at least 55 percent of each day's content, but they were also meant to ensure that the  
542“[r]ealizar trabajo comunitario de cualquier tipo en su comunidad, ya sea perteneciendo a algún grupo social  
de base o como colaborador”
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voices of the “organized community” were channeled through the station. As a notice posted at Catia TVe  
explained, ECPAIs favor not only “the organized distribution of work” but also:
...the conscientious discussion of material to produce … because the construction of the  
contents to disseminate are [sic] carried out directly by the community team, and don't  
obey an 'editorial line', as happens in the private media, where the owner of the medium  
(and the mercantile interests that (s)he obeys) is who decides what content to broadcast.  
(Catia TVe, nd A)543
As defined by Catia TVe, ECPAIs were meant to actualize a community not merely as those living within  
a particular geographic location, but as people working together as a civil society to shape outcomes  
related to shared issues. The ECPAI:
“[i]s Community because the group of persons come from a specific sector with common  
interests and characteristics where they necessarily have socio-community relations based  
on fortifying the organization of their surroundings. When we say community we are not  
referring only to  barrios, but also to student, worker, professional, artistic, athletic, and  
other communities.” (ibid.)544
Here we can see an attempt to expand on the understanding of community established by the regulations  
and  move  further  toward  the  construction  of  an  articulated,  interdependent  civil  society  that  would  
provide the basis for a Gramscian civil state. To the extent that community media outlets serve to foster  
and channel the self-representation of popular organizations, they play a crucial role in the articulation of  
those organizations with one another and with the wider community. By mediating and representing the  
role that self-organization can play within a community, community media demonstrate and thus enhance  
the possibilities for civil society governance. In other words, community media outlets can best function  
as a central node within an articulated, or networked, popular civil society to the extent that other nodes  
within that network (the civil society organizations themselves) participate in the production of texts that  
engage the issues with which they are primarily concerned.
543“la distribución organizada del trabajo”; “...la discusión conciente del material a producir … porque la 
construcción de los contenidos a difundir son realizados directamente por el equipo comunitario, y no obedecen 
a una 'linea editorial', como pasa en los medios privados, en donde el dueño del medio (y los intereses 
mercantiles a los que obedece) es quien decide sobre los contenidos a emitir”
544“[e]s Comunitario porque el grupo de personas provienen de un sector específico con intereses y características 
comunes en donde tienen necesariamente relaciones socio-comunitarias en función de fortalecer la 
organización de su entorno. Cuando decimos comunidad no nos referimos solo a los barrios, sino también a 
comunidades estudiantiles, obreras, profesionales, arísticas, deportivas, etc.”
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There  is  no  reason,  of  course,  why  geographically  identified  ECPAIs  can  not  also  work  to  
articulate  civil  society  organizations.  What's  more,  ECPAIs  that  are  not  associated  with  a  particular  
organization may be more free to address a wider range of issues, take on more artistic projects, or present  
more critical points of view. Nonetheless, they may have a more difficult time representing the capacities  
and concerns of civil society organizations than ECPAIs functioning within those same organizations.  
There is clearly space for both types of production teams within a robust, counter-hegemonic system of  
community media. Indeed, not all of the ECPAIs trained by Catia TVe have formed within civil society  
organizations. Schiller (2009), for example, describes a workshop that featured one group of workers  
from a Mission, one group of communications students (enrolled through a Mission), and two groups  
identified by their neighborhood of residence (115-6). The two other Catia TVe ECPAIs that she mentions  
were also identified by geography, not organizational affiliation (126, 128).  Meanwhile,  stations like  
Teletambores and Canal Z have focused more exclusively on geographically identified ECPAIs.
The greatest weakness of the ECPAI system has been the extreme difficulty of maintaining a  
significant number of consistently functioning teams. This is partially caused by a limited availability of  
resources, as discussed above. ECPAIs must have ready access to cameras and other recording equipment,  
as well as functioning post-production facilities. We have already seen that the stations themselves have  
had  difficulties  obtaining  and  maintaining  equipment  for  their  internal  use;  the  problems  are  only  
exacerbated when they attempt to serve multiple production teams. Some core members in Teletambores,  
for example, were reluctant to lend their cameras for fear that they would be broken or stolen. Learning to  
efficiently and effectively edit on a digital workstation, meanwhile, requires more than can be delivered in  
one or even several workshops. For volunteers with little or no knowledge of computers and/or English,  
the experience can be overwhelmingly frustrating. As Schiller points out, “[a]fter a period of time away, it  
was difficult for people to begin participating again because the English-only editing program requires  
frequent practice to maintain fluidity” (128).
Other obstacles to the maintenance of active ECPAIs are the limited interest and time of their  
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members. Many ECPAIs are formed while members are enthusiastic about learning new creative skills in  
an exciting medium. Some members will then lose interest after the initial workshop, in large part due to  
the realization that  competent video production requires a  considerable  amount  of labor.  Meanwhile,  
many of those that would otherwise be inclined to exert that labor find themselves unable to do so as a  
result of work, family, or other obligations. Schiller offers a concise summary of a common process:
…  Evencio  had  enrolled  in  a  free  video  production  workshop  offered  at  the  station.  
Together with six people from his neighborhood, he formed an [ECPAI].... As with most  
volunteer groups at Catia TV, a few months after the workshop, Evencio’s team dispersed.  
They were too busy to participate or had lost interest. (126)
Given that Catia TVe is the most resource rich community television station in Venezuela, it is not hard to  
understand why many stations  across  the country  faced  the  same problem.  Flores,  of  Teletambores,  
observed that in relation to the ECPAIs they had trained:
Reality overcomes fiction, as they say.... Either they dissolve under their own pressure, or  
they leave there, they go to a state television station.... That type of organization, volunteer  
like that, is difficult. Audiovisual [production], you have to give it time. It's not like in  
radio. In radio one hour is an actual hour. In a television station, half an hour of [content]  
requires doing a week of work. It takes up a lot of the ECPAI's [time], then.... and the cost  
of a television station is rather expensive. You have to have cameras... to buy tape... We  
sometimes provide it, but it's not enough for [maintaining consistent production]. 
In July of 2011, Jesús Suárez, the Director of Catia TVe, reported that the station had trained  
some 120 ECPAIs, but that only 5 or 6 were currently active. He estimated that they were only able to fill  
around 30 percent of the daily broadcasting schedule with community produced content. Referring to the  
quota established by the regulations, he explained that:
...you would  have  to  have at  least  60 production teams … [that]  dedicate  themselves  
weekly to a program [in order to fill] at least 72 hours.... 70 percent becomes, in a way, a  
lie to sustain in a system like this.... The problem isn't the 70 percent, but thinking that that  
70 percent is going to be volunteered.545
545Suárez later confirmed that his understanding of the regulations is that content produced by the station itself does 
not count toward the 70 percent daily quota of community production, which is a misinterpretation of the 
regulations (see chapter 4). Suárez also reported that Catia TVe was broadcasting 14 hours per day, which would 
mean a total of 98 hours per week. 70 percent of this total would be 68.6 hours. 55 percent (the true minimum for 
outside community production) would be 53.9 hours.; “...tendrías que tener por lo menos 60 equipos de 
producción … [que] se dedican semanalmente a un programa [para llenar] por lo menos 72 horas.... 70 por 
ciento se vuelve, por un lado, una mentira de sostener en un sistema como este.... El malo no es el 70 por ciento, 
sino pensar que ese 70 por ciento va a ser voluntariado.”
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Suárez was keenly aware that  the community media sector needed to find a way to sustain outside  
production teams and that the current funding model was wholly insufficient.
Ostensibly, ECPAIs formed within civil society organizations (as per the Catia TVe ideal) might  
draw resources from those organizations, but community media practitioners had not actively pursued this  
option and, in any case, those organizations were more than likely to have funding issues of their own and  
thus be disinclined to support in-house television production. In the case that they did, the question of  
autonomy would immediately resurface. Civil society organizations might conceivably fund productions  
that furthered their own ends but would be unlikely to fund critical or aesthetic projects. Such projects are  
necessary to a truly counter-hegemonic community television system. As Suarez explained, his vision is  
for a network of ECPAIs focused on producing “a creative program, not any old opinion program.” He  
recalled that at one point ECPAIs had produced much more regularly, but their programs “looked alike.  
They were almost the same, in the format.... like a single format. In other words, an opinion program....  
Three seats, a moderator, the questions, the problematic, you know.” 546
Suarez, like most committed community television operators, had an alternative and audacious  
vision for a counter-hegemonic system. He wanted to see community producers working in “all the genres  
that you can produce in television, that could help you.... Fiction, animation, telenovelas, [etc.] … You  
say, 'Hey, I need, at least to make a fiction, I need more time. To produce weekly I need, whoooo, I need  
[lots of resources] to produce.” 547 Suarez was quick to point out that his vision did not emerge from a  
mere desire to produce popular entertainment, but from an understanding that counter-hegemonic media  
must be attractive in order to successfully contribute to a process of social change:
Everyone likes fiction.... The different genres that television and cinema have invented are  
good. Well, some. The content in those genres isn't the best in some cases, but there are  
genres that are interesting and … we can use them, they would help us in many things,  
since, understanding that it's not a battle for ratings, but for the possibility that people think  
546“...se parecían. Eran casi iguales los programas, en el formato.... un formato como que único. O sea, programa 
de opinión.... Tres sillas, un moderador, las preguntas, la problemática, sabes.”
547“todos los generos que puedes realizar dentro de la television, que te podrían ayudar.... La ficción, la comiquita,  
la novela, [etc.] ... Tu dices, 'Oye, necesito, por lo menos para hacer una ficción, necesito más tiempo. Para 
producir semanalmente necesito, wooooo, necesito [muchos recursos] para producir.”
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about what's happening in their reality....  Some are fighting to separate you from your  
reality and others are fighting to bring you to your reality.... [But] in both cases you need a  
hook to attract people.548
Within the framework established by the regulations and the forms of support currently offered by the  
Bolivarian government, such a system remained out of reach.
In  this  section  we  have  reviewed  a  series  of  interrelated  difficulties  within  the  Bolivarain  
community media sector, some of which are especially pronounced in relation to community television.  
One early difficulty was a significant fissure within the alternative and community media movement that  
was represented by the RVMC on one side and ANMCLA on the other. We noted that this division  
expressed itself partly in relation to a more ready acceptance by the RVMC of a liberal regulatory model  
and a significant degree of state control. While that framework – in conjunction with the motivation  
produced by the attempted coup and polarized political climate – produced significant growth, it proved  
insufficient for the construction of a robust counter-hegemonic community media apparatus that would  
operate in accordance with a Gramscian civil state. Nonetheless, the alternative and community media  
movement, including RVMC members, came to recognize this state of affairs and the internal division  
began to disappear as the movement turned its collective attention toward establishing a new framework  
that would address the significant practical problems of the sector.
Our review has focused on two of the most significant problem areas in the sector. We looked at  
the  relationship  between  community  media  and  the  state,  noting  first  that  the  sector  had  become  
dependent on institutions that exhibited both inefficiency and inconsistency. These flaws were especially  
significant  in  relation  to  the  provision  of  resources.  Community  media  outlets,  especially  television  
stations, found themselves unable to subsist on private revenue, yet the sources of state revenue proved  
insufficient to enable robust production, vital community engagement, and planned growth. At the same  
548"A todo el mundo le gusta la ficción…. Los diferentes generos que han inventado la televisión y el cine son 
buenos. Bueno, algunos. Los contenidos en esos generos no es [sic] lo mejor en algunos casos, pero hay algunos 
generos que son interesantes y … podemos utilizarlos, nos ayudarían en muchas cosas, pues, entendiendo que 
también que es una batalla no por los ratings, sino por la posibilidad de que la gente piense en lo que está 
pasando en su realidad…. Algunos están peleando por separarte de tu realidad y otros están peleando para 
llevarte a tu realidad…. [Pero] en los dos casos necesitas un gancho para atraer la gente."
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time, however, dependence on state resources made tenuous the sector's claims to autonomy and thus  
made it vulnerable to attacks from a political opposition wielding liberal ideals. We also saw that limited  
resources significantly constrained media outlet's ability to attract and maintain community participation,  
especially in terms of articulating a broad civil society. Difficulties related to community engagement  
were not entirely caused by a lack of resources, however. The regulations' narrow focus on community  
producers as the sole link between community media outlets and their communities, which has been  
primarily instantiated within the community television sector through the use of the ECPAI model, has  
produced a  situation in which community media outlets are  expected to provide all  of the resources  
necessary for production as well  as distribution. In effect,  by downplaying (if  not casting aside) the  
possibility that the community itself would sponsor production, the system served only to exacerbate the  
problem of limited resources experienced by community media outlets.
By 2008, if not earlier, not only the alternative and community media movement but also the  
Bolivarian government had come to recognize that a new framework was in order. We will examine their  
attempts to establish that new framework in the final section of this chapter, focusing specifically on  
efforts to pass what came to be known as the Law of Popular Power Communication. In order to make  
sense of those efforts and the legal proposal that they produced, however, we must first take stock of some  
significant changes that took place within the Bolivarian revolution as it shifted to an open rhetorical  
embrace of  “Socialism for  the 21 st Century”.  Most  specifically,  we will  be interested in  the gradual  
institution of  a  new framework for  Popular Power that has  been centered on the establishment  of  a  
communal structure whose basic unit of governance is the communal council.
Communal Councils, the New Geometry of Power, and the Path Toward a Civil State
In  the  previous  chapter  we  saw  that  Chávez's  Bolivarian  movement  has  always  rhetorically  
endorsed  widespread  citizen  participation  in  governance,  but  that  during  the  early  years  of  his  
administration Chávez failed to implement a radical restructuring toward this end. The Plan Bolívar 2000  
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and the Missions all incorporated participatory elements yet nonetheless remained largely centralized and  
hierarchical. The Bolivarian Circles and the worker cooperatives were less centralized and hierarchical,  
but they were limited in scope and not integrated with the existing system of social governance. The  
CTUs and Water Advisory Councils showed much greater promise for citizen participation in governance,  
but they too were quite limited in scope.
In the year following the attempted coup, Chávez and his Bolivarian movement scored several  
important political victories that consolidated their hold on national power. In 2004 he prevailed in a  
recall  referendum,  with  58  percent  of  voters  electing  to  keep  him in  office;  in  2005 the opposition  
boycotted the parliamentary elections, thus ceding full control of the legislative branch to the Bolivarians;  
and in 2006 Chávez won a second six-year term with a 62.8 percent landslide. These victories seem to  
have emboldened Chávez to take a more radical approach toward the institution of citizen governance. As  
early  as  January  of  2005  Chávez  made  his  first  public  call  for  the  construction  of  "21st  Century  
Socialism"  and  during  that  year  the  government  began  a  pilot  program  for  the  implementation  of  
Communal Councils which, as we have seen, had already been mentioned in the  2002 Law of Local 
Councils of Public Planning and the 2005 Fundamental Law of Municipal Public Power.
In 2006, however, the Communal Councils assumed a prominent position on the national stage  
with the passage of the Law of Communal Councils, whose second article defines them as:
...instances  of  participation,  articulation,  and  integration  between  diverse  community  
organizations,  social  groups,  and  citizens,  that  permit  the organized people  to  directly  
exercise the management of public policies and projects oriented toward responding to the  
necessities and aspirations of  communities in the construction of an equal and socially just  
society.549
The law specifies that in urban areas each council should represent between 200 and 400 families grouped  
into  a  citizens  assembly  (asamblea  de  ciudadanos  y  ciudadanas).550 The  communal  council  itself  is  
549“...instancias de participación, articulación e integración entre las diversas organizaciones comunitarias,  
grupos sociales y los ciudadanos y ciudadanas, que permiten al pueblo organizado ejercer directamente la 
gestión de las políticas públicas y proyectos orientados a responder a las necesidades y aspiraciones de las 
comunidades en la construcción de una sociedad de equidad y justicia social.”
550Rural communal councils must represent a minimum of 20 families. The minimum number of families in 
indigenous communities is ten.
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comprised of an executive body (órgano ejecutivo), a unit of financial management (unidad de gestión  
financiera) (also known as the communal bank [banco comunal]), and a unit of social oversight (unidad 
de contraloria social). The executive body is comprised of spokespeople for the various working groups  
or committees created by the community. Examples of committees suggested in the law include those  
dedicated to health, education, land, housing, water, the popular economy, culture, security, recreation and  
sports,  and  media.  The  spokespeople  for  these  committees,  as  well  as  the  members  of  the  units  of  
financial management and social oversight, are all elected to two year terms by the assembly. The citizens  
assembly is also the maximum authority for any decisions taken or projects proposed by the executive  
council.
The executive council is expected to create a Community Development Plan ( Plan de Desarrollo  
de la Comunidad) and, based on that plan, propose specific projects to be carried out or overseen by the  
working groups. Among its other duties, it is also expected to “[a]rticulate with the social organizations  
present in the community and promote the creation of new organizations where necessary, in defense of 
the collective interest and integral and sustainable development of the communities”. Beyond managing  
the assembly's finances, the duties of the communal bank include overseeing a participatory budget for  
the community, promoting the creation of cooperatives to carry out community projects, and offering a  
yearly  public  accounting  to  both  the  assembly  and  the  National  Communal  Councils  Fund  ( Fondo 
Nacional de los Consejos Comunales). The unit of social oversight is expected to audit the activities of  
the executive council and the communal bank.
Once established, Communal Councils may obtain resources from a number of sources, including  
the  institutions  of  the  municipal,  state,  and  federal  governments.  The  law  specifically  established,  
however, a National Communal Councils Fund to finance projects presented by the communal councils.  
Over one billion dollars were disbursed to community councils during 2006 and another five billion in  
funding was announced in January of 2007 (López Maya & Lander 2011, 74; Duffy & Everton 2008,  
119). While the onus for the formation of a community council lies on the community itself, this funding  
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added practical incentive to ideological motivation. A national study carried out in 2008 concluded that  
“this organizational form has been extended successfully in all of the country” (Machado 2009, 115).
The communal councils had clearly become the Bolivarian movement's organizational form of  
choice for instituting participatory civil governance. They manifested a turn away from top-down and  
centralized institutions, such as the Missions, as well as economistic organizational forms, such as the  
cooperatives.  Nonetheless,  detractors  “argued  that  the  president  was  trying  to  legislate  participatory  
democracy from above and feared that the new networks of councils, whose priorities would be funded  
directly by the national executive, would develop into new patronage networks beholden to the political  
class” (Hellinger 2011, 37). This criticism rests on the assumption, however, that the communal councils  
would remain in a direct relationship with the national executive. This relationship appears to have been  
conceived as a temporary solution for funding the communal councils without making them dependent on 
municipal governments. Whether because they were often not controlled by members of his political  
movement  or  because  they  were  holdovers  of  fourth-republican  representational  democracy,  Chávez 
admitted in August of 2007 “that he had 'misgivings regarding established local authorities'  and had  
greater faith in the capacity of the people at the local level” (Ellner 2009). Chávez's ultimate goal was to  
displace, or perhaps replace, the existing system of municipal and state government with a “new geometry  
of power”.
Significantly, this new geometry of power was not articulated in the “Guidelines of the National  
Social  and  Economic  Development  Plan  2007  –  2013”  (Lineas  Generales  del  Plan  de  Desarrollo  
Económica  y  Social  de  la  Nación  2007  –  2013),  which  were  publicly  released  during  the  2006  
presidential election campaign. The 2007 Guidelines do define “directives” ( directrices) of development 
designed to orient the country “toward the construction of Socialism for the 21 st Century” and one of 
those directives, entitled “New National Geopolitics” ( Nueva Geopolítica Nacional), calls for “a new 
socio-territorial organization coherent with the new Socialism for the 21 st Century”, but it is primarily 
concerned with the deconcentration of what it refers to as a historically “dependent” and “extractive”  
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economy focused on the shipment of petroleum products through coastal port cities (31).
The changes proposed under the new geometry of power refer less to fundamentally economistic  
concerns than to the reorganization of political power. Chávez proposed them in 2007, following his  
electoral  victory,  as  a  package  of  constitutional  amendments  that  would  be  put  up  to  a  national  
referendum.551 Ambitious in its scope, the reform package proposed to establish an additional co-equal  
branch of government, called the "popular power" ( poder popular), alongside the five established by the  
1999 constitution (the executive, legislative, judicial, electoral, and citizen powers). Popular power was  
defined as a system of self-government based on a  federated structure of geographic areas in which  
“communities” would be grouped into “communes” that would, in turn,  be  grouped into “communal 
cities” (ciudades  comunales)  (articles  16  and 136).  While  the  reform would  not  have abolished  the  
municipalities and states of the old geometry of power, it would have discarded the smaller parishes and  
made the new communal city the "primary political unit of the organization of the national territory"  
(article  16).552 The  communities  envisioned  as  subcomponents  of  the  communes  would  have  been  
governed not only by the communal councils, but also by councils representing interest groups; examples  
listed in the proposal include workers, artisans, fishers, students, youth, athletes, the elderly, and people  
with disabilities (article 136).
The functional details of this system were to be spelled out in a fundamental law, and the reforms  
themselves left “unanswered ... the question of how the [communal councils], charged with developing  
spending priorities for local projects financed by the central government, would relate to existing state  
and  local  governments”  (Hellinger  2011,  36).  Communal  cities,  for  example,  were  specified  as  “all  
population settlements inside the municipality”,  suggesting that municipalities and states would exert  
control over them (article 16).553 Meanwhile, the reforms also specified that communal cities were to be  
constituted  by  presidential  decree,  and  that  the  President  could  also  decree  the  creation  of  other  
551In August of 2007 Chávez called for amendments to 33 articles. In October of 2007 the National Assembly 
proposed amendments to an additional 25 articles.
552“unidad política primaria de la organización territorial nacional”
553“todo asentamiento poblacional dentro del municipio”
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geopolitical  entities,  including  federal  municipalities,  provinces,  and  cities,  as  well  as  “functional  
districts” (distritos funcionales). These various entities were specified, more or less explicitly, to be under  
the control of the national government without diminishing the constitutional status of the states and  
municipalities, thus leaving the exact functioning of this new geometry of power quite indeterminate.
The reforms encompassed much more than the new geometry of power, so it is not clear to what  
extent that particular plan was rejected in the referendum that was held in December of 2007, but the  
reform package was indeed narrowly rejected by the voters. 554 This result left the Law of Communal 
Councils as the only standing element of the new geometry of power, but the reforms confirmed that the  
Bolivarian vision for the communal councils was that they form the basis of a much larger system of  
participatory  governance.  Without  further  detail,  however,  the  reform  proposal  left  unresolved  the  
question of to what degree the new geometry of power would simply concentrate control within the  
national government, especially the executive branch, and to what degree it would serve to establish a  
framework of civil governance that would underpin a truly viable Gramscian civil state.
The  shift  toward  a  broader  basis  for  participatory  governance  certainly  did  not  mean  an  
abandonment of initiatives focused on work and economic production. Already in 2007, “Chávez picked  
up the idea of 'socialist  workers councils,'  which was already being discussed by many rank-and-file  
workers and by existing councils and workers’ initiatives”, though the concept met  resistance  in state  
institutions. In 2009, however, government institutions began promoting Enterprises of Communal Social  
Property (EPSC), which “create local production units and community services enterprises” that are held  
as  the  “collective  property  of  the  communities,  which  decide  on  the  organizational  structure  of  
enterprises, the workers incorporated and the eventual use of profits. The EPSCs have been described as  
the  Bolivarian  movement's  “most  successful  attempt  at  a  democratization  of  ownership  and  
554The proposed amendments also included reforms to the presidential term limit, campaign financing, specified 
economic entities to be promoted by the sate, the autonomy of the central bank, the categorization of property, 
and the composition of the military. The reforms were divided into two “blocks” of amendments, each to be 
determined by a separate vote. With 94 percent of votes counted, 49.34 percent of voters were in favor of block 
A and 48.99 percent of voters were in favor of block B.
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administration of the means of production” (Azzelini).
The push to expand the burgeoning communal council system took a seemingly significant step  
forward in March of 2009, when the Ministry of the Communal Economy ( Ministerio de la Economía  
Comunal)  and  the  Ministry  of  Social  Participation  and  Protection  ( Ministerio  de  Participación  y  
Protección Social) were combined to create the Ministry of Popular Power for Communes and Social  
Protection (Ministerio del Poder Popular para las Comunas y Protección Social ). More significantly, in 
2010, the government passed a series of laws which implemented many facets of the new geometry of  
power, including the Fundamental Law of Popular Power, which defines Popular Power in article two as  
"the full exercise of sovereignty on the part of the people ... through their diverse and distinct forms of  
organization, which make up the communal state". Other laws passed in 2010 included: the Fundamental  
Law of the Communes (Ley Orgánica de las Comunas), the Fundamental Law of Public and Popular  
Planning (Ley Orgánica de Planificación Pública y Popular), the Fundamental Law of Social Oversight  
(Ley Orgánica de Contraloría Social), the Fundamental Law of the Comunal Economic System ( Ley 
Orgánica del Sistema Económica Comunal), and the Fundamental Law of Municipal Public Power ( Ley 
Orgánica del Poder Público Municipal). Taken together, these laws were meant to accomplish much of  
what had been proposed by the constitutional reform package. The opposition, meanwhile, has protested  
that  they  are  unconstitutional,  as  the  “popular  power”  framework  is  not  recognized  in  the  1999  
constitution.
As ever, Bolivarian legal initiatives must be measured by their real world outcomes and it remains  
too  early  to  assess  the  degree  to  which  the  popular  power  framework  has  been  translated  into  an  
expansion of participatory civil governance. One thing that is clear, however, is that the tension between  
top-down and bottom-up decision-making persists, as is evident by the perception that:
the Ministry of Communes turns out to be one of the biggest obstacles to the construction  
of communes.... Only the growing organization 'from below,' especially the self-organized  
network of commune activists that brings together about 70 communes could bring enough  
pressure on the Ministry of Communes to start changing its politics at the end of 2011.  
They forced the ministry to register some 20 communes. In return, the communes had to  
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set up the registration sheet since the Ministry of Communes not only did not register any  
communes in the first three years of it’s existence, but one year after the law on communes  
had been released, it  had not even created an official procedure for the registration of  
communes. (Azzellini)
Meanwhile, the Bolivarian movement has continued to lean heavily on a charismatic mode of linkage  
with  Chávez  and  centralized  institutions,  including  the  establishment  of  multiple  “Great  Missions”  
(Grandes  Misiones)  beginning  in  2011.  Significantly,  the  stability  of  that  charismatic  linkage  has  
diminished considerably.
To a certain extent, the failure to pass the reforms in December of 2007 marked the beginning of a 
decline in Chávez's political power. Although the result of the reform referendum was extremely close,  
the  population  had  begun to  signal  that  it  was  less  concerned  with  a  precipitous  march  forward  to  
socialism  than  with  the  more  immediate  problems  of  violent  crime  and  a  slowing  economy.  The  
opposition, meanwhile, which had been reduced to impotency by its own internal fragmentation, had  
begun to regroup under a unified banner. While Chavéz continued to enjoy majority support, Chavistas  
found their control over the national assembly, as well as state and local offices, diminished as the result  
of  subsequent  elections.  The  most  severe  blow to  the  Bolivarian  movement,  however,  was  dealt  by  
Chávez's long battle with cancer, news of which first became public in June of 2011. Chávez managed to  
win a third term in the presidential elections of October of 2012, but passed away in March of 2013,  
leaving his hand-picked successor, Francisco Maduro, as interim President. Maduro, who lacks Chávez's  
aura and intimate identification with “the people”, won the Presidency in April of 2013 with only 50.6  
percent of the vote. He has since been forced to deal with an inflation rate that his risen above 50 percent,  
a continued crisis in relation to violent crime, and an opposition that sees the the loss of Chávez as a  
window of opportunity for regaining control of the national government.
The history outlined above provides the context for our subsequent discussion, in which we will  
review efforts by both the government and the community and alternative media movement to restructure  
the legal framework of the community media sector. As we will see, the tensions between top-down and  
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bottom-up decision making were evident there also, both in the process of proposing solutions as well as  
within the proposals themselves. Key to our discussion, however, is the degree to and manner in which  
the movement has sought to integrate with the new geometry of power as expressed in the commune  
system.  Since  the  communal  councils  were  the  only  part  of  that  system to  have  been  significantly  
instantiated during the process,  they were the primary focus of such proposals and will  thus be the  
primary focus of our investigation.
Bolivarian Community Media and the New Geometry of Power
As we have seen with ANMCLA, some elements of the Bolivarian community media sector have  
long held that the liberal framework of the regulations is insufficient for the establishment of a truly  
counter-hegemonic participatory media system. It is therefore difficult to pinpoint the moment when the  
alternative and community media movement,  as  a  whole,  unified around the need to  restructure the  
community media sector. Nonetheless, the call for a “Communication Mission” ( Misión Comunicación), 
which emerged shortly after the enactment of the Law of Communal Councils in 2006, provides a salient  
point of departure.
The concept of a Communication Mission was put forth by the Venezuelan Block of Alternative  
Press (Bloque Venezolano de Prensa Alternativa / BVPA) in an essay principally authored by Miguel  
Ugas (Bloque Venezolano de Prensa Alternativa 2006). 555  In utilizing the term “mission” the BVPA  
sought to rhetorically align itself with the institutional framework of the Bolivarian revolution, but it was  
not calling for the creation of a formal state institution dedicated to communication. Rather, the idea of  
the Communication Mission was presented as a call to arms, expressing the need to defend the Bolivarian  
revolution by countering the commercial media hegemony with popular participation. The Mission itself  
was described as “the massive incorporation of the people in the communicational duty”, a collective  
555The BVPA article, published on the aporrea web site on June 26, 2006, had ten signatories representing 13 print 
and digital outlets; Ugas was the the first name listed. Ugas (2006a) had already described the concept in an 
article published on the same site on May 11.  From July through September, also on aporrea, Ugas published a 
four part essay on Bolivarian communication policy (2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e) that incorporated language 
from the BVPA article.
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effort toward “the reconstruction of communication practice in such a manner that, literally, the entire  
people participates, becomes active, gets involved in a new communicational social relation”. 556  In this 
sense, it only re-articulated the ideology of the alternative and community media movement as it had  
cohered following the attempted coup of 2002.
Several elements of the proposal did, however, signal a shift within the movement. To begin, the  
document  clearly  expressed  a  sentiment  that  the  existing  state  of  affairs  was  insufficient  to  the  
movement's goals. On the one hand, this was linked to the fact that the state communications apparatus  
“does not manage to cover the urgent communicational necessities of the transformational project”. 557 
This failure was expressed in no uncertain terms:
The ideological debility and/or political incomprehension of the conjunction of a good part  
of the functionaries responsible for attending to this significant area, has a determinative  
impact on the persistence of a situation that has been indicated on many occasions but  
never resolved. The limited or spasmodic support that is dispensed to [community media],  
is an emblematic expression, as well, of the grave failure that is dragged along by the  
communicational policies of the Bolivarian Government.558
This sentiment had already been expressed by ANMCLA, but its inclusion within the BVPA text signaled  
that frustration within the movement as a whole was reaching a tipping point.
The BVPA's “manifesto” was not only critical of the Bolivarian government, but also the sector  
itself, noting that community media “as a social movement still have not achieved an optimal level of  
political  nor  organic  articulation”. 559 In  this  context,  the  document  explicitly  recognized  the  goal  of  
growing community media into not only a counter-hegemonic force but a truly hegemonic media system.  
Moreover, it matched this goal with three relatively specific vectors of action. First, it called for greater  
556“la incorporación masiva del pueblo al quehacer comunicacional”; “a reconstrucción de la práctica 
comunicacional de tal manera que, literalmente, todo el pueblo participe, se active, se involucre en una nueva 
relación social comunicacional”
557“no logra cubrir las exigentes necesidades comunicacionales del proyecto transformador”
558“La debilidad ideológica y/o la incomprensión política de la coyuntura de buena parte de los funcionarios que  
les corresponde atender esta sensible área, incide de manera determinante en la persistencia de una situación 
que ha sido señalada en muchas oportunidades pero nunca resuelta. El apoyo limitado o epasmódico [sic] que 
se les dispensa a los MAC, es expresión emblemática, también, de la grave falla que arrastra la política 
comunicacional del Gobierno Bolivariano.”
559“como movimiento social aún no han logrado un óptimo nivel de articulación política ni orgánica”
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government support:
[Community media] are, as of today, an inarguable media reality that advance each day in  
their  coverage,  their  listenership,  their  readers,  with  the  proposition  of  displacing  or  
supplanting the traditional or conventional private media. Certainly this will occur within  
the frame of another context, in which they will shift from alternative to usual. For the  
materialization  of  this  goal,  conceived  in  the  mid-term,  the  decisive,  systematic,  and  
consistent support of the Bolivarian Government is required.” 560
Second, it called for the integration of community media with Bolivarian civil society:
Despite the significance of these social movements in the present circumstances, almost in  
their entirety none of these movements possess a communication medium that serves as a  
mouthpiece as much to the inside of the movement itself as to society as a whole.... The  
implementation  of  the  Communication  Mission  is  happening  so  that  each  social  
movement,  at  different  levels,  has  its  respective  communication  media  whether  print,  
radio, television, or digital.561
Third, it recognized the vital role to be played by the integration of community media with the newly  
codified communal council system:
The people, in the Communal Councils, will have the opportunity to re-appropriate the  
communicational act. To search for, to construct the truth produced by all. It will no longer  
be the truth of a few. It will be the truth of many, the truth of all. The truth that will be  
possible in socialist society.... The Communication Mission will have in the Communal  
Councils a natural, extraordinary space for its concretion and development. 562
In sum, the call for a Communication Mission was tantamount to a call for community media to become a  
primary articulating element of a Gramscian civil state.
This was hardly the first time such a call came from within the alternative and community media  
movement,  but  it  was  significant  for  the  level  of  specificity  with  which  it  pointed  to  the  need  for  
560“Los [medios comunitarios] son, hoy por hoy, una realidad mediática indiscutible que cada día avanzan en su 
cobertura, su sintonía, sus lectores, dentro del propósito de desplazar o suplantar los medios privados  
tradicionales o convencionales. Ciertamente esto ocurrirá en el marco de otro contexto, en el que pasaran de 
alternativos a usuales. Para la materialización de ese logro, concebido a mediano plazo, se requiere el apoyo 
decisivo, sistemático y consecuente del Gobierno Bolivariano.”
561“Pues a pesar de la significación de estos movimientos sociales en la presente coyuntura, casi en su totalidad 
ninguno de estos movimientos posee un medio de comunicación que le sirva de portavoz tanto a lo interno del 
movimiento propiamente como a la sociedad en su conjunto.... La implantación de la Misión Comunicación 
pasa porque cada movimiento social, a diferentes niveles, disponga de su respectivo medio de comunicación 
bien sea impreso, radial, televisivo o digital.”
562“El pueblo, en los consejos comunales, tendrá la oportunidad de reapropiarse del hecho comunicacional. De 
buscar, de construir la verdad producida por todos. Ya no será la verdad de unos pocos. Será la verdad de 
muchos, la verdad de todos. La verdad que será posible en la sociedad socialista.... La Misión Comunicación 
tendrá en los Consejos Comunales un espacio natural, extraordinario para su concreción y desarrollo.”
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integration  between community media,  social  movements  and organizations,  and  the  new communal  
council system. It was also significant in that it was taken up as a representative position of the alternative  
and community media sector as a whole. For example, the “Political and Programmatic Declaration”  
(Declaración  Política  y  Programática)  produced  during  the  National  Meeting  of  Alternative  and  
Community Media in November of 2006 included a section entitled “We Propose The Communication  
Mission”  (Proponemos  la  Misión  Comunicacíon)  that  incorporated  text  from  the  BVPA document  
(Encuentro  Nacional  Medios  Alternativos  y  Comunitarios  2006).  Then,  in  February  of  2007,  the  
community and alternative media movement organized a march in Caracas in which they delivered a  
document to William Lara, then Minister of Communications and Information, as well representatives of 
the office of the Vice President. That document affirmed the movement's support for both the non-renewal  
of RCTV's broadcast license and the concept of the Communication Mission (Movimiento de Medios  
Alternativos y Comunitarios 2007).
Probably as a result of his leadership role in the alternative and community media movement,  
Ugas was made Director of DGMAC in mid-2007. Significantly, however, his appointment did not result  
in significant and measurable progress toward the goals that he had endorsed under the concept of the  
Communication Mission. This is perhaps not surprising, considering that the Communication Mission  
endorsed the integration of community media with social movements and the community councils, yet  
offered no concrete steps for achieving this goal. In fact, the BVPA document evidenced some confusion  
regarding the organizational structure of a hegemonic participatory communication system:
The idea, of course, is that each Communal Council have a media outlet or outlets through  
which to express itself, whether print, radio, television, or digital. In which there is space  
for  all  the  members  of  that  community  as  much  in  the  conception,  development,  
production,  design,  diffusion,  etc.,  of  information.  The  Independent  Audiovisual  
Community Production Teams (ECPAI) of Catia TVe are a good example of the route to  
follow in this sense.563 
563“La idea, por supuesto, es que cada Consejo Comunal disponga de un medio o medios a través del cual 
expresarse, bien sea impreso, radial, televisivo o digital. En la que tengan cabida todos los miembros de esa 
comunidad tanto en la concepción, elaboración, producción, diseño, difusión, etc., de la información. Los 
Equipos Comunitarios de Productores Audiovisuales Independientes (ECPAI) de Catia Tve son un buen ejemplo 
del camino a seguir en ese sentido.”
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As we have seen, however, the ECPAIs are not media outlets in and of themselves, but are only small  
production teams attached to media outlets, specifically television broadcasters. Was the conception of the  
Communication Mission therefore that each communal  council  have one or  more full-fledged media  
outlets? It seems hardly plausible, of course, that 200 to 400 families would need more than a bulletin or  
website;  it  certainly  makes  little  sense  to  imagine  that  they  would  need  a  television  station  unto  
themselves.
Perhaps we are nitpicking the wording of the document, but serious organizational and economic  
questions remain nonetheless. How many communal councils should be served by any one community  
media outlet? Should community councils have a single media unit producing material for all forms of  
media, or should they create units dedicated to specific media? To what degree would these units be under  
the authority of the council and to what degree would they operate as independent enterprises? However  
these units are organized, how might they join together at the commune, state, regional, or national levels  
to  take  on  more  ambitious  projects?  Who  should  fund  the  media  units  within  communal  councils:  
community media outlets or the councils themselves? How should they allocate any revenue that they  
might generate? These are some of the questions that the call for a Communication Mission entirely  
elided; some of them were also applicable to social movements and other civil society organizations.
Symptomatic of the bureaucratic churn discussed above, however, Ugas did not have much time  
as Director of DGMAC to implement his vision; he was replaced after Andrés Izarra was reappointed as  
Minister  of  Communications  and Information  in  December of  2007.  In  his  second term as  head  of  
MINCI,  Izarra  oversaw  the  formulation  of  a  National  Public  System  of  Popular,  Alternative,  and  
Community  Communication  (Sistema  Público  Nacional  de  Comunicación  Popular,  Alernativa,  y  
Comunitaria /  SPNCPAC) that marked something of a turning point in the state's rhetoric, if not actual  
policy, toward the community media sector.
The  Bolivarian  government  had  reiterated  it's  support  for  community  media  in  its  official  
development plan for 2007 – 2013. The third section of that document, entitled “Revolutionary Active  
403
Democracy” (Democracia Protagónica Revolucionaria), called for the state to “[f]ortify the network of  
alternative communication media” as a sub-component of “[d]eveloping an efficient network of informal  
channels of information and education toward the people” (21). 564 Meanwhile, the goal of “universalizing 
access  to  different  types  of  communication”  included  sub-components  that  called  for  “[f]acilitating  
community  access  to  communication  media”  alongside  “[f]ortifying  State  communication  and  
information media and democratizing its communication spaces” (23). 565 These statements, however, did 
not present a vision for integrating community media into the new geometry of power that had been  
initiated by the communal councils, nor did they specify the role the state would play in its support for  
community media.
The SPNCPAC, however, was touted as a “new phase” in state support that would seek to “unify  
public policy directed toward this sector, creating suitable spaces for the activation of the communication  
power of the people” and “[i]n parallel, from the alternative and community media outlets themselves,  
develop an organizational model integrated with the strategy of creation and fortification of Communal  
Councils,  Water  Advisory  Councils,  Land  Committees,  and  other  initiatives  for  the  construction  of  
Popular Power” (Milano 2008a).566 These statements suggested that the SPNCPAC would make good on  
the  vision  of  the  Communication  Mission,  which  had  called  for  increased  state  support  and  the  
construction  of  a  hegemonic  participatory  communication system in conjunction  with the communal  
councils and Bolivarian civil society. Moreover, in March of 2008 DGMAC oversaw a process of popular  
consultation designed to ensure that the SPNCPAC would accord with the desires of the alternative and  
community movement, as well as representatives from communal councils and other Bolivarian civil  
society organizations. The consultation process comprised 13 regional meetings, the results of which were  
564“[f]ortalecer la red de medios de comunicación alternativa”; “[d]esarrollar una red eficiente de vía de 
información y de educación no formal hacia el pueblo”
565“[u]niversalizar el acceso los diferentes tipos de comunicación”; “[f]ortalecer los medios de comunicación e 
información del Estado y democratizar sus espacio de comunicación”
566“unificar la política pública dirigida hacia este sector, creando espacios propios para la activación del poder  
comunicacional del pueblo”; “[e]n paralelo, desde los mismos medios alternativos y comunitarios, desarrollar  
un modelo organizativo integrado con la estrategia de creación y fortalecimiento de los Consejos Comunales,  
Mesas de Agua, Comités de Tierra, y otras iniciativas de construcción del Poder Popular”
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compiled and summarized by a “Follow-up Commission” (Comisión de Seguimiento) (MINCI 2010).
The  resulting  document  presented  six  “guidelines”:  “training”,  “content  production”,  
“technological platform”, “interrelation of actors”, “sustainability”, and “institutional articulation” ( ibid., 
Benítez 2008, 78).567 For each guideline, the document included explanatory text and a numerical list of  
items for its “implementation” ( implementación). Nonetheless, many of these items exhibited problems  
similar  to  those  of  the  Communication  Mission;  lacking  specific  and  concrete  steps  for  actual  
implementation, they read more like statements of principals or desired outcomes than action steps. For  
example, the first “implementation” item under “content production” called for the:
[p]roduction of an educational, informative, and recreational program made by popular  
communicators united in a region and their communities and communal councils, in order  
to show the local history and the particularities of latin american reality, transmitted over a  
national broadcast. (16)568
The questions of how this regional production would be organized or who would finance it were left open  
and the generality of the other guidelines did not provide truly adequate responses.
The first action item under “interrelation of actors”, for example, presented only a grab bag of  
organizational possibilities:
Establish  as  instance  of  participation  [sic]  assemblies  of  spokespeople  of  popular  
communication  and  communication  councils,  circuits,  functional  communes,  
commissions, committees, promotional teams, work groups, and other forms of relation in  
popular alternative, and community communication. (23) 569
Which of these were to be used in what capacity and how any of these were meant to work together was  
not addressed. The first action item under sustainability was similar in this regard:
Interchange of services: Concerns a diversification of the [services offered by alternative  
and community media] beyond publicity spots and the establishment of an offering of  
services between public institutions of the Venezuelan State, beginning with proposal such  
567“formación, producción de contenidos, plataforma tecnológica, interrelación de actores, sostentibilidad,  
articulación institucional”
568“[p]roducción de un programa educativo, informativo y recreativo, realizado por los comunicadores populares 
unidos en una región y sus comunidades y consejos comunales, a manera de mostrar la historia local y las 
particularidades de la realidad latinoamericana, transmitido por una señal abierta nacional.”
569“Establecer como instancia de participación [sic], las asambleas de voceros de la comunicación popular y 
mesas de comunicación, circuitos, comunas funcionales, comisiones, comités, equipos promotores, mesas 
técnicas y demás formas de relación en la comunicación popular, alternativa y comunitaria.”
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as:  facilitation of  workshops,  creation of  Web pages,  consulting services,  conferences,  
courses,  editing  and  reproduction  of  [Point  of  Purchase]  material,  mural  campaigns,  
posters,  development  of  research  guidelines.  Which  places  us  before  a  harmonious  
relationship  of  construction  and  work,  without  breaking  with  the  ethical  precepts  of  
popular communication. (27)570
The list of unanswered questions here is long, but these suggestions certainly seem to have the cart before  
the horse, inasmuch as they suggest that the sector might acquire additional resources by offering services  
for which it did not currently have sufficient resources to provide. Other action items for sustainability,  
meanwhile, were perhaps more sound yet remained beyond the power of MINCI to enforce. Examples  
include  “[f]inancing  on  the  part  of  the  Communal  Bank,  to  projects  directed  to  the  promotion  and  
formation  of  the  media  outlet  and  community”  and  “[f]inancing  to  projects  of  expansion,  physical  
modification, equipment, and training (under the method of the Participatory Budget) to present before  
[state and international] financing entities” (28). 571
Some of the action items listed in the document were more properly under MINCI's purview,  
however.  One  example  is  the  second  action  item  under  “interrelation  of  actors”:  “Development  of  
permanent  fora,  seminars,   dialogues,  and  meetings  at  local,  municipal  and  regional,  national  and  
international  level  [sic]  for  the  interchange  of  experiences  in  popular,  alternative,  and  community  
communication” (23). 572 Another example is the eighth item under “sustainability”:
Centralization  of  Publicity  Spots:  Concerns  centralizing  and  making  coherent  the  
traditional mechanism since the 19 th century [sic] for the maintenance of communication  
media of a mercantile nature, “the publicity spot”. During this nine (9) years, the State has  
maintained this mechanism, but lacking political and economic criteria adjusted to the  
570“Contraprestación de servicios: Se trata de una diversificación de la oferta [de servicios] de los [medios 
alternativos y comunitarios] más allá de la pauta publicitaria y el establecimiento de una oferta de servicios 
entre las instituciones públicas del Estado venezolano, a partir de propuestas como: la facilitación de talleres,  
elaboración de páginas Web, asesorías, conferencias, cursos, editorial y reproducción de material POP, 
campañas muralistas, pancartas, desarrollo de líneas de investigación. Lo cual nos coloca ante una  relación 
armónica de construcción y trabajo, sin romper con los preceptos éticos propios de la  comunicación  popular.”
571“[f]inanciamiento por parte del Banco Comunal, a proyectos dirigidos a la promoción y formación del medio y  
la comunidad”; “[f]inanciamiento a proyectos de expansión, adecuación física, equipamiento y formación (bajo 
el método del Presupuesto Participativo), para presentar ante entes [estatales e internacionalesde] de 
financiamiento”
572“Realización de foros, seminarios, conversatorios y encuentros permanentes a nivel local, municipal y regional, 
nacional e internacional para el intercambio de experiencias en comunicación popular, alternativa y 
comunitaria.”
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nature of [alternative and community media]. (29) 573
Left unclear in the document, however, is to what extent the results of the popular consultation were  
meant to direct state policy. MINCI did not publish a print version of the document until August of 2010,  
nor did it issue a more refined plan for the construction of a national “system” of community media.
Meanwhile, at least one contingent of the alternative and community media movement manifested  
opposition to MINCI's notion of a national system. In early March, just as MINCI was initiating the  
consultation  process  for  the  SPNCPAC,  a  group  of  420  “popular  communicators”  (comunicadores 
populares)  from  some  200  alternative  and  community  media  collectives  established   the  National  
Movement  of  Alternative  and  Community  Media  (Movimiento  Nacional  de  Medios  Alternativos  y  
Comunitarios / MoMAC) during a “National Constituent Assembly” (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente) 
held in Caracas. Among the 13 members of the National Directorate ( Dirección Nacional) elected during 
that  assembly  were  Miguel  Ugas  and  another  of  the  principal  signatories  of  the  BVPA's  call  for  a  
Communicaton Mission and, as might be expected, promoting the Communication Mission was the first  
of the “programmatic bases” (bases programáticas) listed in the assembly's final declaration.
Beginning in April, several members of the National Directorate authored public denunciations of  
the SPNCPAC that were in the tradition of ANMCLA's criticism of the state. Luis Salazar (2008), who  
hosted programs on both Catia TVe and Radio Negro Primero, wrote that:
[f]or no one is it a secret that the communicational apparatus of the state-government is in  
the hands of the right,  that  the 'institutional'  vision, developed from government press  
offices, by action or omission obey the parameters of the fourth republic, not to mention  
the disdain manifested toward [alternative and community media]. 574
Carlos  Machado (2008),  in  an article  titled “What  can MINCI's  famous SNCPAC [sic] be hiding?”,  
573“Centralización de las Pautas Publicitarias: Se trata de centralizar y darle coherencia al mecanismo 
tradicional  desde el siglo XIX [sic] para el sostenimiento de los medios de comunicación de naturaleza 
mercantil, “la pauta publicitaria”. Durante estos nueve (9) años, el Estado ha mantenido este mecanismo, pero 
carente  de criterios políticos y económicos ajustados a la naturaleza de los [medios alternativos y 
comunitarios].”
574“[p]ara nadie es un secreto que el aparato comunicacional de estado-gobierno está en manos de la derecha, 
que la visión “institucional”, desarrollada desde las direcciones de prensa gubernamentales, por acción u 
omisión obedecen a los parámetros de la cuarta república, sin dejar de mencionar el menosprecio manifiesto a 
los MAC.”
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described  the  plan  as  one  “in  which  orwellian  visions  clearly  appear  to  have  prevailed  in  its  final  
elaboration”.575 Ugas,  despite  –  or  perhaps because –  of  his  recent  service as  Director  of  DGMAC,  
affirmed that the community media sector was allied with the state, but insisted that “we are not going to  
accept that this State, which is penetrated by the fifth column and many of whose members respond to  
imperial policy, claims to assume control of the social movement” (Prensa MoMAC 2008) 576 Shortly after 
MINCI  published  the  SPNCPAC  text,  in  October  of  2010,  MoMAC's  “Central  Council”  ( Consejo  
Central) (which included 8 members of the 2008 Directorate) authored the “Catia Manifesto”, in which  
they called once again for the Communication Mission and rejected once again the SPNCPAC, referring  
to it as “[a]mong the most evident symptoms of the incomprehension of [a] state bureaucracy” that fails  
“to understand the facilitator role that, rather, falls to it, in this stage of transition, in the construction of  
the revolutionary subject” (MoMAC 2010).577
MoMAC did not specify to which of the SPNCPAC's “implementation” items it objected, but  
some of them certainly suggested a heavy state presence. One example is the first item under “training”,  
which called for the:
[c]reation of a training School: of a permanent character, oriented toward 'training trainers',  
community producers, communication spokespeople of the communal councils, [national  
independent producers], and other popular communicators. The area of the School, it is  
proposed  [sic]  that  it  be  regional  to  amplify  its  coverage  and  centralize  common  
experiences....  The  [National  Institute  of  Socialist  Training  and  Education  (Instituto  
Nacional de Capacitación y Educación Socialista / INCES)] are proposed as educational  
entities [sic] to provide service to popular communicators, in a constant and permanent  
manner. (13)578
Another is the third item under “content production”, which called for the “[u]nification of an editorial  
575“Qué puede ocultar el famoso SNCPAC [sic] del MINCI ?”; “en el que a todas luces parecen haber prevalecido 
visiones orwelianas en su elaboración final, por decir lo menos, luego de una atropellada consulta nacional.”
576“no vamos a aceptar que ese Estado, que esta penetrado por la quinta columna y muchos de cuyos integrantes 
responden a la política imperial, pretenda asumir el control del movimiento social.”
577“[e]ntre los síntomas mas evidentes de la incomprensión de la burocracia estatal”; “entender el papel 
facilitador que, más bien,  le compete a éste, en esta etapa de transición, en la construcción del sujeto 
revolucionario”
578“Creación de una Escuela de formación y capacitación: de carácter permanente, orientada a “formar 
formadores”, productores comunitarios, voceros de comunicación de los consejos comunales, PNI y demás 
comunicadores populares. El ámbito de la Escuela, se propone sea regional para ampliar su cobertura y 
centralizar experiencias comunes.... Se proponen los INCES como entes formativos para prestar el servicio a los 
comunicadores populares, de manera constante y permanente.”
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line to defend communicational sovereignty in a forceful manner, at the same time as offering direct and  
agreed responses to the community. Measure [sic] that serves as an impetus for the sense of belonging of  
the community and as a link with different local and regional experiences” (17). 579
Other examples suggest the possibility of state control over important hubs, though they might  
just as easily be understood to suggest popular control. Examples include the first  action item under  
“technology platform”, which called for the “[i]nstallation of a Situation Room with the fundamental  
technology platform, according to specific necessities of each region of the country, to guarantee the  
effective interconnection between actors committed to the exercise of a communicational sovereignty”  
(19),  as  well  as  the seventh item under “interrelation of actors”,  which called for  the “[c]reation of  
regional  production  centers  that  imply  the  generation  and  distribution  of  news,  experiences,  and  
communicational  products...”  (24).580 Likewise,  the  first  item listed  under  “institutional  articulation”  
might signify an increase in either control or efficiency: “[p]romotion of Regional Offices of Information  
(regional MINCI offices) and it is proposed [sic] that CONATEL also make offices of this type … to  
guarantee efficient attention and de-concentration toward the regions, of administrative processes only  
carried out from the central office located in Caracas” (31).
While these items signaled the possibility of overt state control, they remained for the most part  
ambiguous and it remained to be seen what direction MINCI's implementation would take. On their own,  
they seem insufficient to motivate MoMAC's immediate and vehement opposition. What else accounted  
for  it?  To  begin,  although  the  SPNCPAC  document  had  been  informed  by  representatives  of  the  
alternative  and  community  media  movement  and  other  elements  of  Bolivarian  civil  society,  many  
members of the movement felt  that the consultation had been insufficient.  Machado referred to it  as  
579“[u]nificación de una línea editorial para defender la soberanía comunicacional de forma contundente, a la vez 
de ofrecer respuestas directas y consensuadas a la comunidad. Medida que sirve de impulso para el sentido de 
pertenencia de la comunidad y de enlace con las diferentes vivencias locales y regionales.”
580“[i]nstalación de una Sala Situacional con la plataforma tecnológica fundamental, según necesidades  
específicas de cada región del país, para garantizar la interconexión efectiva entre los actores comprometidos 
con el ejercicio de una soberanía comunicacional.”; “[c]reación de centros de producción regional, que 
implique la generación y distribución de noticias, experiencias y productos comunicacionales...”
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“rushed” and many community media practitioners  had not participated for  several  possible  reasons,  
including a lack of response to MINCI's invitation, “the government's interest in cherry picking 'allied'  
[community  media  producers,]  ...  [and]  a  boycott  by  some ...  practitioners,  who,  after  a  few initial  
meetings, felt their voices ignored and overrun by a preset governmental agenda” (Fuentes-Batista & Gil-
Ergui 2011, 271 n12).  Nonetheless,  much of the document actually  coincided with the vision of  the  
Communication Mission that MoMAC strenuously endorsed. To truly understand MoMAC's opposition,  
we might look to the figure of Andrés Izarra for further clarification.
Izarra's uncle had been jailed for leftist political activities in the 1970s and his father, a Lieutenant  
Colonel in the Venezuelan Air Force, participated in Chávez's 1992 coup attempt and became “one of the  
chief theorists” of the Bolivarian revolution, but Izarra was hardly groomed to be a chavista. As a child, 
“he attended public schools in [Massachusetts] while his parents did graduate work at Harvard” and his  
mother, a retired professor, would go on to become a critic of the Bolivarian movement (Agustín 2010,  
Romero 2007). As a young man, Izarra spent five years in the United States working for CNN and NBC  
before  he  became  a  production  manager  for  RCTV  in  Venezuela.  His  outrage  at  that  station's  
manipulation  of  information  during  the attempted  coup of  2002 led  him to  resign  that  post,  but  he  
remained in commercial news, working for CNN in Caracas. In 2003, however, he began working in  
Venezuela's US Embassy and shortly thereafter was hired to produce “Alo Presidente”, Chávez's Sunday  
television show. This set off a rapid rise to power; in September of 2004 he was appointed to his first term  
as Minister of Communications and Information and he would go on to serve as President of both VTV  
and teleSUR over the next several years.581
As a result of his career trajectory, many within the alternative and community media movement  
view Izarra as possessing a hierarchical and professionalized conception of communication that befits  
large commercial and state television networks. Thus, while he frequently invokes Gramsci, they remain  
581TeleSUR is an international television network headquartered in Caracas and primarily distributed in Latin 
America. It is funded by a consortium of Latin American states, with Venezuela as the chief financial contributor.
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skeptical that he shares their goal of participatory civil governance. In January of 2007, while President of  
Telesur, Izarra's notion of  Bolivarian “communication hegemony” already included “a national system  of  
community and alternative media” (cited in Uribarrí 2009, 169). Then, when the SPNCPAC emerged  
early  in  Izarra's  second  term  as  Minister  of  Communication  and  Information,  it  did  so  nearly  
simultaneously to the formulation of a “National System of Public Media” ( Sistema Nacional de Medios  
Públicos), thus adding weight to the interpretation that Izarra viewed these sectors in  similar terms, as  
tools for state control over Bolivarian messaging (Urbina 2012, 42). Nonetheless, little progress was made  
during Izarra's second term, which lasted only one year, until December of 2008. As will be discussed  
below, the SPNCPAC would not return to prominence until Izarra's third term, which began two years  
later, in December of 2010. In the meantime MINCI was headed by Jesse Chacón, who led CONATEL  
during the formulation of the regulations, and Blanca Eekhout.
Having emerged from within the alternative and community media movement, Eekhout was not  
likely to share Izarra's approach. In fact, during her one year tenure as Minister, beginning in April of  
2009, MINCI endorsed a very different model for integrating Bolivarian community media with the new  
geometry of power. The Popular Communication Council (Consejo Popular de Comunicación / CPC) 
was  conceived  as  a  grassroots  organizational  entity  comprised  of  perhaps  40  representatives  from  
community media outlets, community councils, and other units of Bolivarian civil society, “the goal of  
which is to produce territorial communicational policy, that goes from local to regional, based on the  
analysis of the reality that presents itself” (Eekhout 2010). 582 The CPC would, in other words, serve as a  
governance mechanism by which Bolivarian civil society would be able to jointly guide the community  
media sector.
The CPC concept originated in Catia TVe, in part as a response to the limitations of the ECPAIs.  
On the one hand, the formation of CPCs would encourage other organizations to provide resources to the  
582“cuyo fin es elaborar la política comunicacional territorial, que va desde lo local hasta lo regional, partiendo 
del análisis de la realidad que presenta”
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community media sector. In effect, the CPCs would become responsible for creating and maintaining the  
ECPAIs, thus alleviating the burden on the television station. At the same time, however, the CPCs would  
integrate other community media outlets and facilitate community production teams working in multiple  
media, taking advantage of the resources at hand and utilizing whichever media were most appropriate to  
the goals for a particular project. The Catia TVe staff felt that they did not have resources sufficient to  
carrying out the plan, however, so they brought the idea to  Eekhout, who facilitated its incorporation into  
the strategic plans of both ViVe and MINCI (Almao 2011).
In late 2009, MINCI's DGMAC oversaw what Triviño described as a “pilot program” ( prueba de 
piloto)  in  which  CPCs were created  across  the country.  This  first  group of  CPCs was then  brought  
together for the First  National  Congress of  CPCs ( I  Congreso Nacional de CPC)  in December.  The 
creation of CPCs was facilitated by ViVe, acting through its regional centers, according to a three stage  
process that was designed to take place over several months. The first stage involved identifying and  
dialoguing with prospective members, as well as offering a series of workshops designed to familiarize  
them with the concepts of participatory communication. The second stage encompassed the creation of  
the CPC, workshops designed to impart specific skills, and the creation of a communicational plan that  
would respond to the needs and/or desires of the community. In the third stage, the facilitators assisted the  
newly formed CPC in carrying out the plan. 583 As of June 2010, 49 CPCs had been created and 100 more  
were reported to be in preparation, but in August of 2011 Gil reported that ViVe had established 60 and  
Catia TVe had created another 18 (Medios alternativos y comunitarios consolidarán... 2010; Gil 2011).
The  CPCs  were  meant  to  articulate  community  media  outlets,  local  production  teams,  and  
Bolivarian civil society, including the communal councils. Triviño provided the following example: “If  
we have a  commune and in that area there is  a social  production business where there is  a Factory  
583These three stages are outlined in an undated “Guide for the Formation [of] Popular Communication Counsels” 
(Guía para la Conformación [de] Consejos Populares de Comunicación) made available publicly from 
Eekhout's profile on the PSUV webpage. This document suggests that the communicational plan be developed in 
the third stage. Triviño, however, gave a slightly different account, in which the communicational plan would be 
created in the second stage, to National Radio of Venezuela (Van Arcken 2009).
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Council,  and  if  in  addition  to  the Communal  Councils  we have  a  radio,  a  television  station,  and  a  
newspaper, all those organizations begin to meet and to discuss a communicational policy”. 584 In this 
sense, the CPCs are a mechanism for grassroots governance focusing on specific areas. Nonetheless,  
Triviño also envisioned them functioning as a network and in that manner carrying out unified campaigns:  
“imagine, we would have thousands of CPCs in the whole country carrying out a campaign, that is more  
or less the operation and the policy of the CPCs”. 585 As examples, he suggested campaigns in opposition  
to US military bases in Colombia and in favor of the Fundamental Law of Education, both of which were  
hot button topics at the time (Van Arcken 2009). In this vision, the CPCs are presented less as venues for  
debate  and localized decision-making than as  outlets  for  propaganda,  illustrating how the Bolivarian  
conception of hegemony tends to slip between popular democratic control and centralized messaging.  
While Triviño's vision had less to do with a message imposed from above than an assumption that all  
committed Bolivarians would share a “correct” view on important issues, it nonetheless suggested that he  
did not view CPCs as venues for open debate, inclusive of oppositional viewpoints. This, in conjunction  
with  the  promotional  roles  played  by  MINCI  and  ViVe,  may  have  reinforced  the  alternative  and  
community media movement's ever-present skepticism toward state-led efforts, with the result that, as  
Triviño explained, “many [community media producers] believed that we were creating the CPCs to be  
able  to  take  control  of  community  media  outlets.” 586 This  distrust  never  coalesced  into  sustained 
opposition,  as  with  the  SPNCPAC,  but  illustrated  once  again  the  tensions  inherent  in  using  state  
institutions to enable civil society governance.
ViVe continued to facilitate the creation of CPCs at least through 2011, although with greater or  
lesser commitment depending on the region (Manrique 2011). MINCI, however, ceased to support the  
584"Si tenemos una comuna y en ese ámbito hay una empresa de producción social donde hay un Consejo de 
Fábrica, y si además de los Consejos Comunales tenemos una radio, una televisora y un periódico, todas esas 
organizaciones comienzan a reunirse y a discutir una política comunicacional.”
585“imagínate, tendríamos a miles de Consejos Populares de Comunicación en todo el país haciendo una campaña, 
ese es más o menos el funcionamiento y la política de los CPC”
586“muchos [productores de medios comunitarios] creían que nosotros estabamos creando los CPCs para poder 
apoderarse de los medios comunitarios"
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CPC model once Triviño was replaced in June of 2010, two months after Eekhout's departure. MINCI  
gave no official cause for this policy shift, but Lidice Altuve, who served as Vice Minister of Media  
Management (Vice Ministra de Gestión de Medios) during Izarra's third term as Minister, believed that the  
CPC was not necessary within the new geometry of power. The CPC, she said:
...takes you out of the model.... You have to strengthen what exists.... I insist, I don't want  
to think of closed models, but evidently if you have a structure of popular government –  
because what is a communal council? What is a commune? Just as the state, the national  
government, has a president,  a body of ministers,  you understand me? The communal  
council has its committee, the commune, the bank of the commune, it has a comprehensive  
development plan, that is shaped by the projects, it establishes a maximum instance of  
deliberation which is the assembly, and what is constructed can't be at the margin of this  
model.....  What  we say  is,  'Goodness,  if  you are  birthing a  societal  model  that  has  a  
specific nature, you [do] it in the communal structure, the instruments of communication  
have to place themselves in the service of that. To fortify it, to inform it, to incubate it, to  
generate  consciousness.'  I  bet  more  on  an  impulse  of  communal  communication  that  
supports that model. (Altuve 2011)587 
In other words, the commune, as the organizational entity that gathers communications spokespeople  
from all communal councils in its area of governance, should properly determine communications policy  
for that area.
Supporters of the CPC model, however, would argue that it  is more representative because it  
allows  for  the  participation  of  not  only  the  spokespeople  of  the  communal  councils,  but  also  staff  
members of community media outlets, community producers, and representatives from other entities of  
Bolivarian civil society, whether social movements, professional associations, user groups, cooperatives,  
etc. Within the commune system, the interests of all of these diverse groups would have to be channeled  
through  the  communications  spokespeople  of  the  communal  councils  and  they  would  have  less  
opportunity to directly influence policy decisions. Of course, it remains to be seen whether these groups  
587“...te sale del modelo.… Tu tienes que potenciar lo que existe.… Insisto, no quiero pensar en modelos cerrados, 
pero evidentamente si tu tienes una estructura de gobierno popular – porque qué lo que es un consejo comunal? 
Qué es la comuna? Así como el estado, el gobierno nacional, tiene un presidente, un cuerpo de ministros, me 
entiendes? El consejo comunal tiene su comité, la comuna, el banco de la comuna, tiene un plan de desarrollo 
integral, que lo conforman los proyectos, establece una instancia de deliberación máxima que es la asamblea, y 
lo que se arma no puede estar al margen de ese modelo.... Lo que decimos es, 'Cónchale, si tu estás pariendo un 
modelo de sociedad que tiene una especificidad, lo [?] en lo comunal, los instrumentos de comunicación tienen 
que ponerse al servicio de eso. Para fortalecerlo, para informarlo, para incubarlo, para generar conciencia.' Yo 
apuesto más a un impulso de la comunicación comunal que soporte este modelo.”
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would desire such a level of participation or to what degree a CPC would influence policy if it did not  
exercise direct authority over funding decisions. The bottom line, of course, is that such conjecture means  
little  outside  of  an  operational  commune  system  because  these  open  questions  must  ultimately  be  
addressed through experimentation and resolved through experience. In this context, the CPC model can  
be seen  as  an  attempt  to  “jump start”  popular  governance  over  participatory  communications,  since  
although many communal councils had been established by 2011, few of them had either joined together  
as communes or committed themselves to funding community media.
Prior to serving as Vice Minister, Altuve had served as Director of DGMAC from 2005 into 2007  
and subsequently as Vice Minister of Communal Economy ( Vice Ministra de Economía Comunal) in the 
Ministry of Communes. She reported that the communal councils have not proposed projects related to  
community  media  since  “[t]he  dynamic  of  the  communal  councils  from  their  beginnings  has  been  
[oriented] more toward … projects that have to do with their materiality in the immediate term” ( ibid.).588 
Illustrative  of  this  point  is  a  2008  survey  of  communal  council  members  which  found  that  of  the  
represented councils 33 percent had undertaken a project related to housing, 21 percent had addressed  
water  and  sewage,  15  percent  had  improved  roadways,  and  14  percent  had  augmented  electricity  
provision, while communication and media were not among the top nine categories (Machado 2009, 118).  
Community media producers recognize and to a large degree empathize with these choices. As Mendez,  
of TV Petare, explained, “[t]he people don't see the economic benefit of having a camera, a newspaper,  
none of that stuff. And besides there's a historic debt, which is the cinder block, the cement, the rebar, all  
that. The people resolve their problems first!” 589
While community  media producers  understand that  the  immediate  economic  priorities  of  the  
communal councils may not include community media, they have nonetheless been frustrated by their  
seeming lack of concern for constructing a participatory communications system. The primary evidence  
588“[l]a dinámica de los CC desde sus incicios ha estado [orientado] más a ... proyectos que tienen que ver con su 
materialidad en [el plazo] inmediato.”
589“[l]a gente no le ven el beneficio económico a tener una cámara, un periódico, nada de esa vaina. Y además 
hay una deuda histórica, que es el bloque, el cemento, la cabilla, eso. La gente primera resuelven sus peos!”
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for this has been the lack of media spokespersons and their corresponding committees within the councils.  
Flores, of Teletambores, lamented that “[t]he reality of many communal councils is that they lack that  
committee,  now it's  called  'committee  of  media  and propaganda'....  Some 98 percent  don't  have  the  
committee.”590 The  lack  of  this  committee  is  the  primary  reason  given  by  community  television  
practitioners for the inability to form ECPAIs within communal councils (although if the councils are  
unable to provide funding, then the television stations are still faced with the problem of how to maintain  
volunteer ECPAIs). The result has often been that the councils expect the community television stations to  
cover their meetings, projects, and activities, instead of producing their own coverage, as the television  
stations would have it. As Flores expressed it:
The communal councils haven't placed any importance on that propaganda committee …  
which is for their own benefit in any case. They expect the community television station to  
record all [of their activities]. Imagine, therefore, ten communal councils for a community  
television station that doesn't have resources and has few personnel for that. Therefore we  
end up dividing ourselves and not doing anything. Without resources, we can't... 591
For Flores, the sad result of all of this is that “[m]any neighbors … watch television, but they don't see  
what [the communal councils] are doing” and the system thus loses a valuable opportunity to reinforce or  
grow its support.592
The problem does  not  necessarily  lie  entirely  within  the  communal  council,  however.  Many  
community media outlets have had years to establish entrenched modes of operation. We have already  
seen that resource constraints, among other reasons, often impel community television stations to depend  
on the dedicated efforts of a core group of practitioners. Altuve described how this has sometimes led to  
tension and confrontation:
...because  the  media  outlet  is  born  before  the  communal  council,  …  before  the  
commune.... Now there are tensions... that are legitimate, in some cases the media outlet as  
590“La realidad de muchos CC es que carecen de ese comité, ahora se llama 'comité de medios y propaganda'…. 
Un 98% no tiene el comité.”
591“Los consejos comunales no le han dado importancia a esa comisión de propaganda … que es para el beneficio 
de ellos en todo caso. Se dedica a que la televisora comunitaria les grabe todo[s sus actividades]. Imagínate, 
entonces, diez consejos comunales para una televisora comunitaria que no tiene recursos y cuenta con poco 
personal para eso. Entonces terminamos en dividirnos y no hacer nada. Sin recursos, no podemos…”
592“Muchos vecinos … ven televisión, pero no ven lo que [los consejos comunales] están haciendo”
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a foundation has closed off.... Where the media outlet had much communal inclusion … it  
has been … transforming, but in other places where that inclusion and that articulation  
with the community wasn't so strong, so consolidated, to the extent that the communal  
council develops there exists a level of tension about who controls the radio station, if it's  
the communal council and it supplanted the foundation, or the foundation closed off more  
and faced off, apart from the communal council. Which has to do with us as regulatory  
entities of this policy and of a process of accompaniment, that that isn't a mechanism of  
community division.593
In  actual  practice,  MINCI's  DGMAC  does  not  have  the  capacity  to  monitor  the  relations  between  
hundreds  of  community  media  outlets  and  their  surrounding communal  councils,  and  thus  can  only  
intercede when situations reach an absolute crisis. In the meantime, these tensions play out at the local  
level.
Such was the case with Teletambores in July of 2011. As discussed above, the station itself had  
reached a crisis point due to a lack of funds, malfunctioning equipment, and a staff that had been reduced  
to a demoralized core group of six. This core group had been hoping for months to revitalize the station  
through better integration with the surrounding communal councils but had met with little success. By  
July, it had become necessary to elect a new board of directors for the community foundation and the core  
group was hoping that representatives from the communal councils would participate. Toward that end, it  
called a meeting to discuss the options. Not all of the community councils sent representatives to the  
meeting  and only  one  had  actually  elected  a  media  spokesperson,  but  some 25 people  attended the  
meeting. Several of the attendees had previously been active in Teletambores and were now participating  
in their communal council, but none of the core group of Teletambores staff was active in a community  
council.
This was the first open meeting on the topic, but Teletambores had been offering workshops to  
593“…fueron dinámicas distintas … porque el medio nace primero que el consejo comunal, … que la comuna…. 
Ahora hay unas tensiones… que son legítimas, en algunos casos el medio como fundación ha cerrada…. Donde 
el medio tenía mucha inserción comunal … ha ido ... transformando, pero en otros lados donde esa inserción y 
esa articulación con la comunidad no era tan fuerte, tan consolidada, en la medida que el consejo comunal se 
desarrolla existe un nivel de tensión de quien controla la radio, si es el consejo comunal y suplantó a la 
fundación, o la fundación se cierra más y se enfrenta, aparte del consejo comunal. Que nos toca nosotros como 
entes rectores de esta política y de un proceso de acompañamiento, que eso no sea un mecanismo de división de 
la comunidad.”
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and holding discussions with individual community councils previously, so the producers were aware that  
some  of  the  councils  held  grievances.  One  complaint  was  that  Briceño  had  been  serving  on  the  
foundation's board, most recently as President, but that he now lived outside the station's coverage area,  
thus  violating  article  21  of  the  regulations.  Briceño,  who  had  spent  over  two  decades  working  for  
Teletambores and its precursor projects, and who had moved away in order to purchase land for a house at  
a more affordable price, took this criticism as a lack of respect for his efforts and it was one of the  
motivations for his decision to leave Teletambores and take a job with the municipal government near his  
new home. Flores and his wife, who was also an active member of the core group, had recently had a  
child and moved to the same area as Briceño, also to take advantage of less expensive lots. They were  
thus not eligible to serve on the board either.
Another complaint was that Teletambores did not always cover events when requested to do so by  
community councils. This complaint resurfaced in the meeting when a member of one council stated that  
Teletambores “is not carrying out the principal function of a community television station.” 594 He cited an 
example that had occurred two months earlier, when a local high school had requested that Teletambores  
record  an  event  on  global  warming.  The  station,  he  said,  could  not  respond “because  it's  broke.” 595 
Members of Teletambores, however, saw the same situation quite differently. They did not believe that it  
was the function of the station staff to respond to requests for coverage, but to train community producers  
to carry out those tasks. For them, the onus was on the communal councils and other organizations to  
provide volunteers and even funding to make that possible.
The  majority  of  the  discussion  at  the  meeting,  however,  concerned  the  issue  of  integrating  
members of the community councils into Teletambores. Some members of the councils had previously  
suggested that representatives of the councils should sit on the foundation's board, but core members of  
Teletambores felt  that  this would cede too much power to individuals who were unfamiliar with the  
594“no está cumpliendo la función principal de una televisora comunitaria”
595“porque está quebrada”
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history,  philosophy,  and  operations  of  the  station.  In  the  meeting,  they  therefore  appealed  to  the  
foundation's  bylaws,  which  restricted  membership  on  the  board,  as  well  as  voting  rights  in  board  
elections, to members who had participated actively for at least two years. Some members of the councils  
argued, however, that if they could not serve on the board nor vote in the elections, they were effectively  
barred from participating. Teletambores producers, backed by other members of the councils (especially  
those who had previously participated in  the station),  responded by  pointing out  that  their  offers  of  
workshops and calls for participation had gone unheeded by council members, which is why they were  
now not in a position to vote or serve on the board.
The  meeting  concluded  with  an  informal  compromise.  On  one  hand,  the  Teletambores  staff  
agreed that the bylaws should be revised to speed the process of incorporation of new members into  
positions of leadership. In calling for this approach, María Santini, a founding member of the station,  
acknowledged  that  the  current  bylaws  did  not  accord  with  the  ethos  of  “active  participation”  
(participación protagónica) that lies at the heart of the Bolivarian revolution. On the other hand, various  
members of the communal councils pledged to work harder to participate in the daily work necessary to  
operating the station and producing content. The question of funding was left unresolved.
This snapshot of tensions between Teletambores and its surrounding communal councils suggests  
the difficulties encountered in the process of integrating community media into the burgeoning Bolivarian  
civil state. The Communication Mission, the proposal for a SPNCPAC, and the CPC model had all sought  
to remedy this situation, but none had decisively taken hold by 2011. In relation to all three proposals the  
alternative and community media movement  had signaled that  it  felt  capable  of  constructing a  truly  
participatory system and that what it therefore needed from the state was not guidance but the consistent  
allocation of resources with which to consolidate and expand. Many within the movement felt that this  
required a  re-structuration of the sector's  legal  framework that  would definitively surpass the liberal  
model of the 2001 regulations, fundamentally reform the sector's relationship with the state, and define  
the organizational model by which the sector would integrate with the commune system. This desire did  
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not emerge in reaction to the models discussed above but had been developing alongside them over the  
course of several years.
The  alternative  and community  media movement's  desire  to  reform the regulations began to  
coalesce in 2008. In January of that year, Chávez himself publicly called for such a reform (Movimiento  
Integrador de Medios Alternativos y Comunitario 2009). Then, when MoMAC formed in March and  
declared its “programmatic bases”, they included “[r]aising the banner of the Law of Alternative and  
Community  Media”.596 Just  a  couple  of  weeks  later  ANMCLA published  a  call  for  “a  new Law of  
Telecommunications that advances toward indoafroamerican socialism” (ANMCLA 2008). 597 Later that 
year, ViVe hosted a meeting of community media practitioners in order to generate proposals for a new  
law (Manrique 2011).
In April of 2009, the Ministry of Popular Power of the Office of the President ( Ministerio del  
Poder  Popular  del  Despacho  de  la  Presidencia  /  MPPDP)  hosted  a  meeting  of  community  media  
practitioners in Caracas. The “central proposal” to emerge from that meeting was the “[c]reation and  
promulgation  of  the  'Fundamental  Law  of  the  National  Public  System  of  Socialist  Alternative  and  
Community Popular Communication' as a legal framework consonant with current reality” (Informe sobre  
3er encuentro... 2009).598 Following this meeting, community media practitioners held regional meetings  
to discuss the specific points they wished to see incorporated in the law. In July, practitioners brought  
these  regional  proposals  to  the  Bolivarian  National  Congress  of  Alternative  and  Community  Media  
(Congreso Nacional Bolivariano de Medios Alternativos y Comunitarios) in Maracaibo (Zulia), the sole  
purpose of which was to formulate a proposal for the new law. 599 In attendance at the meeting were 
596“[l]evantar la bandera de la Ley de la Comunicación Alternativa y Comunitaria”
597“una nueva Ley de Telecomunicaciones que avance hacia el socialismo indoafroamericano”
598“propuesta central”; “[c]reación y promulgación de la 'Ley Orgánica del Sistema Nacional Público de 
Comunicación Popular Alternative y Comunitaria Socialista' como marco jurídico cónsono a la realidad actual”
599The Congress was organized by the Office of Alternative and Community Media (Dirección de Medios 
Alternativos y Comunitarios / DMAC) of the municipality of San Francisco, Zulia and funded by its municipal 
government. San Francisco borders Maracaibo, the capital of Zulia, to the south. Whereas the municipal 
government of the wealthier municipality of Maracaibo has been controlled by opposition parties, San 
Francisco's less wealthy, working class population has consistently voted for parties aligned with the Bolivarian 
revolution. San Francisco was the first municipality in the country to have an office dedicated to community 
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Rosario Pacheco and Israel Sotillo, PSUV members of the National Assembly who were then serving on  
Commission of Science and Technology's Sub-commission of Media, thus giving the community media  
sector confidence that a law was forthcoming. No bill was produced in the Assembly, however, ostensibly  
due to the election of new representatives in September of 2010 (Almao & Macol 2011).
Through  2010  and  into  2011,  the  alternative  and  community  media  movement  continued  to  
organize around a new legal structure for the sector. In October of 2010, the Catia Manifesto reiterated  
MoMAC's call  for what was now referred to as “the Law of popular communication” ( la Ley de la  
comunicación popular). In November, the movement held a Working Session for the Construction of  
Socialist Popular Communication (Cayapa para la Construcción de la Comunicación Popular Socialista ) 
in the state of Yaracuy that produced proposals for a new law. Meanwhile, although the elections of 2010  
had disrupted the first attempt to pass a law, they had also given the movement a powerful ally within the  
National Assembly, as Eekhout had not only been elected to represent her home state of Portuguesa, but  
had also been named Second Vice President of the Assembly itself.
In 2011, Eekhout facilitated two meetings (the first on March 30 th and the second on May 4 th) 
between  representatives  from the  alternative  and  community  media  movement  and  members  of  the  
Permanent Commission of Popular Power and Communication Media ( Comisión Permanente del Poder  
Popular  y  Medios  de  Comunicación).600 At  the first  of  these,  the  Commission  named several  of  its  
media. The DMAC was created in late 2008 in response to a petition submitted by community media 
practitioners. As of 2011, it employed six salaried workers, six contracted workers, and four interns (Hernández 
2011).
600Various representatives of the community media sector indicated that Eekhout facilitated the legislative process 
(Miguel Hernández 2011, Macol 2011, Manrique 2011). Eekhout, however, insisted that she played a minor role 
in the process: “I'm convinced that yes, it would have been discussed [without her intervention], Within the idea 
of the 'people as legislator', if it wasn't arriving by this route the people would have managed to make their 
proposal by another.... Perhaps I pushed it a bit. It might be, due to my interest, because I come from that 
experience and I know it, it might be. But I'm sure that it would have been done, if not right now a little bit 
further ahead. But of course. If the people have a proposal, this assembly would have picked it up and is picking 
it up.... It's listening to the proposals of the people.... Maybe a little, the fact of my proximity to many of these 
colleagues accelerated [it]... but it wasn't determinative” (Eekhout 2011).; “Estoy convencida de que sí, se 
hubiera estado discutido [sin su intervención]. Dentro de la idea del 'pueblo legislador', si no venía por ésta vía 
por otra el pueblo habría llegado a hacer su propuesta.... A lo mejor yo lo empujé un poquito. Puede ser, por el 
interes, porque vengo de esa experiencia y la conozco, puede ser. Pero estoy segura de que se hubiera hecho, 
sino ahorita un poquito más adelante, pero claro que sí. Si el pueblo tiene una propuesta, ésta asamblea la 
habría recogido.... Está eschuchando las propuestas del pueblo.... Tal vez un poco, el hecho de mi cercanía a 
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members  to  a  special   “Directorate  of  Community  and  Alternative  Media”  ( Dirección  de  Medios  
Comunitarios y Alternativos). At the second of these, which was also attended by representative from  
CONATEL and  Rukleman  Soto,  then  Director  of  DGMACS,  the  community  media  representatives  
presented their  proposals  as  a  “Popular  Initiative of Legislation” ( Iniciativa Popular de Legislación) 
(Macol 2011, Dirección General de Investigación y Desarrollo Legislativo 2011). The agreed strategy was  
to pass the law using a process that is referred to by Bolivarians as the “People as Legislator” ( Pueblo 
Legislador). In this context, it refers to making use of article 204 of the Bolivarian constitution, which  
specifies that a bill may be initiated by a petition of one-tenth of one percent of registered voters.
On May 30th a  “Commission on the Law of Community Media” ( Comisión sobre la  Ley de  
Medios  Comunitarios),  which  included  representatives  from  the  alternative  and  community  media  
movement,  as  well  as  “liaisons”  (enlaces)  from  the  Directorate  and  members  of  the  Technical  
Commission (Comisión Técnica) of the National Assembly, met to formulate a plan for creating a draft  
bill (anteproyecto).601 They agreed that the National Assembly would sponsor twelve regional meetings  
over the course of one month, from early June to early July, that would be “open to organizations in  
general” and which would produce “twelve principal documents that systematize the proposals discussed  
as much in these events as in other avenues for the generation of proposals.” 602 A web page was also to be 
created to allow the public to submit proposals. Following the regional meetings, representatives from the  
movement would meet to consolidate all of the proposals into a single draft bill that would be delivered to  
the National Assembly. Meanwhile,  representatives  in  each region would be assigned to oversee the  
process of collecting signatures of voters in support of the draft bill. 603 Once the signatures were approved 
muchos de estos compañeros [lo] agilizó... pero no fue determinante.”
601The minutes of this meeting document the presence of representatives from the following list of associations: 
“Non aligned (No Alineados), ANCLA [sic], AMCLA, [sic], Network of Television Stations (Red de Televisoras) 
[sic], Bolivarian Block (Bloque Bolivariano), MoMAC, Network of Collectives (Red de Colectivos)”.
602“abierta a organizaciones en general”; “doce documentos principales que sistematizan las propuestas discutidas 
tanto en estos eventos como en las otras vías de generación de propuestas.”
603In 2011, citizen initiatives required a minimum of 17,793 signatures to meet the 0.1 percent threshold. Moreover, 
the National Electoral Commission (Comisión Nacional Electoral) was required to approve the submitted 
signatures. 33,854 signatures were ultimately collected (Llevarán a primera discusión Proyecto de Ley de 
Comunicación para el Poder Popular 2011).
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and the draft bill delivered, it would be refined into proper legal language by “technicians” ( técnicos) 
from the National Assembly and submitted to the two discussions that are required to pass a law in that  
body.
Further below we will examine the content of the sector's proposals and their evolution within the  
legislative process. Before we do, however, it is worth noting certain aspects of the “People as Legislator”  
process in relation to our previous discussion of autonomy vis-a-vis the Venezuelan state. As we have  
seen, the alternative and community media movement simultaneously recognizes the Bolivarian state as  
an ally in its  efforts to establish a hegemonic participatory media system and a potential  obstacle  to  
establishing  citizen  control  over  that  same  system.  In  relation  to  the  Communication  Mission,  the  
SPNCPAC, and the CPCs, civil society control over community media was of paramount importance for  
practitioners. Advancing the proposed law as a citizen initiative provided a rhetorical claim to popular  
legitimacy  that  was  backed  by  a  consultative  process  which  included  not  only  the  twelve  regional  
meetings, but also the results of the 2009 National Congress and many other previous meetings, as well as  
proposals  submitted  by  various  associations  of  community  media  practitioners.  Nonetheless,  certain  
aspects of the process called into question the nature of its popular legitimacy.
The consultative process was limited in two ways. First, though perhaps not unexpectedly, the  
regional meetings were clearly intended to solicit input from committed Bolivarians only. Of course, this  
is  common practice  in  a  highly  polarized  political  system in  which  the  opposing  sides  do  not  only  
disagree about policy issues, but about the framework of governance itself. Bolivarians would argue that  
anyone not aligned with the Bolivarian cause would have little to contribute to a law designed to enmesh  
with a new geometry of power and the communal structure. Advocates of a liberal model of community  
media, in other words, would find little common ground from which to offer proposals. Nonetheless,  
opening a  regional meeting by singing not  only the national anthem, but  also that of  the PSUV, as  
occurred in Maracaibo on June 17 th, belied the rhetorical ideal of a plural and broadly inclusive popular  
consultative process.
423
The process was also limited in the degree that it represented Bolivarian civil society. While the 
strategy devised by the Commission on the Law of Community Media sought broad participation from  
social movements and organizations, the reality was that the vast majority of participants in the regional  
conferences were community media practitioners. The collected proposals, therefore, reflected the desires  
of  the  Bolivarian  alternative  and  community  media  movement,  not  those  of  community  councils,  
associations of workers, or other civil society entities. This is not to say that the process was not open to  
representatives  from  such  organizations,  and  their  lack  of  participation  is  partly  a  reflection  of  the  
ongoing  difficulty  of  engaging  Bolivarian  civil  society  in  relation  to  the  issue  of  participatory  
communications, which is neither widely understood nor prioritized. Nonetheless, the rapid pace of the  
consultation process and its dependence on existent communication networks within the alternative and  
community media sector also played a significant role in limiting participation.
Arguably, greater participation by individuals representing organizations outside the community  
media sector may have yielded few significant proposals, as they would have been unfamiliar with the  
theoretical and practical context of the issues at hand. Ostensibly, however, the process of collecting  
signatures in support  of the proposed bill  presented an additional opportunity for generating broader  
public debate on these issues. In actuality, though, signatures were solicited prior to the preparation of the  
draft bill, meaning that signatories were unable to review the specifics of the proposal. In other words,  
they were at best registering their support for participatory media but not the substantive content of the  
proposal itself. When signatures were solicited in public spaces, such as when Catia TVe set up a table in  
the Plaza Bolivar in downtown Caracas, the willingness of passersby seemed to have more to do with  
their affinity for the Bolivarian revolution in general than with any particular concern for or even curiosity  
regarding community media.
Given these limitations, the labor and resources invested in the “people as legislator” process do  
not seem to have effected a broad public debate. As a result, the draft bill that was ultimately produced  
reflected almost entirely the concerns of the alternative and community media movement itself, and many  
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of  those  concerns  had  been  established  prior  to  the  process,  whether  through  national  associations,  
regional  meetings,  or the 2009 national  congress.  Nonetheless,  the process  did allow for  the further  
refinement of specific proposals, as we will discuss in detail below. Speaking at the July 20 th ceremony in 
which the draft bill was officially presented before the Permanent Commission of Popular Power and  
Communication  Media,  Eekhout  stated  that  “almost  3,000”  individuals  representing  321  community  
media outlets had participated in the regional meetings and that an additional eight proposals, received  
from groups including ANMCLA and the National Movement of Community Television Stations, had  
been incorporated into the proposed text. Shaping the mass of collected proposals into the text of the draft  
bill, however, required that a “systematization team” ( equipo de sistematización) reduce them to a set of 
discrete articles.
Upon presenting the draft bill at the July 20 th ceremony, Rosiris Berroteran, a producer for Tatuy  
TV (Merida), claimed that the systematization team had been composed of representatives from each of  
the 23 Venezuelan states.  Nonetheless,  Miguel Hernández, a  “promoter” ( promotor)  in  the Office of 
Alternative  and  Community  Media  (Dirección  de  Medios  Alternativos  y  Comunitarios)  of  the 
municipality of San Francisco (Zulia), reported that the systematization was carried out by members of  
the Commission on the Law of  Community Media that had been selected in  March. Originally  this  
commission included 12 representatives from the alternative and community media movement, but only  
five  were  able  to  be  in  Caracas to  participate  in  the  systematization.  In  addition  to  Hernández  and  
Berroteran, they were Fermín Sandoval, of Radio Petare, Meylin Chung, formerly of Catia TVe and at the  
time employed by ViVe, and Miguel Ugas (Miguel Hernández 2011). Chung conceived the CPC while at  
Catia TVe and then been hired at ViVe to oversee its promotion (Almao 2011) and we have seen that Ugas  
had been largely responsible for theorizing and publicizing the Communication Mission. In addition to  
these representatives, the systematization team included three technicians from the National Assembly,  
two members  of  Eekhout's  staff,  and  one  representative  from both  MINCI and  CONATEL (Miguel  
Hernández). Decisions made during this process necessarily created an additional filter and may have  
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reflected the predilections of the team members.
Of course, once the draft bill was submitted to the Assembly, control over the text was entirely  
out  of  the  hands  of  the  movement.  In  recognition  of  this,  upon  concluding  her  presentation  to  the  
Commission of Popular Power and Communication Media,  Berroteran asked “that it  be respected as  
much as possible.”604 As we will see, however, the legislators ultimately introduced considerable changes.
As noted above,  representatives from the alternative and community media movement met with  
those from the Office of the President in April of 2009 to formulate a strategy for passing a “Fundamental  
Law of the National Public System of Socialist Alternative and Community Popular Communication”.  
The document they created outlined eight themes to be addressed by the new law: 1) Conceptual Aspects  
2) Sustainability and Stability of Financing 3) Entity of Articulation [with Bolivarian Civil Society] 4)  
Authorization, Transmission, and Radio Spectrum 5) Infrastructure, Services, and Transport 6) Socio-
Political Training 7) Social Security 8) Reception of Graduates [from Mission Sucre and the Bolivarian  
University of Venezuela] and Platform (Regional – Local) of National System of Public Media (Informe  
sobre 3er encuentro...).605 For the National Congress held in July, these were condensed to four areas that  
served as the basis for proposals created by separate “working groups” ( mesas): 1) Conceptual Aspects 
from the New Socialist Ethics 2) Training from Popular Power for the Creation of Communicational  
Policies  3)  Sustainability  in  the  Socialist  Productive  Model  4)  Participatory  and  Active  Democracy  
(Conclusiones y propuesta finales 2009). 606 Participants in the regional meetings of the 2011 “people as  
legislator”  consultative  process  were  also  divided  into  four  “thematic  axes”  ( ejes  temáticos):  1) 
Diagnostic and Principals: Socialist Ethic of Communication 2) Participatory Democracy: Popular Power  
604“que se respete lo más posible”
6051) Aspectos Conceptuales 2) Sustainability and Stability of Financing 3) Órgano de Articulación [con la  
Sociedad Civil Bolivariana] 4) Habilitación, Transmisión y Espectro Radioeléctrico 5) Infraestructura, 
Servicios y Transporte 6) Formación Socio Política 7) Seguridad Social 8) Recepción de Egresados [de la 
Misión Sucre y la Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela] y Plataforma (Regional – Local) de Sistema Nacional 
de Medios Públicos
6061) Aspectos Conceptuales desde la Nueva Ética Socialista 2) Formación desde el Poder Popular para la 
Creación de Políticas Comunicacionales 3) Sustentabilidad en el Modelo Productivo Socialista 4) Democracia 
Participativa y Protagónica
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for Communicating 3) Training in Alternative and Community Communication 4) Sustainability (Plan de  
Discusión del Anteproyecto... 2011).607
Taken  together,  these  themes  express  the  breadth  of  topics  considered  fundamental  to  the  
restructuration of  the legal framework for  Bolivarian community media and provide a sense of their  
relative weight within the multi-phase consultative process. As a thorough review of each of these themes  
is beyond the scope of our analysis, this shorthand must suffice for a general understanding of the many  
issues at play. Here we will  focus on two key areas: organizational structure and sustainability.  This  
choice stems from our discussion of the difficulties faced by the sector under the 2001 regulations, as well  
as the necessity and difficulty of integrating with the new geometry of power.
By examining proposals for a reformulation of the sector's organizational model we can gain  
insight into the developing logic of participatory civil society governance within the communal structure.  
As we saw, a general lack of resources has been a major obstacle not only to the development of this  
governance structure, but to the autonomous consolidation and expansion of the sector more generally.  
Jointly  reviewing  proposals  for  financial  sustainability  and  civil  society  integration  will  help  us  to  
understand the vital relationship between funding and autonomy within “socialism for the 21 st century”, 
which we have understood as a transition toward a Gramscian civil state.
In terms of sustainability, the report produced by the April 2009 meeting hosted by the  
Office of the President called for the creation of:
a  financing  fund  for  [community  media  outlets]  and  popular  communication,  with  
contributions from the Fund of the RESORTE Law, [the Fundamental Law of Science,  
Technology,  and  Innovation  (Ley  Orgánica  de  Ciencia,  Tecnología  e  Innovación  / 
LOCTI)], resources from the national budget and publicity line items from public entities.”  
(Informe Sobre 3er Encuentro...)608
6071) Diagnóstico y Principios: Ética Socialista de la Comunicación 2) Democracia Participativa: Poder Popular 
para Comunicar 3) Formación y Capacitación en Comunicación Comunitaria y Alternativa 4) Sustentabilidad
608Both the RESORTE Law and the LOCTI included provisions requiring businesses of a certain size and within 
certain sectors to contribute to funds earmarked for public initiatives.; “un fondo de financiamiento para los  
[medios comunitarios] y la comunicación popular, con aportes del Fondo de Ley RESORTE, [Ley Orgánica de 
Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación (LOCTI)], recursos del presupuesto nacional y partidas de publicidad de los 
entes públicos.”
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Once established, “permanent and constant mechanisms for the distribution of resources” from this fund  
would finance “annual socialist operating projects, that include payroll, equipment, new revenues and  
development,  duly  endorsed  by  Communal  Councils  or  other  instruments  of  social  control.” 609 
Assumedly,  the  intent  was  to  replace  the  burden of  constantly  applying  for  project  funding  from a  
multiplicity of public institutions with a single annual application to a unitary source. Additionally, the  
report called for “[p]romoting the elimination of publicity spots as a mechanism of commercialization of  
communication that reproduces [the] capitalist model.” 610 Additional elements related to sustainability  
included no cost provision of public services, including electricity, telephone, and Internet, for community  
media outlets, promotion of “a financing system for the acquisition or provision of vehicles”, and the  
inclusion of community media practitioners in the public social security system, which includes medical  
insurance, basic food subsidies, and access to the pension system. 611
The report was much more vague regarding a new organizational model for the sector. It called  
for:
[p]romoting the creation of a linking instance or council, as an organic structure expressing  
the popular power for the participation, integration, and articulation of community media  
outlets,  communication committees  [in  the Communal Councils]  and user  committees,  
students and graduates in the area. This being, [sic] a mechanism of deep organization,  
self-regulation,  planning,  and  administration,  that  takes  into  account  plans  for  
technological development and serves as a social platform of community media outlets  
with socialist principles.612
This  was  basically  a  re-articulation  of  the  impulse  expressed  in  general  terms  in  relation  to  the  
Communication Mission and SPNCPAC, and more specifically in the model of the CPC.
609“mecanismos permanentes y constantes para la distribución de recursos”; “proyectos operativos anuales 
socialistas (POAS), que contemplan nómina, equipos, nuevos ingresos y desarrollo, debidamente avalados por 
Consejos Comunales u otros instrumentos de control social”
610“[i]mpular la eliminación de las pautas publicitarias como mecanismo de mercantilización de la comunicación 
que reproduce [el] modelo capitalista”
611“un sistema de financiamiento para adquisición o dotación de vehiculos”
612“[p]romover la creación de una instancia vinculante o consejo, como estructura orgánica y de expresión del 
poder popular para la participación, integración y articulación de los medios comunitarios, comités de 
comunicación y usuarios, estudiantes y egresados en el área. Siendo este, [sic] un mecanismo de organización, 
autoregulación, planificación y administración del fondo, que contemple planes para el desarrollo tecnológico y 
sirve de plataforma social de los MAC con principios socialistas.”
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These proposals provided the basis from which community media practitioners proceeded during  
the National Congress in July of 2009. As noted above, participants of the Congress were divided into  
various working groups, each of which was tasked with agreeing on proposals for a different aspect of the  
proposed law. Nonetheless, there was some overlap between the working groups. Group Three, tasked  
with formulating proposals related to “Sustainability in the Socialist Productive Model” followed the  
rubric laid out in the April report by calling for the “National Executive” to create a “Permanent Support  
and Financing Fund for  the direct distribution of resources  to [community media outlets], to guarantee  
their normal functioning, by the assignation of annual  operating resources” that would be “under the  
responsibility of an articulating council designated by the [alternative and community media outlets]  and 
supervised by the Social Oversight of the [community media sector]” (my emphasis). 613 Group Three's 
proposal also follows the April report in calling for the fund to be drawn from the funds established by the  
RESORTE Law, the LOCTI, and the national budget, but it specified that the fund should also receive “45  
percent of the line items for publicity, of public entities and assignations of the National Executive”. 614
Meanwhile, whereas the April proposal implied that the national fund would end the sector's  
dependence on short term projects funded by multiple institutions, Group Three specified that the sector's  
financing “should come from projects”.615 Also, whereas the April report called for the elimination of  
publicity campaigns as a form of financing community media, Group Three proposed that the sector “will  
be able to make publicity in accordance with the [RESORTE Law] and the regulations”. 616 Finally, Group 
Three  mentioned  the  potential  for  “the  participation  of  members  of  the  communal  councils  in  the  
sustainability” of the sector and further suggested the possibility that the community councils would  
613All quotations related to the proposals formulated at the National Congress are taken from “Conclusiones y 
Propuestas finales” (2009).; “Ejecutivo Nacional”; “Fondo de Financiamiento y Sustentación Permanente para 
la distribución directa de recursos a los [medios alternativos y comunitarios], para garantizar su normal  
funcionamiento, mediante la asignación de recursos operativos anuales”; “a cargo de un consejo articulador 
por los [medios alternativos y comunitarios] y superviado por la Contraloría Social del [sector de medios 
comunitarios]”
614“el 45 por ciento de las partidas de publicidad, de los entes publicos [sic] y asignaciones del Ejecutivo Nacioanl  
[sic].”
615“debe ser contra proyectos”
616“podrán hacer publicidad de acuerdo a lo esablecido en la Ley [RESORTE] y el reglamento”
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facilitate “reimbursable credits”.617
This set of proposals suggest that the alternative and community media movement was indeed  
focused  on  a  national  fund  as  the  primary  source  of  financing,  but  it  nonetheless  held  tight  to  the  
flexibility  provided  by  projects  and  publicity,  both  familiar  sources  of  revenue.  More  significant,  
however, is the extremely limited degree to which sustainability was envisioned as integral to the new  
geometry of power of the communal system and other forms of Bolivarian civil society. The fund would  
be centralized at the national level and its resources distributed directly to individual community media  
outlets,  with decisions taken by a  council  composed entirely of  representatives from the community  
media sector.  In  this formulation no other elements  of  Bolivarian civil  society  would play a role  in  
decision-making  or  social  oversight,  although  such  possibilities  certainly  existed.  For  example,  
representatives from other sectors of civil society might sit on the council overseeing the national fund.  
Alternatively, the fund might be distributed through the communal system, so that funding decisions  
would  ultimately  be  made at  regional  and  local  levels  by  elected  spokespeople  responsible  to  their  
community assemblies. Rather than integrating the fund with the communal system, however, Group  
Three included only vague language that positioned communal councils as peripheral sources of funding.
Although Group Two was tasked with formulating proposals related to “Training from Popular  
Power for the Creation of Communicational Policies”, its suggestions bear on the issue of sustainability.  
It called for requiring every community media outlet to create a “Committee of Technical and Socio-
Political  Training”  composed  of  at  least  three  members,  a  “General  Coordinator”,  a  “Finance  
Coordinator”,  and  a  “Training  Spokesperson”.618 These  committees  would  then  be  able  to  apply  for  
project  funding  to  a  national  “Permanent  Fund for  the  Committees  of  Technical  and  Socio-Political  
Training, whose resources will be accounted for in the Annual Budget Law of the Nation” and which  
would be administered by “the Interdisciplinary Commission of Alternative and Community Media”. 619 
617“la participación de los miembros de los consejos comunales en la sustentabilidad”; “creditos retornables”
618“Comité de Formación Técnica y Socio-Política”; “Coordinador(a) General”; “Coordinador(a) de Finanzas”; 
“Vocer(o/a) de Finanzas”
619“Fondo Permanente para los Comités de Formación Técnica y Socio-Política, cuyos recursos estarán 
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Significantly, this commission would be tasked with “guaranteeing the equitable distribution of said fund  
in the diverse areas: training, equipment, [and] projects”, which suggest that Group Two envisioned this  
fund as the primary funding source for community media in general, not only in relation to training. 620 
The  Interdisciplinary  Commission  would  be  composed  of  seven  members,  although  two  contrasting  
methods for their election appeared in the proposal. One called for them to be “elected in an assembly of  
the alternative media, by distinct geographic axes”, whereas a different section called for them to be  
“elected in a National Assembly of Alternative and Community Media, which must be attended by a  
delegate from each media outlet”.621 In either case, however, control over the national fund was placed  
entirely  under  the  community  media  sector,  with  the  implication  that  the  sector  would  be  formally  
organized into a federated structure holding regular decision-making assemblies.
Group  Four,  which  was  asked  to  develop  proposals  related  to  the  theme  of  “Active  and  
Participatory Democracy”, called for the creation of CPCs. Its vision of the CPC, however, was distinct  
from the model that was soon to be actualized by MINCI and ViVe. In the model proposed by Group  
Four, the CPC would operate at the municipal level and be comprised of all of the “parish councils”  
(consejos parroquiales) operating within its municipality. These parish councils would include:
a)  the  communications  spokespersons  of  the  communal  councils  of  the  parish  b)  
representatives  from [the  alternative  and  community  media  outlets]  c)  communication  
students of the parish d) representatives from the users committees e) and representatives  
from all the social organizations that are linked with [the community media sector] and  
that operate within the parish space.622
contemplados en la Ley de Presupuesto Anual de la Nación”; “la Comisión Interdisciplinaria de Medios 
Alternativos y Comunitarios”
620“garantizando la equitativa distribución de dicho fondo en las diversas áreas: formación, equipos, proyectos”
621Though not directly pertinent to our discussion of sustainability, it is worth noting that Group Two specified that 
eligibility for election to both the Training Committees and the Interdisciplinary Committee would require at 
least one year of active membership in the community media outlet as well as “having a politico-ideological 
profile coherent with the revolutionary socialist vocation of the alternative and community media movement”. 
How such a determination would be legally evaluated was, of course, not specified.; “[t]ener un perfil politico-
ideológico coherente con la vocación revoucionaria socialista del movimiento de medios alternativos y 
comunitarios.”; “electos en asamblea de los medios alternativos, por los distintos ejes geográficos”; “electos en 
Asamblea Nacional de Medios Alternativos y Comunitarios, a la cual deberá asistir un delegado por cada 
medio”
622“a) los voceros y voceras de comunicación de los consejos comunales de la parroquia b) los representantes de 
los [medios alternativos y comunitarios] c) los estudiantes de comunicación social de la parroquia d) los 
representantes de los comités de usuarios e) y representantes de todas las organizaciones sociales que estén 
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The  tasks  of  the  parish  councils  were  defined  to  include  “[p]romoting  and  supporting  the  creation,  
organization, and functioning” of alternative and community media outlets, “[e]stablishing [their] norms  
of self-regulation”, “[p]lanning and distributing external or internal resources [sic]”, and “[e]stablishing  
[their] policies of participation, interaction, and articulation”. 623 Finally, each parish council was to form a  
“parish committee” (comité parroquial)  with an unspecified number of representatives from both the  
community media sector and Bolivarian civil society whose responsibility would be to administer funds  
according to the decisions made by the council.
While the proposals from Group Four clearly embrace integration with the communal system,  
they make use of “fourth republican” parishes and municipalities to determine geographical boundaries,  
instead of keeping to the communal council and commune framework. Assumedly, this was because very  
few communes had actually been created as of 2009 and the familiar geopolitical zoning structure was  
deemed more trustworthy, at least in the short term. Meanwhile, the role of the municipal-level CPC is  
left undefined, although it would ostensibly serve as a mechanism for coordinating policy amongst the  
parish councils and perhaps carrying out municipal-level projects. Most significantly, we should note that  
the  assignment  of  decision-making  authority  over  funding  to  the  parish  councils  places  this  set  of  
proposals at odds with the design of the national funds proposed by Groups Two and Three, making some  
sort of reconciliation necessary.
In relation to our areas of focus, the proposals created during the 2009 National Congress can be  
summarized  as  follows.  Regarding  sustainability,  the  alternative  and  community  media  movement  
indicated a clear preference for the establishment of a national fund as a primary funding mechanism.  
This fund would be administered by the Bolivarian community media sector and financed by taxes on the  
private sector (via the funds already established by the RESORTE Law and the LOCTI), the publicity  
budgets of state institutions, and a direct contribution from the annual public budget. Additional sources  
vinculadas con los MACs y que hagan vida dentro del espacio parroquial”
623“[p]romover y apoyar la creación, organización y funcionamiento”; “[e]stablecer [sus] normas de 
autoregulación”; “[p]lanificar y distribuir los recursos externos o internos [sic]”; “[e]stablecer [sus] políticas  
de participación, interacción y articulación”
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of revenue, including projects, publicity, and contributions from communal councils, were acknowledged  
but  not  prioritized.  Regarding  organizational  structure,  the  movement  suggested  the  creation  of  a  
federated system of participatory civil governance that would draw on but exist parallel to the communal  
system,  thus  allowing  a  wider  range  of  Bolivarian  civil  society  to  participate  more  directly  in  the  
governance of the popular media system. Significantly, however, there was no direct mention of how  
community producers would fit into this framework. 
Following the Congress, the Office of Alternative and Community Media of San Francisco led an  
effort to consolidate the proposals of the various groups into a single document. This led to a working  
paper that evolved through three drafts but remained nonetheless an unfinished product. As such, it offers  
little additional insight into the vision of the alternative and community media movement in relation to  
our current focus areas. In the section on sustainability, however, the addition of the following language,  
which was not in the group proposals generated during the Congress, is worth noting: “Governmental  
institutions should be obligated in the new Law to advertise in the alternative and community media and  
should be prohibited from advertising in commercial media.” 624 Thus, whereas the report generated by the 
April  2009  meeting  with  the  Office  of  the  President  called  for  eliminating  publicity  entirely,  the  
movement opted to maintain the possibility of commercial  advertising and proposed to convert  state  
publicity budgets into a guaranteed subsidy.
The proposals generated at the 2009 National Congress, in conjunction with those formulated at  
regional meetings, were incorporated into the document that served a basis for the discussions that took  
place during the 2011 “people as legislator” process (Miguel Hernández 2011). This document, entitled  
“Draft Bill of the Law of Alternative, Community Media and of Popular Communication” ( Anteproyecto  
de Ley de Medios Comunitarios, Alternativos, y de la Comunicación Popular  / LMCACP), was printed 
by the National Assembly in June and distributed at the 12 regional meetings. It was then revised by the  
624“Las Instituciones gubernamentales deben estar obligadas en la nueva Ley a pautar en los medios alternativos y  
comunitarios y deben tener prohibido pautar en medios comerciales.”
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systematization team based on the proposals collected during the process and submitted to the Assembly's  
Commission on Popular Power and Media in August as “Draft Bill of the Law of Communication for  
Popular Power” (Anteproyecto de Ley de Comunicación para el Poder Popular  /  LCPP). That document 
was then lightly revised, retitled as the “Law of Popular Communication”, and submitted to the full  
Assembly. The Venezuelan legislative process requires that a bill be subject to two separate discussions.  
The first of these serves to introduce the bill and allows for general remarks. Most bills easily pass the  
first discussion. The second discussion is where strenuous debate occurs, with amended articles being  
subjected to votes. The Law of Popular Communication was approved in a first discussion in November  
and submitted for a second discussion in December. Significant changes were made to the bill's text in the  
interim. We will continue to focus on the issues of sustainability and organizational structure as we follow  
the evolution of the drafts throughout the above process.
In line with the proposals of the 2009 National Congress, the draft bill that accompanied the  
regional discussions of the “people as legislator” process prioritized the creation of a national fund. This  
fund was to be assigned to the office of the Vice President, provided with an annual budget the sources of  
which were not  specified,  and administered by an “ad hoc Technical Commission” comprised of “a  
spokesperson for each communicational expression: Radio, Print, Television Stations, Murals, Internet,  
Telematics and a representative of the State, who will preside over said Commission.” The community  
media sector would thus continue to control the fund, although its members would represent distinct  
media, not the geographic areas suggested in the National Congress proposals. Also, for the first time a  
representative of the state would be included in the administrative body.
The June draft bill also called for all state entities to direct 50 percent of their publicity budgets  
“to  be  distributed  with  criteria  of  proportionality,  equity,  justice,  and  transparency,  via  institutional  
publicity spots, between all Alternative and Community Communication Media Outlets, legally and duly  
established in the national territory.” Whereas the 2009 National Congress proposal had called for 45  
percent of publicity budgets  to be directed to  the national fund, here the amount was increased and  
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directed to the community media sector as an additional source of revenue, above and beyond the national  
fund. Meanwhile, the June draft bill followed the Congress proposal in explicitly authorizing commercial  
publicity  in  accordance  with  the  regulations  established  by  the  RESORTE  Law,  though  it  included  
language an article which attempted to mitigate the range of that publicity. Much of the language in that  
article, however, was legally untenable. For example, “[p]articular attention will be placed on the content  
of publicity that shows modes of life contrary to the values that are promoted and defended, such as:  
consumerism...”.
A separate article listed additional sources of potential revenue, including the provision of various  
services. Significantly, although this article mentioned the “collection of donations from the community”,  
the June draft bill included no language linking the sustainability of community media to the commune  
system. In fact, it hardly mentioned the commune system, even in an article entitled “Organization and  
Participation” that specified the creation of CPCs “in every Commune in construction and in each social  
movement, as a basic instance of organization for the active participation of the people, in the cultivation,  
diffusion, and practice of Popular Communication.” The article did not specify the role of a CPC nor who  
was to participate within it. In fact, in calling for the creation of CPCs “in each social movement”, it  
displayed a misunderstanding of the structure of the CPC, which should draw representatives from social  
movements,  not be embedded within them.  Moreover,  the reference to communes “in construction”  
signals that the authors of the draft were focused on the contemporary state of the commune system, not  
the structure envisioned by the new geometry of power.
At the time of the regional discussions in 2011, the alternative and community media movement  
had been seeking to integrate with the communal council system for five years. The sparsity of the vision  
it  had  so  far  developed  can  not  be  ignored;  it  appears  to  testify  to  the  difficulty  of  understanding  
community media in terms of organization, as an articulating element of an inclusive and hegemonic civil  
society, as opposed to in terms of content, as a mechanism for producing counter-hegemonic messages. It  
remained easier, in other words, to specify what kind of advertising content should be avoided than to  
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describe mechanisms for  establishing a participatory system of decision-making. A certain degree of  
mistrust was also involved in the lack of emphasis on civil society governance. For example, a significant  
number of participants in the regional discussions believed that the sustainability of community media  
outlets should depend primarily on the communal councils and communes, as opposed to a national fund  
or  institutional  publicity.  They  thus  proposed  that  the  law  should  require  community  councils  and  
communes to direct a small percentage of the budget of all approved projects to a local fund for popular  
communication that would be accessible by community media outlets and community producers. Part of  
the rationale for this proposal was that community media would play a role in the promotion and social  
oversight of  these projects,  and was thus entitled to a  percentage of their  budget.  Supporters of this  
proposal also pointed out that it produced a greater degree of local control over decision-making relative  
to a national fund, although supporters of the national fund countered that it could be structured so that  
block grants were distributed through the communal system and decisions regarding individual projects  
would be made at the local level. The most common objection to requiring funding via the communal  
councils, however, was that the system was not yet fully operational and would thus be insufficient to the  
consolidation and growth of community media. Given this context, most participants preferred the option  
of  a  national  fund  that  would  depend  on  the  executive  branch  and  provide  greater  resources  more  
immediately.
Indeed, the revised draft bill that was presented to the National Assembly in August maintained  
the national fund as the primary source of revenue for the community media sector. Whereas the June  
draft specified that the fund would be administered by six representatives from the sector and one from  
the state, the August draft called for:
a board of evaluation of projects presided by a representative from the Executive Vice  
Presidency  of  the  Republic,  a  representative  from the  Ministry  of  Popular  Power  for  
Planning  and  Finance,  a  representative  of  the  Ministry  of  Popular  Power  for  
Communication and Information, [and] four spokespersons of the Communication Media  
of Popular Power.625
625“una junta de evaluación de proyectos presidida por un representante de la Vicepresidencia Ejecutiva de la 
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Obviously, this composition invested much more control in the state, though the community media sector  
retained the majority presence. The the 2009 National Congress proposals had made clear the alternative  
and community media movement's preference for total control. The 2011 regional meeting in Caracas,  
meanwhile, proposed that the fund be controlled by an autonomous institution with representation from  
the community media sector and other social movements. The introduction of  representatives from state  
institutions  therefore  appears  to  have  been  imposed by  the  systematization  team,  perhaps  under  the  
guidance of the legislative staff and/or the representatives from MINCI and CONATEL. Hernández, who  
served on the team, explained that they had viewed this as a compromise. They recognized that MINCI,  
as the institution that housed the DGMAC and supported the community media sector, deserved to be  
represented in the administration of the fund, but only as one voice among many, “because they have  
always chosen [to provide funding for] whoever they wanted.” The representatives from the alternative  
and community media movement were confident, in other words, that they had established a framework  
within which the sector itself would maintain control over funding.
Although  the  administration  of  the  fund  had  been  opened  to  representatives  from  state  
institutions,  it  had  no  representatives  from civil  society  organizations  beyond  the  community  media  
sector, although this had been proposed at the regional meeting in Caracas. When asked specifically why  
the communal system was not represented, Hernández explained that “they can't be there.... They are  
going to be included inside [the media outlets], as a controller … for the programs … [and the] content....  
They will have voice and vote when they organize themselves in the media outlet that is close to their  
house.”626 Bolivarian  civil  society,  in  other  words,  would  only  be  represented  at  the  local  level  of  
decision-making. He went on to express a concern that if  representatives from the commune system  
played a role in the administration of the fund, they might choose to divert the financing to other types of  
Republica, un representante del Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Planificación y Finanzas, un 
representante del Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación e Información, [y] cuatro voceros de los 
Medios de Comunicación del Poder Popular.”
626“ellos no pueden estar allí.... Se van a incluir dentro, como controlor … para los programas … [y el]  
contenido.... Ellos van a tener voz y voto cuando ellos se organizen en el medio que queda cerca a su casa.”
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projects. He also expressed an additional worry that members of the opposition could participate in the  
communes and thus influence the allocation of the resources. These fears seem quite unfounded: it would  
be simple enough to mandate that the fund be used solely for community media no matter who controlled  
its  allocation,  while  a  democratic  selection  process  within  the  communal  system  would  ensure  the  
selection of Bolivarian representatives, so long as the majority of electors insisted upon that ideology.  
Hernández's concerns were perhaps less indicative of actual obstacles than a lack of vision regarding the  
integration of the community media sector with Bolivarian civil society and a persistent mistrust of a  
communal  system that  had  yet  to  become deeply  rooted  in  Venezuelan  society.  In  this  context,  the  
alternative  and  community  media  movement  remained  convinced  that  only  its  members  sufficiently  
understood  its  needs.  While  this  perspective  may  have  been  accurate  in  the  short  term,  it  led  the  
movement to propose a law which ceded greater decision-making authority to the state apparatus than it  
did to other elements of Bolivarian civil society. 
Unlike the June draft bill, which had called for the national fund to draw on funds established in  
the RESORTE Law and the LOCTI, the August draft bill required that publicity and telecommunications  
companies contribute two percent of their profits to the fund. The draft bill also called for the fund to  
receive annual contributions from the profits of the public banking system and state enterprises, though it  
did not specify the amount. Additionally, it specifically authorized donations to the fund from any natural  
or legal person.
As noted above, the June draft bill had called for 50 percent of state publicity budgets to go  
toward community media outlets. This was consistently supported by participants at the regional meetings  
who were outraged that the state would contribute such a significant amount of money to a commercial  
media system that sought to undermine it. Nonetheless, the August draft bill removed the 50 percent  
specification, leaving a weak article which stated that community media outlets “will be able to receive  
… a percentage of resources earmarked for publicity” within the budgets of state institutions. 627 Given the 
627“podrán recibir … un porcentaje de los recursos destinados para publicidad”
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movement's widespread support for mandating a 50 percent contribution, its removal in the august draft  
seems likely to have been suggested by state representatives who recognized it as untenable.
One  of  the  more  intense  vectors  of  debate  during  the  regional  meetings  of  the  “people  as  
legislator” process was over commercial advertising. Many members of the movement felt that it had no  
place in a popular communication system, whereas others felt that it remained a necessary evil, at least  
until other sources of funding proved consistently reliable. Like the June draft bill,  the August draft  
specifically permitted commercial advertising, though it required that no more than 40 percent of that  
advertising pertain to persons or businesses outside of a media outlet's service area. This was probably a  
compromise solution, as it advanced the limitation of the 2001 regulations, which had set the maximum at  
50 percent. The August draft also dropped the language of the June draft that had attempted to mitigate  
the type of advertising permitted,  perhaps because much of it  was recognized as untenable, but also  
perhaps because it belonged more properly in the regulations that would follow the law. The August draft  
also  followed  the  June  draft  in  specifically  recognizing  additional  sources  of  revenue,  including  
“[d]onations [from] and agreements with public and private institutions”. 628
The June draft bill had included the CPC as an organizational model designed to integrate the  
community media sector with Bolivarian civil society more generally, but it was dropped from the August  
draft. This decision was perhaps influenced by the presence of a representative from MINCI, which in  
2011 did not support the CPC model. In any case, two new articles pointed to the communal council  
system as the primary mechanism of integration. One specified that:
[d]irect members of a popular communication media outlet, will have to stimulate and  
assist  in  the  formation  and  activation  of  the  Alternative  and  Community  Media  
Committees of the Communal Councils in the territories neighboring its location, as well  
as contribute to the fortification of other organizations of Popular Power. 629
The other declared that “[t]he citizens of the community where the media outlet functions, constituted as  
628“[d]onaciones [de] y convenios con instituciones públicas y privadas”
629“[l]os integrantes directos de un medio de comunicación popular, deberán impulsar y coadyuvar en la 
conformación y activación de los Comités de Medios Comunitarios y Alternativos de los Consejos Comunales en 
los territorios aledaños a su ubicación, así como también contribuir con el fortalecimiento de las demás 
organlzaciones del Poder Popular.”
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an assembly, will exercise social oversight over their communication media, in order to guarantee the  
participation of the community” in their functioning. 630 The language in these articles is barely tenable, as  
it merely suggests integration with the communal council system without specifying viable and legally  
enforceable  mechanisms  by  which  this  should  occur.  It  might  have,  for  example,  required  that  
communication spokespersons from the communal councils have a voting presence within the general  
assemblies  and/or  administrative boards of community media outlets,  or that  each community media  
outlet deliver an annual report of its activities to the communal councils in its service area. The lack of  
such  enforceable  mechanisms  signaled  once  again  the  movement's  difficulty  in  envisioning  and  
articulating a concrete mode of integration with the communal system.
Significantly,  the  August  draft  bill  introduced  language  that  specified  the  coverage  area  for  
community media broadcasters. Whereas the regulations had limited this area to a single municipality, the  
draft bill specified only that “[c]overage will depend on the social and cultural characteristics of the  
determined geographic zone, of the community organizations that promote the media outlet, and of the  
technical characteristics  of the transmission equipment.” 631 This  meant that  there were essentially  no 
limits on the reach of a single broadcaster and implied that the movement endorsed a system in which the  
broadcasters themselves would not be responsible for producing the majority of the content. Although it  
was not explicitly stated, the implication was that the consistent financing provided by the national fund,  
perhaps  in  conjunction  with  a  more  developed  commune  system,  would  finally  enable  community  
producers, such as the ECPAIs, to deliver content on a regular and timely basis.
In brief, the draft bill that had been created via the “people as legislator” process and which was  
presented to the Commission on Popular Power and Media in August of 2011 established a national fund  
as the primary source of financing for the community media sector, mandated a tax on advertising and  
630“[l]os ciudadanos y ciudadanas de la comunidad donde funcione el medio, reunidos en asamblea, ejercerán la 
contraloría social de sus medios de comunicación, a fin de garantizar la participación de la comunidad”
631“[l]a cobertura dependerá de las características sociales y culturales de la zona geográfica determinada, de las 
organizaciones comunitarias que impulsan el medio y de las características técnicas de los equipos de 
transmisión.”
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telecommunications companies as the revenue source for that fund, and included only vague language  
encouraging an integration of the community media sector with the communal system. Although it had  
been retitled as the Law of Popular Power Communication ( Ley de Comunicación del Poder Popular / 
LCPP), the bill was largely unchanged when it was submitted for its first discussion in the National  
Assembly. In relation to our current areas of focus, the only substantial change was to the mechanism by  
which the national fund would be financed. Telecommunications companies would no longer be subjected  
to the two percent tax, leaving only advertising companies as the source of revenue for the fund. The bill  
was approved following its first discussion on November 10 th, with representatives from the PSUV and 
the Communist Party voting in favor, and opposition representatives voting against. 632
By December 16th, when the National Assembly opened the second discussion on the LCPP bill, it  
had been considerably altered by Bolivarian legislators acting without the input of the alternative and  
community media movement. The national fund, now called the Fund for the Development of Popular  
Power Communication (Fondo para el Desarrollo de la Comunicación del Poder Popular), was retained, 
although the corresponding tax on the advertising sector had been altered to one percent of the annual  
gross revenue where that revenue was greater than 20,000 Tributary Units ( Unidades Tributarias).633 
Meanwhile,  references to  other  sources of revenue for  the community sector were removed entirely,  
which is not to say that they were prohibited; assumedly they were meant to be addressed in the law's  
subsidiary regulations. The major changes to the bill, however, resulted from the reintroduction of the  
CPC as the basic unit for the organizational and administrative structure of the entire sector.
The December LCPP bill defined CPCs as “organizational instances of Popular Power, whose  
object is to develop popular communication in its geographic or sectoral area, in correspondence with the  
policies  and  strategies  designed  collectively  and  issued  from  the  National  Council  of  Popular  
632In August, the four opposition members of the Commission on Popular Power and Media had circulated a 
counter-proposal, entitled “Principles and Proposals for the drafting of a Law on public service, non-profit 
community media” which was based on recommendations published by AMARC and thus hewed to the liberal 
model of community media (Pillieri et al. 2011).
633Venezuelan laws specify financial amounts in multiple of Tributary Units, the value of which is adjusted 
periodically to account for inflation.
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Communication.”634 The National Council, meanwhile, was assigned to the Vice Presidency and charged  
with “the coordination and collective and articulated development of policies related to the promotion,  
formation, and financing of the instances and organizations of Popular Power Communication, through  
the   Fund  for  the  Development  of  Popular  Power  Communication.” 635 In  this  system,  therefore, 
administration  at  the  national  level  was  integrated  with  an  organizational  model  that  functioned  at  
subsidiary levels. The result was a vision for a robust structure of participatory communications that  
would be integrated with not only the communal system but also other manifestations of Bolivarian civil  
society. This vision was more comprehensive than any that had been previously proposed and represented  
a considerable advance toward civil society governance of a potentially hegemonic media system. At the  
same time, however, it remained incomplete and proposed a distribution of power at the national level the  
balance of which favored the state over the community media sector.
The National Council was tasked with the following responsibilities:
1) Designing, formulating, and coordinating policies and strategies that consolidate the  
model of Popular Power Communication in correspondence with the Plan of Economic  
and Social Development of the Nation 2) Organizing, directing, and administering the  
Fund for the Development of Popular Power Communication 3) Approving the projects to  
be  financed  with  resources  from  the  Fund  for  the  Development  of  Popular  Power  
Communication, based on an evaluation of their viability and feasibility 4) Designing and  
promoting  training  programs  in  Popular  Power  Communication  5)  Coordinating  and  
supervising the functioning of units of training and production of content 6) Promoting  
citizen  participation  in  Popular  Power  Communication  7)  Articulating  the  distinct  
instances  of  Popular  Power  Communication  8)  Registering  and  conferring  legal  
personality to the diverse actors of Popular Power Communication 9) Signing agreements  
with  organs  and  entities  of  Public  Power,  for  training,  technical  assistance  and  
technological  upgrade  10)  Promoting  the  interchange  and  spread  of  knowledge  and  
technologies  at  the  national  and  international  level,  preferably  with  plans  for  Latin  
American  and  Caribbean  integration  to  strengthen Popular  Power  Communication  11)  
Establishing its internal rules of operation 12) Supervising and controlling the efficient  
use, the administration, and the correct execution of authorized resources 13) Any other  
established in the present law and its regulations 636
634“instancias organizativas del Poder Popular, cuyo objeto es desarrollar la comunicación popular en su ámbito  
geográfico o sectorial, en correspondencia con las políticas y estrategias diseñadas colectivamente y emanadas 
del Consejo Nacional de Comunicación Popular.”
635“la coordinación y el desarrollo colectivo y articulado de políticas relacionadas con la promoción, formación y 
financiamiento de las instancias y organizaciones de la comunicación del Poder Popular, a través del fondo 
para el desarrollo de la comunicación del Poder Popular.”
636 “1) Diseñar, formular y coordinar políticas y estrategias que consoliden el modelo de comunicación del Poder 
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The National Council was to be composed of 15 individual members, eight of which would correspond to  
the state and seven of which to the community media sector. Those corresponding to the state included  
representatives from the Vice Presidency, as well as the ministries responsible for Citizen Participation,  
Communication and Information, Science and Technology, Planning and Finance, Culture, Education, and  
Higher Education. The community media sector, meanwhile, was to select a spokesperson from the CPCs  
within each of seven geographic regions (grouped by state). As the National Council's decision were to be  
decided by a simple majority, this distribution of the 15 members meant that the state representatives  
would be able to overrule those from the community media sector in the event of a split between them.
The CPCs were tasked with the following responsibilities:
1) Formulating plans, programs, projects, and actions of Popular Power Communication in  
their geographic or sectoral area in accordance with the directives of the National Council  
of  Popular  Communication  2)  Promoting  in  their  geographic  or  sectoral  area  active  
participation for the creation of the liberating model of communication 3) Articulating  
Media  Outlets,  Units  of  Training  and  Production  for  Popular  Communication,  and  
Community Producers in their geographic and sectoral area 4) Exercising social oversight  
5) Any other that is attributed to it [sic] in the present law and its regulations. 637
As  for  the  internal  composition  of  the  CPCs,  the  bill  specified  that  they  would  be  composed  of  
spokespeople  serving  two  year  terms,  with  the  procedure  for  their  election  to  be  specified  in  the  
Popular en correspondencia con el Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social de la Nación 2) Organizar, dirigir y 
administrar el fondo para el desarrollo de la comunicación del Poder Popular 3) Aprobar los proyectos a ser 
financiados con recursos del fondo para el desarrollo de la comunicación del Poder Popular, previa evaluación 
de su viabilidad y factibilidad 4) Diseñar y promover los programas de capacitación y formación en 
comunicación del Poder Popular 5) Coordinar y supervisar el funcionamiento de las unidades de formación y 
producción de contenidos 6) Promover la participación ciudadana en la comunicación del Poder Popular 7) 
Articular las distintas instancias de la comunicación del Poder Popular 8) Registrar y otorgar personalidad 
jurídica a los diversos actores y actoras de la comunicación del Poder Popular 9) Celebrar convenios con los 
órganos y entes del Poder Público, para la capacitación, formación, asistencia técnica y actualización 
tecnológica 10) Promover el intercambio y difusión de saberes, conocimientos y tecnologías a nivel nacional e 
internacional, preferiblemente con los esquemas de integración regional en Latinoamérica y el Caribe para 
potenciar la comunicación del Poder Popular 11) Establecer su normativa interna de funcionamiento 12) 
Supervisar y controlar el uso eficiente, la administración y la correcta ejecución de los recursos otorgados 13) 
Cualquier otra establecida en la presente ley y su reglamento”
637“1) Formular planes, programas, proyectos y acciones de la comunicación del Poder Popular en su ámbito 
geográfico o sectorial de acuerdo a las directrices del Consejo Nacional de Comunicación Popular 2) Promover 
en su ámbito geográfico o sectorial la participación protagónica para la creación del modelo de comunicación 
liberadora 3) Articular los Medios de Comunicación, las Unidades de Formación y Producción para la 
Comunicación Popular y las Productoras y Productores Comunitarios en su ámbito geográfico o sectorial 4) 
Ejercer la contraloría social 5) Cualquier otra que se le atribuya en la presente ley y su reglamento.”
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corresponding regulations. Decisions were to be taken by simple majority. Significantly, this conception  
of the CPCs was quite distinct from that promoted by ViVe and (during 2009 and 2010) MINCI. The  
original CPC model focused on geographic areas and allowed for open membership, so that anyone might  
join. The CPC proposed by the LCPP bill, however, could represent either a geographical area or an  
organized  sector  of  society,  whether  a  trade  association  or  a  social  movement  organization,  and  its  
membership would be restricted to elected spokespersons. It became, in other words, a much more formal  
unit of policy making and coordination.
In the absence of the accompanying regulations, it is difficult to understand how the CPCs were  
meant to interact with each other. The bill  specified that they “will be able to constitute systems of  
aggregation  between  themselves,  with  the  purpose  of  articulating  themselves  in  the  development  of  
Popular Communication”, but this does not address important questions. For example, what is the proper  
geographic  zone  of  a  CPC?  Were  they  to  be  constituted  at  the  level  of  the  communal  council,  the  
commune, the municipality, the communal city, and/or the state? If they were to be constituted at multiple  
levels,  then  were  they  to  be  hierarchical,  with  representatives  from  lower  level  CPCs  forming  the  
membership of higher level CPCs? To what degree would higher level CPCs exercise authority over  
lower level CPCs? How would sectoral CPCs fit into this structure? How would overlapping zones of  
influence be resolved?
The LCPP bill did imply, however, that CPCs would exert a guiding influence over community  
media outlets,  units of training and production, and community producers. Community media outlets  
were retitled as “Popular Power Communication Media” ( Medios de Comunicación del Poder Popular) 
and defined as “providers of popular communication services, and non-profit, under the legal figure of  
communal  direct  social  property  enterprises  that  will  function  in  the  territorial,  national,  state,  or  
communal  area”  that  would  be  governed  by  the  norms  “established  in  the  law  that  regulates  the  
communal  economy.”638 With  this  language,  community  broadcasters  were  freed  from  two  of  the  
638“prestadores de servicios de comunicación popular, y sin fines de lucro, bajo las figuras jurídicas de empresas 
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restrictions established in the 2001 regulation. They were given a new legal personality, rooted no longer  
in the liberal civil code of the fourth republic, but in the communal economy of the new geometry of  
power. As defined by the Fundamental Law of the Communal Economic System, communal direct social  
property  enterprises  are  to  be  created  and  managed  by  communal  councils,  communes,  communal  
federations, or communal confederations. As such, they were no longer limited to covering no more than  
a single municipality, but could now conceivably cover the entire country. 
The  “Units  of  Training  and  Production”  (Unidades  de  Formación  y  Producción /  UFPs),  a 
creation of the December LCPP bill, were defined as “organizations registered to the National Council of  
Popular  Communication,  dedicated  to  the  training  and  support  of  Popular  Power  communication  
producers in their diverse modalities: print, audio, audiovisual, electronic, digital, muralist, or others.”  
The Popular Power communication producers, meanwhile, were defined as “content producers, certified  
by  the  [UFPs].”  The  absence  of  the  accompanying  regulations  also  makes  the  intended  nature  and  
interrelation of these entities less than clear. For example, were the Units of Training and Production  
meant to cover regions, states, or more local areas? What was clear, however, is that the media outlets  
themselves were now formally detached from the content production teams. Unlike under the ECPAI  
model, a television station would now be able to focus entirely on programming and distribution. It might  
still have its own internal production team (ostensibly also requiring certification from a UFP), but the  
UFPs would be responsible for training and supporting production teams formed in association with  
elements of Bolivarian civil society.
Unfortunately, the December LCPP bill did not paint a complete picture. It presented only the  
outline of a Bolivarian system of participatory media. We have seen several of the gaps above; others  
existed in relation to the distribution of the national fund, as it remained unclear which of the various  
entities  would  be  eligible  to  apply  for  funding  and  to  what  degree  funding  decisions  would  be  
de propiedad social directa comunal, que funcionarán en el ámbito territorial, nacional, estadal o comunal”; 
“establecido en la ley que regula la materia de economía comunal.”
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decentralized. For example, were CPCs meant to apply to the National Council for funding alongside  
media outlets, UFPs, and content producers? Or would they be recipients of block grants which they  
would in turn distribute to media outlets, UFPs, and content producers operating in their geographic or  
sectoral  area? Such question are crucial because to the extent that individual funding decisions were  
decentralized,  especially  considering  the  concentration  of  state  power  within  the  national  fund,  the  
Bolivarian participatory communication system would exhibit a greater degree of civil governance.
Nonetheless,  the December LCPP bill  represented a  relatively  mature vision  of  a  potentially  
hegemonic system of participatory media because it provided a stable framework for its integration with  
the communal system. Whereas the August bill contemplated this integration only at the local level, and  
in vague terms, the December bill enabled specific mechanisms of integration at multiple levels. We have  
already seen, for example, that participatory media outlets (the Popular Power communication media)  
could be established and managed at any level of the commune structure. Though less clearly stated, it  
seems that CPCs could also be created at any level of the commune system, although these could also be  
affiliated with Bolivarian civil society outside of that framework. Content production teams seemed to  
have the same flexibility. All of these entities would therefore be embedded within some component of  
Bolivarian civil society (generally, but not always, within the commune system). Assumedly, they would  
draw their  primary  resources  from whichever  civil  society  organization  (e.g.  a  communal  council,  a  
commune, a trade union, or an interest group) had created them.
At the same time, the media outlets, CPCs, and content producers would also be able to apply to  
the national fund for special projects, equipment, or other needs. Via that and other mechanisms, such as  
control over the UFPs, the national council would sit atop a parallel system of policy formation and  
coordination. Meanwhile, the CPCs would be free to organize on their own, thus enabling a third axis of  
policy formation. What the December LCPP bill established, therefore, was a structure of interdependent  
but autonomous systems of civil governance for the production and distribution of participatory media.  
This is not to say that the proposed structure was ideal; we have already reviewed various points of  
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uncertainty and signaled the seeming over-concentration of  state control  within the national  council.  
Nonetheless, the bill's integration of participatory media with the emerging framework of Bolivarian civil  
society provided an innovative and robust vision for a potentially hegemonic system of participatory civil  
society as a functioning component of a Gramscian civil state.
The National Assembly's failure to pass the LCPP means that we do not know how this system  
would have worked in actual practice. The first five articles were approved on December 16 th, but the 
second discussion of the bill was suspended until the following parliamentary session, in 2012 (Queda  
pendiente Ley del Poder Popular 2011, Vidal 2012). The discussion was not resumed, however, and no  
rationale was provided publicly. The alternative and community media movement continued to express  
optimism that  the Assembly  would  take  up  the  bill  again,  holding  a  Forum on the  Bill  of  Popular  
Communication (Foro sobre el Proyecto de Ley de Comunicación Popular ) in Caracas at the end of 
March.
The movement was not entirely in favor of the December LCPP bill, however. In June of 2012 it  
marched through Caracas in attempt to draw support for the sector. Members read a document addressed  
directly to Chávez which, among other points, declared that:
the organized community and alternative media, we have been reflecting on the proposal  
of  a  Popular  Communication  Bill,  that  is  being  revised  and modified  in  the  National  
Assembly.  We  believe  that  this  bill,  though  it  does  contain  undoubtedly  progressive  
aspects, still doesn't transfer control to the Popular Power, the organized people, of which  
the alternative and community media form a part, inasmuch as it foresees the formation of  
a  National  Council  of  Popular  Communication  with  the  State  as  a  majority  in  its  
composition and neither is proposed the redistribution of the radio spectrum to lead us  
toward  the  predominance  of  popular  communication  above  corporate  and  private  
communication, as corresponds to socialism. As such, we are soliciting that it be analyzed  
in the light of the [Proposal of the Candidate of the Fatherland Comandante Hugo Chávez  
for Bolivarian Socialist Adminsitration 2013 – 2019] and that the discussion of this bill be  
democratized much more, since we understand that participatory and active democracy  
must  go  far  beyond  simple  discussion  and  must  guarantee  the  real  influence  of  the  
organized people, and in this case, the real incidence of popular communication media  
involved in the issue, in the final synthesis that is going to be approved. We think that,  
beforehand,  it  must  be  endorsed  and  approved  in  democratic  debate  with  the  social  
subjects of the process.639
639In June of 2011, at the outset of the “people as legislator” process, the alternative and community media 
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Although the LCPP lay dormant throughout 2012, in January 2013 a group called the “National Council  
of Community Media” (Consejo Nacional de Medios Comunitarios) published a proposed revision of the 
LCPP that addressed the state's concentrated power within the national council.
The  2013 counterproposal  called  for  a  Socialist  system of  Popular  Communication  ( Sistema 
Socialista  de Comunicación Popular)  in  which each federal  entity  would create  a  “State Council  of  
Participation  and  Planning  of  Popular  Power  Communication”  ( Consejo  Estadal  de  Participación  y  
Planificación  de  la  Comunicación  del  Poder  Popular)  among  whose  responsibilities  would  be  the 
allocation of financing from the national fund as well as policy formulation within its geographic area.  
Each state council would be represented by two spokespersons within a National Council of Participation  
and Planning of Popular Power Communication” (Consejo Nacional de Participación y Planificación de  
la Comunicación del Poder Popular) among whose responsibilities would be oversight of the funding  
process  as  well  as  national  projects  developed by  the  state  councils.  State  representation  within  the  
movement was largely unified in its adamant demand that the new law divide the radio spectrum into thirds, with 
equal parts being dedicated to the public, private, and community broadcasting sectors. Although this demand 
was reiterated throughout the regional meetings, it was not included in the August draft bill prepared by the 
systematization team. The reasons for this omission were not clear (see Urbina 2012, 51-3). Throughout the 
deliberative process, PSUV representatives sitting on the Commission of Popular Power and Media suggested 
that the demand was not viable from a legal and/or political perspective. (From a legal point of view, any change 
to spectrum allocation would have also required a change to the LOT. Politically, the division of the spectrum 
would have incited ardent protest from the opposition on the pretext of a repression of the freedom of speech.) 
The division of the spectrum was therefore perhaps left out of the LCPP bill due to pressure from Bolivarian 
officials. By August, however, a counter-logic had gained traction within the movement. Many practitioners had 
begun to argue that the division of the spectrum into thirds would actually impose a limitation on the sector, 
since in a truly socialist society 100 percent of the spectrum would be in the hands of the organized people. It 
may have been the case that the revolutionary validity of this argument was employed to justify a decision that 
was entirely or in part motivated by legal and/or political concerns.; “los medios comunitarios y alternativos 
organizados, hemos venido reflexionando en torno a la propuesta de un Proyecto de Ley de Comunicación 
Popular, que está siendo revisando y modificando en la Asamblea Nacional. Opinamos que ese proyecto, si bien 
contiene aspectos indudablemente progresivos, no termina de transferir el control al Poder Popular, al pueblo 
organizado, del cual forman parte los medios comunitarios y alternativos, por cuanto prevé la formación de un 
Consejo Nacional de Comunicación Popular con mayoría del Estado en su composición y tampoco se plantea la 
redistribución del espectro radioeléctrico para encaminarnos hacia el predominio de la comunicación popular 
sobre la comunicación corporativa y privada, como se corresponde con el socialismo. Por lo tanto, estamos 
solicitando que se analice a la luz de la [Propuesta del Candidato de la Patria Comandante Hugo Chávez para 
la Gestión Bolivariana Socialista 2013 – 2019] y que se democratice mucho más la discusión de ese proyecto de 
ley, pues entendemos que la democracia participativa y protagónica debe ir mucho más allá de la simple 
discusión y debe garantizar la incidencia real del pueblo organizado, y en este caso, la incidencia real de los 
medios de comunicación popular involucrados con el tema, en la síntesis final que vaya a ser aprobada. 
Pensamos que, previamente, debe ser refrendanda [sic] y avalada en el debate democrático con los sujetos 
sociales del proceso.”
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national council was thus removed and the power of the council was largely shifted to the state councils.
The  2013  counterproposal  also  altered  the  organizational  structure  of  content  producers  and  
distributors. While it maintained the Units of Training and Production, it assigned oversight of these to  
the  state  councils,  as  opposed  to  the  national  council.  The  counterproposal  removed  the  distinction  
between distributors and content producers, however, conflating these within a single category of “Units  
of Popular Power Communication”, which were defined as “collectives that promote non-profit Popular  
Power communication, as a tool for the construction of Bolivarian Socialism in a defined territorial area  
where  sectors and forms of self-government coexist.” 640 These collectives were further specified as being  
composed of “communicators that come from diverse social and/or sectoral movements.” The ultimate  
authority of these collective was invested in “spokespersons assembly councils” ( consejos asamblearios  
de la  voceras y  los  voceros),  which were to  be “comprised of  two spokespersons from each of the  
organized Sectors, Movements, and Collectives of Popular Power.” How these “sectors, movements, and  
collectives” were to be officially recognized was not specified, nor was it clear if this designation was  
meant to include the organizational entities of the communal system, such as the communal councils and  
communes;  this  ambiguity  represented  a  significant  weakness  of  the  counterproposal.  An  additional  
drawback  of  the  counterproposal  was  that  it  restricted  the  definition  of  units  of  popular  power  
communication  to  geographical  areas,  thus  making it  impossible  for  them to  be  represent  dispersed  
interest groups or social movements.
While  these  points  are  of  significant  theoretical  import,  they  proved moot  in  relation  to  the  
development of the Bolivarian community media sector. Despite the interest of the movement, the LCPP  
never moved further in the legislative process. Conceivably, this may have been related to the especially  
tense political climate of 2012, in which the gravity of Chávez's struggle with cancer became increasingly  
apparent even as he campaigned for and won the October presidential election. The tension turned to  
640“Unidades de Comunicación del Poder Popular”; “colectivos que impulsan la comunicación del Poder Popular 
sin fines de lucro, como herramienta para la construcción del Socialismo Bolivariano en un ámbito territorial  
determinado donde conviven sectores y formas de autogobierno”
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turmoil in 2013, as Chávez proved unable to attend the inauguration of his third term in January and  
passed away in March, leaving Maduro to serve as interim president until he emerged victorious in the  
special  presidential  election held in  April.  Regardless,  the LCPP has not advanced in the year since  
Chávez's  death  and the movement's  silence seems to  indicate  that  it  has  accepted the  failure  of  the  
initiative.
MINCI, meanwhile, gave no indication that it prioritized passage of the law. Rather, following  
Izarra's return for a third term as Minister of Communications and Information, it resumed promotion of  
the national system. In April of 2012, Izarra himself announced the official “launch” of the re-baptized  
“Fabricio Ojeda National System of Alternative and Community Media” ( Sistema Nacional  de Medios  
Alternativos y Comunitarios Fabricio Ojeda).641 Izarra described the system as having three “pillars”: the  
nationwide interconnection of community radio stations across a network maintained by National Radio  
of Venezuela (Radio Nacional de Venezuela), a training program anchored by the “recuperation” of the  
Latin American School of Image and Sound (Escuela Latinoamericana de la Imagen y el Sonido), and a 
“more articulated and constant” accompaniment of the sector on the part of MINCI (Izarra anuncia la  
creación del sistema nacional... 2012, Alguieda 2012). Each of these was state directed and no mention  
was made of integrating the community media sector with the communal system.
Less  than  a  year  later,  in  March  of  2013,  Maduro  appeared  alongside  the  new  Minister  of  
Communication and Information, Ernesto Villegas, to announce the launch of the Bolivarian System of  
Information and Communications (Sistema Bolivariano de Comunicación e Información  / SiBCI), which 
would  “encompass all  state  and community  media  outlets”  in  an  apparent  merger  of  the previously  
established public and community media systems. One journalist reported that:
[i]t is unclear how exactly the new system will work, but Villegas explained that it will be  
conformed  of  three  different  types  of  'communicational  units',  from  the  level  of  
community  media  up  to  those  who  run  the  national  state  media  outlets.  These  
'communicational units' will apparently be in constant contact to carry the news directly to  
641Fabricio Ojeda was a Venezuelan journalist and politician who became a leftist guerrilla fighter and died in 1966 
while in the custody of the Venezuelan armed forces.
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the communities... (Carlson 2013)
Villegas explained that his objective in including community media within the state system was to combat  
“the false information that is spread by private media sources” ( ibid.).  The focus, in other words, was not 
expanding  civil  governance  of  communications  but  extending  the  reach  of  the  state's  propaganda  
apparatus.
SiBCI seems to have had little impact on the Bolivarian community media sector, which appears  
instead to be continuing in its familiar mode of operation. Since the appointment of Delcy Rodriguez as  
Minister of Communications and Information in August of 2013, the alternative and community media  
movement and MINCI's DGMAC have held at least  two national meetings by which they sought to  
formulate  a  “National  Plan  of  Community  and  Alternative  Communication  2014-2019”  (Célula  de  
Comunicación e Información / CDP Táchira 2014, Pearson 2014). At the second  of these meetings, held  
in Caracas in January of 2014, participants were divided into working groups that addressed four themes:  
training,  content  production,  sustainability,  and  the  “responsible  use  of  the  national  radio  spectrum”  
(Célula de Comunicación e Información / CDP Táchira 2014.) 642 The proposals emanating from those 
groups focused on sustainability indicated that the movement's prior emphasis on a national fund had  
shifted to seeking resources through integration with the communal system. As one group of participant  
reporters explained:
advances were made on ideas long elaborated by the popular communication sector in  
Venezuela, where productive projects in alliance with the communes in construction, with  
the communal councils in each of the communities where… areas of development will be  
promoted that strengthen the productive as much as the communicational, in sectors such  
as tourism [and] gastronomy, among others. ( ibid.)643
Whether the communal system has matured sufficiently to make this feasible, or whether other aspects of  
the five year plan will come to pass, only time will tell. What is certain is that the Venezuelan community  
642“uso responsable del espectro radioeléctrico nacional”
643“se avanzó en ideas largamente trabajadas por el sector de la comunicación popular en Venezuela, donde 
proyectos productivos en alianza con las comunas en construcción, con los concejos comunales en cada una de 
las comunidades donde ... se impulsarán áreas de desarrollo que potencien tanto lo productivo como lo 
comunicacional, en sectores tales como turismo [y] gastronomía, entre otros.”
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media sector continues to operate under the outmoded framework established by the 2001 regulations and  
has yet to succeed in transitioning to a third historical phase.
The  Bolivarian  revolution  has  so  far  not  succeeded  in  establishing  a  truly  viable  counter-
hegemonic participatory media system, much less a hegemonic system functioning as a component of a  
Gramscian civil state. This is not to say, of course, that the alternative and community media movement,  
with  considerable  support  from  the  Bolivarian  government,  has  not  accrued  many  successes.  Our  
historical  review has largely  neglected the many powerful  moments  of  empowerment  and collective  
knowledge production that have marked the decades of struggle and motivated the continual sacrifices of  
those working within the sector. These deserve to be celebrated. If we have in this chapter focused instead  
on the difficulties of the second phase and the various attempts to transcend them, it is not to render a  
verdict of failure. Rather, it is because the movement's search for solutions, even if so far unsuccessful,  
provides invaluable lessons for those willing to observe carefully. 
The LCPP bill, for all its ambiguities and despite its worrisome concentration of state power,  
represents the most robust framework for a hegemonic system of participatory media that has so far been  
advanced as part of a national political project. Rather than cast it aside as totalitarian, as opposition  
politicians did, or naively utopian, as even sympathetic observers are bound to do, we should explore its  
logic  and  draw  out  whichever  examples  and  principles  might  be  of  service  to  the  construction  of  
participatory media systems in distinct contexts. We will take up this task in the concluding section of this  
work.
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Conclusion: Toward a Heterarchical Public Sphere Theory as a Basis for the Structuration of a  
Participatory Democratic Media System
In the first chapter of this work we reviewed the history of community media studies since the  
emergence  of  that  subfield  in  the  1970s.  We noted  three  overlapping  but  distinct  discursive  modes:  
participatory  development,  counter-hegemonic  liberation,  and  alternative  discourse  within  a  liberal  
representative democracy. An inability to integrate these three discursive modes has been responsible for  
considerable  confusion  within  the  subfield,  as  evidenced  by  longstanding  debates  over  the  proper  
conceptualization of 'alternative', 'participation', and 'community'. As we have seen, however, since the  
turn of the millennium scholars have signaled a potentially cohering theoretical framework by re-situating  
community media within a broader discussion of civil society. Expanding on this impulse, we noted that  
community media can properly be understood as an articulating mechanism of civil society. We also  
noted that describing the mechanics of this articulation will require a reconceptualization of public sphere  
theory,  especially  as  it  relates  to  community  media.  Here  we  will  attempt  to  further  develop  this  
theoretical framework and then illustrate its potential by drawing on the history of participatory media in  
Latin American socialist states that we reviewed in chapters two through five.
Throughout that history we did not explicitly address the question of the public sphere, but it was  
implicit in our continual discussion of civil society and democratic deliberation. We can illustrate this  
interrelation by returning to Marx's critique of bourgeois civil  society,  which he viewed as merely a  
conveyance for the ideology of the capitalist class. It is easy enough to recognize this view of civil society  
as part of a more general critique of the liberal public sphere and its domination by elites. That larger  
critique recognizes the proletariat's restricted access to not only civil society, but also the formal political  
institutions of the state, such as the parliament. Marx, in other words, viewed civil society as one among  
several components of the public sphere in which political deliberation was restricted to the capitalist  
class.
Marx believed, of course, that the necessary response to this situation is a proletarian revolution  
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that will facilitate the consolidation of a communist society. As discussed in chapter two, Gouldner has  
identified two variants of Marxist thought that differ in their conception of this revolution. Scientific  
Marxism, holding to the determinist logic of historical materialism, has argued that the contradictions of  
the capitalist system must bring about its own implosion. Critical Marxism, meanwhile, has posited that a  
revolutionary  vanguard can  successfully  motivate  a  proletarian revolution  via  the  dissemination of  a  
counter-hegemonic ideology. In either case, however, Marxists tended to envision the state as the primary  
structuring apparatus for subsequent economic production and political deliberation. State control over  
political deliberation was deemed necessary due to Marx's view of civil society as merely “a transmission  
belt for ruling-class values and as mechanisms for the control of the working-class” (Gouldner 346). This  
focus on the negative effects of civil society led Marxists to believe that it, like the capitalist productive  
apparatus, must be subsumed by the socialist state.
Gouldner insists, however, that this over-reliance on the capacity of the state to stand in for civil  
society and thus wholly embody a deliberative public sphere has been Marxism's fatal flaw:
For in emphasizing that socialism required the expropriation of private property, it was led  
to turn the management of that property over to the state. The new state then develops a  
vast managerial bureaucracy to control both the economic and the political spheres. The 
bureaucracy  effectively  becomes  a  new  stand,  i.e.  a  ruling  class  whose  political  and  
personal privileges are united, whose actual power is disguised by an ideology that asserts  
that a bureaucracy is not an 'actual' class, but only a creature of such actual classes, and  
then decorates this new false consciousness with the outrageous myth that the new 'actual'  
ruling class (under socialism) is the humiliated proletariat itself. (307, original emphasis)
Since the state is defined (in the primary paradigm) as the instrument of the ruling class -  
then, when the bourgeoisie is overthrown and replaced by the working class, the latter are  
now  defined  as  the  new  proprietary  class.  The  state  is  then  seen  as  the  proletariat's  
'executive committee,'  as the agency of the majority  class in  society and,  thus,  as not  
needing to  exploit  the majority.  The state  then  presumably  loses  its  partisan  political  
character  and  becomes  a  fully  public  realm  devoid  of  its  own  special  exploitative  
interests....  In  effect,  the  Marxist  theory  of  the  state  and  of  the  ruling  class,  here  
interwoven,  had misled Marxist  politics  by profoundly underestimating the dangers  to  
human emancipation inherent in the state bureaucracy and its capacity to be a new ruling  
class. (345, my emphasis)
The  tendency  toward  this  mistake,  Gouldner  tells  us,  is  more  pronounced  in  relation  to  Scientific  
Marxism, since:
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Scientific Marxism's impulse is to reduce politics to the struggle for power in the state. It  
thus  neglects  the  importance  of  protecting  and  rebuilding  the  dense  infrastructure  of  
communities, institutions, organizations, and groups [i.e. civil society] within which, even  
now, some of its own needs could be supplied through self-help and mutual aid, by which  
its own anxieties can be controlled, and its dependency reduced. (345)
Conversely:
one of the historical functions of Critical Marxism is to develop the morality of socialism,  
or a moral socialism in which the pursuit of human emancipation is not derailed by the  
industrial build-up of the state's power; in which consumerism is not confused with either  
culture or contentment; in which there is an enrichment of social structures and of groups  
autonomous of the state [i.e. civil society], which can enable people to use rather than be  
used by the state and which, being close to everyday life, can enforce a living moral code  
with knowledge and compassion, without a ponderous and plundering bureaucracy. (219)
Unfortunately, Marx's preoccupation with the control of bourgeois civil society by the capitalist class and  
its resulting role in the production of false ideology led him to leave the necessary “enrichment of social  
structures and of groups autonomous of the state” drastically under-theorized, such that the Soviet and  
Cuban projects, which Gouldner identifies with Critical Marxism, had little basis for envisioning, much  
less actualizing, the structuration of an alternative civil society in the service of a truly democratic public  
sphere. We have seen that it  was Gramsci who provided a more robust theoretical basis by pointing  
toward a civil state in which the state apparatus is (partially) subsumed by a popular and democratic civil  
society. This Gramscian ideal became the basis for a neo-Critical turn in Latin American socialism that  
has been articulated in a loose set of ideas known as 21 st Century Socialism.
A primary goal of this work has been to demonstrate the development of that neo-Critical turn,  
both broadly and in specific relation to participatory media, across national-level socialist projects in  
Cuba, Chile,  Nicaragua, and Venezuela.  We have seen that even in Venezuela,  where the Bolivarian  
administration  has  enjoyed  the  benefits  of  prior  experiences  and  maturing  theorization,  as  well  as  
substantial oil revenues and relative longevity, the structuration of a participatory civil society as the basis  
of a radically democratic public sphere has remained elusive. Within the community media sector the  
tendency toward state control and vanguardism remains strong. What has been lacking is a more profound  
theoretical framework for conceptualizing the public sphere. Such a framework will allow us to better  
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envision the role played by civil society in facilitating public sphere deliberation within a civil state and,  
in turn, enable us to more precisely specify the mechanics by which community media can serve as an  
articulating mechanism for a democratic civil society. We are looking, in other words, to describe the  
interrelationship between the public sphere, civil society, and community, and more specifically the role  
of the media therein.
Habermas (1991) notes that in the liberal framework of the 17 th and 18th centuries, “[t]he public 
sphere as a functional element in the political realm was given the normative status of an organ for the  
self-articulation of civil society with a state authority corresponding to its needs” (74). The public sphere,  
in  other  words,  was  conceived  as  a  forum for  rational  deliberation  among  private  individuals  who  
recognized themselves as a civil society. Initially, this deliberation was aimed at mitigating the decisions  
of the monarchical state, but it became – in the democratic ideal of the American and French revolutions  
– the legitimating basis for the authority of the state. As Habermas puts it, “[t]he bourgeois idea of the  
law-based state, namely,  the binding of all  state activity to a system of norms legitimated by public  
opinion (a system that had no gaps, if possible), already aimed at abolishing the state as an instrument of  
domination altogether” (82).  The question of “gaps” in the system is, of course, far beyond parenthetical  
importance since, as Habermas recognizes, “[t]he public sphere of civil society stood or fell with the  
principle of universal access. A public sphere from which specific groups would be eo ipso excluded was 
less than merely incomplete; it was not a public sphere at all” (85).
Habermas has been criticized for insufficiently recognizing the extent to which the bourgeois  
public sphere fell short of establishing universal access. Such criticism is not entirely undeserved, but  
Habermas  does  recognize  those  limitations  when  he  notes  that  “[t]he  social  precondition  for  this  
'developed' bourgeois public sphere was a market that, tending to be liberalized, made affairs in the sphere  
of social reproduction as much as possible a matter of private people left to themselves and so finally  
completed the privatization of civil society” (74) and, further, that:
the 'private people' on whose autonomy, socially guaranteed by property, the constitutional  
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state counted, just as much as on the educational qualifications of the public formed by  
these people,  were in  truth a  small  minority,  even if  one added the petty  to  the high  
bourgeoisie. Incomparably more numerous were the 'common people,' especially the rural  
population. (84)
As a result,  “[f]rom the very start,  indeed, the parliament was rent by the contradiction of being an  
institution opposing all political authority and yet established as an 'authority' itself” (233). In recognizing  
the property-based limitations of this authority, Habermas is of course echoing Marx's critique of the  
bourgeois public sphere. Others, however, have pointed out that considerations of property and education  
were and continue to be thoroughly imbricated with those of race, gender, and other markers of identity-
based social difference in restricting access to the dominant public sphere. This is the basis for Fraser's  
(1992) identification of the need to recognize the role played by “counterpublics” in the politics of liberal  
societies. 
However incomplete Habermas' critique of the 18 th and early 19th century bourgeois public sphere 
may be, his interest is not in its restoration but in the achievement of its unfulfilled ideal of universal  
access. Toward that end, he turns his analysis toward the inadequate public sphere of “the welfare-state  
mass democracy” that, as it  developed through the late 19 th and 20th centuries, steadily supplemented 
parliamentary deliberation with an increasingly complicated process of power-brokerage that incorporated  
“parties[,]  …  politically  influential  mass  media[,]  and  special-interest  associations”,  which  he  
characterizes as “institutions of societal power centers whose actions are oriented to the state - private  
organizations of society that exercise public functions within the political order” (208). Habermas argues,  
in other words, that the various limitations of the bourgeois parliamentary system resulted in an expansion  
of civil society as a field of public opinion formation that operates outside of the formal mechanisms of  
public  governance.  In  some  cases,  exemplified  by  dominant  political  parties,  oligopolist  media  
corporations,  and  well-entrenched  labor  unions,  this  civil  society  activity  manifests  attempts  by  
institutionalized  bourgeois  interests  to  consolidate  their  representation  of  “the”  public  within  the  
parliamentary system. In other cases, such as minority political parties, alternative media outlets, and  
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social justice advocacy organizations, it manifests attempts by marginalized groups to achieve increased  
representation for counterpublics within the parliamentary system.
For Habermas, the ideal of universal access to the public sphere requires that this broad civil  
society be integrated into the formal process of political deliberation. This “democratization of societal  
organizations engaged in state-related activity” (210) requires that:
their inner structure must first be organized in accord with the principle of publicity and  
must  institutionally  permit  an  intraparty  or  intra-association  democracy  -  to  allow for  
unhampered communication and public rational-critical debate. In addition, by making the  
internal affairs of the parties and special-interest associations public, the linkage between  
such an intraorganizational public sphere and the public sphere of the entire public has to  
be assured. Finally, the activities of the organizations themselves - their pressure on the  
state  apparatus  and  their  use  of  power  against  one  another,  as  well  as  the  manifold  
relations of dependency and of economic intertwining - need a far reaching publicity. This  
would  include,  for  instance,  requiring  that  the  organizations  provide  the  public  with  
information concerning the source and deployment of their financial means. (209)
Whether  these  recommendations  are  in  fact  sufficient  for  the  democratization  of  civil  society  is  
imminently debatable but beyond our immediate concerns. We have reviewed Habermas' argument not to  
judge it's ultimate adequacy but because it suggests much about his conception of the public sphere that,  
though he did not make it explicit, is of considerable importance for developing a theoretical framework  
that can guide the structuration of a hegemonic system of participatory media.
First,  we  must  note  his  acknowledgement  that  “intraorganizational  public  spheres”  operate  
alongside “the public sphere of the entire public”. Habermas thus recognizes the existence of multiple  
public spheres;  significantly,  however,  these are not presented in terms of a  dominant public and its  
associated counterpublics. This is not to say that counterpublics do not exist, for they certainly do. Rather,  
we are noting that the interrelationship of distinct public spheres need not be a simple opposition, as is  
implied by the public / counterpublic binary. In pointing out that intraorganizational public spheres are  
part and parcel of a larger, total public sphere, Habermas suggests that we are not simply dealing with  
multiple publics standing side-by-side but, rather, a multiplicity of interpenetrated publics. He recognizes  
that each civil society organization (parties, mass media outlets, and special interest organizations, among  
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others) necessarily establishes its own (intraorganizational) public sphere, that the national parliament is  
another type of public sphere (which was once presumed to offer universal representation), and that all of  
these are subsumed by an ideal typish public sphere that is “the public sphere of the entire public”.
Second,  we  can  find  in  the  distinction  Habermas  draws  between  intraorganizational  public  
spheres and the “the public sphere of the entire public” an indication of Fraser's much more explicit  
distinction between “strong” and “weak” public  spheres.  As discussed in  chapter  one,  Fraser (1992)  
pointed out that there are strong spheres, which are explicitly tasked with channeling opinions toward  
concrete decisions, and weak spheres, in which opinions are exchanged outside of any structured path  
toward concrete and binding decisions. Once again, we will refer to these two types not as strong and  
weak public spheres (in part to avoid the value judgement therein implied) but as decision-making and  
meaning-making public spheres (which has the added benefit of identifying the functional distinction  
between them).
The  explicit  recognition  of  these  two  general  categories  of  public  spheres  enables  a  better  
understanding of the “modular interpenetration” that describes the structural relationship between the  
multiplicity of public spheres that make up a society. As noted in chapter one, the term is drawn from  
Keane (1998) and Braman (1996), who both recognize that public spheres do not stand apart from one  
another but intersect and interact. Thinking in terms of meaning- and decision-making spheres can help us  
to understand this interrelation.
Meaning-making spheres  are  ideal,  in  the sense  that  their  existence seems obvious  but  their  
boundaries and participants can not be determined with precision. What Habermas refers to as “the public  
sphere of the entire public”, which is what those who refer to “the” public sphere usually have in mind, is  
a meaning-making sphere. Such a public sphere certainly exists in relation to a nation-state, but who  
exactly are its  participants? All  citizens of the nation-state? What about those whose participation is  
restricted or prohibited? Or non-citizens who nonetheless influence or participate in public debates? Or  
citizens who engage in public debate in relation to certain issues but are apathetic regarding others? The  
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boundaries of a meaning-making sphere are always in flux and impossible to pin down with exactitude.
It is easy enough to conceive of meaning-making spheres populated by persons with common  
interests, such as fan communities or those affected by a particular disease, but it would be impossible to  
draw up an exact list of the names of those who participate in such a sphere, in part because participation  
is irregular both in terms of intensity and frequency, but also because the boundaries of the sphere change  
in relation to the context in which it is invoked. We might conceive, for instance, of a meaning-making  
sphere in relation to HIV. Depending on how we circumscribe that sphere, we might include a doctor  
working toward a cure, an advocate working in an NGO dedicated to HIV awareness, someone with an  
infected friend who occasionally exchanges personal anecdotes with their social contacts, and someone  
who has no intimate connection to the disease but who sometimes voices prejudice against carriers. Some  
conceptions of a meaning-making sphere defined in relation to HIV would include all of the above, but  
some would not.
Unlike  meaning-making  spheres,  decision-making  spheres  are  formally  structured  and  their  
membership is thus precisely defined. A national parliament, for instance, is a decision-making sphere  
meant to correspond to an imagined national meaning-making sphere. The boundary of the latter is fuzzy;  
that of the former is not. In a parliament, a certain number of representatives are empowered to vote in a  
formal decision-making process meant to express the will of the national meaning-making sphere that  
they represent. We have already indicated the imperfections of this system, but we can recall here that the  
intent is to establish a one-to-one correspondence between a particular meaning-making sphere and a  
particular decision-making sphere.
The relation between meaning- and decision-making spheres is not, however, always one-to-one.  
An  NGO  dedicated  to  HIV awareness,  for  example,  seeks  to  wield  influence  within  meaning-  and  
decision-making  spheres,  but  it  does  not  pretend  to  establish  a  decision-making  sphere  entirely  
representative  of  a  particular  meaning-making  sphere.  It  does,  however,  establish  a  formal,  
intraorganizational decision-making sphere whose members purport to act in representation of a subset of  
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the  members  of  one  or  more  meaning-making  spheres.  In  the  contemporary  context,  that  
intraorganizational  decision-making sphere  is  likely  to  be  hierarchically  organized  and  to  offer  only  
limited opportunities for the participation of those it represents.
There is much more to be said in relation to these two types of public spheres, but here we are  
particularly concerned with emphasizing that the modular interpenetration of public spheres is partly the  
result of definite decision-making spheres standing in imperfect representation of indefinite meaning-
making spheres. Habermas' concern, if we recast it using the vocabulary we have developed so far, was  
how to best structure this modular interpenetration in order to maximize the democratic representation of  
the  national  meaning-making sphere  by  formally  organized  decision-making  spheres.    As  we  have  
already noted,  his  response  was to  call  for  the democratization of  civil  society in  a  vein  similar  to  
Gramsci's call for what we have termed a civil state. For Habermas, this depended on intraorganizational  
democracy, which we have understood as the democratization of the decision-making spheres of civil  
society organizations. 
Habermas'  recommendations did not end there, however. He not only called for “making the  
internal affairs of the parties and special-interest associations public” in order to assure the “linkage”  
between the decision-making spheres of civil society and the national-level meaning-making sphere, but  
also for “a far reaching publicity” of “the activities of the organizations themselves”. Again, we are less  
concerned here with the adequacy of these recommendations than with the general impulse that they  
represent. That impulse, it seems fair to say, moves toward a communication system that publicizes the  
operations and actions of civil society organizations and in so doing links, or articulates, the decision-
making spheres of civil society with the meaning-making spheres of the citizenry of the state. If we  
acknowledge, however, that the citizens of the state (especially those of a civil state) are simultaneously  
participants in civil society, then we can understand this communication system to be articulating the  
decision-making  spheres  of  civil  society  organizations  by  making  information  available  to  multiple  
meaning-making  spheres  in  order  to  enable  a  democratic  system  of  checks  and  balances  on  social  
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governance. To the extent that communication within this system is mediated, we are describing a media  
system that serves as an articulating mechanism for civil society, which is precisely the definition that we  
attached to community media in chapter one. In other words, as the media of a democratic civil society,  
community media are  a  vital  element  in  the democratic  structuration of the multiplicity  of  modular,  
interpenetrated, and dual-type public spheres that comprise “the” public sphere.
Why, though, are community – as opposed to other types of – media essential to a democratic  
civil society? Having recognized the distinction between meaning- and decision-making public spheres,  
we are in a better position to respond to this question. We are, in fact, also in a better position to respond  
to the persistently troublesome question of just what is meant by the term “community” in this context.  
We can begin to illustrate this point by recalling once again that the liberal democratic impulse was to  
establish a national parliament that, functioning as a decision-making sphere, would adequately represent  
the national meaning-making sphere. This has not been the case, however, as access to the decision-
making sphere has been severely limited or non-existent for most participants in the meaning-making  
sphere,  thus  producing  a  significant  representational  imbalance.  Of  course,  it  would  be  entirely  
impractical for every member of a meaning-making sphere to participate in a corresponding decision-
making sphere, but a more perfect democracy nonetheless requires that representation be distributed more  
evenly. What is required, therefore, is a more tailored relationship between meaning- and decision-making  
spheres.
We can find in federated political systems an impulse toward the above goal. In the United States,  
for  example,  meaning-making  spheres  are  matched  at  the  state,  county,  and  municipal  levels  with  
representative bodies acting as decision-making spheres. The question of which decisions should be taken  
at which level is, of course, highly contentious. In the Jeffersonian democratic tradition the rpeference is  
for authority to remain decentralized so that the responsibilities of governance are vested as locally as  
possible. This principal, known as subsidiarity, holds that the degree of an individual's participation in a  
decision-making process should be directly proportional to the degree to which that individual will be  
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affected by the outcomes of the decision in question. If we reflect that meaning is produced as individuals  
and groups live with the outcomes of human decisions, then we can see that subsidiarity becomes a  
structuring  principal  for  the  organization  of  meaning-  and  decision-making  spheres  in  a  democratic  
society.
It would be easy enough to apply the principal of subsidiarity if the outcomes of decisions were  
neatly bounded, but this is not the case. Decisions have multiple outcomes that function at multiple levels.  
Take, for instance, the decision to build a factory. Two obvious and frequently debated outcomes, the  
creation of jobs and pollution, will have distinct effects at the local, regional, national, and transnational  
levels. They may have a greater impact on the local community and thus influence local meaning-making  
spheres much more extensively, but how might we adequately reflect the proportionality of this influence  
in the construction of decision-making spheres so as to maximize democratic participation in the myriad  
decisions that, stretching across time and space, ultimately determine the construction of a factory or the  
manifestation of any other social process? In other words, how might we incorporate the principal of  
subsidiarity into the modular and interpenetrated structuration of meaning- and decision-making spheres  
that is a complex and multi-leveled society?
Habermas and Gramsci agree that the federated, hierarchical structure of representation in the  
liberal republic is insufficient for this task and they both point to the democratization of civil society as a  
necessary supplement. A democratic civil society, in other words, must operate alongside a system of  
representative government in order to allow for a more granular “subsidiarization” of decision-making,  
since  the  structure  of  meaning-making  spheres  is  only  partially  captured  by  thinking  in  terms  of  
geographic scale (i.e. municipal, state, national). To be sure, the impact of outcomes is often enough  
distributed according to geography, so a spatial organization of decision-making spheres makes some  
sense.  Outcomes  also  determine  meaning across  geographic areas,  however,  which means that  other  
organizational axes are necessary for the relation of meaning- to decision-making spheres. This is where  
the notion of community becomes useful.
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In chapter one we noted that the subfield of community media studies has struggled to define just  
what is  meant by community media. This is  only symptomatic of a broader confusion regarding the  
definition of community that is evident throughout more than a century of literature in sociology and  
other  fields.  Debate  has  often  revolved  around  two  different  conceptions  of  community:  place  and  
interest. Communities of place are just that – communities determined by the propinquity of residents,  
one to another, within geographic space. Alternatively, communities of interest are determined by their  
members' shared focus on things, events, or ideas, independent of their geographical relation. Another  
point of contention has been the boundedness of communities (of either type), especially in an age of  
rapidly advancing communication and transportation technologies. Discussing communities in terms of  
shared outcomes offers a path forward that bridges place- and interest-based definitions of community  
while  also  accounting  for  the  fuzzy  scalability  of  community  boundaries.  In  taking  this  approach,  
Laudeman (2005) has provided a definition of community that reinforces our framework of modular and  
interpenetrated public spheres:
Communities, like other aggregations, exist to mediate outcomes for an individual. In  
effect, each person has her or his own unique, personal “community”: the set of social  
and economic ties that shape and afford that person’s particular outcomes. The nexus of  
multiple  personal  “communities”  gives  rise  to  a  fuzzy  set  of  persons  interrelated  by  
outcomes  within  a  geographic  area  and  “communities  of  interest”  overlapping  in  a  
“community  of  place.”  Rather  than  simply  being  an  aggregation  of  individuals,  a  
community is an aggregation of aggregations of individuals within a particular locale.  
(42)
In Laudeman’s view, conceptions of community based on place and interest are at once subsumed within  
each individual’s particular “idio-community” and recreated as “fuzzy set[s] of persons interrelated by  
outcomes” that are  “aggregations of  aggregations.” In other  words,  for  any particular  analysis  of  an  
outcome or set of outcomes, the “unit” of analysis will be the particular community of persons who have  
an interest in that outcome.
Hopefully it is clear that this notion of community maps nicely onto the notion of a meaning-
making public sphere, as both are determined by the mutual relationship of a set of individuals to one or  
more particular outcomes. Moreover, both are fuzzy and scaleable, in constant flux and open to different  
possibilities of boundedness, and interpenetrated. The complex structure of these forms (communities and  
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meaning-making spheres) is ultimately unmappable, yet democratization depends on a structuration of  
decision-making spheres that best approximates that complexity. From this perspective, we might say that  
decision-making spheres are to meaning-making spheres as digital code is to analog waveforms, where in  
each case the former makes use of fixed values (binary digits or formal decisions) in order to represent a  
fluid process (of oscillation or communication). This is an incomplete analogy, however, since meaning-  
and decision-making spheres are not different descriptions of the same phenomenon (as with digital and  
analog  signals),  but  are  dialectically  determinative  (with  formal  decisions  influencing  subsequent  
meaning-making and vice versa).
Democracy thus requires not only matching decision- to meaning-making spheres in as close an  
approximation as possible, but also facilitating the dialectic interaction of decision- and meaning-making  
through the flow of information. This is why Habermas calls for “a far reaching publicity” and also why  
community media is so essential to a system of civil governance as envisioned by a Gramscian civil state.  
Civil  society  organizations  buttress  the  formal,  representative  decision-making  bodies  of  democratic  
states by providing additional decision-making spheres that allow for a more granular approximation of  
meaning-making (loosely akin to a higher sampling rate for the digital conversion of an analog signal).  
Community media, to the extent that it articulates these decision-making spheres, accomplishes this more  
granular approximation by facilitating a more robust dialectic interaction between them. This is why it is  
incorrect,  or  at  least  misleading,  to  understand the role  of  community media  as  simply  representing  
particular communities of place or interest. Its role, rather, is to link or articulate public spheres, both  
decision-making  spheres  (functioning  within  formal  civil  society  organizations  and  government  
institutions) and meaning-making spheres (understood as more or less stable communities of individuals  
linked by their relationship to shared outcomes of natural phenomena and human decisions).
The question remains, however, as to why a system of community – and not public or commercial  
– media is  necessary to effect  this articulation. The answer has everything to do with the notion of  
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community and the relationship of decision- to meaning-making spheres that we have outlined above.  
Only a system of community media reflexively manifests the very dialectic that it means to facilitate  
outside of that system. To understand why this is so we must first recognize that the creation of a media  
organization (as with the creation of any organization) necessarily involves the creation of a decision-
making public sphere and thus begs the question of who should participate in that newly created sphere.  
By applying the principal of subsidiarity we can conclude that those who should participate are those who  
will  be  affected  by  the  outcomes  of  decisions  made within  that  sphere.  From a  certain  perspective,  
therefore, the media organization actually creates a new fuzzy community, or meaning-making sphere, of  
those individuals who will be affected by the outcomes that it partially determines. Of course, the goal of  
community  media  is  to  match  this  new meaning-making  community  as  closely  as  possible  with  an  
existent one (whether it be place or interest based) and to place itself in the service of meaning-making  
processes that interact dialectically with other decision-making spheres. Participation in the decision-
making sphere of the media organization should therefore be open to all members of the fuzzy community  
it serves and, ideally, be accessible by them to the degree that they are affected by the outcomes of those  
decisions. Public and commercial media organizations do not strive to meet this condition, but community  
media organizations do. This is precisely why participation and access are fundamental to the notion of  
community media and why community media organizations are uniquely capable of providing “a far  
reaching publicity” to the intraorganizational decision-making processes of not only other civil society  
organizations, but also of themselves as civil society organizations. It is  this reflexive nurturing of a  
participatory  relationship  between  a  decision-  and  a  meaning-making  sphere  that  makes  community  
media a necessary component of a hegemonic system of civil governance.
In the preceeding paragraph we have merely utilized a new theoretical framework and vocabulary  
to describe the local role of community media outlets. While our language may be more precise, the goal  
it describes was clearly identified within the subfield of community media studies many decades ago. The  
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real benefit of thinking about community media in terms of civil society and interpenetrated, dual-type  
public spheres is that it allows us to describe structural models which enable a “scaling-up” of community  
media from the micro- to the macro-level. The goal of this scaling is to establish and/or maintain the  
participatory reflexivity between decision- and meaning-making spheres, which presumably exists within  
local community media outlets,  at  all  levels  of an expansive media system. We can draw out  some  
important lessons for this endeavor by applying our developing theoretical framework to the history of  
participatory media initiatives within socialist administrations in Latin American that we have discussed  
in previous chapters.
Our discussion of the historical shortcomings of the critical Marxist approach to civil society,  
which in the Soviet and Cuban cases was tethered tightly to the state, has already suggested the problem  
with the vanguardist mentality in relation to the public sphere. To recast this problem in terms of dual-
type public spheres, we might say that vanguardism, because of its certitude regarding ideology, distorts  
the structural reflexivity between meaning- and decision-making spheres that is necessary to democratic  
practice  even  as  it  rhetorically  endorses  that  very  reflexivity.  Vanguardist  rhetoric,  in  other  words,  
endorses  popular  participation  in  both  meaning-  and  decision-making  spheres,  but  the  vanguardist  
mentality actually restricts participation in decision-making spheres to those who hold to a more or less  
narrowly circumscribed set of views that have been deemed correct on an a priori basis. As we saw in 
Cuba, this restricted access to decision-making spheres, manifested partly in party control over civil-
society institutions and media outlets, results in insufficiently critical meaning-making spheres, which in  
turn limits the capacity of decision-making spheres to address vital issues. The shortcomings of the 
Cuban state-centered approach have propelled a neo-critical turn in Latin American socialism in which  
emphasis has shifted toward civil governance. This shift was visible in the growing popular emphasis on  
participatory media in Chile during the Allende administration, as well as in state-supported attempts to  
institutionalize participatory media under the Sandinista administration in Nicaragua. In Chile, the lack of  
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state resources meant that participatory initiatives remained relatively feeble. In Nicaragua, however, the  
provision of state resources resulted in a corruptive state influence over the decision-making spheres of  
the burgeoning participatory media apparatus. In Venezuela, therefore, one major goal of the community  
and alternative media movement has been to procure institutionalized state support for a participatory  
media system without ceding decision-making authority to the state.
An initial attempt to achieve this goal, manifested by the Law of Telecommunications and its  
attendant  regulations,  attempted  to  combine  the  legal  recognition  of  the  state  with  private  sector  
resources, in line with the existing liberal model of community media. The community and alternative  
media movement, as well as the Bolivarian government, soon recognized, however, that private sector  
financial support was insufficient for effecting a determinative role in meaning-making spheres. They also  
recognized  that  if  private  sector  support  became  sufficient  for  that  task,  it  would  most  likely  be  
accompanied  by  control  over  the  intraorganizational  decision-making  spheres  of  community  media  
organizations  such  that  their  intervention  in  meaning-making  spheres  would  be  unlikely  to  support  
Bolivarian ideals. In other words, the liberal model of participatory media, like the vanguardist model,  
also produces a distortion of the structural reflexivity between meaning- and decision-making spheres that  
is necessary to democratic practice. The response of the Bolivarian government, which was accelerated  
and intensified by deep political polarization and generally endorsed by the community and alternative  
media movement, was to increase public financial support for the community media sector. In the absence  
of a restructuration of the regulatory framework of community media, however, state support threatened  
to only swing the institutional balance back to the distortions of the vanguardist model. Though this has  
not occurred to the degree lamented by critics of the Bolivarian community media sector, dependence on  
state  resources  in  the  absence  of  a  defined  and  replicable  structure  for  efficient  and  effective  civil  
governance  has  nonetheless  made  the  sector  vulnerable  to  such  criticism  while  also  mitigating  its  
opportunities to grow into a viable counter-hegemonic system. In recognition of this problematic, the  
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movement has sought to enact a new regulatory structure that will institutionalize a democratic structural  
reflexivity between meaning- and decision-making spheres. While this goal has not been achieved, the  
history of efforts in that direction provides valuable insight into what such a structure might look like.
The crucial feature of Bolivarian efforts to establish a counter-hegemonic participatory media  
system has been its integration with the commune system, precisely because the commune system offers  
the potential for allocating state resources according to a system of civil governance. In concrete terms,  
this has so far meant the provision of federal grants to local community councils. We have seen that in  
actual practice, community councils have not yet prioritized participatory media projects. Nonetheless,  
the  sector's  general  vision  for  the  interaction  between  community  councils  and  community  media  
organizations  provides  us  with  a  relatively  concrete  example  upon  which  to  apply  our  developing  
theoretical framework of interpenetrated, dual-type public spheres.
We can begin by recognizing that community councils are designed to function as a democratic  
decision-making sphere that responds to the desires of an assembly comprised of 200 to 400 households  
(in an urban context) which have recognized themselves as a community in light of their geographic  
proximity and thus their shared relationship to a particular set of outcomes. In other words, a community  
council creates a formal decision-making sphere in which participation is limited to the members of a  
bounded  meaning-making  sphere  who  are  understood  to  be  most  affected  by  the  outcomes  of  its  
decisions. Suppose, then, that a community council chooses to create a community media outlet. This  
necessarily entails the creation of another decision-making sphere, i.e. the intraorganizational decision-
making sphere of  the community media outlet  itself.  In  this  scenario  we have  two decision-making  
spheres, both primarily in the service of a single local meaning-making sphere, although simultaneously  
influential on numerous other meaning-making spheres. This not only provides a simple example of the  
modular interpenetration of multiple, dual-type public spheres, but also illustrates how multiple decision-
making  spheres  can  function  together  to  provide  a  more  granular,  and  thus  more  democratic,  
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approximation of a particular meaning-making sphere. This is so because the conjunction of two decision-
making spheres  within  a  single  meaning-making spheres  provides increased  opportunities  for  citizen  
participation in civil  governance. In other words,  members  of the community may participate in  the  
decision-making process of the communal council, in which resources are allocated, as well as in the  
decision-making process of the community media outlet, in which projects making use of those resources  
are  executed.  Given  this  double  opportunity  for  community  input,  it  becomes  more  likely  that  the  
meanings  engendered  by  the  inherently  dialogic  process  of  the  community  find  expression  in  the  
organizational structure and content of the community media outlet.
We must recognize, of course, that community media outlets are far from the only civil society  
organizations that might exist within the community in question. Where other such organizations exist,  
other intraorganizational decision-making spheres will also exist, thus adding to the multiplicity of public  
spheres and the granularity of their representation of the meanings produced within the whole of the  
community. In this light we can better appreciate the double role played by community media outlets,  
since they operate as one among many decision-making spheres but also take on the task of mediating the  
flow of information between all members of the community and thus articulating all manifestations of  
civil  society.  Thus,  while  no  single  member  of  the  community  can  participate  in  all  of  the various  
intraorganizational decision-making spheres that contribute to the determination of outcomes within that  
community,  community  media  outlets  offer  a  democratically  structured  mechanism  for  circulating  
pertinent information among all of those decision-making spheres, which means that the decisions they  
take are more likely to accord with the consensus view (to the extent it exists) of the meaning-making  
community at large.
In the Bolivarian system, various community councils can choose to unite as a commune. As with  
an  individual  community  council,  the  establishment  of  a  commune implies  the  creation  of  a  formal  
decision-making sphere  that  responds  to  and is  open to  the  participation  of  members  of  a  bounded  
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meaning-making sphere. The multiple decision- and meaning-making spheres of the various communal  
councils are, of course, encompassed by the decision- and meaning-making spheres of the commune that  
they  comprise.  This  nesting  provides  another  illustration  of  the  interpenetration  of  dual-type  public  
spheres, but it also provides a framework for the scalability of a community media system. To see how  
this might work we need only consider that the decision-making sphere of a commune is responsible for  
allocating  mutual  resources  of  the  community  councils  that  comprise  it.  Just  as  in  the  lower  level  
community  councils,  communes  might  choose  to  create  or  support  any  number  of  civil  society  
organizations, including community media outlets. These outlets would then be in a position to articulate  
the various civil society organizations at the commune level in the same manner as we discussed above in  
the context of communal councils.
Here, of course, we are describing a federated system of decision-making spheres that is distinct  
from the liberal representative model. A discussion of the mechanics of this system and its differences  
with the liberal model would extend far beyond the scope of our present concerns, but there is one aspect  
of the system that is of particular import to our analysis. Let us imagine that a particular commune has  
established a community television station. Meanwhile, each of the community councils that make up this  
commune has established an audiovisual production group whose primary objective is to produce content  
pertaining to their corresponding communal council for broadcast on the communal television station.  
Now let us suppose that one of these audiovisual production groups has decided to produce a series of  
investigative reports on corruption within its corresponding communal council and that, as a result, the  
communal council has (formally or informally) withdrawn funding from the production group.
Were we describing a purely hierarchical structure, in which the production group could only  
draw funding from its own communal council, the decision to withdraw funding would spell an end to the  
production  group's  operations.  Within the federated  structure of  the Bolivarian  system, however,  the  
production group is not entirely dependent on its communal council. It might, for instance, appeal for  
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funding to the communally-funded community television station or to the commune itself, and it might  
well acquire that funding since the other communal councils that make up the commune would have a  
compelling  interest  in  uncovering  corruption  within  a  communal  council  whose  conduct  partially  
determines the outcomes of the commune as a whole. 
This example illustrates the importance of rejecting a purely hierarchical structuration of dual-
type  public  spheres  in  the  service  of  a  democratic  community  media  system.  Were  the  relationship  
between decision-making spheres purely hierarchical, the dependency of community media organizations  
on the funding decisions of a single decision-making sphere would create opportunities for abuse. The  
structure of the Bolivarian communal system, however, mitigates the dependence of any particular civil  
society organization on any particular funding body. Moreover, the community and alternative media  
movement  has  explicitly  sought  to  further  diminish  opportunities  for  dependence  by  proposing  the  
creation  of  popular  communication  councils  (consejos  populares  de  comunicación /  CPCs),  which 
establish yet another set of interpenetrated participatory decision-making spheres and thus contribute to  
the granular approximation of social meaning-making within the formal decision-making apparatus of  
civil  governance.  Participatory  media  production  and  distribution  organizations  thus  enjoy  multiple  
potential sources of funding and guidance without sacrificing their autonomy.
This capacity for community media organizations to operate simultaneously within and outside of  
hierarchical  structures  of  governance  illustrates  a  crucial  concept  for  the  structuration  of  democratic  
systems of civil governance. We have already recognized the hierarchical structuration of the commune  
system. Communal councils, which operate as the basic organizational unit, are grouped together into  
communes, which operate at a “higher” level. As of this writing, the Bolivarian commune structure has  
not established a functioning third level; in operational terms, the communes link directly to the executive  
branch of the federal government (and exist in an ambiguous relationship to the municipal and state  
governments that still operate within the “fourth republican” federated hierarchy of the liberal tradition).  
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The  proposed  constitutional  reforms  of  2006,  however,  indicate  that  the  vision  for  the  Bolivarian  
commune system involves higher levels of grouping that would ostensibly reduce to a single body at the  
national level. The core structure of civil governance within the Bolivarian commune system, in other  
words, is a hierarchically organized federation of nested decision-making bodies.
Of particular interest, however, is that the Bolivarian community media sector has envisioned the  
establishment of a parallel structure of civil governance focused specifically on participatory media. 
As  discussed  in  chapter  five,  this  parallel  structure  was  most  explicitly  formulated  within  the  2011  
proposal for a Law of Popular Power Communication (Ley de Comunicación del Poder Popular / LCPP), 
which identified the CPCs as the primary unit of civil governance for the sector. We have seen, of course,  
that imbalanced representation of the executive branch of the state within the National Council of Popular  
Communication, which would have imperiled the authority of civil governance, most likely contributed to  
the failure to pass the LCPP. Here, however, we are less concerned with the particulars of the proposal  
than  with  the  general  impetus  to  create  a  parallel  system  of  civil  governance,  also  organized  as  a  
hierarchically organized federation of nested decision-making bodies (the CPCs), but with a scope of  
concern restricted to the functioning of a system of popular communication. Crucially, this would have  
allowed  a  single  community  media  organization  to  simultaneously  operate  within  two  different  
hierarchically structured systems of civil governance (the Commune and the CPC systems).
This incorporation of parallel hierarchies would have made community media a formal element  
within a Bolivarian system of civil governance that functions as a heterarchy. Crumley (2005) notes that  
heterarchy is  “a  fundamental  organizational  principle  of  complex  systems”  (np)  and has  provided a  
general purpose definition by contrasting hierarchies, “the elements of which are ranked relative to one  
another”, to heterarchies, “the elements of which are unranked, or possess the potential for being ranked  
in a number of different ways, depending on systemic requirements”. Heterarchy, in fact, “is the more  
general category”; hierarchy is just a particular type of heterarchy (2008, 469-70). Kontopolous (2003), in  
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a fascinating, dense, and lengthy treatise on the heterarchical logic of social structure, posits that “[t]he  
semiautonomy  of  each  level  [of  a  social  structure]  is  the  central  dogma  of  heterarchy”  (301).  He  
emphasizes this point when he writes that “[a]ny theory that speaks of levels of phenomena that are  
semiindependent  from  each  other  and  entangled  with  each  other  in  other  than  totally  ordered,  
asymmetrical  ways, that is, levels that are partially ordered or nonlinearly ordered, is  a heterarchical  
theory” (226). This “semiautonomous” and “entangled” nature of levels within heterarchies suggests that  
heterarchic theory bears great potential for the analysis of the structuration of public spheres and the role  
of community media therein.
To actualize this potential we must first recognize that, as Kontopolous demonstrates at length,  
society is already structured according to the logic of heterarchy. We have, for instance, noted above that  
the federated structure of representation in the liberal republic operates as a hierarchy, but Kontopolous  
reminds  us  that  federal,  state,  and  local  jurisdictions  are  "a  'contextual'  hierarchy  (belonging)  in  
geographical terms but a heterarchy in juridical and economic terms" (229). In other words, economic  
actors at the local level need not pass through a state level decision-making body in order to interact with  
other economic actors at the national level; they may interact directly, outside of a hierarchical order and  
across  structural  levels,  along innumerable  vectors  of  connection.  Indeed,  Kontopolous  refers  to  the  
national economy (presumably of a capitalist state) as providing “an intuitively clear understanding of a  
'heterarchy' as an entangled system of level-structures each of which imposes constraints on the workings 
of the others" (230).
In a like manner, the structuration of multiple,  dual-type public spheres is  a manifestation of  
heterarchic entanglement, which we have referred to above as modular interpenetration. As we have seen,  
we  can  recognize  fuzzy  meaning-making  spheres  that  correspond  to  a  hierarchical  structuration  of  
geographic  areas  within  a  federated  nation-state.  It  makes  sense,  in  other  words,  to  recognize  the  
meaning-making sphere (or community) of Illinois as distinct from that of Chicago, Cook County, or the  
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United States. We would not say, however, that any such geographically bounded meaning-making sphere  
is wholly dependent on the operations of the meaning-making spheres below or above it in that hierarchy.  
Such  meaning-making  spheres  are,  especially  in  the  highly  mediated  contemporary  context,  deeply  
entangled  with  numerous  other  meaning-  and  decision-making  spheres,  yet  they  operate  semi-
autonomously.
In  and  of  itself,  this  observation  is  anything  but  revelatory.  Whether  we  refer  to  modular  
interpenetration or heterarchic entanglement, it is clear that the structuration of meaning-making public  
spheres is deeply complex and difficult, if not impossible, to map with any degree of specificity. The  
value in recognizing that public spheres interact according to  a heterarchic logic,  however,  is  that  it  
invites  us  to  respect  and think in  terms of heterarchy as  we envision possible  structural  models  for  
participatory  media  systems,  especially  in  relation  to  the  formally  bounded  decision-making  public  
spheres  that  are  much  more  amenable  to  mapping  than  their  meaning-making  counterparts.  This  is  
particularly crucial in relation to participatory media, where there exists a longstanding resistance to “top  
down”, “vertical”,  and “hierarchical”  organizational  structures,  but  where insistence on “bottom up”,  
“horizontal”,  and  “consensual”  organization  has  a  tendency  to  impede  the  productive  efficiency,  
institutional  stability,  and  scalability  that  seems  necessary  for  the  displacement  of  dominant  media  
systems. As noted in chapter one, Dervin & Huesca (1999), as well as Rodriguez (2001), give expression 
to this tension, as does Portales (1981), in a different context and from a different perspective, when he  
laments  that  “[v]ertical  communication  could  well  be  a  contributing  factor  in  horizontal  and  
multidirectional communication processes” but “there is no articulation between vertical and horizontal  
communication, which diminishes the dynamism of the communicational process and reduces the subject  
to the role of a spectator” (64). 644 The logic of heterarchy responds to this problematic by suggesting that 
hierarchical organizational models can indeed play a principal role in the structuration of a participatory  
644“[l]a comunicación vertical bien podría ser un factor coadyuvante de los procesos de comunicación horizontal y 
multidireccional”; “no ha articulación entre comunicación vertical y horizontal, esto resta dinanismo al proceso 
comunicacional y reduce al sujeto a la calidad de espectador”
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media  system that  nonetheless  opens  space  for  dialogic  and  “horizontal”  modes  of  communication.  
Indeed, such logic is at work in the Bolivarian attempt to resolve that tension through the structural model  
proposed within the LCPP.
We have already observed that the LCPP proposed the creation of a hierarchically organized  
structure of CPCs in parallel to the existent and also hierarchically organized commune system. We have  
also already considered that one potential benefit of this structural model was to offer local community  
producers multiple avenues for acquiring resources for projects so that they would not be dependent on a  
single  communal council  for  resources.  Within the hierarchical  structure of  the Bolivarian commune  
system they would, for example, have the opportunity to acquire resources from the commune to which  
their “originating” communal council belongs, even if the communal council itself refused to provide  
resources. They would thus be making use of their semi-autonomy in order to skip over a level of the  
hierarchical system. They would also, however, be able to draw on the parallel hierarchical structure of  
the CPCs as a potential source of funding, thus bypassing the communal system altogether. They would  
this be making use of their semi-autonomy in order to participate in a distinct hierarchical system (within  
which they might also operate at multiple levels).
The heterarchical structuration of decision-making spheres thus opens up more fluid possibilities 
for  the  dialectic  representation  of  meaning-making  spheres.  The  idea,  in  other  words,  is  that  the  
intentional  application  of  heterarchic  logic  to  the  structuration  of  decision-making  spheres  within  a  
system of civil governance enables an extremely granular approximation of the meaning-making public 
spheres in which public opinion is forged. This increased reflexivity between meaning- and decision-
making, in conjunction with increased opportunities for citizen participation in decision-making spheres,  
increases the democratic quotient of society.
Unfortunately,  this  analysis  remains largely speculative.  We have reviewed the difficulties  of  
constructing  hegemonic  participatory  media  systems  and  tracked  the  development  of  a  proposal  to  
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overcome them within the Bolivarian project, but that proposal has not been instituted. Nonetheless, we  
have been able to analyze it  in general terms from the perspective of a heterarchic, dual-type public  
sphere theory in an attempt to draw out lessons that will be applicable beyond the context of socialist  
projects or even governments explicitly supportive of community media. There is significant space for  
civil society activity within liberal social orders and capitalist market economies, and those interested in  
the expansion of civil governance can find opportunities to put these lessons into practice. Attempts to do  
so will provide empirical evidence upon which our theoretical model might be further refined, but the  
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